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LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUE, 



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LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR 



FROM THE FRENCH 



M. CHARLES DE MAZADE-^njcl - 




NEW YORK 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
182 Fifth Avenue 

1877 




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5 52 



By Transfer 

MAR 30 1917 




PREFACE. 



This book is composed of the public records of a memorable 
history, together with less known documents, which I 
owe to treasured private communications and some per- 
sonal knowledge of the facts. It is devoted to a man 
who will ever be ranked as one of the rarest of human 
kind ; for in him there was the union of strength, suavity, 
passion, suppleness, boldness, and prudence, and he 
succeeded in all that he undertook. 

It may be said with truth that Count Cavour was 
among the most illustrious of the favourites of fortune 
in our century. He was not one of those chance favourites 
whom a happy accident, interest at court, or the winning 
of popularity, launches to a fleeting renown ; but he was 
of the few that, being privileged to deserve success by 
the exercise of a consummate skill, leave their names 
inscribed upon imperishable works. 

His mission was fulfilled within the space often years — 
less than the cycle of Tacitus. These ten years sufficed for 



vi PREFACE. 

him to realise a dream of nationality that seemed beyond 
realisation, and more particularly at the beginning of 
his parliamentary life ; to raise up his country, and to 
become himself the greatest of Italians, among the 
foremost of the political men of all time, European in 
influence, glory, and genius. 

It would be writing with levity to say that he was 
happy, even in his premature end, in escaping, as he did, 
through an opportune and sudden death, the perplexities 
of his task. If ever there was a man who needed not 
to fear to live, and who knew how to precombine and 
prearrange all for the attainment of a special object, and 
then to assure his success by guarding himself against 
the reverses of fortune and the risk of unforeseen events, 
it was he. Better than any other he knew the right 
moment when to adventure and to stop, so as always to 
remain master of the crisis he brought to a head or 
unwound so daringly, in which none but he was able to 
preserve a perfect serenity of mind. 

Those who knew him, who were mixed up with his 
labours — and there is one among them, M. Nigra, 
whose name friendship permits me to write beside that of 
his first instructor in public affairs — have not forgotten 
the ready resource, the simple ease, the correctness of 
judgment in midst of the gravest situations and the 
keenest contests, displayed by Cavour. He overcame 
everything. He had arrived at that point when he no 
longer feared to be unequal to the final trials ; he felt 



PREFACE. vii 

sure of completing that which he had begun, and more ; 
for since his death Italy has been sustained by his breath, 
and whatever has been done, has only been the com- 
pletion of projects left behind by him, and animating 
his mind up to his last moments. 

There is in the life of such a man a profound attrac- 
tion for those who love the spectacle of a nature mar- 
vellously gifted to grapple with events. It has, more- 
over, at the present time, almost a direct and practical 
interest ; for, apart from the lively remembrance I have 
retained of Count Cavour, I must confess that one of my 
objects, when I wrote this book in the Revue cles Deux 
Mondes, arose from a desire to bring before those who 
may stand in need of the example, this striking image of 
a man who knew how to be a great Liberal as well as a 
downright head of the Government. It is what I would 
term the moral lesson of this work. If the aforesaid 
moral is made sufficiently prominent, it maynot perhaps 
be inopportune at a time when, if care be not taken, 
party spirit will disturb and confound everything, from 
the simplest ideas of Liberalism to the most elementary 
conditions of Government. 

The signal superiority of Count Cavour consists in 
his having been a real Liberal, in the strongest and 
fullest acceptation of the word. The liberty in which he 
believed, both from instinct and reason, was to him no 
empty formula, nor was it an engine of destruction, or an 
implement of war against the Church or the State ; it 



viii PREFACE. 

was a regular system of public guarantees, impartially 
applied and patiently worked out, as free from subter- 
fuge as from violence. In the working of institutions, 
even in the boldest undertakings, he carried a mind free 
alike from revolutionary prejudice and timid scruples. 
Confidence was a part of his nature, and, granting 
whatsoever was due to liberty, he was still, and above all, 
the man made to govern. Let me explain. 

Premier of a parliamentary State, he was compelled 
to secure to himself a majority ; he required it, for 
he understood that, to use his own expression, "there 
is no governing on needles' points ; " but the majority 
he needed was of his creating ; he knew how to direct 
and guide it ; he did not abandon it to its own inex- 
perience, its doubts and phantasies ; he thought for it, 
and at the right moment ; he did not shrink from the 
responsibility of taking a desperate initiative. When he 
debated within himself on the advisability of an alliance 
with France and England in the Crimea ; when he ven- 
tured to propose to his little Piedmont such works as 
economical reform, or the boring of a tunnel through 
Mont Cenis, he proved that he had no intention of 
allowing the reins of Government to slacken and grow 
weak in his grasp. However deferential his attitude 
before public opinion and the Chambers, he knew how to 
outshoot and make a way for them. 

I admit that he leaned upon a solid and popular 
monarchy, and in this he gathered strength ; he was 



PREFACE. 



IX 



supported by a king who was a pattern of patriotic and 
constitutional sovereignty ; lie was assisted by fellow- 
workers, such as La Marmora, in the reconstruction of an 
army. But it was Cavour who obtained the money where- 
with to do it, as Avell as the opportunities of making use 
of it ; adding to the fecundity of his contrivances and 
the certainty of his combinations an indomitable power 
in willing and executing. Had he awaited the good 
pleasure of parties in all his resolutions, he would have 
waited long ; and on more than one occasion he ran 
great risks, in concert with La Marmora, to carry out 
military undertakings which have subsequently been the 
saving of Piedmont in the hour of danger. He did not 
hesitate to pledge himself, convinced that the affairs 
of a nation were only placed in his hands for guidance 
and judicious direction, even under a parliamentary 
regime ; and thus he knew how to unite in the fullest 
measure the spirit of government with the spirit of 
Liberalism ; thus it was that he was more than an 
eminent man in power, he was a living and working 
policy, and, after having recast a little country, he 
created a new nation. 

Another name, that of one who may take rank as a 
competitor in the arena of political conflicts, naturally 
rises to the mind at the present time. It is now diffi- 
cult to speak of Count Cavour without being reminded 
of the Prussian minister who has been enabled to per- 
form in Germany what the Piedmontese minister 



x PREFACE. 

achieved in Italy. Events are interlinked ; men follow 
but do not always resemble one another. I have no 
desire to undervalue the German chancellor ; coming 
from a Frenchman this would be childish and unworthy. 
In Prince Bismarck we have good reason to see an enemy, 
aud we do not combat him with idle disparagements. 
All we can say is, that if Count Cavour and Prince 
Bismarck appear to have a similar fortune, at least till 
now, in analogous undertakings, they differ in genius, 
character, and mode of proceeding, as widely as Italy 
differs from Germany. 

Several private letters written by Prince Bismarck 
in the course of his career have been published within 
the last few years ; and they unveil a strangely com- 
plex nature ; they reveal the whole man. A man 
assuredly of powerful originality, impetuous, crabbed, 
abrupt, and familiar ; of feudal stamp, a Teuton by 
temperament and education ; mixing confidential com- 
munications as to his capacities as a drinker, and the 
effects of moonlight on the banks of the Rhine, with 
visions of grandeur and power ; a Mephistophelean 
politician and diplomatist, despising diplomatic and 
parliamentary formulas ; impatient for action at all cost, 
ferro et igne, and defining himself with the air of a 
ruffled giant, from a heap of violent contradictions, 
in his disturbing and discomposed figure of conqueror. 

That is not the portrait of Count Cavour, whom his 
contemporaries knew and saw at his work. Doubtless, 



PREFACE. xi 

Prince Bismarck is a great German. Count Cavour was 
rather, and in the broad humane sense, a great man. 
He, too, had strength of will and genius, but with 
perfect cordiality and a very taking charm. Prince 
Bismarck began by showing himself independent of his 
parliament, and even in some degree ridiculing it ; he 
provoked the conflict and defied " rebellious " majorities ; 
and if he ended in overruling the Chambers, it was by 
making his power and success a necessity to his country. 
Count Cavour worked always with the aid of public 
opinion and of parliament on his side. What he had 
been aided by liberty in accomplishing, he leaned on 
liberty to consolidate, with no despotic impatience, no 
persecution of beliefs. 

And, furthermore, if Prince Bismarck has been a 
German Cavour, it cannot be said that Cavour was 
ever an Italian Bismarck. The Piedmontese minister 
copied no model ; he was the first on this field ; and 
what makes his greatness is, that in an unprecedented 
enterprise, even in success, he has left behind him 
an example of forethought, judgment, and moderation 
worthy to be studied universally where politics is still a 
business. 

Had Cavour been solely a great Italian, he would by 
right have belonged to his fellow-countrymen ; and who 
has better revived his image than my excellent friend 
Massari, writing with tender fidelity and veneration his 
volume of recollections, II conte di Cavour, Ricordi 



xii PREFACE. 

biogrctfici ? "" Such as he was, Cavour belongs not only 
to Italy, but to the world ; and it has struck me that in 
writing this great life, in showing how a man was able 
to raise up a fallen nation by genius and policy, it would 
be a work of service to the conquered, and not without a 
lesson for the conquerors. 

March 2, 1877. 



* Count Cavour has been the subject of much literary work, both in and out 
of Italy. It is my duty to mention, besides the substantial literary study by 
S. Massari, the attractive work by M. de la Rive : Le Cotnte de Cavour, re'cits 
et souvenirs, and a very interesting preface, with which S. Artom has headed 
a collection of Cavour's principal speeches, translated into French. It is, how- 
ever, only an abridgment of the large collection of Cavour's Speeches (12 vols.), 
published by order of the Chamber of Deputies. I should also mention the 
Historia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia, by S. Nicomede 
Bianchi, now in the Record Office at Turin, as being instructive as to contem- 
poraneous history. Many other works might be cited. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

PREFACE v— xii 



CHAPTEE I. 

The Youth of Cavour — Piedmont and Italy after the Defeat. 

A Liberal Conservative — Origin and Antecedents of Cavour — His Family 
— His Education and Military Life— A young Piedmontese Citoyen — 
Agricultor's Life at Leri — Journeys in Switzerland, in France, and 
in England — Piedmont and Italy under Charles Albert — Cavour's first 
Political Ideas — Events preliminary to 1848 — Cavour a Journalist — 
The Constitutional Order of Things at Turin — First War in Lombardy 
— Revolutionary Agitations — Battle of Novara — Piedmont after the 
Defeat — Communism at Genoa — D'Azeglio's Ministry and the Con- 
clusion of Peace — The Standard and Liberal Institutions — The Begin- 
ning of Retribution — Cavour in Parliament and in the Ministry — 
Piedmont and the 2nd of December — The Two Policies— The Con. 
nubio — Political Development of Cavour ...... 1 



CHAPTEE II. 

The Policy of Cavour — The First Act of the National 

Drama. 

Cavour President of the Council — The National and Liberal Idea — Financial 
Policy— Commercial Policy — Religious Policy — Party Opposition — 
Letter from Cavoiir on his Policy — Beginning of Operations — The 
Eastern Question and the Crimean War of 1856 — Alliance with France 
and England — The Piedmontese Corps in the Crimea — Peace, and its 



xiv CONTENTS. 

PAOB 

Effects upon Piedmont — Victor Emmanuel in France — Cavour at the 
Congress of Paris — First Interviews with the Emperor — The Italian 
Question as regards Europe — The Session of the 8th of April — 
Cavour's Illusions — Piedmont and Italy after the Peace . . .58 

CHAPTEE III. 

Parliamentary Eeign of Cavour — Preparations for War. 

A Pause after 1856 — New Situation of Piedmont — Moral Headship of 
Cavour — Portrait of the Man — His Character —His Speeches — A Parlia- 
mentary Eeign — Watchword of the New Phase — Mere flammwm ! — 
Activity in Turin — The Fortifications of Alessandria — Maritime 
Arsenal of Spezzia — Boring of the Mont Cenis — Piedmontese Policy 
in Italy — Cavour and Daniel Manin — Piedmont before Europe — 
Eelations with Bussia, with England, and with France — Crisis in 
Piedmontese Policy — Elections of 1857 — The Crime of Orsini in 
Paris — Effects in Turin — Official and Secret Diplomacy — Speech of 
Cavour on the Alliances — Private Communications of the Emperor 
— Negotiations — Interview at Plombieres — Secret Treaty — Scene on 
the 1st of January, 1859, at the Tuileries — Speech of King Victor 
Emmanuel before Parliament — Prologue of the War .... Ill 



CHAPTEE IV. 

The War of 1859 — Cavour and the Peace of Villafranca. 

Prologue of the War of Italian Independence — The Situation at the 
Beginning of 1859 — Napoleon III. and Cavour — Marriage of Princess 
Clotilde and Prince Napoleon — The Pamphlet "Napoleon III. and 
Italy" — Position of Affairs — Diplomatic Phase — English Negotia- 
tions — Diplomacy of the Emperor— Proposed Congress — Cavour 
during the Winter of 1859 — Italy in a Ferment — The Volunteers 
at Turin — Preparations moral and military — Cavour and Diplomacy — 
Trip to Paris — Two French Politicians — Napoleon III. and Count 
Walewski — Mot of Cavour to M. cle Rothschild — The knotty Point — 
Crisis in April — Dramatic Situation, Coup de Theatre — The Austrian 
Ultimatum at Turin — War is declared — French Troops at Turin — 
Military Operations — Napoleon III. and his Proclamations^ — March 
of the Franco-Piedmontese Army — Movements at Modena, Parma, 
Florence, and Bologna — Cavour during the War— Solferino and 
the Preliminaries of Villafranca — Cavour in the Camp — Scene at 
Desenzano — Victor Emmanuel — Despair and Retirement of f Cavour — 
Departure for Switzerland — Uncertainty after Villafranca — Mental 
Condition of Cavour — Departure of the Emperor for France . . 168 



CONTENTS. xv 



CHAPTEE V 



The Italian Crisis after Yillafranca — Cavour and the 
Cession of Savoy. 

PAGE 

Speech of Napoleon III. at St. Cloud — Character and first Consequences of 
the Peace of Villafranca — France and Austria — Piedmont and the New 
Ministry — Italian Phase — The Annexation Movement in Central Italy 
— Farina at Modena and at Bologna — Eicasoli at Florence — Portrait 
of Eicasoli — The Military League of Central Italy — The Tuscan Envoys 
in Paris — Official Policy of France —Personal Policy of the Emperor — 
Contradictions of French Diplomacy — Negotiations with England — 
The Emperor's Tactics to disengage himself — New Coup de Theatre — 
Change in the French Ministry — M. Thouvenel takes the Place of 
Count Walewski — The Pamphlet "The Pope and the Congress" — 
Change of Ministry at Turin — Cavour recalled to Office — Negotiations 
with Central Italy and with Paris — Preparations for the Benoument — 
The Annexations — Cession of Savoy and Nice to France — Opinion in 
Italy — Opinion in Europe — The External and Internal Situation — The 
Treaty of March 24, 1860, before Parliament — Speech of Cavour on 
Italian Policy and the French Alliance — Cavour at Pisa and at Florence 
— Results of the Annexations and the Cession of Savoy — The Policy of 
Action — Revolution in Sicily 211 



CHAPTER VI. 



Cavour and the Unity of Italy — Rome and Naples. 

The Idea of Unity in the Mind of Cavour — Insurrection of Sicily and the 
Expedition of Garibaldi — Attitude of Cavour at Turin — Relations with 
Naples and with Rome — Negotiations with Europe — Cavour and the 
Dictatorship of Garibaldi iu Sicily — Matters touching his Policy — 
Advance of the Insurrection in the South — The Revolution in Naples 
— Projects of Garibaldi — Threats of an Attempt on Rome and on Venice 
— Private Dissensions between Cavour and Garibaldi — -Necessity for 
a Resolution — The Chambery Mission — Words of Napoleon III. — In- 
vasion of Umbria and the Marches — The Piedmontese Army in the 
Kingdom of Naples — Assembly of the Chambers in Turin — The Policy 
of Cavour before Parliament — Triumph of that Policy — Annexation of 
Sicily and Naples — Programme of Cavour as to Venice and Rome — 
Letters and Speeches — Rome the Capital — The Free Church in the 
Free State — Views of Cavour concerning the Papacy .... 260 



xvi CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEE VII. 

The Final Victory op a Policy — Death and Legacy op Cavour. 

PAGB 

Italian Unity and Europe — Austria and the Annexations — La Marmora's 
Mission to Berlin — Last Negotiation with Napoleon III. — Unity at 
Naples — Baron Bicasoli's Discourse and Interpellation — Cavour and 
Garibaldi before Parliament — The Sitting of April 18, 1861 — A 
Minister's last Victory — Sudden Illness of Cavour — His last Moments 
— His Death — Fra Giacomo — Legacy of Cavour — His Work and his 
Policy — Conclusion 310 










LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE YOUTH OF CAVOUR PIEDMONT AND ITALY AFTER 

THE DEFEAT. 

L Liberal Conservative — Origin and Antecedents of Cavour — His Family — - 
His Education and Military Life — A young Piedruontese Citoyen — • 
Agricultor's Life at Leri — Journeys in Switzerland, in France, and in 
England— Piedmont and Italy under Charles Albert — Cavour's first 
political Ideas — Events preliminary to 1818 — Cayour a Journalist — The 
constitutional Order of Things at Turin — First War in Lombardy — 
Revolutionary Agitations — Battle of Novara — Piedmont after the Defeat — 
Communism at Genoa — D'Azeglio's Ministry and the Conclusion of Peace — • 
The Standard and Liberal Institutions — The Beginning of Retribution — 
Cavour in Parliament and in the Ministry: — Piedmont and the 2nd of 
December — The Two Policies — The Connubio — Political Development of 
Cavour. 



One of the most extraordinary revolutions of the cen- 
tury has made Italy a constituted nation, and has raised 
her on a level with the Powers of the world. This can 
hardly be called a resurrection ; Italy, seeing her as she 
has emerged from contemporary events, in no way 
resembles what she has ever been before ; the sky 
illumining her, the seas into which she dips on every 

B 



2 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUR. 

side, and the many traditions of those twenty brilliant 
cities which are now joined together in national unity — 
these are all that she has in common with the past. 
Modern Italy is a new creation; a work prepared by 
history, no doubt, but one also which is the combined 
result of policy, of circumstances, high daring, and pro- 
found astuteness. 

Now that this work is completed, we regard it as 
natural and simple ; it has become so intimately allied 
with the general order of things, that we can hardly 
imagine the successive reactions and upheavings which 
would be required to destroy it. Only five-and-twenty 
years ago it seemed an impossibility, so many conditions 
and events did it presuppose that could not even be 
reasonably conceived as realisable. 

To establish it as a reality, the agents have been 
European revolutions, changes in the balance of power 
and of national equilibrium, and wars unexpected, though 
sagaciously planned ; these, together with diplomatic 
dramas, the disappearance of local sovereignties, and a 
complete transformation of that which struck the mind 
as the most immovable of institutions — the temporal 
power of the Pope. It needed, too, that there should 
be at the foot of the Alps a small but disciplined and 
devoted people, of exemplary courage, and at the head 
of these people a prince made popular by his patriotic 
sentiments, it may be by an ambition in his blood ; and 
in the councils of this prince and this people, one of 
those great ministers, who seem to have been created 
for the most complicated as well as the most perilous of 
enterprises. 



ITALY AND CAVOTJR. 3 

To enter upon a public career at so critical a period 
ns 1848, and boldly to take in hand the affairs of his 
country immediately after a national disaster, which 
threatened to be for a long time irremediable ; and in 
a condition of internal revolution full of uncertainty, to 
go through all the difficulties of reorganisation amidst 
the shiftings of European policy, without wavering or a 
moment's deviation in making everything concur in one 
aim ; to conspire openly for ten years — in the noblest of 
causes it is true, but in one the triumph of which could 
realise itself only at the cost of almost impossible 
changes ; and to succeed in gathering to his side 
alliances and sympathies, I might almost say the force 
of facts ; then suddenly to disappear when the work 
has reached a point where the past appears as a dream 
— such was the destiny of Count Cavour. 

What Italy would have been without him — what 
she would still be — one can no longer conceive; it is 
through him that she has become what she now is ; she 
has become developed, disciplined, and concrete in de- 
spite of all her divisions ; Italy has become a new power, 
and she has found in that little Piedmont the frame- 
work ready-made of a living nationality ; and this work 
of energy, perseverance, suppleness, and profound com- 
binations, is one of the most complete and instructive 
lessons in the art of governing. 

It teaches how a country, overwhelmed by defeat, 
can be raised again, and how a parliamentary system 
and established liberty may contribute to carry out a 
national idea ; it shows us how this policy, patiently and 
strenuously followed under a patriotic inspiration, can 

b 2 



4 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

frustrate those fatal concurrencies of reaction and revolu- 
tion which endanger the justest of causes. And, finally, 
it demonstrates what a Liberal Conservative is, who 
tempers his genius to identify himself with his country 
and his time ; — supple in turning all to his purposes, 
even his adversaries or the unforeseen, while concealing 
the depth of his calculations under the most equable air ; 
- — knowing how to prepare and command events by the 
power of a penetrating and unerring reason, and by a 
constantly inventive boldness in the execution of new 
and ever- enlarging designs. 

One day, towards the autumn of 1850, on the eve 
of entering for the first time into office as a simple 
Minister of Commerce, journeyiug through the provinces 
of Piedmont, Cavour stopped at Stresa, on the borders 
of Lago Maggiore, at the house of Eosmini the philo- 
sopher, where he met Manzoni. These eminent men 
conversed on the future destiny of Italy from the top of 
the villa Bolongaro, keeping their eyes fixed upon the 
opposite shore, which was then, and seemed likely long 
to remain, a part of the Austrian dominions. Manzoni, 
in the simplicity of his soul, did not cease to hope ; 
Eosmini smiled sadly at this poet's dreams, but Cavour 
rubbed his hands — it was even at that time a peculiar 
habit with him — and repeated with persuasive liveliness : 
" We will do something." 

The man who thus lightly disposed of the future was 
still young and full of life, having lately tried his maiden 
steel in the revolutionary turmoil of 1848 — one who 
carried with him into the whirlwind of public affairs a 
clear mind, great strength of will, the most liberal of 



PARENTAGE OF CAVOUR. 5 

natures, and a disposition every way fitted for action. 
He was not a revolutionist meditating the renewal of 
conspiracies when he spoke of " doing something ; " he 
was, on the contrary, the man of all men the most politic, 
having in him at once the solidity of the old Piedmontese 
race without any of its prejudices ; and he had, moreover, 
the patriotic and liberal sap of the later generations, 
without having ever been a conspirator. 

His good fortune consisted in his coming at the right 
moment, and being prepared by his birth and his educa- 
tion, as well as by his temperament, to meet the chances 
which might befall him. He was born at Turin, on 
August 1, 1810, in one of those periods when indeed 
no one would have said or thought that he who had then 
received breath would one day, for the benefit of princes 
then discrowned or banished, revive that name of Italy, 
with which the whimsical caprice of a glorious despot 
embroidered a fiction of nationality. He was the second 
son of the Marquis Michael Benso di Cavour, the last of 
one of those ancient Piedmontese houses issuing from 
the little republic of Chieri, called the Republic of the 
Seven B's, because of seven families having lived there 
which had all made their way in the world : the Bensi, 
the Balbi, the Balbiani, the Biscaretti, the Buschetti, 
the Bertoni, the Broglie, destined to figure in another 
land.'"'' By his paternal grandfather Camillo Cavour was 

* I recall, as a further characteristic trait of those who love to follow out 
the genealogies, that the first founder of the house appears to be a personage 
of the name of Hubert, who conies from Saxony with Frederic Barbarossa. 
This Hubert, on his return from a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, espouses, at 
Chieri, the heiress of the Bensi, of whom he takes the name, and at the same 
time he obtains several fiefs, amongst which is the estate of Santena, where 
now the last descendant of the race reposes. The title of Marquis of Cavour 



C LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

linked with Savoy and the amiable race of St. Francois 
de Sales ; Geneva claimed him on his mother's side, a 
de Sellon ; and he was drawn to France by many rela- 
tions — by the two sisters of his mother, who were 
married, one to the Due de Clermont-Tonnerre, a per- 
sonage of distinction at the court of the Eestoration, 
the other to the Baron d'Auzers, a gentleman of 
Auvergne, who, after having been a functionary of 
the empire beyond the Alps, settled at Turin. 

It was in this varied, though very united, social 
centre, which often met either at Turin or at Geneva, 
and in this wholesome and strengthening atmosphere, 
that Camillo Cavour was bred and born : as a child, 
robust, enjoying his life, sparkling, and bringing happi- 
ness to all about him ; a young man of a most liberal 
spirit, prompt and open, with a mind seizing and un- 
derstanding everything. 

Cavour was among the youngest of a generation 
that, after the Eestoration of 1815, and when still op- 
pressed by prolonged reactions, began, in the heavy 

elates only from the last century; it was given by King Charles Emmanuel III., 
in recompense for military services to Michael Antonio Benso, lord of Santena, 
ami lieutenant-general. The Castle of Cavour, situated on the summit of a 
rock, in the province of Pignerol, is no more than a ruin since Catinat de- 
stroyed it in 1691. One day Cavour was asked how it chanced that his armo- 
rial bearings were headed by a German motto, " Gott will Eecht." " It is 
supposed," answered he, "that my family originated in Saxony, and that a 
pilgrim of my name came to Piedmont in 1080. Hence the shells that you see 
in my coat-of-arms, and the motto which ornaments them. Do you believe 
this ? " — " No." " Neither do I ; " and he burst into laughter. Cavour always 
entertained the broadest and most liberal notions in all that pertains to titles, 
external dignities, honorary distinctions, but without using any affectation, or 
ever condescending to natter base democratic instincts. He was naturally 
familiar and simple ; with his good-humoured frankness he possessed also a 
well-bred ease, and a sense of personal dignity, which it was well not to 
offend. 



MILITARY LIFE. 7 

darkness of absolutist reigns, to ripen for the ultimate 
freedom of Italy. 

In 1815, when the tragic warfare which swept away 
the French Empire had made Piedmont independent, 
he was only five years of age. At the age of ten he 
was admitted to the Military Academy, the school of 
the young nobility, and soon obtained the position of 
page in the household of the Prince di Carignano — the 
future Charles Albert — where at once the impetuous 
vivacity of his natural temper burst out in revolt 
against this gilded servitude. 

At eighteen he was the most brilliant and amiable 
of sub-lieutenants of engineers, leading a light-minded 
soldier's life at Vintimille, Turin, and Genoa — especially 
at Genoa, in which he found the freedom and the attrac- 
tions of a city of business and pleasure. 

In his twenty-second year he had already sent in his 
resignation, after having undergone the disgrace of a 
sort of exile at a small station in the Alps, for having 
uttered a few risky words, which were merely a cry of 
generous emotion and sympathy, hailing the French 
Revolution of 1830. 

Reduced, for his sole pastime, to play at tarok with 
the contractors for the building of the fort of Bard, his 
place of exile, and menaced with being always suspected 
at headquarters, he had resigned himself to be no more 
than an " obscure citizen of Piedmont," as he termed 
himself, a son of good family stopped on the threshold 
of a brilliant career. But this " obscure citizen of Pied- 
mont," this young man whom a breath of liberty come 
from France had set quivering — this retired officer of 



8 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

twenty-two — was of the order of those who reach the 
goal by all roads, and who do not allow themselves to 
be discouraged, or even irritated, by a misunderstanding 
or a disgrace. 

Thus exiled from a soldier's life, on the morrow he 
was brisk and resolute ; he combined the study of 
agricultural affairs with the enjoyment of the pleasures 
of the world and a course of travel, taking with him into 
this larger sphere an inexhaustible store of activity, 
together with those precociously fixed ideas of liberty 
and patriotism which gave rise to his utterance that 
" in his youthful dreams he already saw himself Prime 
Minister of the Kingdom of Italy ; " which also made 
him write to his aunt, Madame de Sellon, after the 
"decisive step" of his resignation: "Do not imagine 
that all I have suffered — morally, be it understood — has 
in any way abated my love for the views which I pre- 
viously entertained. These ideas form a part of my 
existence. I s"hall profess, teach, and uphold them as 
long as I have a breath of life." Already we see the 
whole man in the resigning officer of 1832, and in the 
rebellious youth of the beginning of the reign — that of 
Charles Albert — a reign destined to conclude with a 
national explosion, but which for the moment remained 
under the hand of Austria and the Jesuits. 



ii. 

Three things contributed to the development and 
expansion of this happy nature, while giving it the 
impress of originality. It is evident that Cavonr always 



FAMILY INFLUENCES. 9 

felt the influence of the family life which had been his 
first education. He gathered from it that which forms 
the man and the character. He had become morally 
developed in a centre where habits of affection and com- 
panionship tempered all differences in political and even 
in religious views ; for if in Turin that society of the 
Cavours, Auzers, Clermont-Tonnerres was profoundly 
attached to traditions of supremacy, both religions and 
monarchical, at Geneva, the Comte de Sellon, a Protestant 
and a Liberal, kept faithful allegiance to all that was 
lofty in the ideas of the eighteenth century, and of the 
French Eevolution. 

Divided between these family influences, Camillo 
Cavour was able to reconcile them in his liberal nature. 
With his uncle, M. de Sellon, he suffered himself to 
succumb to the fascination of new ideas. With Baron 
d'Auzers, an Absolutist by conviction, but a man of 
good intelligence and of agreeable company, who liked 
discussion even with young men, his mind was 
sharpened. At that school of maternal grace, when with 
Madame d'Auzers, who had the quick, lively, and 
animated nature of her nephew, and with Madame de 
Clermont-Tonnerre, a woman of extreme Eoyalist 
notions, but of the most perfect charity, he had imbibed 
a beautiful amenity and a love of tolerance, together 
with an easy dignity, mixed perhaps with pride, which 
sometimes made itself felt through all his familiar 
heartiness. 

Let no one be deceived : with the most liberal 
opinions on the rights and claims of birth, Cavour 
was never a renegade aristocrat, denouncing the 



10 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

traditions of race or the spirit and customs of his 
family. At the highest elevation of his political fortune 
he was and remained the same. In the " house of the 
Cavours," which he did not cease to inhabit, even when 
he was Minister, and which was the patrimonial mansion, 
his eldest brother held the highest place ; and it chanced 
only a short time before his death, that as one day he 
was travelling by train a few miles from Turin, Cavour 
looked out on the flying landscape, and said to a fellow- 
traveller : " Do you see that spire half hidden among 
the trees ? it is the spire of the Church of Santena. 
There is the hereditary chateau of my family ; it is 
there that I wish to rest after my death ! " Thus, 
before he disappeared, with the pride of a great name, 
he wished to give testimony to the surviving power of 
those first impressions which had contributed to his 
moral development when young. 

Another perceptible influence in this supple and 
vigorous organisation, was the almost exclusively scien- 
tific education of the Military Academy. Indeed 
Cavour had but little literary instruction. " In my 
youth," he used to say, " I was never taught to write ; 
I never had a professor of rhetoric, nor even of the 
humanities." At times, during his active life, he has 
indulged in a sort of coquettish ignorance, pretending 
that he neither knew Latin nor Greek, and he main- 
tained lightly that to him it " was easier to make Italy 
than to make a sonnet." He had supplied that which 
was wanting, by the determination or the curiosity of a 
mind which knew how to take an interest in everything, 
even in a new novel ; and he boldly set to work to learn 
English, in the history of Lord Mahon. 



STUDY OF MATHEMATICS. 11 

His intelligence was disciplined and shaped on the 
mathematics, which he had successfully studied at the 
Military Academy, under the able geometrician, Giovanni 
Plana : " That is what builds a head and teaches you to 
think. From the study of triangles and algebraic 
propositions, I passed to those of men and things ; and 
now I know how useful this study has been to me, by 
what I am able to do with things and men." He 
believed himself to owe to this primary teaching the 
faculty " of keeping in his head a long series of theorems 
and corollaries which always maintained their order of 
battle." It is indubitable that the study of mathematics 
developed in him a disposition to preciseness, clearness, 
and exactitude ; it had given him an amazing aptitude 
to play with figures and calculations. 

It is possible that he threw a certain amount of 
whim and some slight decree of affectation even into 
this, as he did in his pretended literary ignorance. The 
truth is, that the study of mathematics would not have 
sufficed, if this spirit of his, which all things contributed 
to strengthen, had not at the same time been impreg- 
nated by influences powerful in quite other ways — by 
experience, by his travels, by his manifold studies, and 
by real practical life in all its forms. 



in. 

The life of the real world was one of the great 
teachers of Cavour. Immediately upon his resignation 
as officer of engineers, he did not hesitate an instant ; a 
soldier one day, on the morrow he became a sort 
of steward of the much -neglected family estates. 



12 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

Soldier and farmer, these, without his knowing it, 
were the two most instructive of the schools of politics. 
Agriculture had the advantage of being the only possible 
occupation under a government that saw revolutionary 
perils even in the pursuits of industry. Cavour gave 
himself up to agricultural life, not in distaste, nor for 
a pastime, but with the fire of an impatient activity ; 
with the spirit and the resources of a nature not in- 
clined, according to his own expression, to do things by 
halves, taking an increasing interest in everything about 
him. " I have embarked," he wrote to his friends in 
Geneva, " in great speculations ; I have purchased a 
large estate among the rice-fields. I think I have done 
a very good stroke of business. All I am in want of is 
the money to pay for it ; that settled, I shall make a 
splendid profit by it. I cannot do things by halves. 
Once embarked in business, I give myself up to it alto- 
gether — for that matter, my situation compels me to it. 
I am a younger son, which says a good deal in an aristo- 
cratically-constituted country. I must carve myself a 
way by the sweat of my brow." This large estate of 
which he speaks is Leri, created and transformed by 
Cavour in the middle of the Vercelli district — that Leri 
where he so often went to seek twenty-four- hours' rest 
in the midst of the most absorbing affairs. 

It was there, in this sufficiently monotonous district 
of Vercelli, in a plain covered with rice-fields and bare 
open meadows, that Camillo Cavour lived for years, 
syndic of his village, and farmer ; himself directing all 
the details of a vast system of cultivation, seeking aid in 
the discoveries of science, introducing new measures and 



COUNTRY AND TOWN LIFE. 13 

machines, thus converting a dilapidated estate into a 
model property. It was his work, his conquest — a 
prelude to many other conquests ; and in proportion as 
success smiled on his intrepidity, he did not fear to 
extend his operations. He had in him activity for 
everything ; to make a clearing of a forest, as well as 
to make a canal or a bank ; to cultivate beetroot, as well 
as to establish a sugar manufactory, or a manufactory of 
chemical productions. One day he undertook to furnish 
eight hundred merino sheep for the Pasha of Egypt, 
and he kept his engagement, although at first he was 
rather put about to do so. 

Assuredly this well-occupied and active life, in the 
midst of which he could offer his friends the free and 
joyous hospitality, not of a luxurious mansion, but of a 
well-to-do farm, was fertile for Oavour. To this he 
owed much of what made his peculiar originality, and 
his weight in politics, his familiar experience of things 
and men, his practical acquaintance with all special 
interests, and his ability and judgment in the manage- 
ment of the springs of a country's wealth. And withal 
he was the man of all others the least absorbed even 
when the most occupied, and while appearing to be 
entirely given up to his works of cultivation, he never 
ceased to be one among the foremost in the gay life of 
the world. 

When he was not leading his country life he was at 
Turin, enlivening with his inexhaustible verve the 
salon of his aunt, the Duchess of Clermont-Tonnerre, 
or delio'htino? and instructing himself in the shrewd, 
sensible, and liberal conversation of the Ambassador of 



14 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJR. 

France, M. de Barante, and of his secretary, M. de 
Haussonville. When the air of Turin weighed on him, 
he went to Geneva, where he found himself near his 
uncle, in that cordial and intelligent society of the 
La Eives, the Navilles, the Lullin de Chateauvieux, 
amongst whom he passed evenings that he recalls, 
launching epigrams on the affairs of Europe, reconstruct- 
ing false systems, recomposing bad ministries — in fine, 
arranging everything for the very best. When he ceased 
to feel at home at Geneva, he departed for Paris and 
London, the two great theatres of the world. Twice, 
in 1835 and in 1843, he visited France and England, as a 
traveller who did not lose his time. 

The institutions, the parliamentary struggles, the 
development of national, agricultural, and industrial 
forces in England interested him vividly ; everything — ■ 
politics and social life — attracted him in France. Wel- 
comed for his name, his intelligence, and his cordiality 
in the principal salons, he fell under their charm ; it is 
possible that other seductions also carried him away. 
Well, he was in the spring-tide of his youth, fond of 
pleasure, priding himself little upon being a sage, and 
bold at the green-table, as in everything he did ; in 
good company not shrinking from a rubber at whist, at 
twenty-five louis the trick. But these wild bursts of 
youth did not prevent him from being an attentive 
observer, with a taste for serious things, above all from 
being impressionable to the fine and elevated charm of 
Parisian life ; and he wrote pleasantly from London to 
Madame de Circourt, with whom he was constantly in 
correspondence : " England is a country of enormous 



VISITS TO FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 15 

resources ; but what you look for in vain there is that 
admirable union of science and intelligence, depth and 
graciousness, of the inner and the outer, in perfection, 
which is the charm of certain Parisian salons ; a charm 
that we regret all through life when once we have tasted 
it, and that is not to be found again when we have been 
removed from this intellectual oasis ; " and, casting an 
eye on his own country, he added : " Under certain 
particulars the air of Piedmont is heavier than that of 
London ; the sky is pure, but the moral horizon so 
obscured by the clouds developed by an intensely com- 
pressing system, that the mind there has still less 
elasticity than in England." 

In default of elasticity, England, without doubt, 
possessed merits appreciated by Cavour, though he 
nevertheless preserved a distinct preference for France. 
" When you shall have shown me an English or a 
German Due de Broglie, I shall begin to question my 
opinion of the moral, intellectual, and political supe- 
riority of France, an opinion that every day takes 
deeper root in my. judgment." These excursions, in 
which a life of pleasure was mingled with much studious 
observation, had undoubtedly a remarkable influence on 
Camillo Cavour. They initiated him, while still young, 
in the heart of European affairs, the complicated in- 
terests of the world, and the various aspects of politics 
in England and in France, in Belgium and in Switzer- 
land. They gave him what I would call the exterior 
and diplomatic sense of things, as agriculture, practised 
in a certain extension, gave him the sense of all the 
positive interior realities. 



16 LIFE OF COUNT GAYOTJR. 



IV. 

Sucli was, then, the life of "a young citizen of 
Piedmont," who, throughout the changes of an active 
and easy-going life, remained constantly a Liberal, 
nourishing in the shade of absolute government. Cavour 
was liberal, according to the ingenious phrase of M. de 
la Eive, "as he was fair, alert, and brilliant — by birth." 

From his early youth he had the national and liberal 
instinct which governed his soul to the very latest hour, 
and he gives a vivid picture of the deception with which 
the period of IS 30 afflicted him: "How many hopes 
deceived !" he writes; "what illusions laid bare ! what 
a host of misfortunes have fallen upon our country ! I 
accuse no one ; it may be but the force of circumstances 
which has so decided it ; but the fact is, that the revolu- 
tion of July, after bidding us conceive the noblest hopes, 
has rcplungeA us into a state more deplorable than ever. 
Ah ! if France had known how to make the most of her 

position ; if she had drawn the sword it might 

have been that ! " Entirely disconnected from 

the government, he did not withhold his railleries from 
a rule resting on Jesuitism and police, that confounded 
in its proscriptions the secret societies, the philosophy of 
Rosmini, railways, and industry — a rule with which 
Madame de Clermont-Tonnerre was reduced to ne<ro- 
tiate, for a considerable period, that she might be per- 
mitted, by the medium of the Ambassador of France, to 
receive the Journal des Debats. " Science and intelli- 
gence," he said, " are deemed things infernal by those 



THE JESUITS. 17 

who have the goodness to govern us." Cavour loved 
science, and his intelligence was as free as it was clear. 
During these years of trial for Italy and for Piedmont, 
between 1830 and 1846, he often, in his private conver- 
sations, and in his correspondence with his closest 
friends, stirred many a deep question that he seemed 
but to brush in trifling ; his sharp and decisive stroke 
was that of a man who saw far and distinctly, nothing 
astonishing him. 

One day, before the appearance of De Tocqueville's 
book, in the course of a letter to one of his friends, he 
described the march of new societies towards a democracy 
of yet unshapen outlines ; he showed the material and 
intellectual levelling beginning to operate between 
classes ; the patrician more than half destroyed ; the 
ancient organisations on the road to disintegration, or to 
transformation, of some kind ; and, he added : " What 
is there left now to take arms against these waves of the 
masses ? Nothing that is solid ; nothing that has 
strength. Is it a good ? is it an evil ? I hardly know ; 
but it is, to my thinking, the inevitable future of hu- 
manity. Let us prepare ourselves for it, or at least 
prepare our descendants, whom it concerns more than 
us." Is it a good ? is it an evil ? He saw the inevitable 
circumstance, and he was of those who do not revolt 
against evident facts, who believe that there is nothing 
better than to make what you can of them by directing 
them. On another occasion, roused by the noise that 
was going on in France about the Jesuits, then masters 
of his little Piedmont, he wrote to a French lady : "If 
one would learn to know the true nature of that order, 



18 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

it is not where the Jesuits are struggling, and where 
they hold a precarious footing, that they should be 
studied ; they are not to be appreciated fully as they 
are, except where, meeting no obstacle, they apply their 
rules in a logical and consecutive manner. They have 
learnt nothing, forgotten nothing ; their minds and their 
methods are the same. Woe to the country, woe to the 
class confiding its youth to their exclusive education ! 
Unless it be owing to fortunate circumstances that 
destroy in the man the lessons imparted to the child, 
they will, within one century, make a race utterly de- 
based. The opinion that I express here is shared by the 

most distinguished members of our clergy The 

Jesuits are not dangerous in France. In a country of 
liberty, science, and enlightenment, they must always 
be compelled to shape and transform themselves ; 
neither in the political nor in the intellectual world can 
they ever obtain a real and durable empire. I wish, in- 
deed, that, in»the interests of humanity, we could come 
to an understanding with the Jesuits, and concede them, 
in the countries from which they are excluded, three, 
four, ten times the degree of liberty that they are willing 
to grant in the countries where they dominate." Observe 
this wish — even for the Jesuits ! 



v. 

Yes, assuredly, Cavour was a Liberal of the early 
dawn, but he was always one in his own manner and 
in harmony with his own temperament. His was the 
Liberalism of a justly-poised unprejudiced brain, with- 



HIS POSITION BETWEEN PARTIES. 19 

out fanaticism as without sourness, with nothing 
sickly or desponding in it ; and I fancy he must have 
smiled somewhat when his friend Pietro di Santa-Eosa 
addressed him in elegiacal verses : " Camillo, for us 
to mourn together is henceforward the consolation of 
our broken spirits." He for his part never wasted much 
time in bewailing himself. If he had not too good an 
opinion of the Government, he by no means assumed 
the air of a victim, or of a systematic antagonist. If he 
was not particularly fond of those whom in his fancy 
French he called the reculeurs — backsliders — -the ultras, 
those who from hatred or dread of revolution had 
retrograded to the length of one or many centuries, as 
little did he esteem the " fanatics " — the idealists, who, 
for a dream of their owu, would push " Society into a 
fearful chaos, from which it could not be raised save by 
the agency of an absolute and brutal Imperialism." 

He was neither of the one nor the other party ; he 
had a natural aversion from excesses that are, more 
often than not, a disguise of impotence ; and during 
one of those conspiratorial crises and reactions through 
which his country passed, he said: "As to me, I 
have long been undecided in the midst of these move- 
ments in opposite directions. Common sense coun- 
selled moderation ; an overweening desire to set our 
reculeurs inarching precipitated me into action. At 
last, after numerous and violent agitations and waver- 
ings, I finished by fixing myself, like the pendulum, 
between the two. So let me tell you, I am an honest 
middle-course man, desiring and hoping for social pro- 
gress with all my might, but resolved not to purchase it at 

c 2 



20 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

the cost of an universal overthrow My position 

between the two, however, does not hinder me from 
wishing for the emancipation of Italy, with all possible 
speed, from the barbarians oppressing her ; and in con- 
sequence I foresee that a tolerably violent crisis is 
inevitable. But I would have that crisis brought about 
with all the discretion compatible with existing circum- 
stances ; and besides this, I am more than persuaded that 
the mad attempts made by the men of action do but 
retard and render it more risky 

He was already, if you will, a Liberal cloaking the 
man of government, or a Conservative who, in spite 
of his profession of the " middle-course," had nothing 
in him of the doctrinaire ; did not take immobility for 
the final word of wisdom, and who meant to make of the 
principle of moderation a policy of initiation and action 
realising what the revolutionist promises, and doing it 
better. 

There was" another distinction in the Liberalism of 
Cavour. Others have contributed to the movements 
preceding Italian emancipation, and have made their 
way into politics through literature or by philosophy. 
Gioberti revived the sentiment of the supremacy of Italy. 
Balbo, by a series of patient and ingenious deduc- 
tions, saw in the past the nourishment of new hopes. 
D'Azeglio wrote his romances and pamphlets with a 
fine, sensible, and persuasive eloquence. Camillo Cavour 
was neither a philosopher, an historian, nor a poet. His 
Liberalism was of a more practical kind, and I might 
almost venture to say more modern in its direction. 
A farmer and a man of the world, he endeavoured in 



HIS FIRST WRITINGS. 21 

his fashion to rekindle the feeling of public interests. 
He was always ready to seek a means to break through 
the network of supervision. He was one of the founders 
of the " Piedrnontcse Agrarian Society," whose statutes 
he had revised, from which society sprang a multitude 
of offshoots, where, under the pretext of agriculture, 
the spirit of discussion spread and sharpened. In con- 
junction with the Count of Salmour and others of 
his friends, he naturalised in Piedmont the popular 
institution of infant schools. Acting with the Marquis 
Alfieri and Count Pralormo, who represented what might 
be called the liberal side of the Government, he formed, 
at Turin, under the inoffensive name of " Whist 
Society," a sort of club of the Piedmontese nobility ; a 
reunion, where men were accustomed to meet and 
exchange ideas. He felt the necessity of doing some- 
thing ; of giving a distinct shape to an activity that was 
beginning to disquiet the police ; and when, instigated 
by his friends at Geneva, or excited by the wider 
awakening of the minds beyond the Alps, he likewise 
decided to take up a pen, what were the subjects he 
selected ? They were questions of political economy, 
agricultural labour, and finance. He treated of the 
voyages agronomiques of M. de Chateau vieux, or of the 
state of Ireland ; of " model farms," or of " communistic 
doctrines ; " of " railways in Italy ; " or of " the influence 
of the English commercial reforms." 

All that was written in French, in an easy, pointed, 
and simple manner, without any literary style, by an 
observer manifestly schooled in economical problems, 
and taken with the great reforms, of which he hailed the 



22 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

victorious realisation in England, already dreaming that 
he might see them transported and applied in Italy. 

Was he an economist ? He was one after his own 
fashion, just as he was a farmer ; as a man who con- 
stantly made use of whatsoever came in his way, with- 
out subjecting himself to a theory or to a speciality ; 
one for whom the science of the laws of production, and 
the experience derived from agriculture, were useful and 
necessary, but secondary elements towards the art of 
governing. In these first pages of an amateur, writing 
upon questions that were special to all appearance, the 
politician burst forth spontaneously, so to speak, plan- 
ning in a system of railways an instrument of national 
transformation for Italy, or in his economical liberalism 
the prelude of the liberalism of institutions. The man 
revealed himself completely by his verdicts, his ideas, 
and his preferences. 

VI. 

Unite all these features in him ; they compose, if I 
mistake not, the characteristic physiognomy of one who 
is not likely to be stopped in his road. This is Camillo 
Cavour at the age of thirty-six, towards 1846 and 1847 ; 
it is Cavour breathing life and energy, endowed with a 
sort of contagious entrain, squandering his activity 
without ever exhausting it, allying discretion with 
audacity, flexibility with decision, the traditionary and 
Conservative sentiment with all modern instincts, an 
Italian and a Liberal, without ever being a revolutionist 
or a conspirator. Having a decided taste for France, 
and at the same time formed in the English school, 



HIS EULOGY OF PITT. 23 

Cavour in some respects had a touch of the nature of 
Charles Fox. He had the ardent temperament of the 
great Whig leader — the power of mind, the charm of 
manner, and the irony without bitterness. He had yet 
more than Charles Fox — the instinct and the natural 
stamp of the man born to govern, and in his dreams of 
ambition he did not content himself with the part of 
chief of the Opposition. His leanings and his admira- 
tions were rather in the direction of those men who 
knew how, in case of necessity, to sacrifice their popu- 
larity for the sake of their country. "Yes, my friend," 
he wrote excitedly, in 1847, "Peel's reform has been the 
safety of England. What would have come to pass if 
they had allowed the too famous sliding-scale to stand ? 
It is probable that England w r ould have been left with- 
out resource after the recent harvest, and then what 
should we have seen ? England owes statues to Peel ; 
some day he will have them." If he encountered in the 
past, on the subject of Ireland, the figure of Pitt, he 
kindled, and seemed to find in himself some of the 
features under which he painted the son of Lord 
Chatham. "He had," says Cavour, "the lights of his 
time ; he was no friend of despotism nor a champion of 
intolerance. This A 7 ast and able mind loved power as a 
means, not as an end. He was not one of those men who 
aim at recasting society from top to bottom, with loose 
conceptions and humanitarian theories of profound and 
frigid genius. Devoid of prejudices, he was animated 
only by the love of his country and of glory. If he had 
governed in a time of peace and tranquillity he would 
have been a reformer in the manner of Peel and Canning, 



24 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

uniting his own peculiar boldness to the largeness of 
view of the one, and the ableness and the sagacity of the 
other." 

Pitt, Canning, Kobert Peel — such were the men 
whom Cavour loved to take for models, and it was thus 
at the moment when the period of reforms opened for 
Italy, and those agitations and illusions whereof the 
accession of Pius IX. was the signal, that " the obscure 
citizen of Piedmont" found himself, better than any 
other, armed for public life. 

On the first concessions made by Charles Albert at 
the end of 1847, he flung himself resolutely into this 
new career, not in the character of one agitator more, 
but as a counsellor, as a guide, by the aid of a journal, 
The Risorgimiento, which he founded with his friends, 
the moderate Liberals of Turin, Balbo, Massimo 
d'Azeglio, Carlo Boncompagni, Michelangelo Castelli. 
The Risorgimiento represented the opinions of all those 
who desire to maintain a good understanding between 
princes and people ; whose effort it was to regulate 
without enchaining the liberal and national movement 
of Italy. Cavour was not precisely a journalist ; to him 
journalism was only a new sphere of action, which, like 
all that he did, was useful to him ; it compelled him to 
fix his ideas ; and successively on two important occa- 
sions, the journalist, the leader of moderate Liberalism, 
had occasion to show that he did not shrink from reso- 
lutions of the gravest importance. 

One day, early in 1848, there had been troubles in 
Genoa, that centre of keen passions. A deputation had 
gone to Turin to demand from the king, Charles Albert, 



THE REVOLUTIONS OF FEBRUARY, 1848. 25 

the expulsion of the Jesuits and the institution of a 
National Guard. The public mind was in a state of 
excitement. The Liberal section at Turin was favour- 
able to the Genoese deputation. Cavour instantly per- 
ceived that they were on a wrong track, and that to 
demand rigorous measures against the Jesuits was to run 
the risk of wounding the religious sentiments of the 
king ; that a National Guard could only provoke trouble 
and sedition so long as a legal representation of the 
whole country was wanting ; and he proposed to go 
straight to the point, without confining himself to the 
Genoese petition — to claim a Constitution. 

While it was more daring, it was also more politic, 
for this was a step to flatter the pride and secret ambi- 
tion of the prince whom the Constitution would elect 
the chief of Liberal Italy. It was in the very essence of 
Cavour, and, curiously enough, those who most warmly 
opposed him, those who refused to follow him, were men 
of extreme Liberalism, men of the Democratic party, 
Valerio and Sineo, who were suspicious of his leaning to 
English institutions, and ironically called him "My Lord 
Camillo." From that moment arose the question 
between constitutional policy and revolutionary policy. 

Shortly after this, everything had undergone a sin- 
gular change ; there was no longer any question of the 
Constitution wrested from the vacillations of Charles 
Albert. The revolution of February 24 had just burst 
forth, everywhere kindling incendiary fires, in Italy and 
in Germany — at Vienna as well as at Berlin. Sicily 
was already in a state of insurrection. After five clays' 
combat, Milan had expelled the Germans ; while, at the 



26 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

same moment, Venice was setting herself free. The 
Austrian dominion, weakened in the heart of the empire 
by the Viennese revolution, had barely a hold even in 
its fortresses of the Adige. Amidst all these events, 
Turin re-echoed with impassioned appeals : Cavour was 
one of the first to utter the decisive word. " The 
supreme moment has arrived for the Sardinian 
monarchy," he wrote, on March 23, 1848 ; "the moment 
of grave deliberations ; that which decides the fortune 
of empires and the fate of nations. In the face of the 
recent events in Lombardy and at Vienna, hesitation 

and doubt are no longer tolerable We, men of 

coolness, accustomed to follow the counsels of reason 
rather than the passions of the heart, after carefully 
weighing our words, should declare that only one course 
is open to the nation, to the government, and to the 
king — war ! immediate war ! . . . . Under existing 
circumstances, the highest policy is that of bold 

resolutions " 

Thus Cavour struck at once to the centre of the Italian 
movement, outstepping the boldest, and approaching — 
without much of illusion, perhaps, but with no vain 
subterfuges — that double question of constitutional 
liberty and of national independence which suddenly 
sprung up in the midst of the universal outburst. 



VII. 

Italy was destined to stand for mournful evidence of 
how a national revolution can in a few years be wrecked 
for want of maturity and good management — how, on 



CONDITION OF EUROPE. 27 

the contrary, that same revolution could become suc- 
cessful when patiently organised and skilfully conducted. 
What was not known in March, 1848, the which has since 
been a lesson to a whole generation, was that this sudden 
crisis, perhaps an inevitable one, before which men like 
Cavour thought it their duty not to draw back, was never- 
theless the most perilous of trials. Circumstances seemed, 
no doubt, at first to warrant audacity, and fortune seemed 
to smile on Italy. Eadetzki's army, driven back from 
Milan and from Lombardy, reduced to shut itself up in 
Verona, in the midst of a circle of fire, and almost 
deserted by Vienna, was, it might well be believed, a 
last defence, quite inadequate to maintain the Austrian 
dominion beyond the Alps. On the other hand, the 
Piedmontesc army, crossing the Ticino under the com- 
mand of Charles Albert, could with a single spring reach 
the lines of the Mincio and the Adige. For four months 
it fought most valiantly, and a day came — that of the 
taking of Peschiera and the victory at Goito — when the 
cause of Italian independence seemed almost won. It 
was, in reality, a grand undertaking badly begun, and 
rendered complex by inexperience of every sort, as well 
as by every passion and every illusion which could lead 
it to a fatal termination. 

The first of its dangers rested with external cir- 
cumstances. The war of 1848, which broke out thus 
unexpectedly and with so little preparation, was inti- 
mately connected with a wide-set revolutionary situation, 
with an European convulsion. The result was that, up 
to a certain point, everything beyond the Alps depended 
upon what took place in Europe — upon the reactions 



28 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

which might, and which inevitably must, ensue. The 
chances of succeeding, which at the commencement of 
the campaign no doubt were real, diminished in pro- 
portion as events unrolled themselves. 

After the days of June France was fully occupied 
with her own affairs. The intervention she had thought of, 
when she gathered together an army of the Alps, dwindled 
into an evasive and lingering mediation. England, an 
ally in this mediation, was only anxious to have done 
with agitations seeming to threaten the peace of Europe 
established in 1815. Eevolutionary Germany, far from 
being favourable in parliament at Frankfort, openly 
pointed to the fortresses of the Adige as being the 
outworks of her natural frontiers. Austria, shaken 
for a moment, had time to look about her, and, 
by the assistance of her generals at Prague and at 
Vienna, to recover herself; and from the heart of the 
empire the poets sent forth to Eadetzki, to that ancient 
warrior of Italy, the sympathetic war-cry, 45- " Austria is 
in your camp !" In a few months everything had 
changed, in so much that, before the autumn of 1848, 
Piedmont, flung back from the Mincio to the Ticino, 
reduced to undergo the humiliating armistice of 
August 16, stood unsupported to face a strengthened 
and victorious Austria, having nothing more to hope 
from Europe, hesitating to recommence hostilities, with 

* Lines of Grillparzer's, very popular in Vienna at the time : 

GMckauf, mein Feldherr, fuhre den Streich, 

Nicht bios um des Ruhmes schimnier : 
In deinem Lager is Oesterreich, 

Wir andern sind einzelne Trummer. — Tr. 



EFFECTS OF PARTY PASSIONS. 29 

an army disorganised by defeat, and already powerless 
to restrain the passions urging it to renew the combat. 

The violence of these passions, raging beneath the 
surface in Italy, led straight to ruin. While the army 
was gallantly fighting at Pastrengo, Goito, Curtatone, 
and Vicenza, everything was conspiring against her. 
The princes, on the one hand, full of misgivings and 
alarm, refused their alliance ; the Pope, by the ency- 
clical of April 29, disavowed the war of indepen- 
dence ; and King Ferdinand of Naples was engaging, 
on May 15, in a victorious battle of internal repression, 
which ultimately drove Neapolitan policy to extreme 
reactionary measures. 

On the other hand, the political doctrinaires, the 
abettors of sedition and conspiracy, with Mazzini at 
their head, were puffing the flame, adding to the diffi- 
culties of war by their divisions, and the outbreak of all 
the republican passions, unionist or federalist. These 
were really Austria's most useful auxiliaries ; and the 
reverses of the Piedmontese army became the signal for 
an immense and disastrous anarchy, which extended far 
and wide, manifesting itself successively — at Milan, in 
scenes which imperilled the life of Charles Albert ; at 
Kome, in the murder of Eossi, the flight of the Pope, 
and the proclamation of Mazzini's republic ; at Florence, 
in the flight of the Grand Duke, and the advent of a 
noisy and confused demagogy. 

Although Piedmont was protected by solid tradi- 
tions, by a national dynasty, and by the "statute,"""" or 
royal decree, recently promulgated, it did not escape the 

* Stahrfo fondamentale, the basis of a constitution, sworn to Charles Albert 
February 8, 1818, and observed by him. 



30 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

universal contagion. The democratic party of the 
Ratazzis, the Valerios, the Buffas, the Ravinas, the Brof- 
ferias, although it did not carry a majority in the newly- 
opened parliament, was powerful enough to perplex the 
military and political action of the government, by its in- 
coherent propositions and its declamations, aided by the 
clubs and an intemperate and excited press. At Turin 
that party was the representative or the accomplice of a 
turbulent democracy, the ally of all the agitators of Italy, 
and of all the partisans of war to the knife, of popular 
insurrections, and the wildest of combinations. I am 
but summing up the situation of 1848, in its principal 
external and internal features. 

vnr. 

In the midst of these disturbances, and in this feverish 
and dramatic inauguration of public life in Piedmont, 
Cavour fought in the front ranks, both as deputy from 
Turin to parliament, and in his capacity of editor of TJie 
Risorgimiento. 

A constitutionalist and a patriot before the " statuto," 
and before the war, he was during the struggle the least 
revolutionary of men, the most reasonable, and the most 
liberal. Against those who feigned to bribe the union 
of Lombardy and of Piedmont with the simulacrum of 
a constituent assembly, he energetically upheld the 
necessity for immediate amalgamation. To those who 
proposed to establish a sliding-scale of taxation, he- 
replied with the experienced discernment of a financier, 
a political economist, and a man of business. To those 
who were ever talking of recommencing hostilities with 



REVOLUTIONARY MEANS. 31 

a disorganised army, reckoning on the help of France 
and of England, he exhibited the views of a politician 
sagaciously weighing the affairs of Europe. In the 
presence of vain and turbulent hostilities he stood by the 
Government. He did not fear the conflict. Without 
immediately obtaining the success of an orator, he soon 
became seasoned, making his way, and facing with an 
imperturbable coolness the hissing of public assemblies 
and the unpopularity of the streets, bearing lightly the 
name of coclino, much amused with the accusation 
brought against him of his being an Anglomaniac. He 
was a frank and simple moderate, eager for the fray ; of 
a merciless common sense and irony towards those who 
believed only in " revolutionary means " without taking- 
nature, reality, and experience into account. One day, 
in November, 1848, he directly attacked this shibboleth 
of the extreme party. 

" What is it," said he, "which has always wrecked 
the finest and justest of revolutions ? — The mania for 
revolutionary means ; the men who have attempted 
to emancipate themselves from ordinary laws ; . . . . 
the French Constituent Assembly creating the as- 
signats in contempt of nature and economic laws ; — 
revolutionary means, productive of discredit and of 
ruin ! The Convention attempting to smother in blood 
the resistance to its ambitious project ; — revolutionary 
means, producing the Directory, the Consulate, and the 
Empire ; Napoleon bending all to his caprice, imagining 
1 that one can with a like facility concpier at the Bridge 
of Lodi and wipe out a law of nature ; ' — revolutionary 
means, leading to Waterloo and St. Helena ! The sec- 



32 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOTTE. 

tarians of June striving to impose the Democratic and 
social republic by fire and sword : — revolutionary means, 
producing the siege of Paris and reaction everywhere. 
Wait but a little longer," he added, " and you will see 
the last consequence of your revolutionary means — Louis 
Napoleon on the Throne! " 

In truth he was of a just, liberal, and far-seeing 
mind ; but neither Cavour, nor his friends in parliament, 
nor of the press, could, placed as they were in the 
centre of a circle of fire, improvise moderate views that 
should yet have strength to prevail. The movement 
that was hurrying Italy away, and re-echoed through 
Turin, swept off with it successively the first constitu- 
tional ministry of Count Balbo, Count Casati's ministry 
of national compromise, the armistice ministry of Alfieri, 
Eevel, Pinelli, to fling itself into one of headlong 
measures, revolutionary plots, and war at any price. 

For a moment only, in the latter days of 1848, 
Vincenzo Gidberti, a man raised to power through popu- 
larity, seemed called to arrest events, or to stamp them 
with a new character ; at least he tried to do so, and in 
so doing he soon learnt to appreciate the energetic assist- 
ance of Cavour, who had previously defended to the 
utmost the ministry of Counts Eevel and Pinelli against 
him. 

Gioberti felt the danger of a policy that was at once 
coarsely revolutionary and rashly pledged to war. He 
understood that without renouncing the idea of national 
independence it was possible to reach it by another road ; 
and before precipitating herself upon the Austrians, 
Piedmont had another part to play — that of bringing the 



GIOBERTI. 33 

Grand Duke horue to Florence and the Pope to Eome ; 
and everywhere re-establish a constitutional government, 
— in a word, to direct the Italian movement. Piedmont 
would thus deprive Austria of one excuse for intervening 
in Peninsular affairs, at the same time conciliating and 
strengthening the restored princes ; she would regain the 
sympathy of Europe, now ready to forsake her, out- 
wearied of so much excitement ; and when her work was 
completed she would find herself in a better position 
either to negotiate with the concourse of mediating 
Powers, or again to take up arms. 

Thing's were in readiness : England and France 
approved of the plan ; General Alfonso La Marmora 
was approaching with a Piedmontese division from 
Tuscany. Unfortunately Gioberti, having come into 
power with the perfervid heads of the period, such as 
Patazzi, Buffa, Sineo, and Tecchio, had been guilty of 
the error of dissolving the first Piedmontese parliament, 
when it had hardly been established, and to suffer a new 
and thoroughly Democratic chamber to be elected under 
the auspices of his name. Gioberti still fancied himself 
the master when he had ceased to be anything. At last 
he was left alone with his project of intervention, for- 
saken by a chamber to which ten elections had returned 
him ; betrayed in his own cabinet by certain of his 
colleagues, and vainly supported by Cavour, who had 
now to defend him against his recent friends. 

The defeat of Gioberti was the victory of the Demo- 
cratic ministers opposed to intervention in Central Italy. 
These, impatient to break with the armistice and all 
negotiations, were for immediate war. Gioberti's defeat 



34 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOTJR. 

was the resumption of the old policy of extremes, with 
an army still inefficiently reorganised, and irritated by 
party insults ; with a king overwhelmed with bitterness. 
Placed midway between intricate complications at home 
and a new war of independence, Charles Albert pre- 
ferred to throw himself on the Austrian sword, heading 
a country whose only cry was : "Let us make an end of 
it ! " One year after first crossing the Ticino, and 
the hopeful departure for the campaign in Lombardy, 
Piedmont found herself again driven to the combat, to 
play the highest of stakes. The policy of " revolution- 
ary means," to use Cavour's own words, had been per- 
mitted to see the light, to show its complete hollowness. 
On March 23, 1489, it expired in the catastrophe of 
Novara, where Charles Albert staked his crown with an 
all but desperate heroism, and for a time the last chance 
was wrecked for Piedmont and Italy. 



IX. 

Imagine this morrow of defeat prepared by a spirit 
of rashness, and settled in a few hours. A vanquished 
nation always seems to plunge into the very bottom of 
the abyss. 

The first consequence of the defeat of Novara was 
the necessity for an armistice, which handed over a 
portion of the country to foreign occupation. The 
Austrians, encamped on the Sesia, with power to place a 
garrison in Alessandria, held Piedmont between the two 
threats of an absolute invasion or a treaty of peace, of 
which they would not state the conditions. The 



THE RISING IN GENOA. 35 

Piedmontesc could no longer oppose any steady re- 
sistance. No doubt the army had fought gallantly at 
Mortara and at Novara, under the eyes of Charles 
Albert — always in the hottest fire of battle. It had 
lost some of its generals and many of its officers, fallen 
before the enemy. It was not the less in a condition of 
extreme demoralisation, composed as it was chiefly of 
recruits, and convinced that it had been forced to pay 
the price of blood for the madness of political agitators. 
The officers found it impossible to keep together their 
men, who broke, and scattered panic all about them. 

At Turin opinions wavered between discouragement 
and exasperation. The clubs were noisy with passionate 
rhetoric, and naturally enough there arose a cry of 
treason. In the chambers, Brofferio prepared a decree 
of general insurrection, and the formation in the 
assembly of a committee of public safety. Motions in 
Parliament rapidly succeeded one another : one in- 
geniously declaring the armistice to be " unconsti- 
tutional," and the " statuto " in peril ; another threaten- 
ing to indict the Government if it opened the gates 
of Alessandria to the Austrians ; a third gravely prepared 
an inquiry into the situation, and as to means for pur- 
suing the war : all this as though the enemy were not at 
hand, and ready to draw the sword of certain victory if 
defied. 

Matters at Turin were of small moment for the 
nonce. At the first news of disaster, the populous and 
fiery city of Genoa, the town of Mazziniism, caught the 
contagion, passing from agitation to insurrection, and 
thence to a real revolution. Either the army had 



36 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

betrayed its chiefs, or it had been betrayed by them. 
The " statuto " had been violated. Turin was to be 
handed over to the Austrians, and Genoa herself was to 
be held as a hostage of war. It was with these reports, 
perfidiously spread, that agitators inflamed the public 
mind, and gave the signal for civil war. 

The garrison, chiefly composed of reserves weakly 
commanded, was compelled to retire after a humiliating 
surrender to the rioters, who thus remained masters of 
the town, the arms, artillery, forts, and defences of the 
most important place in the kingdom. The unrestrained 
populace massacred a few unfortunates, among whom 
were a major of carabineers and the military com- 
mandant of the city ; the general and his family were 
detained as hostages. The Genoese rabble, headed 
by an old emigre, the veteran Avezzana, constituted 
itself an "association of public safety" — "the provi- 
sional government of Liguria." It refused to recognise 
the armistice, it separated itself from Piedmont, and it 
humiliated the army by putting itself in opposition to 
the regular authorities. In truth, what took place as 
early as 1849 at Genoa, was an anticipatory sketch of 
the Commune in Paris in 1871. 

This furious rabble, anxious to take advantage of the 
general disturbance, could not perceive that it was guilty 
of the crime of national treason ; that in so doing it 
could only add to the misery of the masses, draw on 
Piedmont a still heavier invasion, and place the Govern- 
ment in a situation still more difficult. The defeat at 
Novara, the disorganised army, the threatened ruin of 
the country, agitations at Turin, civil war at Genoa.. 



VICTOR EMMANUEL'S DIFFICULTIES. 37 

uncertainty everywhere — this was what followed the 
catastrophe. It was in these conditions that the young 
prince, destined by his birth to wear the crown of the 
exiled Charles Albert — Victor Emmanuel — re-entered 
Turin in the last days of March, 1849, to find himself 
so situated that everything depended on his first acts. 



There were two policies open to the new reign. At 
this decisive moment of European reaction and national 
confusion, Victor Emmanuel could lay aside the 
" statuto," and the recently inaugurated liberal regime, 
again possess himself of the blue flag of Savoy, and 
recover the past by shutting himself up within his 
frontiers, and no longer turning his attention beyond 
the Ticino towards Italy. Had he done this he would 
certainly have obtained an easier peace, and he would 
in his perplexity have had the support of Austria. 
External solicitations were not wanting — the most 
powerful influences sought to incline him to this reso- 
lution, which would perhaps have given him a certain 
momentary security, — but it is true it would have 
placed him in the modest condition of a subject of 
Austria — another Duke of Modena, or a second Grand 
Duke of Tuscany. Victor Emmanuel could also* have 
manfully resigned himself to his ill-fortune, and have 
endured the ill results of war, without sacrificing the 
" statuto,'' or the tricoloured flag — the only two surviv- 
ing representatives, the only two symbols of Piedmontcse 
independence, and of Italian hopes, that were left. 



38 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOTJB. 

Thus placed between divergent policies, tlie soldierly 
and princely loyalty of Victor Emmanuel did not hesi- 
tate : he accepted the part of liberal and national king,' 
and certainly the most significant testimony that he 
could give of the frankness of his intentions was almost 
immediately to elevate to the post of prime minister 
him who might be termed the Knight of Italy, Massimo 
d'Azeoiio, still lame of a wound he had received at 
Vicenza. 

This was decisive of the fate of Italy ; this made of 
that dark day of Novara not only an anniversary of 
mourning for the bloody termination to the incon- 
secutive attempts of 1848, but made it also the sombre 
yet absolute starting-point of a new epoch. By the 
preservation of the tricoloured Italian flag and the 
maintenance of the " statute " the future of Italy was 
saved. " It is a long work to recommence," said 
D'Azeglio, "but we will recommence it." And on the 
other hand, Cavour wrote about the same time to 
Salvagnoli : " As long as liberty exists in one corner 
of the Peninsula we must not despair of the future. 
As long as Piedmont can protect its institutions from 
despotism and anarchy, there will be a means of working 
successfully at the regeneration of the country." 

It was with nothing more nor less than the 
" statute " that Massimo d'Azegiio entered into office 
after Novara, calling to his assistance men as moderate 
and patriotic as himself — Count Siccardi, Paleocapa, the 
Venetian, the banker Nigra, and General Alfonso La 
Marmora, who had lately performed a national service, 
in suppressing, with equal judgment and promptitude, 



TERMS OF PEACE. 89 

the factious Genoese. Indeed, the task was not an easy 
one ; it had to triumph over the confusion and irritation 
of parties, parliamentary blunders due to inexperience, 
and all possible internal and external difficulties. 

Peace was the chief necessity, and D'Azeglio, in 
submitting to it and negotiating for it, set an example 
of resigned patriotism and courageous abnegation. It 
was evident that this peace must be a hard one ; it 
carried Piedmont back to the treaties of 1815, inflict- 
ing a war indemnity of seventy-five millions of francs 
— a heavy weight on the budget of the country. After 
all, it was not humiliating ; it was a necessity. It 
will, however, scarcely be credited — parties played the 
sad game of bargaining with that necessity, and refusing 
their co-operation, at the risk of sacrificing everything. 
On two occasions the Government saw itself reduced to 
dissolve the House, and on the last of these two the 
king himself was compelled to make a direct appeal to 
the common sense of the country by the proclamation of 
Moncalieri, which, under the cloak of a coup d'etat, was 
nevertheless a deed of far-sighted Liberalism. " Do not 
these gentlemen perceive," said D'Azeglio, sadly, " that 
the Ministry has already enough to do in upholding the 
Constitution — and that after us the Croats ? " 

This was not the only task. At the time when Pied- 
mont stood for Constitutionalism, reaction carried the day 
in all parts of Europe. Piedmontese liberty seemed an 
anomaly and a danger, in the midst of the absolutist 
restorations which were taking place in Italy, at Rome, 
at Florence, and at Milan. Austria signalised Turin as 
a last incendiary focus. The Emperor of Russia declined 



40 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUli. 

any intercourse with the new King of Sardinia, Even 
in France the Conservative party, which had lately rein- 
stated the Pope at Rome, seemed to look upon this 
transalpine constitutional regime, which had the strange 
pretension of accomplishing reforms, both civil and 
religious, as a troublesome and importunate brawler. 
Piedmont encountered everywhere hostility or coldness, 
so that what had to be done was virtually, day by day, 
to wrest, as it were, from Austria, and from domestic 
factions as well as foreign suspicions, that " statuto " in 
which a well-inspired prince and wise Liberals perceived 
a means of reconstructing, with the aid of a constitu- 
tional monarchy, what had been cast down by revolu- 
tions and revolutionists. 



XI. 

Cavour was one of the most energetic supporters of 
this renovating policy, and of D'Azegiio's ministry. At 
the democratic elections which had overthrown Gioberti, 
in January, 1849, he had been excluded from parliament 
as a reactionary or codino ; the extremists had defeated 
him by bringing forward to oppose him an obscure 
nonentity of the name of Pansoya — a Barodet of the 
period — who only owed his celebrity of one day to that 
strange adventure. At the elections which followed 
after Novara, Cavour again found himself at the head of 
the poll in his native town of Turin ; re-entering the 
House never again to leave it ; and in this new position 
he rapidly attained increasing authority, warranted and 
confirmed by the clear-sighted decision he had not 



HIS SUrPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT. 41 

eeased to show for the space of a year ; by the political 
spirit that never left him ; and by a superiority that 
made itself felt in matters of public and financial 
economy. 

He was the same frank and simple upholder of the 
Constitution before the crisis as after it. He held in 
antipathy and contempt the bragging of impotent 
revolutionists ; and he defended and stood by the 
Government, more especially in the critical times imme- 
diately succeeding Novara, until the peace was definitely 
settled, which was only in January, 1850. But let us 
not deceive ourselves. Cavour, in the meantime, still 
remained a bold and active Liberal, accepting the 
"statuto" with all its conditions, guarantees, and con- 
sequences. In upholding the Ministry, he often stimu- 
lated and outstripped it ; he was becoming, by degrees, 
the chief — the leader, if not, of the Conservative 
majority, with which he kept pace — at least, of the 
Liberal fraction of that majority. He was not the 
man to pursue a Conservative policy as a partisan of 
immobility and reaction ; nor was he slow in showing 
that in him, the moderate and parliamentary man was 
the statesman born for power and action. 

Opportunities were not wanting : they were the 
natural issue of that policy of day by day ; and, indeed, 
of the constitutional system, which is perpetually bring- 
ing parties into collision. 

One of the simplest consequences of this system was 
evidently the suppression of privileged jurisdictions and 
ecclesiastical immunities in the administration of justice. 
It was natural that the most religious and the most 



42 LIFF OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

conservative of the men on the Eight, Count Balbo and 
Count Bevel, friends of the Ministry, should not them- 
selves hold the principle in doubt ; they only asked that 
negotiations should be made first with the Pope. Un- 
fortunately, such negotiations had been carried on for 
two years in vain, and a longer delay would only 
enervate the new institutions, and allow it to be sup- 
posed that in a Liberal State there could be two laws, 
two jurisdictions, and two powers. It is true there 
were many other questions of civil reforms and eccle- 
siastical organisations, issuing infallibly from a consti- 
tutional regime. For the time being the Ministry did 
not go so far; it modestly contented itself with pro- 
posing the abolition of ecclesiastical privileges, of that 
which was called the foro. 

Such was the bill introduced by the minister of 
justice, Count Siccardi — supported by all the sincere 
Liberals ; contested dubiously by a portion of the minis- 
terial Eight ; and combated with fury by the members 
of the reaction. 

Cavour could not hesitate. He was of those who 
had urged the Ministry to present the bill ; and when 
the matter was discussed in March, 1850, he seized the 
opportunity of claiming the civil rights of society in the 
face of the privileges of the Church ; thus boldly to 
resume a true constitutional policy. He "combated 
those who were always opposed to reforms — sometimes 
on the score of troubled times, at others because they 
were tranquil ; he called attention to English statesmen, 
who knew how to turn the tide of revolution by the use 
of opportune measures ; and he added : " When reforms 



EXAMPLE OF ENGLISH STATESMEN. 43 

are effected in good time, far from weakening autho- 
rity, they strengthen it, rendering the revolutionary 
spirit powerless. I would say, therefore, to statesmen : 
Frankly follow the examples of the Duke of Wellington, 
Earl Grey, and Sir Eobert Peel .... follow broadly 
the road of reforms, without fear of their being 
inopportune. Do not think that it will weaken the 
cause of the constitutional throne, for it will on the 
contrary strengthen it, and will strike such deep roots 
into our soil that, should revolution spring up around 
us, not only will it have power to dominate revolution, 
but it will gather about it all the live forces of Italy, and 
conduct the nation to the destinies awaiting her " 

This speech, one of the first in which Cavour 
revealed his innermost thought, manifestly outstepped 
the limits of a special question, and in determining the 
success of the law in parliament, in the public mind 
it left a profound impression as the revelation of a 
policy, and of the man created to conduct it. 

Another opportunity soon presented itself. This 
time it was not one of those delicate questions which 
stir every passion, but of the cruelly-embarrassed con- 
dition of Piedmontese finance — a deficit of six millions 
per annum. Cavour, as we have said, stood by the 
Government, brushing aside puerile charges and 
chimerical schemes ; but in defending the Government, 
he caused it to feel the prick of the spur. He in turn 
reviewed the economical position, like a man who was 
master of the facts ; touching upon them with clearness 
and confident boldness ; and at the end of the list he con- 
cluded by saying nearly in these words : "Be careful; 



44 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

if in tlie next session the Ministry does not bring forward 
a financial scheme by which to restore the balance, with 
a reformed custom-house tariff, and the system of tax- 
ation which the country needs, I shall deeply regret it : we 

shall, my friends and I, be compelled to abandon it 

Although the condition of our country is serious, it 
is by no means desperate ; we only need a little strength 
of will and courage to make it accede to the necessary 

taxation Let us hear no more of party agitations ; 

the union between the king and the nation is sufficiently 
close and well established, there is nothing to fear from 
extreme, revolutionary, or reactionary parties. I do not 

fear the spread of either one or the other Proceed, 

therefore ; banish alarms ; you will have the support of 
parliament and of the country, even in the most dis- 
tressing portion of our task — the re-establishment of the 
balance of expenditure and income." 

In this universal ability, firmness of mind in matters 
politic, and prompt activity, we discern the man and the 
minister eager to restore lost time, ripe for the work. 
So clearly was this felt, that when the minister of 
commerce, Santa-Eosa, died unexpectedly, in October, 
1850, the name of Cavour instantly suggested itself. 
Everything concurred in pointing out Cavour as his fit 
successor, at a time when circumstances were full of 
anguish. The unfortunate Santa-Eosa having taken part 
in the introduction as well as the vote of the law of the 
foro, yet nevertheless profoundly religious, was, by 
order of the Archbishop of Turin, Mgr. Fransoni, harshly 
refused the last sacraments of the Church. A painful 
scene took place round this death-bed, of a man begging 



A ROYAL PREDICTION. 45 

for the prayers of the priest, while he stoutly refused to 
utter a recantation which he considered would dishonour 
his name. 

At Turin public opinion was deeply moved, and not 
unnaturally turned towards him who had been the 
intimate friend of Santa-Kosa, and who more than any 
other had lent his aid to the success of the law of the 
foro. D'Azeglio himself desired no better than to have 
the support of so able and vigorous an athlete, and when 
he went to propose him to Victor Emmanuel, the king, 
without showing any more surprise than the rest, replied 
shrewdly : "I will accept him ; but wait a little, and he 
will rob you of all your portfolios." As to these con- 
ditions, Cavour had made none, neither as regarded men 
nor things. He knew that a minister has what power he 
is capable of taking, capable of exercising. Here was his 
old saying of the Villa Bolongaro : " We will do some- 
thing." Before long, he had added the ministry of com- 
merce to that of finance ; he held in hand the whole 
economic government of Piedmont, and Victor Emmanuel 
had said truly, that was not all ! 



XII. 

My desire is to point out the nature of a situation in 
which a vanquished country has the good fortune, in 
the moment when most wanted, to meet with a well- 
inspired prince, and devoted men, who do not despair of 
raising it, by the aid of patriotism and constitutional 
liberty, from a disaster apparently irreparable. 

This difficult and complicated task was not accom- 



46 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

plished in a single day or by a single blow ; it passed 
through many an obscure and peculiar crisis. In 
fact, it had two characteristic phases, of which the 
first is represented by the ministry of D'Azeglio, which 
Cavour entered in October, 1850, and which, immediately 
after Novara, was the true terminating point of the 
ruin, when things began to mend. It was really the 
ministry of an imperative peace, heightened and made 
good by the maintenance of liberal institutions. 

While D'Azeglio, with his affable dignity and loyal 
moderation, was endeavouring to disperse external dis- 
trust, and re-establish the diplomatic position of Pied- 
mont, Count Siccardi took the lead in ecclesiastical 
reforms. After having restored peace at Genoa, General 
Alfonso La Marmora, the minister of war, used all his 
efforts to reconstruct an army disorganised by defeat. 
Military institutions had to be modified, a new system of 
military instruction begun, officers' corps reconstructed, 
by an opening of the ranks of the regular army to most 
of the other Italian provinces who had fought with the 
Piedmontese during the war ; and he inspired all with 
the same spirit. " I trust," said he, "that from whatever 
province they may come, the officers are fully penetrated 
with the national sentiment which makes all Italians 
equally devoted sons of the same great country — Italy I " 
La Marmora did not shrink from making himself respon- 
sible before the chambers by pushing on the fortifications 
of Casale, fortifications which, ten years later, in 1859, 
were to arrest the Austrian invasion. 

In this renovating work Cavour, as minister of 
commerce and finance, lent important assistance, by his 



WORK OF RECONSTRUCTION. 47 

economic reforms, by throwing off the shackles from 
commerce, and by his combinations of imposts ; especially 
by an inexhaustible fertility of resource and untiring 
activity, which soon gave him influence in parliament. 

Piedmont started afresh. But in advancing it had 
to face a double difficulty ; one which I should call a 
matter of general policy, and another of parliamentary 
conduct. 

The question of general policy seemed decided, but 
it sprang up at every step and in every form, under 
conditions in which everything was changed. At the 
time when D Azeglio's new ministry had been formed, in 
upholding under the hard blow of Novara the flag of the 
"statuto," and the Liberal cause of the nation, Cavour 
had been compelled to dissolve a chamber when a warlike 
and revolutionary opposition could only prove to be 
dangerous. It was not before a second dissolution of 
parliament, and through the intervention of the king, 
that he had obtained from the country a parliamen- 
tary assembly that he could work with. In this new 
Ministry the majority, composed of all shades of Con- 
servatism, was immense ; the Left represented a minority 
too small to be feared. This Conservative chamber gave 
Piedmont peace and good order, and saved her from 
perdition. 

The acceptance and conclusion of peace was the 
signal for a totally new state of things, in which the 
internal affairs of the country resumed primary import- 
ance, and parties began visibly to become modified and 
transformed. While a fraction of the majority represent- 
ing a Liberal Conservative Centre, and headed by such 



48 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

men as Pinelli, Boncompagni, and Castelli, did not 
hesitate to follow the Ministry in its attempts at reform 
in a wisely Liberal course, the extreme Eight, with 
whom were Balbo, Count Revel, Colonel Menabrea and 
a few deputies from Savoy, offered a certain resistance. 
It did not wish to separate itself from the Government, 
nor was it other than sincerely constitutional ; but, on 
the whole, it was a stationary or reactionary party, 
which was for the " statuto," but with none of its con- 
sequences, and in supporting the Government often 
perplexed it. 

When the Ministry presented the law of the foro, 
Count Balbo and his friends opposed it. When Cavour 
carried out his reforms in political economy, and was in 
negotiation with France, England, and Belgium for a 
treaty of commerce, he met with opposition from Count 
Revel, and from the Conservative protectionists. 
Although Colonel Menabrea, then a young and brilliant 
officer of engineers and an able speaker, was not pre- 
cisely adverse, his attitude resembled that of a clerical 
and Conservative dissenter ; when the question of eccle- 
siastical privileges was broached, he had quitted the post 
of first secretary of foreign affairs. Meantime, in the 
opposite camp, a movement was taking place in a con- 
trary direction. The extreme Left — of the Tecchios, 
Sineos, Brofferios — was lively, and retained its pas- 
sionate and declamatory habits. But already a group 
was detaching itself from this Democratic party, forming, 
as it were, a Left Centre, with Rattazzi, Lanza, Cadorna, 
and Buffa, This Left Centre was gradually drawing 
nearer to the Government, preserving no more than an 



PARLIAMENTARY DIFFICULTIES. 40 

opposition of tactics, or of the occasion, and even some- 
times upholding ministerial reforms with its votes. 

Parliamentary conditions began to wear a strange 
aspect. On the one hand, the Ministry had a majority, 
with which it had made peace ; but a portion of it 
seemed to resist or fall off whenever the policy of 
the Government followed its national and liberal 
course ; on the other, the Cabinet had adversaries 
to encounter, from whom it had become estranged, 
chiefly in 1848 and 1849 ; but these had been visibly 
affected by the sobering influence of events. They 
might either become useful allies or dangerous oppo- 
nents. Hence a stirring situation, dubious and un- 
certain. Some positive step had plainly to be taken. 
To remain at the disposal of the Eight was to allow the 
policy of Government to drift towards reactions, which 
would one day affect the system of religious reforms, 
and probably, also, the liberty of the press and electoral 
law. Persistency in the policy that had been inaugu- 
rated was to accept in advance the necessity of making 
up for defections in the Right by other alliances and 
other support. The Ministry was not deceived, and here 
the question became complicated by the differences of 
the temperament in two men who were at the same time 
friends and competitors in the Government — D'Azeglio 
and Cavour. 

XIII. 

D'Azeglio and Cavour took exactly the same view of 
the liberal and national course to be adopted by Pied- 
mont ; but, for reasons of diplomacy, as well as from 

E 



50 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

personal characteristics, D'Azeglio found it hard to make 
up his mind to an open and avowed rupture with the 
Right. Devotion to the service of his country, rather 
than taste or ambition, had raised him to the Ministry ; 
and he remained, when in power, the same generous and 
softly-mannered gentleman — clear-sighted and amiable, 
courageous in danger, a little languid in overcoming 
everyday difficulties, and easily wearied of business. 
Cavour had the energy and activity of a political man 
who had a passion for business matters, and not only 
foresaw coming difficulties, but instantly sought to 
counteract or to overcome them. 

He was not insensible to the seriousness, and even 
the pain, of having to separate from " friends of child- 
hood," as he called them ;* if the success of a liberal 
and national policy could only be bought at that price, 
he did not hesitate ; he was not one to halt half way. 
With the instincts of a man born to govern, he often 
grew impatient with the perplexities caused to the 
Ministry by a more or less avowed resistance ; he under- 
stood that, with an uncertain, shifting, and restless ma- 
jority, it is impossible to govern " on a needle's point." 
"I have been accused," he says later, " of having separated 
from old friends ; the accusation is unfounded. I have 
not left them, but they have left me. I did everything 

* About that time, when in an animated discussion, he chanced to meet 
"with opposition from old friends, he said with emotion, but resolutely : " Yes, 
gentlemen, I know that in entering on political life, in time of such difficulties 
as these, one must be prepared for the greatest deceptions. I am prepared for 
it. Should I be compelled to give up all the friends of my childhood ; if I 
should have to see my most intimate acquaintances transformed into my 
bitterest enemies, I would not fail in my duty. I will never abandon the prin- 
ciples of liberty, to whic'.i I have vowed allegiance " 



RATTAZZT. 51 

to retain them, and to persuade them ; it is they who 
have refused to follow me. Ought I, then, to have 
stood alone, rejecting the co-operation of those who 
were disposed to follow me ? " 

Those who showed themselves disposed to follow 
him belonged to the Left Centre, chiefly represented by 
Urbano Kattazzi, a man of tact and resource, a lawyer 
rather than a politician, but a clever orator, who might 
some day become a powerful auxiliary. Cavour was not 
forgetful of the part played by the Left Centre in the 
parliamentary affairs of 1848 and 1849 ; he well remem- 
bered having had to combat them, and he did so again, 
and as often as occasion offered, to the end. He was not, 
however, the man to hamper himself with irritating 
recollections of past divisions, and in the alliance pro- 
posed to him he saw a means of emancipating the 
Government and strengthening the condition of par- 
liament, by forming among men of extreme opinions the 
party of all shades of Liberalism. He had no fear of 
these new allies ; he felt himself able to hold them in. 
It was all deducible to a question of a propos ; and 
Cavour, by a marvel of dexterity, chose for the more 
decisive affirmation of that evolution of liberal policy 
meditated by him exactly the moment when Piedmont 
was compelled to "reef sail," and pay an apparent 
tribute to the reactionary spirit. 

Let me explain. It was when the coup d'etat of 
December 2, 1851, burst upon France. The new 18th 
brumaire, appearing to Europe in the garb of a new 
Napoleon, was not reassuring to smaller countries like 
Piedmont and Belgium, where the press had full inde- 

e 2 



52 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

pendence, and where the defeated in Paris went in 
search of a refuge. It was a menace to constitutional 
liberty wherever it existed, as well as an encouragement 
to the parties of absolutism and reaction. Piedmont 
was especially in a position to feel the double pressure 
of France under the coup d'etat, and of Austria ready to 
take every advantage ; she had to screen herself from 
the storm that might be drawn down on her by the 
vexatious imprudences of the press or refugees. 

The Cabinet at Turin was sensible of the diffi- 
culties and delicacies of this situation, and as early as 
January 7, 1852, it hastened to justify itself to the French 
Government by proposing a law on the press, by which 
offences against foreign princes were to be transferred 
to the ordinary tribunals and not to be tried by jury. 
The Piedmontese Cabinet submitted to what could not 
be avoided ; it made a virtue of necessity, and D'Azeglio 
ingeniously expressed his meaning in a transparent 
apologue : " Suppose we had to traverse one of those 
regions where wild beasts abound, and pass close to a 
den where a iion was sleeping, and that one of our 
guides told us : ' Do not speak ; make no noise, lest you 
should awaken him,' and if one of us were to begin to 
sing, I imagine we should all combine to shut his mouth. 
.... Or again : if, notwithstanding all possible precau- 
tion and prudence, the lion awakes and springs upon us, 
then, if Ave are men, we must fight ! " So much for 
prudence ; but the bold and able deed was the taking- 
advantage of this occasion, when a concession had been 
perilously made, to break with those who would fain 
have pushed reaction farther, establish the integrity of 



THE CONNUBIO. 53 

Piedmontese policy, and keep inviolate the institutions 
of the country, by the drawing together of Liberal 
parties, brought about in full parliamentary combat. 
This was the work of Cavour. 



XIV. 

There was a sort of parliamentary diversion led 
by Colonel Menabrea, who did not conceal his Con- 
servative alarm, and his desire yet more to restrict 
the liberty of the press. Kattazzi, on the other hand, 
intervened, promising to support the Ministry provided 
it maintained a law which he considered temporarily 
needful, and stuck to Liberalism. Hereupon Cavour 
joined the debate, defending the law, and exposing the 
whole policy of the Government with great precision 
and ability, accepting offers of aid from the chief of 
the Left Centre, and from that moment considering 
Colonel Menabrea's speech in the light of a rupture. 

The struggle became sharp ; all the passions were 
alive, and joined in the melee. Peacemakers endeavoured 
to soften the acrimony of the combat. It was evident 
that no one expected this sudden change ; a divorce 
proposed by the Eight, followed by a new marriage — 
a Connubio, as Eevel termed it, in recalling the events of 
1848, for an argument against the new alliance. Colonel 
Menabrea, more surprised than anyone else at the out- 
burst he had provoked, remarked with some sadness : 
" The minister of finance wants to set sail in the direc- 
tion of a new parliamentary coast, and land on another 
shore. He has a right to act as he pleases, but I shall not 



54 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

go with him " Cavour's rejoinder was : " It is 

not true that the Ministry has directed its helm towards 
other shores. It has made no movement of the sort, 
but wishes to go in the direction of the prow instead of 
in the direction of the stern." With the explanations- 
the divisions increased, and the somewhat insignificant 
matter of the law of the press became the pretext for 
a decisive evolution that was well planned and resolutely 
fought out in the parliamentary battle-field. 

The manoeuvre was certainly daring, the more so as 
Cavour was binding the Ministry to more than it was at 
all inclined to bind itself. Some few of the members of 
the Cabinet complained of this, whilst D'Azeglio did his 
utmost to moderate the conflict and account for the words 
of his impetuous colleague. But the blow had been 
dealt ; it had resounded through parliament and through 
the country. It constituted Cavour the manifest chief 
of liberal opinions, the representative not of a new policy, 
but of a new and more active and decisive phase of 
Piedmontese policy, and the Connubio became more 
pronounced. The presidentTof the chamber of deputies 
died suddenly ; the minister of finance instantly sup- 
ported the candidature of Eattazzi for the presidency, 
and did so successfully. 

A conflict so ably fought could, sooner or later, only 
result in the supremacy of Cavour. A ministerial crisis 
which, in May, 1852, temporarily retarded his progress. 
to power, only hastened the inevitable conclusion.. 
Eattazzi's election to the presidency had provoked this 
new change. D'Azeglio thought his formidable col- 
league, the " dear inventor of the Connubio" as he loved 



A CRISIS. 55 

to call him, went a little too fast ; perhaps he felt 
slightly wounded, and also dreaded the effect on the 
outside world of these sudden changes. Cavour saw 
nothing to be apprehended in his leaving the reins to 
D'Azeglio, while he retired for a time with the prestige 
of an ever-increasing authority, and, in writing to his 
friend Salvagnoli, in Florence, he described the recent 
crisis : "It was, in my opinion, not only useful but 
indispensable that a Liberal party should be firmly 
constituted After having, at first, been con- 
vinced of such a necessity, D'Azeglio has not accepted 
all the consequences, and he provoked a crisis which 
could only result in my retirement, or his removal from 
power. External policy required that I should be the 
sacrifice. I think D'Azeglio would willingly have abdi- 
cated, but I did my utmost to dissuade him ; he stayed, 
and we have not ceased to be friends, privately and 
politically. It will next be his turn to retire, and then 
we can constitute an openly Liberal Cabinet. In the 
meantime I take advantage of my new liberty for a 
journey to France and England " 



xv. 

That this was only a truce, that this journey to 
England was not simply one of pleasure, can well be 
perceived. Cavour's intention was to see the statesmen 
of both countries, and disperse the prejudices of which 
Liberal Piedmont was perhaps the object, thus clearing a 
way for his own combinations. In England he found it 
easy to do this. Lord Malmesbury, then the head of 



56 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

the Foreign Office, openly stated his hope of seeing him 
come to terms with his friends — with the party he had 
worked so hard to bring together. In Paris, where he 
had arranged to meet Eattazzi, he met with the warmest 
reception. He saw the Prince-president Napoleon, 
whom he won by his air of easy superiority ; he saw, 
too, some old friends of the parliamentary world, among 
others M. Thiers, who said to him : "Be patient, if 
after they have given you snakes for breakfast they give 
you snakes again for dinner, do not be disgusted." In 
this expedition Cavour made many new friends, and had 
an opportunity of observing the situations which he 
might one day have to manipulate. 

In London and in Paris he kept his eyes fixed upon 
Piedmont, where the Ministry seemed to be sufficiently 
unsettled; and he wrote to his friends: "Instead of 
combating D'Azeglio, we should lend him a frank 
support ; but we cannot sacrifice our good name to 
him. .... As soon as I return we will consult to- 
gether ; we will see La Marmora and speak bluntly to 
him. It is timfi for all this to be settled. If D'Azeglio 
wishes to remain in power, let him say so, and he will 
have in us sincere allies. Should he be tired of it, 
let him no longer render the problem of government 
insoluble by his continual vacillations." 

The fact is that D'Azeglio was bending under the 
weight of government ; while abroad, as at home, Cavour 
was weighing upon the Ministry. If his presence in 
the Government had been a difficulty, his absence was a 
still greater embarrassment. 

The Ministry had not been able to live with him ; it 



D'AZEGLIO ON CAVOUR, 57 

could not subsist without him. An ally of the Cabinet, 
he would have absorbed and eclipsed it ; as chief of 
the Opposition he could vanquish and render it power- 
less. 

As soon as he returned to Turin, in September, 1852, 
it became evident that the question would not long be 
unsettled. Cavour was called to form a Ministry, of 
which he was to be the chief ; and D'Azeglio, with- 
drawing from before so brilliant a rival, and without 
regret, wrote : " I had accepted the helm at a time when 
it was pointed out to me that, better than any other 
man, I could direct it for the country's best advan- 
tage Now that the ship has refitted, let the 

winds fill her sails. I surrender my quarterdeck to 
another ! He, whom you know, is possessed of a dia- 
bolical activity, fitted for the work both in mind and 
body ; and it gives him so much pleasure ! " And thus 
throughout a series of changes and metamorphoses, the 
preponderance of a Liberal Conservative is seen in 
sharp outline, creating, by means of alliances with the 
"Moderates of all parties," a parliamentary position 
whereon to lean, that he may put Piedmont and Italy in 
the track of new destinies. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE POLICY OF CAVOUR — THE FIRST ACT OF THE NATIONAL 

DRAMA. 

Cavour President of the Council — Tne National and Liberal Idea — Financial 
Policy — Commercial Policy — Religions Policy — Party Opposition — Letter 
of Cavour on his Policy — Beginning of Operations — The Eastern Ques- 
tion and the Crimean War of 1856 — Alliance with France and England — 
The Piedmontese Corps in the Crimea — Peace, and its Effects upon 
Piedmont — Victor Emmanuel in France — Cavour at the Congress in Paris 
— First Interviews with the Emperor — The Italian Question as regards 
Europe — The Session of the 8th of April — Cavour's Illusions — Piedmont 
and Italy after the Peace. 

I. 

When, after a retirement of a few months, Cavour 
victoriously returned to political life as president of the 
council, he entered into power, November 4, 1852, 
under circumstances which could not fail to give his 
advent a more distinct character than heretofore. 

At the time when D'Azeglio's ministry, which had so 
patriotically handled affairs immediately after Novara, 
was vanishing, a last attempt, and one not discounte- 
nanced by Victor Emmanuel, was made by Count Balbo 
to reconstitute a purely Conservative Cabinet, which 
might almost be called a ministry of reconciliation with 
Eome. Cavour, consulted in the matter by Victor 




OAYOUR AS PRESIDENT. 59 

Emmanuel, had left them to make experience of this 
J|eeedi»g, the inanity of which he perceived ; he had 
lirted for Leri. Balbo had exhausted all forms 
1^'otiations and overtures, but had broken down ; he 
had me.t_.with nothing but refusals, even from his friends, 
beginning with Eevel, who did not feel himself equal to 
overcome the current of opinion. Cavour's resumption 
of office after this failure was all the more significant : 
it settled the way between the two systems/ which for 
the space of about three years had been perpetually at 
conflict in Turin. 

The new president of the council entered parliament 
under conditions that he himself had arranged, and they 
•only needed now to be broadened and strengthened. 
Let Cavour's manner of going to work be noted : 
resolved not to allow himself to be checked by re- 
sistance from the Eight — the Clerical party — he had 
by no means the intention of suddenly disturbing 
political equilibrium and separating himself from his 
friends — the moderate Liberals ; he was careful not to 
" break the chain," as he called it ; and, above all, he 
held fixedly to secure the concurrence of the principal 
members of D'Azeglio's cabinet, whose colleague he had 
been. " Without La Marmora," he used often to repeat, 
" I could not be minister." In his eyes La Marmora 
represented military reorganisation, just as Paleocapa 
(an engineer of the greatest eminence) represented that 
of progress in material works, and Boncompagni that of 
wise reforms in religious matters. The new ministers of 
foreign affairs and of the interior, General Dabormida 
and Count Ponza di San-Martino, clung to the same 



60 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUE. 

traditions. It still remained a government of the Right 
Centre, with a chief of firmer gait, who retained simply 
the financial department for himself, but was well able 
to undertake every ministry or government. 

It was only some months after this, when time had 
been given to the Cabinet to consolidate, that the elevation 
of Eattazzi to the ministry of justice established a final 
alliance with the Left Centre. The change was accom- 
plished, and it was right that it should be, by a 
sort of assimilation under guidance. Cavour was not 
at the mercy of the Left Centre ; he absorbed or annexed 
it ; and the Left Centre was wise in allowing itself to be 
annexed, since it was furthering the success of a fresh 
and fruitful idea, by the union of the whole Liberal 
party under the ablest of guides. Before one year had 
passed this idea received a striking sanction from the 
country, in the immense ministerial majority returned to 
the chamber in the elections. 

From this moment Cavour might truly say that he 
had "raised a barrier sufficiently high for the reaction 
to be unable to reach above it." Henceforth he had, 
together with the confidence of his King, a Ministry, 
and a majority, that is to say, an entire parliamentary 
situation brought about by him, upon which to lean for 
the accomplishment of his designs and the progressive 
realisation of his policy. 

II. 

That policy, which commenced by creating its own 
instrument of action, had indeed been the original work, 
I might almost call it the manifestation of a man's 



THE NATIONAL POLICY. 61 

genius. No doubt Cavour had not drawn it from his 
own imagination, it had been handed to him by circum- 
stances. He was not the only one who ever thought of 
it ; others had had a similar instinct or presentiment, 
but it was he who shaped it, and brought it within 
practical limits, stamping it with the seal of his adven- 
turous yet prudent mind, by changing into a reality that 
saying of a conquered but not despairing nation : " We 
will begin again !" 

Cavour was one of the first to perceive the conse- 
quences of this great truth, which he summed up one 
day by saying : " It is impossible for the Government to 
have an Italian or national policy outwardly without 
being inwardly reforming and liberal; just as it would be 
impossible for us to be inwardly liberal without being- 
national and Italian in our external relations." More 
clearly than any other he perceived that, if Piedmont 
wished, in her difficult position after her overthrow, and 
lying under the jealous eye of Austria, to carry out this 
design, she must, within her narrow compass, put forth 
all the energy, wisdom, and activity of a great country : 
"Piedmont must begin by raising herself, by re-esta- 
blishing in Europe as well as in Italy, a position and a 
credit equal to her ambition. Hence there must be a 
policy unswerving in its aim, but flexible and various 
as to the means employed, embracing the exchequer, 
military reorganisation, diplomacy, and religious affairs." 

Everything proceeded from a settled thought in 
this work, gradually revealing itself under a vigorous 
impulse. Economic and financial matters first engaged 
the attention of Cavour. Like all the vanquished, 



62 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

Piedmont had to pay for defeat. The country lay 
under the burden of two unfortunate campaigns which, 
with the Austrian indemnity, had already cost it very 
nearly three hundred millions of francs. Thus the public 
debt, which before 1848 amounted to no more than five 
millions per annum (£200,000), was rapidly increased to 
more than thirty millions. The budget of its expenses, 
only eighty millions before the war, was above one 
hundred and seventy-eight millions in 1848, two hundred 
and sixteen in 1849, one hundred and eighty-nine in 
1850, and finally it remained fixed at between one 
hundred and thirty and one hundred and forty millions. 
From almost the first moment, then, the expenses of 
the country had doubled ; the public debt was now six 
times as large as before, and, in making due allowance 
for the time we are speaking of — twenty-five years ago 
— for a country of less than five millions of souls, and 
whose resources were still undeveloped, these figures 
represent a weight almost as heavy as that which has 
been laid upon France under still more tragic circum- 
stances. Such was the situation. 

Two systems were possible — and how frequently have 
they confronted one another ! One scheme was, to pro- 
ceed with the strictest and most scrupulous economy, 
keeping a modest balance, by cutting down expenses, 
lessening the deficit, and increasing only the most neces- 
sary taxes. But then it would be imperative to abandon 
all hope of playing a part in the world, to reduce the 
army, and abstain from the most useful public under- 
takings, or at least indefinitely postpone the completion 
of them. This was prudence of a certain kind ; it was 



CAVOUR'S BUDGET. 63 

not foresight, in that it was to burden the country with 
an inevitable increase of charges without offering it any 
compensation, or doing anything that would assist the 
development of its vitality, or help it to support a weight 
that could not be lightened. Cavour had other plans; 
and it was he who originated the financial system of 
the new order of things in constitutional and liberal 
Piedmont, he who drew up that which, to use his 
own language, I will call the budget of "action and 
progress. " 

in. 

Cavour's budget witnessed to a policy derived from 
a situation : it was the work of a man afflicted by the 
necessity of obtaining of the country the price to be 
paid for its own misfortunes, who prepared to make that 
forced indemnity a means of reparation. New taxes 
could not of course be avoided ; they were the conditions 
of Piedmont's credit and solvency. A combination of 
these new taxes with the old ones, unequally distributed 
in the provinces, was of the first importance. Cavour 
was thoroughly cognisant of the problem he had to solve, 
and, on his first entrance into power he had commenced 
the work without hesitation, without being discoun- 
tenanced by the unpopularity which always awaits a 
minister reduced to rattle the money-box. 

He, too, had to contend with propositions of radical 
reforms and plausible theories, even with the tax on 
income. He resolutely put aside unseasonable ex- 
periences as mere Utopias, to attain just to that which 
appeared to him possible. His whole ingenuity was 



64 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

exercised in wresting from the Opposition, extracting 
from the patriotism of the chambers, a certain number 
of taxes on personal property and furniture, on patents, 
on wills, and on registration deeds. Besides this he hoped 
to give to his Jradget a ballast of from twenty-five to 
thirty millions ; but this was only a part of his schemes. 
He felt that it was quite insufficient to meet the ends of 
his policy. He knew that if Piedmont remained poor, 
taxes would always be too heavy, and that the best way 
of revivifying the budget and filling the exchequer was 
to renew the life of the country, by giving a new start to 
industry and commerce, by the development of its pro- 
ductive energies, and by all that could assist the im- 
provement of the national fortune. This completed 
his financial system, or rather this was the essential and 
original part of it. 

On the one hand, instead of retrenching expenses, at 
the risk of temporarily increasing the deficit by new calls 
on the national credit, Cavour was not afraid to devote 
more than two - hundred millions towards the contri- 
bution of the railways of Genoa and the Lago Maggiore, 
Novara, Susa, and Savoy, in works of every description. 
He hastened the development of interior communi- 
cations, everywhere favouring the spirit of association 
and enterprise. Again, scarcely had Cavour come into 
power, Avhen he resolved to realise in little Piedmont 
a great idea — that of commercial freedom, which he 
inaugurated by a custom-house reform ; and further 
diplomatically established by treaties of commerce with 
France, England,, Belgium, and Switzerland. Cavour, 
let us add, did not proceed as a dogmatist — as a 



FINANCIAL REFORM. 65 

prejudiced or a whimsical freetrader ; he carried out 
a gradual reform practically* one proportioned to the 
circumstances, and which was to become profitable to 
consumers through the diminution of tariffs ; to further 
maritime commerce, stimulate the internal industry of 
the country by foreign competition, and feed it by the 
decrease of taxes on raw material, while it made an 
opening for the exportation of national productions. 

To increase expenses and make new debts when it 
was necessary to levy new taxes ; to carry out a reform 
of tariffs immediately after a postal reform, this together 
with a reduction of the salt-tax, when the budget pre- 
sented a deficit, was assuredly to be bold— perhaps rash. 
In this difficult and complicated work Cavour exhibited 
an imperturbable confidence, relying on "Liberalism and 
the marvels it can work," to use his own expression ; 
with a full conviction of the vivifying influence of these ' 
particular expenditures for which he was blamed, and 
which he was continually compelled to stand up for, 
ao-ainst all attacks. He demonstrated that if one or two 

O 

millions of francs were devoted to the improvement of 
the ports, it would bring in five hundred thousand francs 
per annum ; that if ten millions of francs were spent in 
piercing the Luckmanier, it would increase the com- 
merce of Genoa by a third, perhaps by one half. He 
explained that to take shares and secure an interest in 
the railway of Savoy, was to cause the circulation of 
fifty millions of francs, in a province that sorely needed 
capital. " In order to realise our programme," said 
Cavour, " and profitably cultivate the country's resources, 
it was necessary to give a powerful impulse to works of 



66 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

public utility; to work our railways with all possible 
circumspection, while we gave encouragement to other 

enterprises In order that the position which, for 

so many centuries the monarchy of Savoy has main- 
tained, should not be suffered to decline, it was necessary 
to reorganise and fortify our army. .... This scheme 
made it necessary for us to raise new loans, or rather to 
contract larger loans than they would need to have been, 
if we had acted on the system of modesty and economy. 
It consequently became necessary to increase the taxation • 
but that could not be done, nor could the resources of 
the country be developed without undertaking the re- 
form of our economic system on a large scale 

This reform, undertaken to awaken the activity of 
the country's resources, was, in truth, not only a com- 
mercial and financial work ; the diplomatic form under 
which it was introduced had, in the mind of Cavour, 
and among his designs, another character and another 
part to play. It was to draw Piedmont forth from the 
isolation in which the country had remained since its 
misfortunes, bringing it into closer contact with great 
western nations, with England and with France ; in a 
word, it formed a bond of united interests which might 
grow into one of policy and of ideas. Austria was not 
deceived. Before he died, Prince Schwartzenberg, the 
Austrian prime minister, remarked, with faintly-masked 
ill-humour : " Piedmont intends, with its commercial 
policy, to purchase the support of England for Italy ! " 
This was not absolutely true ; or, at least, Cavour made 
no sacrifice, and sometimes he protested against having 
been influenced by a hidden policy in the direction of a 



COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH FRANCE. 67 

reform which he thought serviceable to his country. In 
reality, he was trusting to the logic of things ; he had 
no doubt but that, in remaining constitutional, and in 
adopting commercial with the other liberties, Piedmont 
would rapidly gain public sympathy in England, and 
that that would give it additional strength. "England," 
he said to an intimate friend, "is no longer the cham- 
pion of absolutism on the Continent, and an English 
minister would find it difficult to take part with Austria 
in the oppression of Italy." 

As to France, Cavour did not hide his intention of 
contracting a friendship with France under the veil of a 
commercial treaty. If that treaty was not in every point 
what he could have desired, and if he had been obliged to 
make some concessions to the French protectionist system, 
he made up his mind to it ; he recognised a political 
rather than an economical advantage in so doing. " The 
horizon is still dark around us," he said, "and our insti- 
tutions are not as yet protected from all danger. Some- 
thing perhaps may chance to make us desire at least 
the moral support of France. Let me say frankly, in 
the face of impending possibilities I think it prudent, 
conformable with the interests of the country, to be on 
good terms with France. We have not neglected matters 
of economy, but merely left them in the background. 
Views of policy have caused us to accept a treaty 
which will strengthen a good and cordial understanding 

between us and France " And Cavour adds, yet 

more strikingly, words that, spoken in 1851, seem 
almost prophetic : "Is it not possible that complications 
may arise, in which all surrounding nations may be 

f 2 



68 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

concerned, in two great questions — the Eastern and the 
Western ? Were this to happen, should we not do well 
to be on o-ood terms with France ?...." 

Thus all concurred successfully under the thoughtful 
and liberal direction of one who knew how to use 
finance, commerce, and diplomacy, in placing Piedmont 
on her feet again. 

IV. 

That which Cavour accomplished by his financial 
and commercial system, he not only attempted but 
effected, in a higher moral sphere, by his religious policy, 
which has been one of the clearest manifestations of 
Liberalism in clerical matters. 

He had this problem to solve : the reconciliation of 
the ecclesiastical situation with the principles of the 
"statuto," and the maintenance of the liberal and 
national Piedmontese policy in its civil relations with 
the Church and the Court of Eome. It was ever 
recurring as a natural consequence to new conditions, 
with the decrees of the laws for the abolition of eccle- 
siastical privileges, that of civil marriages, the law for 
the reorganisation of Church property, and the sup- 
pression of certain monastic orders. 

With every new project the contention became 
warmer ; the clerical agitation, kept up by the remon- 
strances of Kome, was combated by the anti-clerical 
agitation. In parliament, the Government was accused 
by the Left of not proceeding with sufficient resolution 
and energy in religious matters ; while the Eight com- 
plained that no negotiations were entered into with the 



RELIGIOUS POLICY. 60 

Holy See, and that the good pleasure of Kome was not 
consulted. Cavour's manner of handling the questions, 
as delicate as they were formidable, showed a mind full 
of decision, and at the same time absolutely free from 
prejudice, For a moment, no doubt, he had thought it 
possible to come to some arrangement with the Vatican, 
but he very soon perceived that it was impossible ; the 
more so, that the religious reaction, which was spreading 
in Italy as well as Europe, only hardened the Court of 
Rome in its demands and its refusals. It was not long 
before he saw the Pontificate involved in dangerous 
fellowship with the enemy beyond the Alps by the 
Austrian Concordat 

He had, in reality, ceased to believe in an under- 
standing with Rome, for the realisation of the reforms 
Piedmont had at heart, and as for him, he had ceased to 
desire it. " If we put ourselves in direct relations with 
Rome," he said, writing to an intimate friend, " we com- 
pletely ruin the political edifice we have so laboriously 
erected. If we enter into an arrangement with the 
Pope it will be impossible for us to retain our influence 
in Italy. Let us not go too far, but neither let us suffer 
ourselves to retreat even one step. You know that I 
am not a priest hater, that I am disposed towards con- 
ciliation, and would willingly give the Church greater 
liberty than she now enjoys ; you know that I should 
be disposed to give up the exequaturs, the exclusive 
management of the universities, &c, but, under present 
circumstances, I am persuaded that all attempts at con- 
cord would be to our disadvantage " He spoke 

much to the same effect in another circumstance, in the 



70 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUE. 

heat of action : " We have to fight Austria at Venice and 
at Milan, and also at Bologna and at Eome ! " 

Thus the question of ecclesiastical reforms, the rela- 
tions with the Church and with Eome, was contemplated 
by Cavour as being a national question, besides one of 
interior order — it was one of the elements of the Italian 
situation. To pretend to solve that question by 
stratagem or compromise, would only result in endless 
weariness and waste of time. With Cavour there was 
but oue solution — liberty, and complete independence 
of civil and religious authority ; a grand yet simple idea, 
which was soon to resolve itself into these few emphatic 
words : " A Liberal Church in a Liberal State ! " He 
who raised that standard in a small corner of Italy was 
neither a theorist nor a revolutionist yielding, at the 
risk of overthrowing interests, beliefs, and traditions, to 
a fanciful love of novelty ; neither was it the work of a 
puzzled tactician, trying to conceal a parliamentary 
campaign against Clericalism under the cloak of an 
epigram. Cavour neither had the passion of a leader of 
a faction, the subtlety of a casuist, nor the flippancy of a 
thoughtless innovator. In a liberty accepted without 
subterfuge, he saw a sure means of freedom for the lay 
portion of the country — I may call it that of the nation, 
since he did not separate Italy from Piedmont — without 
in any degree subjecting the spiritual portion, namely, 
the Church. 

" Oh, that man," said Archbishop Darboy — the 
same who later fell a victim to the Commune — when 
at Rome, "that man was indeed of a rare sort! he 
had not the slightest sentiment of hatred in his heart.'" 



CHURCH AND STATE. 71 

Nothing could be truer: the Liberalism of this great 
Piedmontcse did not proceed from any sentiment of 
hatred or vulgar animosity. Assuredly Cavour was not 
what he called a " priest hater," and this it was that 
constituted the superiority and originality of his re- 
ligious policy. He had inaugurated and started 
reforms wherein he saw the development of the 
" statuto," and he intended to carry them out ; 
but in claiming social independence he did not refuse 
liberty to the Church ; he left her entire mistress of 
her own ground ; indeed he carried rather far his feeling 
of lay incompetency. 

When some members of the Left, Brofferio and 
Asproni, requested that the State should supervise the 
education in the seminaries, he replied, emphatically : 
" If I had to give an opinion as a citizen, and not as a 
minister, I should say that the Government ought not to 
interfere in the teaching of theology, which it is solely 
the province of the bishops to watch over. Bishops 
should not have to do the work of members of 
parliament, nor deputies that of bishops. We are at 
liberty to believe or not to believe, and to select whom 
we choose for our spiritual advisers. If we are dissatis- 
fied with the moral teaching of the seminaries, we will 
choose our confessors from among theologians who have 
attended the school of Asproni." And he added, more 
seriously : " How can the clergy become converted to 
our institutions, and how will they love them if, after 
having, not unreasonably, withdrawn some, of the privi- 
leges which they enjoyed under the old regime, and just 
as we arc about to deprive them of the few that remain, 



72 LIFE OP COUNT OAVOUB. 

we should say to them : ' We reform, according to 
the principles of liberty and equality, all those points 
of legislation which formerly were favourable to you ; 
but as to your independence and your liberty, we 
wish to preserve those traditions of the past which 
we call, so far as they are opposed to you, the glorious 
heritage of our fathers !'.... The best way of in- 
creasing the political influence of the clergy is to give 
them an exceptional position, persecute, or even subject 
them to petty vexations." 

v. 

Cavour doubtless had his own opinions upon the 
absolutist and theocratic tendency of the Church at that 
time, and the risks of such a tendency. He was under 
no illusion about the nature of Clericalism when com- 
bined with politics, having frequently to combat and 
hold his ground against it. He was careful, however, 
not to meet these aggressions with retaliations on the 
part of the Government ; he continued moderate even 
in the reform's for which he was so vehemently 
reproached. 

What, for instance, was that law — one of those which 
caused the greatest uproar — on the suppression of cer- 
tain monastic orders, and on Church property ? Without 
affecting the rights of religious associations, it suppressed 
the mendicant and a few other orders, depriving them 
of civil status ; while it sanctioned the teaching and 
nursing orders, especially that of the Sisters of Charity, 
which Cavour was foremost in defending against the 
attacks of the Left, declaring that nothing should induce 



CHURCH PROPERTY. 73 

him to subscribe to a law suppressing charitable orders. 
" I would quit the Ministry ten times/' he said, " rather 
than bind myself to an act that would, in my opinion, 
be immensely prejudicial to our country in the eyes of 
civilised Europe " 

As to the possessions of the Church, the object was 
to create a special fund, endowed with the revenues of the 
suppressed orders, and dedicated entirely to the clergy. 

On this point Cavour did not hesitate ; it was one of 
the fixed ideas of his policy. He had always been 
opposed to what was called the incameration of eccle- 
siastical property — in other words, to the dispossession 
of the Church, transformed into a corps receiving salary 
from the State ; and the reason he gave for such an 
opposition was a singular one from the mouth of a 
minister. It was, that this measure would create the 
worst form of despotism, the administrative despotism. 
"I have," said he, "the misfortune — or the good luck, 
which you will — to be minister in a country where a 
certain degree of centralisation reigns, and where the 
Government has quite enough in its hands. I declare 
to you, that if you add this one of which you speak to 
the powers of Government, you will give what will be 

threatening to liberty " But this was not the 

chief reason ; the one which determined Cavour was one 
of "high policy." 

His true reason was that the expropriation of the 
clergy would lead to the extension and intensifying of the 
spirit of caste, by the complete isolation of the clergy, in 
the midst of a civil centre, and the tightening of the bonds 
uniting the priest with the sacerdotal hierarchy. "It has 



74 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

been/' he said, " carried out on a very large scale in some 
European countries. In France, before the Kevolution, 
the clergy was, if I am not mistaken, as rich as that 
of Spain. It was totally stripped, and was not allowed 
to retain a vestige of its old possessions. What ensued ? 
I have a great respect for the French clergy, and I admit 
that it is more moral and also more zealous than it used 
to be ; but no one can deny that it is also less national 
and less liberal than was the clergy of the old regime. 
For that was animated by a spirit of independence with 
regard to Eome, and a certain degree of attachment to 
national views ; it had the instincts of liberty. Now 
things are different ; all facts go to prove that the 
modern French clergy is infinitely more Ultramontane 
than our national clergy. It will be said : ' But there 
is another course that could be pursued : let us leave the 
followers of the faith to remunerate their own clergy/ 
Do you know what would be the consequence of this ? 
A double amount of zeal, fanaticism, and Ultramon- 
tanism. Such a system exists in Ireland. There the 
clergy is unsalaried; its means of existence consist of 
charity and the voluntary contributions of the faithful. 
That clergy is both more fanatical and less liberal than 
the clergy of France." 

On this point Cavour was of the same mind as De 
Tocqueville. Thus it was that he refused to have any- 
thing to do with ecclesiastical expropriations, or to make 
use of any such means for the balancing of his budget. 
Eeligious reform was to result from a legitimate and 
progressive secularisation of civil society, not from hos- 
tility and persecution. 



CAVOVR'S LIBERALISM. 75 

Cavour was a great Liberal and at the same time a 
great politician. Determined to persevere to the end to 
keep the Liberal aims of the country free from interested 
motives, and to protect these formidable religious ques- 
tions from revolutionary passions, he was anxious to 
avoid any hasty step. He was especially desirous not 
to cause divisions in the public mind, and he frankly 
stated his reasons to Sig. Depretis, who one day ques- 
tioned him about it : " It is in order that the nation may 
be unanimous, if an opportunity should present itself of 
regaining our lost position by an energetic effort." 

He wished neither to divide public opinion nor to 
allow the good name of the country to be compromised 
by causing useless annoyances, and when it was proposed 
to subject all students, including those at the seminaries, 
to military service, he made a firm resistance. " Your 
proposition will be regarded throughout the country as 

a revolutionary act In the present state of 

things I should consider as a great evil any act that could, 
even externally, present the appearance of a revolu- 
tionary measure." He had no difficulty in remaining 
moderate, despising party excitement, precisely because 
he was a politician who, without paltry prejudices, fol- 
lowed out the realisation of a lofty scheme. 

His genius was essentially tolerant and practical ; 
he could not see the necessity for wasting words to wound 
the feelings of the clergy ; he was careful rather to win 
them over to the reforms which he required of them, and 
to captivate them : and he succeeded. Witness the 
amazement of the head of a religious order coming from 
Rome at the cordial reception he met with at the hands 



76 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

of Cavour ; who afterwards remarked with a smile : "On 
leaving my house that brother has gone to the Bishop's 
palace, where he will certainly not have had such a recep- 
tion as I gave him. He will compare the two, return to 
Koine, tell his story, and, if he is honest, he will say that 
T am not the persecuting minister and diabolical person 
which at Eome they imagine me to be." This Avas, per- 
haps, not owing to a spirit of calculation ; he acted 
spontaneously, just as, without display or ostentation, he 
would distribute alms to any of the poorer clergy who 
asked them of him. Sometimes in the morning, dipping 
into his private purse as often as into the impoverished 
coffers of the State, he would, with one of his fellow- 
workers, prepare the slender pittance that a few priests 
were waiting for, while he remarked, cheerfully rubbing 
his hands : "Ah, if the gentlemen of the Left could see 
us at what we are doing ! " 

In its very groundwork Cavour's mind was a Liberal 
one ; there was nothing in him of the vulgar freethinker, 
turning to ridicule the belief in which he has been 
educated ; and of this he gave a curious proof which 
long remained unknown. Seven years before his death, 
at the time when the contest about Conventual Laws was 
hottest, and when a fatal epidemic was raging in Turin, 
Cavour had taken precautions, should he too be stricken, 
against the painful scenes which had occurred at the 
death of Count Santa-Kosa. He wished to make sure 
that the ministrations of the Church would not be re- 
fused him. 

One morning he had quietly ordered and prearranged 
everything with Fra Giacomo, the parish priest of the 



BAD TIMES. 77 

Madonna del Angeli, whom lie made the confidant of 
his charities. At the conclusion of their interview, 
Battazzi, the recently-instituted minister of the interior, 
chanced to come in, and Cavour, after having courteously- 
accompanied the priest to the door, turned to his col- 
league and said, simply : " We have arranged everything 
together in case any misfortune should befall me." It 
is remarkable that, seven years afterwards, faithful to 
his promise in 1854, Fra Giacomo hastened to the death- 
bed of the Piedmontese minister, then prime minister of 
Italy. It was with this resolute spirit, a mixture of 
boldness, shrewd tact, simplicity, liberal confidence, and 
universal activity, that Cavour conducted the religious 
campaign which, with the Exchequer and diplomacy, 
expressed his policy. 



VI. 

To say the truth, that policy did not propel itself; 
it had to work its way through many a resistance, many 
a contradiction and passionate opposition, and Cavour 
had daily to contend against difficulties of every kind, 
both within and without. 

In the early part of 1853, almost immediately 
after he had become president of the council, relations 
with Austria had undergone a first shock. Taking ad- 
vantage of a hot-headed Mazzinian outburst at Milan, 
Austria thought fit to strike a blow at the Lombard 
emigres at Turin ; she sequestrated the property of the 
Casati, the Arese, the Arconati, the Torelli, and many 
others. After having frankly fulfilled its duties of inter- 



78 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

national police in suppressing the Milanese outbreak, 
Piedmont could not refrain from protesting against a 
measure of spoliation which affected men who not only 
were manifestly innocent of any offence, but who had 
become naturalised Piedmontese, and of whom some 
were members of parliament. This protest had no effect ; 
hence arose, if not a rupture, a coldness manifested by 
a reciprocal recall of ambassadors. 

Cavour in his heart did not regret an incident that, 
in less than four years after the conclusion of peace, 
seemed to revive the national question, and in which 
Austria had to bear the responsibility of a bitter provo- 
cation, condemned alike by France and England. 
" Austria," he said, " has managed to set public opinion 
and all the Governments of Europe against her. In 
trying to damage us, she has done us service ; we will 
take advantage of it." Nevertheless, this half-rupture 
gave rise to a delicate and precarious situation ; one not 
without anxiety, and which reactionists in Piedmont 
and in Europe did not fail to turn to account by repre- 
senting it as' due to an improvident and impatient 
policy of a Cabinet inspiring revolutionary agitation ; 
but this, as yet, was nothing. In the interior, diffi- 
culties were hourly becoming more serious and more 
painful. 

Unfortunately the new system of taxation, the 
financial reforms, and the commercial treaties could not 
be carried out without clashing with many interests, 
provoking much uneasinesss, and causing temporary 
panics. To these were added bad harvests, and diseases 
smiting the silkworms and the vines. The spirit of 



POPULAR AGITATION. 79 

party or faction took advantage of whatever occurred. If 
bread rose in price, the fault was charged against Cavour 
and his reforms. Harangues were raised against the 
ministry that starved the people, and took what was 
theirs by right ; and one evening, in the peaceful city of 
Turin, an excited crowd, crying " Death to him," 
streamed in the direction of the house of Cavour, whose 
windows were broken, while an attempt was made to 
take it by assault. This, however, was but a skirmish ; 
it was by no means a true index of the sentiments of 
the people of Turin. The following day Cavour, accom- 
panied by La Marmora, walked through the streets on 
his usual way to the ministry of finance, and as he went 
he everywhere met with signs of respectful affection. 

In Savoy, reactionary newspapers endeavoured to 
inflame the populace and encourage discontent by a 
perfidious comparison between the old and the new 
rates of taxes. Cavour was publicly accused of crushing 
the artisan and the labourer with imposts that he might 
prosecute his Utopias about Italy. The nmnicijml 
council of Chambery, altogether under reactionary in- 
fluence, almost gave the signal for a refusal to pay the 
levy. The National Guard declined to be present at 
the rejoicings in honour of the " statuto." A Savoyard 
wrote to Cavour : "If you are obstinate we are doubly 
so ; it is not in Savoy that heads are weathercocks." 

Cavour's religious policy was made a pretext for 
still greater excitement. External agitation kept pace 
with the parliamentary combat. The Government 
which was leading Piedmont " to schism, anarchy, and 
destruction," was threatened. The execution of the 



80 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

law for the suppression of certain convents provoked 
painful scenes of resistance. Epidemics and famines 
were declared to be a visitation from heaven for the 
institution of sacrilegious laws. How much more so 
was it when misfortune fell on the royal family itself; 
when death removed the queen's mother, the queen, and 
the Duke of Genoa in the space of a few days ? These 
unforeseen occasions for mourning were spoken of at the 
court, among those immediately about the person of the 
king, as warnings from heaven. 

In this tangle, although Cavour did not waver an 
instant, he was sometimes anxious : ''Policy is becoming- 
more and more perplexing," he wrote to his friends at 
Geneva ; "we have to contend against famine, new 

taxes, priests, and reactionists Nevertheless, I 

do not relinquish hope." Another day he wrote thus 
from Leri, where he had gone to enjoy a few moments' 
needful rest : " After a desperate struggle, in parliament, 
in the salons, at the court, as well as in the streets, to 
which are added a number of lamentable circumstances, 
I found I had reached the end of my intellectual re- 
sources, and I have come here to restore them by a few 
days' rest. Thanks to my natural elasticity of fibre, I 
shall shortly be able to resume the weight of affairs; 
before the week is out I hope to be back at my post, 
where difficulties await me, giving rise to a political 
situation likely to become more and more strained. ..." 

It was a laborious and an unceasing struggle, com- 
bined, as it was, with intricacies and vicissitudes, to 
which a prime minister of less " elasticity of fibre " than 
he must have succumbed. 



PUBLIC WORKS. 81 

This stoutly- contested policy, nevertheless, began 
to make itself felt and seen in its primary results, 
and in a few years it began to bear fruit. On 
all sides the movement was discernible. With his 
persevering and methodical energy, and by the help 
of a minister of finance who did not begrudge the 
money necessary, La Marmora had already had time to 
reorganise the military institutions, and construct an 
army, which, although it could not be numerous, was 
nevertheless able to bear with dignity the Italian 
standard. Nor was the new economic management 
sterile. Stimulated by liberty, national activity mani- 
fested itself in every form of industry and commercial 
enterprise. The works of public usefulness, when com- 
pleted, were a source of wealth. At the beginning of 
1854 the Genoese railway was opened; cutting its way 
through the Apennines to that Gulf of the Mediterranean, 
where Cavour was proud to have arrived on the first 
locomotive. 

By small degrees Piedmont began to present the 
appearance of a little country full of life, quick to spring- 
to her feet, knowing how rightly to make use of the 
freedom of a constitutional rule ; and she soon acquired 
an honourable name in Europe ; and in France, as in 
England, the country won attention and sympathy. 

Cavour himself was visibly rising in public considera- 
tion. The ability he displayed in the management of 
struggles, out of which he always came the stronger, in- 
spired a growing interest and confidence in those around 
him. In the midst of all these affairs, his thoughts re- 
mained fixed on the momentous enterprise before him ; 

G 



82 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

he did not overlook the serious character of it, and, in a 
private letter to Madame de Oircourt, in 1854, he wrote 
as follows : 

"Circumstances have led Piedmont to take a 
clear and positive position in Italy. I know that it 
is not without danger, and I feel all the responsibility 
that it imposes on me ; but honour and duty have laid 
the burden on us. Since Providence has so willed it that 
Piedmont should alone be free and independent in Italy, 
it is the duty of Piedmont to use that liberty and indepen- 
dence in pleading the cause of our unfortunate peninsula 
before . Europe. We will not shrink from that perilous 
task ; the king and the country are determined to ac- 
complish it to the uttermost. Maybe your friends, the 
doctrinaires and the Liberals, who deplore the loss of 
liberty in France after they have helped to stifle it in 
Italy, will consider our policy absurd and romantic. I 
am resigned to their censures, feeling certain that 
generous hearts like yours will sympathise with our 
efforts to recall to life a nation for centuries buried in a 
frightful tomb! If I should fail, you will not refuse to 
give me a corner among the eminent vanquished who 

fly to group themselves about you Take this 

confession as the avowal that my whole life is conse- 
crated to one object — that of the emancipation of my 

country " 

This, then, was his avowed aim and object ; but in 
order to reach it Cavour knew there must be many a 
halting-place ; there might still be more than one road 
to it, and the result of the policy he had been following 
for more than four years, and by which he was raising 



THE CRIMEAN WAR. 83 

himself in raising his country, was precisely that one 
which was to enable Piedmont to reach its aim by any 
road, taking advantage of any favourable opportunity 
that might offer. When such an opportunity should 
present itself, Cavour was not the man to let it pass. 



VII. 

What Cavour had foreseen as early as 1851, when 
he spoke of the diplomatic advantage of a treaty of com- 
merce, was at hand. The Eussian war with France and 
England was the event which might involve the interests 
of all countries, and divide " into two camps the East and 
the West." From the first Cavour watched the great 
conflict with an attentive eye ; he apprehended its in- 
evitable extension, and was, as it were, fascinated by it. 
In the spring of 1854, when the armies of France and 
England were making for the Black Sea, one evening 
in the company of Count Lisio, at the house of his niece, 
Countess Alfieri, in whose society he loved to seek 
repose, Cavour appeared absorbed. "Why should you 
not send ten thousand men ? " said his niece to him, 
suddenly, as though guessing at what was in his mind. 
" Ah ! " he replied, eagerly, " if everyone thought that, 
it would already be done." Every now and then the 
Countess Alfieri, a woman of intelligent mind, and well 
fitted to understand her uncle, would ask : " Well, are 
we ready to start ? " and he would only reply, with a 
smile : " Who knows ? " 

The truth was that Cavour was entirely in favour of 
such a scheme, and if it had rested only with him he 



84 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

would have been one of the first to join the Western 
alliance, thrown open by the Anglo-French treaty of 
alliance of April 10, 1854. Piedmont could well do as she 
would ; she had not been in direct relations with Russia 
since 1848. Perhaps, from antipathy to the Liberal 
Government of Turin, and also no doubt with a view to 
pleasing Austria, the Emperor Nicholas had not even 
vouchsafed a reply to the first official notifications of 
King Victor Emmanuel. Piedmont's liberty of action and 
sympathies with the Western cause were therefore under 
no restraint ; but Cavour was not acting alone. Besides 
the king, whom he first brought round to his views, 
there were his colleagues, nearly all stubborn men, to 
win over — the minister of foreign affairs, Dabormida, 
Kattazzi like the rest — then parliament, then public 
opinion. 

It must be admitted that when at first the report of 
this project spread abroad in Turin, it produced an im- 
pression that it was the madness of an adventurous spirit. 
Why throw the country into this far-off enterprise % 
What place would little Piedmont take beside the two 
greatest Powers of Europe ? What the part of the 
modest Sardinian contingent among the armies of France 
and of England ? Was it a time to impose new sacri- 
fices on the country for a ruinous piece of folly, when it 
was so difficult to meet the deficit of the budget ? 

Without being insensible to oppositions of which he 
could not be independent, Cavour did not relinquish his 
aim. He saw an opportunity of blotting out Novara 
and bringing forward the new Sardinian army, while 
securing the support of England and France, and acquir- 



QUESTION OF AUSTRIAN POLICY. 85 

ing for Piedmont both moral and diplomatic credit. 
He centred all his energies in popularising his scheme 
and in gaining allies ; and, at one time, persuaded that 
another might be more successful in the matter than 
himself, he proposed to Massimo d'Azeglio that he should 
take his place as president of the council, while he served 
under his orders, or even, if necessary, quitted the 
ministry. "Do what you think best," he wrote; "I 
will support you through and through, provided you 
make the alliance." D'Azeglio promptly declined, pro- 
mising to give his fullest aid to a policy of which he 
appreciated the greatness, and feeling that none could 
conduct it more sagaciously than he who had conceived it. 
In the midst of his perplexities Cavour's eye was on 
Austria, when suddenly the news went forth at Turin 
that the Viennese Cabinet had signed, the treaty of 
December 2, 1854, with France and England, by which 
it both did and did not bind itself. From that moment 
the question became urgent. If, before going any 
further, the scheme of Austria was to cause her assist- 
ance to be purchased at Paris and in London by pledging 
her Italian possessions, it would be the interest of 
Piedmont to counteract it by an immediate alliance with 
the West ; if, on the other hand, Austria intended to 
drag on in an equivocal neutrality — and this the pene- 
trating eye of Cavour foresaw — the Cabinet of Turin 
would necessarily gain an advantage by outstepping 
it with a frank and bold resolution. Lastly, if Austria 
through some unexpected circumstance threw herself 
towards Russia, then all would be for the best, and the 
Italian question would spring up of itself. In any case 



86 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

iio hesitation was possible, and at the last moment 
Cavour was encouraged by one who ever remained 
his devoted friend, Sir James Hudson, the English re- 
presentative at Turin, who had just received from his 
Government the order to propose, in conjunction 
with the minister of France, a treaty of alliance with 
Piedmont. 

As long as the conditions of the alliance were not 
fixed there would of course still be difficulties to contend 
with. Would the Sardinian Government be satisfied by 
sending a contingent for an auxiliary corps in the pay of 
England ? The Cabinet of London seemed to have 
understood it thus ; but neither Cavour, who held to the 
independence of his policy, nor La Marmora, who felt a 
just pride in the small expeditionary corps of which he 
was to be chief, would ever consent to lend themselves 
to that arrangement. They would admit of no other 
part for Piedmont than that of one ally negotiating with 
another, defraying its own expenses, and preserving the 
dignity and disinterestedness of its co-operation, that it 
might retain equal rights. All that was asked of the 
English Cabinet was the facilitation of a loan. 

On the other hand, the ministry of Turin would 
evidently have preferred some guarantee for Italy, or, at 
the least, some sort of ostensible pledge of sympathy. 
It would have wished England and France to bind 
themselves to claim at Vienna the raising of the decree 
sequestrating the Lombard estates ; but to this condition, 
which the Sardinian Government held to in a spirit of re- 
fined generosity, neither France nor England could agree, 
and the question might perhaps have proved serious, 



SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE. 87 

had it not been happily put an end to by the principal 
Lombard emigres, who, in the interests of the negotiation, 
begged that Cavour would not trouble himself about 
them. 

At the eleventh hour, on the refusal of General 
Dabormida to yield the point of the guarantee, Cavour 
was compelled himself to take the management of foreign 
affairs, in order to sign without conditions : and thus, out 
of much perplexity and much deliberation, was con- 
cluded the treaty of January 10, 1855, uniting Piedmont 
to France and England, and which Count von Usedom 
called "a pistol fired in the ear of Austria." 



VIII. 

There was yet another battle to fight in parliament, 
and Cavour had clearly to face every sort of opposition. 
In the camp of the Right the Piedmontese intervention 
was looked upon as a totally unnecessary adventure, 
which might prove ruinous, and which would condemn 
the country to waste of money, while it caused the army 
to play an ill-defined subordinate part. And more : that 
which Cavour had so laboriously effected was termed an 
act of weakness, the enforced penalty of the revolu- 
tionary policy of the Cabinet, the consequence of the 
change to Liberalism of the president of the council, and 
his alliance with the Left Centre, or party of action. It 
was said that France and England, in directing their 
arms to the East, had been unwilling to forego the 
chance of complications in Italy, and had therefore in- 



88 . LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

sistecl on binding Piedmont. That treaty was on their 
part a precautionary measure ; an imposed guarantee. 

In the camp of the Left things were still more extra- 
ordinary. The entry of Piedmont into that " European 
concert," in which Austria was to be one of the principal 
" performers," was sneered at. A treaty with tjie 
Western Powers was a desertion of the national cause. 
" The alliance," said Brofferio, " is economically charge- 
able with rashness ; militarily, it is a piece of folly ; and 
politically, it is a wicked act." It would surely lead to a 
desertion of Liberal principles ! The extreme Liberals 
went so far as to provoke among a few misled subaltern 
officers a protest, in which it was stated that "no 
Government had a right to dispose of Italian soldiers to 
fight in an anti-national war ; " and it went on to say : 
■' Let us rise, and swear that we will only consent to fight 
for the unity of Italy, and for those people who aspire to 
defend their nationality !...." The more moderate, 
and those who had a certain pretension to shrewdness, 
complained that for a time at least neutrality was not 
maintained, an armed neutrality, which could seize its 
favourable opportunity in the midst of the complications 
with which Europe was threatened. 

Neither one side nor the other seemed to see that 
there was yet another means of serving Italy. Cavour 
let them have their say, and then he laid before them his 
policy in a speech which was animated with the breath 
of a new life. He showed them that neutrality could 
not be other than a dangerous falling into the back- 
ground ; that to stop the progress of Russia towards the 
Mediterranean was more in the interest of Piedmont 



CAVOUB ON THE TREATY. 89 

than in that of any other nation ; and, making straight 
at the knotty point of the matter, he asked whether the 
alliance would be favourable or injurious to Italy ? 

Here was the whole question : " We have joined the 
alliance," said he, " without relinquishing our exterior 
sympathies any more than our interior principles. We 
have not hidden our anxiety for the future of Italy, or 
our desire to see its condition ameliorated. But how, I 
shall be asked, can the treaty serve the cause of Italy ? It 
will serve it in the only way possible — in the actual 
situation of Europe. The experience of these last years, 
as well as that of centuries, shows how little Italy has 
benefited by conspiracies, plots, revolutions, and futile 
excitements. Far from bettering her condition, they 
have been among the greatest evils which have befallen 
this beautiful portion of Europe, and that, not only on 
account of the innumerable misfortunes to individuals re- 
sulting from them, but because these perpetual schemings, 
these insurrections and uprisings have resulted in a 
diminution of the esteem and sympathy which other 

nations might have entertained for Italy And 

now the first of conditions for the good of the peninsula 

is the restitution of her good name To effect this, 

two things are necessary : first, w T e must prove to Europe 
that Italy has sufficient civil sagacity to govern herself 
liberally, and that she is in a position to give herself the 
most perfect form of government ; secondly, we must 
show that our military valour is still what it was in the 
time of our ancestors. In the last seven years you have 
done much for Italy. You have proved to Europe that 
the Italians can govern themselves sagaciously 



90 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

But you must do more. Our country must give evi- 
dence that her children can fight courageously on the 
field. Believe this, that the glory our soldiers will know- 
how to achieve on the Eastern coasts will do more for 
the future of Italy than all the noisy talking in the 
world " 

In speaking thus, fascinating the Chambers with the 
patriotism of his ideas, and in carrying, not without some 
trouble, a disputed vote, Cavour was not unaware that 
he was playing a formidable game. He had said to a 
friend, to whom he wrote immediately after signing the 
treaty : "I have undertaken a terrible responsibility ; 
but, come what may, my conscience tells me that I have 
fulfilled a sacred duty ! " 

After that day of April, 1855, when La Marmora 
and his 15,000 Piedmontese soldiers were making their 
way towards the Crimea, Cavour was many a time 
affected with the consciousness of responsibility. 

The little army was showing itself worthy of a 
place side by side with the allies before Sevastopol, 
and it had the instinct that it was there for the fulfil- 
ment of a great idea. On one occasion, when a poor 
soldier was struggling with deep mud in the trenches, 
a young officer cheerfully rallied him with the words : 
" Never mind, it is with this mud that Italy is to be 
made." Nevertheless, Cavour was deeply anxious, for? 
before fighting the Eussians, the little Piedmontese army 
had, on its arrival, to contend with disease — with 
cholera. The epidemic struck its heaviest blows in 
the Piedmontese camp. At one time, in summer, a 
constant succession of deaths was recorded in Turin. 



THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA. 91 

Major Cassinis, Victor de Saint-Marsan, and a Casati — 
all these fell victims to an obscure death in the flower 
of their youth. General Alexander La Marmora, 
brother to the commander-in-chief, was the next to be 
taken away. 

The truth was sad enough, but public rumours exag- 
gerated it ; those foretellers of evil who had tried to hinder 
the expedition already triumphed over what they now, 
more than ever, called a mad enterprise. Cavour anxiously 
watched the course of events, writing to La Marmora : 
"We often meet together, and we always speak of you. 
Our thoughts and our best wishes are with you in that 
glorious but hazardous campaign to which your devo- 
tion to your country has led you." He never doubted 
the result, but he began to find time hang heavily ; his 
mind was full of anxious apprehensions, of which he 
spoke when sitting one Sunday under the trees at 
Santena, whither he had gone with Sir James Hudson, 
Rattazzi, Minghetti, and Massari. " I knew it," he said ; 
"when I advised the king and the country to venture 
upon this great enterprise, I was sure that we should 
meet with many heavy obstacles, and be sorely tried ; 
but this battle with disease fills me with alarm ; it is an 
evil complication. Let us not be discouraged, however ; 
now that we have thrown ourselves headlong into the 
fight, it is useless to look back. I know that, when 
dying, Rosmini expressed a presentiment that the 
Western Powers would conquer. I hope so ; and I, too, 
believe it. Never mind, we are but under a cloud." 
Those around him, and who heard him, could perceive 
a dramatic and patriotic conflict taking place between 



92 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR.. 

the anxiety of a serious man, and the unbounded confi- 
dence which never quitted him. 

On that day Cavour might be said to have reached 
the eventful moment in a lifetime where everything 
depends on the success or failure of one event ; where a 
minister who has played with fortune has no other 
alternative than to be either shunned and disgraced as 
an adventurer, or be a great man. Had he failed, there 
would, it is true, have been nothing in the spirit of 
vulgar adventure in what he attempted; but he was of 
the order of those who succeed, because they know how 
to deserve success ; because they know how to combine 
judgment with boldness in their schemes ; and when he 
himself still seemed uncertain of succeeding, he was on 
the eve of seeing his policy come victoriously out of 
the ordeal, to be crowned with all that can reward 
success. 



IX. 

The first satisfactory sign was the simple and laconic 
message which Cavour received the day following the 
battle of August 16, 1855: "This morning the 
Eussians, with 50,000 men, attacked the lines of the 
Tchernaya. Our pass-word was, ' King and country.' 
This evening you will know by telegram whether the 
Piedmontese were worthy to fight beside the French and 
the English. We have two hundred dead. The French 
despatches will tell you the rest." Piedmont was thus 
relieved of its heavy load of fears ; it gladly welcomed 
this good report with a zealous, patriotic pride. As to 



THE BATTLE OF THE TGHERNAYA. 93 

Cavour, lie felt as much pleasure in the success of La 
Marmora as in his own. The brilliant conduct of the 
troops, and of their leader, not only justified the treaty, 
but it also justified the president of the council in the 
eyes of all those who had accused him of neglecting to 
settle the position of the Piedmontese general in the 
midst of the allied forces. Cavour had left nothing 
undone ; in a delicate situation he had exhibited confi- 
dence, under which great good sense was hidden. He 
had said to himself that if, as was reasonably hoped, the 
army proved true to itself, and worthy of its country, 
its leader would naturally be raised to the position he 
had been able enough to win, and which no one would 
think of refusing him : in the contrary case, all diplo- 
matic stipulations would be useless. He had placed 
confidence in the army and in La Marmora, and he had 
the delight of seeing it justified. The army was making 
a good appearance in the great conflict. With his 
military qualifications, and his spirit of command, La 
Marmora had had no difficulty in taking rank beside the 
generals of the allies in the Crimea, just as a little later 
he took his place in a council of war assembled in 
Paris. The military result, which formed a part of the 
scheme of Piedmontese intervention, was therefore 
attained by the courage of the combatants on the 
Tchernaya, and by the attitude of their leader, in whom 
Lord Clarendon recognised the bearing "of a soldier, a. 
gentleman, and a statesman." 

The next encouragement for Cavour's policy was 
Victor Emmanuel's visit to Paris and to London in the 
latter part of 1855, which proved how Piedmont had 



94 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

progressed in a short time. Instead of being an obscure 
and insignificant State, lying hidden and forgotten at the 
feet of the Alps, Piedmont was gaining a firm footing 
on the European platform ; she was .bringing herself into 
notice, and being talked about. Victor Emmanuel was 
everywhere welcomed as the sovereign of a small king- 
dom which had known how to take a great and important 
step. In Paris he soon became popular ; in London he 
was made much of, not only because he was a Crimean 
ally, but also because he was a constitutional king — the 
legal prince who had made Piedmont into " a small 
England in Italy." 

Victor Emmanuel was accompanied in his travels by 
D'Azeglio, to whom Cavour had assigned a special 
mission. " His presence is necessary," he said cheer- 
fully, "to prove to Europe that we are not infected with 
revolutionary leprosy." To this D'Azeglio lent himself 
with the delicacy and good-nature of the most genuine 
patriotism. Cavour himself was naturally of the party, 
and had his share in the rejoicings and ovations of the 
occasion. Once more he found himself in Paris — he had 
not visited it since 1852 — which he now entered as a 
negotiator for the French alliance, an all-powerful and 
able minister, and a political personage of refined and 
fascinating manners. From the Tuileries, where he held 
counsel with the chief men of the day, he would go to 
the house of Madame de Circourt, where he often met 
the representatives of the beaten parties. 

" From six o'clock in the morning until two hours 
after midnight," he wrote, "lam always about ; I have 
never led so unquiet a life or one so useless : patience, 



IN PARIS. 95 

however The king is in good health and in the 

best of tempers. To-day there is a grand review, to- 
morrow a ball at the H6tel de Ville, and Thursday we 
leave. I send Cibfario the programme of our stay in 
England ; it is not an amusing one. When I shall reckon 
up my various rights to a retiring pension, I hope that 

the present trip will be counted as a campaign 

I have seen Thiers ; he approves of the war, but he 
would now desire peace. He despairs of his party, and 
almost despairs of parliamentary rule. Cousin has be- 
come a fusionist I chanced to meet with Mon- 

talembert, and, notwithstanding the small amount of 
sympathy existing between us, we shook hands. I have 
also seen the Nuncio, and told him that we should wish 
for an agreement on the same basis as the French 

system ; he pretended not to understand me " 

Cavour saw much society ; he saw every branch of 
Parisian society, and he even sometimes regretted not 
being able to escape the turmoil of official visits and re- 
ceptions, to go to the theatre and be cheered by the 
sight of the " nymphs of the ballet." 

In all these diversions, however, he never lost sight 
of the one essential point, the fixed subject of all liis 
thoughts, and it was about that time, in the interviews 
he had with Napoleon III. at the Tuileries, that for the 
first time he heard those words which were to be the 
prelude to many an important event : " What can be 
done for Italy ? " It was perhaps only lightly uttered, 
perhaps merely a vague manifestation of sympathy and 
courtesy; but he who heard it, in December, 1855, was 
not a man to let it fall unheeded, and, if the stay of 



96 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

Victor Emmanuel in Paris and London could have no 
immediate results, it was still the sign of a new era for 
Piedmont. It was like a sort of prologue or preparation 
for the more serious moral victory that Cavour was on 
the eve of securing at the Congress of Paris, by means 
of the general negotiations which were for a time to 
restore peace to Europe. 



x. 



Let me summarily recall the facts. Up to that time 
the war had been circumscribed in the East. The fall 
of Sevastopol, on September 8, 1855, had in reality 
brought the Crimean campaign to an end ; and since 
that bloody and glorious feat of arms, the presence of 
winter had produced a tacit suspension of hostilities. 
It was now a matter of speculation whether the war 
would rekindle in a still more violent form, what point 
it would select, and what new direction it would take ; 
and it was there that all interests met in a conflict half 
veiled between pacific and warlike influences. Eussia 
appeared disposed henceforward to pay for her defeat by 
concessions in the East. England was the least anxious 
to lay down her arms, but she could do nothing without 
France, and France began to incline for peace. Austria, 
not having engaged her army, felt herself compelled to 
take some decisive measure, and was doing her utmost to 
brino; about a settlement : and from all this an armis- 
tice came, with the preliminaries of peace. Such was the 
situation. 

Cavour would, at heart, have desired a continuation 



PIEDMONT IN THE CONGRESS. 97 

of the war. In a prolongation of it he perceived a 
further chance for Italy. Intervention and diplomacy 
were to him only a delusion. But, after all, if instead 
of war there was to be an armistice, he felt he must 
make the most of it, and hold himself in readiness for the 
negotiations which were about to commence at the 
European congress assembled in Paris. 

The selection of a suitable agent had been a cause of 
considerable perplexity at Turin ; D'Azeglio was pointed 
to as the probable plenipotentiary. To say the truth, 
everybody was a little frightened by the difficulties ; 
the more so as no one saw very clearly in this new 
diplomatic phase. It soon became evident that Cavour 
alone could bring to happy issue a matter which he 
had been chiefly instrumental in promoting and direct- 
ing. After hesitating a moment, he consented to start 
for Paris as chief Sardinian plenipotentiary, and from the 
moment of his arrival there he had to settle questions of 
the greatest importance. What part was Piedmont to 
play ? What was to be her position in the congress ? 
Nothing had as yet been decided. What Cavour had 
done for the Piedmontese general in the Crimea, he did 
for diplomacy, and he said : " When the king's govern- 
ment signed a treaty of alliance with England and 
France, it did not think fit positively or particularly to 
state the position to be assigned to Sardinia in the con- 
gress. The Government was convinced that, with nations 
as with individuals, influence and public esteem depend 
on conduct and reputation more than on diplomatic 
stipulations. 

In Paris he relied on his natural resources, as he had 

H 



98 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

relied on La Marmora in the Crimea ; and he was not 
deceived. Austria vainly tried to persuade France and 
England that Piedmont could take part in the war and 
not have a right to be represented at the congress ; 
that she was only a state of the second order — an in- 
truder in European affairs ; Austria did not succeed. 
Neither France, England, nor Russia would consent to 
so humiliating an exclusion. This was the result of the 
" acquired status " of Piedmont, and also an opening 
victory for Cavour, who entered the congress on the same 
level as the representatives of the greatest Powers ; and 
that day the Austrian plenipotentiary, Count Buol, might 
well fear that he would have, as he called it, a web to 
unravel. The position was still full of difficulty for one 
who, entering a congress with a contested right to his 
place there, had some day or other to introduce a per- 
sonage even more objectionable — viz. Italy. It was in 
this that Cavour gave special evidence that he could 
mount with the occasion. Placed for the first time in the 
highest political position in Europe, and mixed up with 
matters of the greatest importance — as arbitrator of war 
and of peace — he proved himself equal, without effort, 
to everything required of him. 

Perfectly master of himself, courteous with everyone, 
patient and shrewd, he chose to keep in the background 
at the few first meetings of the Congress; he spoke 
little, and when obliged to give an opinion on the 
matters under discussion — the free navigation of the 
Danube, or the neutralisation of the Black Sea — he gave 
it concisely and clearly, always taking the most liberal 
view. He very soon won golden opinions from his 



AUSTRIA IN THE CONGRESS. 99 

colleagues, astonishing them with the variety, justice, 
and depth of a mind that nothing seemed ever to take 
unawares. In the midst of this assembly, where so 
many interests met, and where policies were antagonistic 
or jealously eyeing one another, Cavour found no diffi- 
culty in taking a clear course, and in seizing affinities 
and antipathies in different natures ; nor was he slow in 
taking advantage of them, always being particularly 
careful not to separate himself from France and England. 

As it appeared that peace was seriously contemplated, 
he saw no reason to wound the pride and feelings of 
Eussia, plus the conditions already imposed upon her, 
and the more Austria was tenacious, the more lenient he 
became. By a singular contrast, Austria, which had 
done nothing and not lost a man, held rigidly and 
inflexibly against Eussia, while Piedmont, which had 
bravely sent her soldiers to the fight, maintained a 
perfect moderation in the common victory of the 
Allies. 

This difference in the attitude of the representatives 
of Austria and Sardinia did not fail to strike the Eussian 
plenipotentiaries, and Count Orloff was grateful to 
Cavour. The friendliest understanding existed between 
them. One day, when the question of the neutralisation 
of the Black Sea was mooted, Count Orloff turned to 
Cavour and said, loud enough to be heard: " Count Buol 
speaks as though Austria had taken Sevastopol ! " On 
another occasion, when the Austrian plenipotentiary was 
insisting on the subject of a small cession of territory — 
which by a diplomatic euphemism would be termed a 
*? rectification of frontiers " — in Bessarabia, Count Orloff 

H 2 



100 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

said to Cavour in a significant tone : " Austria's plenipo- 
tentiary does not know how much blood or how many 
tears this rectification of frontiers will cost his country." 
Assuredly the Piedmontese took no measures to soften 
the resentment of Russia towards Austria. 

Before a month was out Cavour had solved the 
problem how to establish his position and acquire real 
authority, by the frankness and graciousness of his 
manners, as well as the superiority of his mind; and 
while the Congress was considering the question of the 
East and the Black Sea, the energetic plenipotentiary 
of Victor Emmanuel did not lose his time. Besides 
the official negotiations which were to be crowned by 
the treaty of peace of March 30, 1856, he had his 
own work to carry out. He had interviews with the 
Emperor at the Tuileries, with Lord Clarendon, Lord 
Cowley, and the representatives of Russia ; from some 
he secured support, from others co-operation, or at least 
a benevolent neutrality His effort was to get the 
congress to consider the Italian question — that was the 
only question he had at heart, and he burned to be the 
champion of it before Europe. There indeed was the 
difficulty. 

The Italian question was not discussed ; it did not 
exist officially; it could not therefore present itself 
under a diplomatic and regular form. The " principle 
of nationalities " had not its accredited plenipotentiary. 

The yoke of the foreigner could not be spoken of; 
Austria would have had a right at once to protest 
against the discussion of such a matter in a congress 
assembled to consider the Eastern question. Doubtless, 



THE SITUATION IN ITALY. 101 

this great Italian question, so difficult to lay hold 
of, had one vulnerable point ; it was a permanent 
violation of the treaties which dii^lomacy was accus- 
tomed to regard as the basis of the peace of Europe. 
A French army occupied Rome, and the indefinite pro- 
longation of that occupation was a living testimony to 
the incapacity of the Papal Government to support itself. 
The Austrians had occupied the Legations ever since 
1849, and appeared to be in no way disposed to quit 
Bologna. The Austrian dominion, a legal government 
in Lombardy, extended by an abuse of treaties to the 
duchies of Modena and of Parma as well as to Tuscany. 
The king of Naples could only sustain himself by acts of 
extreme arbitrary power. Hence a state of things chaotic 
and violent, which was dangerously favourable to revo- 
lutionary intrigues, and even menacing to Piedmont. 
In this direction it might be possible to strike on the 
Italian question, and bring it under the observation of 
diplomacy. Cavour left no stone unturned, and from 
the moment that he set foot in Paris he prosecuted the 
matter with indefatigable activity. 

To the question which Napoleon III. had asked him — 
" What can be done for Italy ?" the Piedmontese minister 
replied by handing in a statement remarkable for vigour 
and lucidity. On the eve of the signing of peace, on 
March 27, he sent to his allies, France and England, 
a note, representing the situation of Italy under a new 
aspect ; he proposed for the Roman States — at least for 
the Legations — plans that were perhaps impracticable, but 
which might be at least a point from which to start and 
make a beginning. The more the congress advanced on 



102 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

the road to peace, the more Cavour became pressing, as 
though he felt that the opportunity purchased at such 
cost was about to escape him. In the end he won his 
mark. He succeeded in rousing Napoleon III. and 
fascinating Lord Clarendon, and in securing at least a 
certain favourable neutrality of the Russians. 

Meantime the Emperor commissioned the French 
plenipotentiary, Count Walewski, to kindle the powder 
Cavour had amassed, and thus it was that eight days 
after the peace the Italian question was suddenly 
exploded in the congress at Paris, in that sitting 
of April 8, 1856, when Austria was for the first time 
compelled to hear the announcement that after Russia 
she might have to pay the expenses of the next war 
to come. 

XT. 

The sitting that day was very curious and memor- 
able, from the consequences that ensued. The French 
plenipotentiary called every diplomatic euphemism to his 
assistance; he took advantage of the congress to provoke 
" an interchange of ideas on different subjects which were 
waiting to be settled, and which it would be well to take 
into consideration in order to prevent fresh complications." 
He mixed all the questions together, the occupation of 
Rome by the French troops, the occupation of the Lega- 
tions by the Austrians, the situation of the kingdom of 
Naples, the anarchy of Greece, and the excesses of which 
the Belgian journals were guilty. 

What the real question was it was easy to perceive, 
and Austria was the last to misunderstand it Count 



THE ITALIAN QUESTION. 103 

Buol immediately protested the incompetency of the 
congress, and declined all discussion on the affairs of 
Italy. He would have no explanation, no manifestation 
whatever ; and by his very attitude he forestalled any 
possibility of a practical solution. He very well per- 
ceived whence the blow came : up to a certain point he 
could evade it officially, but he could no longer prevent 
the outburst. Count Walewski said some hard words 
about the interior government of the king of Naples, 
and he admitted that the situation of Eome and the 
Eoman States, reduced as they were to live under foreign 
protection, was "abnormal." Lord Clarendon, still 
more severe upon the king of Naples, plainly declared 
that the Pontifical government was the worst of all 
governments, and that the condition of the Romagna, 
hovering between a state of siege and one of brigandage, 
was frightful ; adding that the only remedy for such a 
state of things was secularisation, liberal reforms, and 
an administration conformable to the spirit of the age. 
Cavour, whose game was being thus so ably played, came 
forward in his turn to corroborate all that had been said, 
and to show that yet more wanted doing. He demon- 
strated that the " abnormal " was not only the situation 
of the Pontifical States and of Naples, it Avas that of the 
whole peninsula ; and that Austria, stretching her power 
from the Ticino to Venice, encamped at Ferrara and 
Bologna ; mistress of Piacenza and possessing a garrison 
at Parma, destroyed the political equilibrium of Italy, 
constituting a permanent danger for Sardinia. "The 
Sardinian plenipotentiaries," he said, as he faced Count 
Buol, " therefore think it their duty to call the attention 



104 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

of Europe to a state of things so abnormal ; that which 
results from the indefinite occupation of a great portion 
of Italy by Austrian troops . . . . ." 

What he uttered at the congress on April 8, 
he energetically confirmed a few days later in a com- 
munication to France and England on April 16, in 
which he stated that the condition of Piedmont was be- 
coming insupportable, and that if nothing were done 
she would be driven to the terrible alternative of bending, 
like the other Italian States, under the yoke of Austria, or 
taking up arms. " Internally troubled," he went on to 
say, "by the action of revolutionary passions instigated 
around her by a system of violent compression and by 
foreign occupation, menaced with a still greater extension 
of Austrian power, the king of Sardinia may from one 
moment to another be compelled by an inevitable neces- 
sity to adopt extreme measures, of which it is impossible 
to foresee the consequences. ..." It was, in a word, 
the exposure of a whole situation, and of a policy laid 
before all Europe by the most strenuous of men; and if for 
the moment nothing came of it but an empty protocol, 
the energy with which the question had been started 
revealed the growing gravity of Italian affairs. 

But had not Cavour hoped for something more than 
a protocol ? Was he not deceiving himself ? No doubt 
he too, in spite of the high balance of his mind, was 
sometimes carried away in action. After having suc- 
ceeded as far as success was possible for the moment, he 
thought he had not done enough, and then, side by side 
with official diplomacy, there was another chapter, show- 
ing him the victim of fits of impatience and frenzy. 



LETTERS OF CAVOUR. 105 

Quick though he was to coutrol himself, Cavour was 
subject to these hot moods ; he felt it himself, and in a 
hurried account which he sent to Turin of all that he 
was doing and attempting, and of his mental agitation, 
he says : " I trust that after reading this you will not 
imagine that I have brain fever, or that I have fallen 
into a state of delirium ; on the contrary, the condition 
of my intellectual health is excellent. I have never felt 
more calm ; I have even obtained a great reputation 
for moderation. Clarendon has often told me that 
Prince Napoleon accuses me of being wanting in energy, 
and even "Walewski praises my behaviour ; I am really 
persuaded, however, that boldness might not be un- 
attended with success." 

XII. 

The fact is that for part of April, 1856, Cavour was 
mentally revolving every kind of plan. He did not 
even shrink from an immediate war with Austria ; even 
flattering; himself into the belief that he could drag 
France and England into it too. His secret diplomacy 
was raised to a singular pitch, chiefly in two letters, 
certainly expressing the most curious of his mental pre- 
occupations, and even of his particular situation, imme- 
diately after the congress. 

" Yesterday morning," he says in one of his letters, 
" I had the following conversation with Lord Clarendon : 
* My lord, that which took place at the congress proves 
two things — 1st. That Austria is determined to persist 
in its system of oppression and violence towards Italy ; 
2ndly. That diplomatic efforts are quite inefficient to 



106 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

modify that system. The results to Piedmont are ex- 
tremely injurious. What with party irritation on the 
one hand, and the arrogance of Austria on the other, 
there are but two courses open to us ; either to become 
reconciled with Austria and the Pope, or to make pre- 
parations for the declaration of war with Austria at no 
distant period. If the first alternative is the better, I 
ought, on my return to Turin, to advise the king to 
call to power the friends of Austria and the Pope. If 
the second is preferable, we shall not fear, my friends 
and I, to prepare ourselves for a terrible war — for war to 
the death ! ' Here I stopped, and Lord Clarendon, with- 
out expressing either surprise or disapprobation, then 
said : ' I think you are right, your position is growing 
critical; I can imagine that an outburst may become 
inevitable ; only the time to speak of it openly has not 
yet come.' I replied : c I have given you evidence of 
my moderation and prudence ; I think that in policy 
one should be excessively reserved as to speech, and 
exceedingly decided as to deeds. There are positions in 
which less danger will be found in an excess of audacity 
than in one of prudence. With La Marmora for our 
commander-in-chief, I am persuaded that we are fit to 
begin a war, and if it should last long you will be 
forced to come to our assistance.' Lord Clarendon 
eagerly replied : ' Oh, certainly, if you should be in 
trouble you can rely upon us; you will see how ener- 
getically we shall hurry to your aid.' ..." Cavour did 
not doubt that these words, coming from so reserved a 
man as Lord Clarendon, showed that England was ready 
to let herself be drawn into a war having for its aim the 



INTERVIEW WITH THE EMPEBOB. 107 

freedom of Italy. But here began his illusion, and 
perhaps he exaggerated to himself the real meaning of 
Lord Clarendon's words, and the extent of his sympathy 
in this matter. 

In another of Cavour's letters about the same time 
he gives an account of a visit he paid the Emperor, 
describing that busy mode of life so full of succeeding 
impressions, and in which he throws some light on the 
relations existing between the Piedmontese and the 
Austrian plenipotentiaries. " I have seen the Emperor," 
he says, " and I said much the same thing to him as I 
had said to Clarendon, only putting it a little more 
mildly. He listened courteously, and added that he 
hoped to bring Austria to a better view of things. He 
told me that on the occasion of last Saturday's dinner 
he had said to Count Buol that he deeply regretted to 
find himself in positive contradiction to the Emperor of 
Austria on the Italian question; upon which Count 
Buol immediately went to Walewski to tell him that 
Austria's greatest wish was to comply with the Emperor's 
wishes in every respect, that France was her only ally, 
and that it was therefore imperative that she should 
follow the same policy. The Emperor appeared pleased 
with this mark of friendship, and he reiterated that he 
would take advantage of it to obtain concessions from 
Austria. I showed myself incredulous, I insisted on 
the necessity for adopting a decided attitude, and I 
told him that to begin with I had prepared a protest 
which I would hand to Walewski the following day. 
The Emperor hesitated long, and finally said : 'Go to 
London, come to a clear understanding with Palmerston, 



108 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR.- 

then come and see me/ The Emperor must have 
spoken to Buol, for he came to me with a thousand 
protestations about Austria's good feeling towards us, 
her desire to live peaceably with us, and to respect our 
institutions, &c. &c, and more humbug of the sort. 
I replied that he had not given much evidence of such 
a wish when at Paris, and that I was leaving with a 
conviction that the understanding between us was worse 
instead of better. The conversation was a long and 
animated one, but always in a tone of urbanity and 
courtesy. ... At parting he shook my hand, saying : 
'Allow me to hope that even 'politically we shall not 
always be adversaries.' I conclude from these words 
that Buol is somewhat uneasy at the exhibitions of 
opinion in our favour, and possibly also at what the 
Emperor may have said to him. . . . Orloff made a 
thousand protestations of friendship — he agreed with 
me that the condition of Italy was insupportable. . . . 
Even the Prussian speaks ill of Austria. After all, if 
we have not gained anything practically in the eyes of 
the world, our' victory is complete. ..." 

It was evident that this idea of a coming war with 
which Cavour flattered his mind could not long be 
indulged. It met with no encouragement in Paris, and 
Cavour soon perceived that nothing was to be gained 
from that journey to London which the Emperor advised 
him to take. A gracious reception from the Queen and 
the Prince Consort, who exhibited a somewhat platonic 
interest in the affairs of Italy, an invitation to be 
present at a naval review, protestations of sympathy 
from Tories as well as Whigs for the Piedmontese 



GAINS OF PIEDMONT. 109 

Constitutional Government — all this lie met with in 
London ; but beyond this he found the English very 
little excitable in favour of the national question. In 
fact, he was able to see but very little of Lord 
Palmerston, and such an interview as he had had in 
Paris with Lord Clarendon was not renewed in London. 
Cavour's steady mind soon reverted to the practical 
truth and a just appreciation of circumstances. But 
though the war which he had been prematurely dreaming 
of kindling, immediately after a recent peace, was only an 
illusion of a moment ; and though he could not have all 
that he wished, what he had actually obtained in reality 
was nevertheless very real and singularly encouraging. 

What more was wanted ? Piedmont had united her 
arms with the arms of the greatest nations in the world, 
and wiped away the painful recollection of her defeat ; 
she had offered in the fire of great battles the spectacle of 
what one of the French generals, Bosquet, called " a 
jewel of an army." She had taken her seat round the 
green-table of a congress, beside France, England, Russia, 
Austria, and Prussia. She had made herself one of the 
European Powers, and shown that the importance of a 
country is measured rather by its ability and valour than 
by extent of territory. She had acquired the right to 
touch upon forbidden questions, to speak for Italy, and 
constitute herself Italy's plenipotentiary. 

This was the result of a policy as consecutive as it 
was resolute ; and when Cavour returned to Turin after 
the congress, and there met with the same opposition 
which had assailed him before the Crimean campaign, 
harassing him anew with questions as to what he had 



110 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

gained, lie was able quietly to reply : " We have not 
reached any very definite object, it is true ; but we have 
secured two things : In the first place, the anomalous 
and unhappy situation of Italy has been laid before 
Europe, not by demagogues or hot-headed revolutionists, 
nor again by excited journalists, but by the representa- 
tives of the highest powers of Europe ; by statesmen who 
govern the greatest nations, and who are accustomed to 
take council of reason rather than emotion. In the 
second place, these very Powers have declared that it 
was not only in the interest of Italy, but in that of 
Europe, that the ills of Italy should be remedied. I 
cannot believe that a judgment passed and a counsel 
given by such powers as those of France and England 
can be barren of good results. The principles which have 
guided us in these last years have enabled us to make a 
great advance. For the first time in the whole course of 

o 

our history the Italian question has been broached and 
discussed in a European congress ; not as formerly at 
Laybach and Verona, with a view to aggravate the evils 
Italy had to bear, and put new chains about her neck ; 
but, on the contrary, with the openly-avowed object of 
finding some remedy for her oppressed condition, and to 
exhibit the sympathies of great nations towards her. The 
congress is ended, and now the cause of Italy is brought 
before the tribunal of public opinion. The action may 

be long, and the shiftings many We await the 

issue of it with an entire confidence " Thus 

spoke Cavour before the Chamber on his return to Turin. 
He was popularly recognised as the representative of a 
revived and strengthened Piedmont, and Italians hailed 
him as the hope of Italy. 



CHAPTER III. 

PARLIAMENTARY REIGN OF CAVOUR — PREPARATIONS 
FOR WAR. 

A Pause after 1856 — New Situation of Piedmont — Moral Headship of Cavour — 
Portrait of the Man — His Character —His Speeches — A Parliamentary Reign 
— Watchword of the New Phase — Aleve fiammam ! — Activity in Turin — The 
Fortifications of Alessandria — Maritime Arsenal of Spezzia — Boring of the 
Mont Cenis — Piedmontese Policy in Italy — Cavour and Daniel Manin — 
Piedmont before Europe — Relations with Russia, with England, and with 
France — Crisis in Piedmontese Policy — Elections of 1857 — The Crime of 
Orsini in Paris — Effects in Turin — Official and Secret Diplomacy — Speech 
of Cavour on the Alliances — Private Communications of the Emperor — 
Negotiations — Interview at Plombieres — Secret Treaty — Scene on the 1st 
of January, 1859, at the Tuileries — Speech of King Victor Emmanuel 
before Parliament — Prologue of the War. 

I. 

It was a particular element of strength in Cavour, 
that he kept a definite object in view, obscured, it inay 
be at times, by passing events, but ever present to his 
mind. His courage, though great, was surpassed by his 
presence of mind and political tact, by the art, which he 
possessed in an eminent degree, of suiting his actions to 
circumstances. Manzoni used to say of him that he was 
every inch a statesman, with " all a statesman's pru- 
dence and even imprudence." He could be prudent or 
imprudent as circumstances required. After the Paris 
congress, he found himself in a positiofi. equally brilliant 



112 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

and difficult. He had sown seed assiduously, and with 
a careful hand, and he looked for a harvest. But if, in 
the midst of all his excitement in Paris, he had indulged 
a hope of the possibility of a war of liberation being 
speedily entered upon, he had soon been obliged to 
recognise that, for one campaign, it was enough to have 
introduced the subject of Italy in the midst of the con- 
gress ; that further steps in the same direction would 
only for the present set France, England, and the whole 
of Europe — slowly recovering from a recent conflict — 
against his scheme. He had quickly understood that 
the new situation, inaugurated by the peace of March 30, 
1856, was still immature ; that it was needful to give 
to all political views, all alliances and conflicting in- 
terests, time enough to assume a definite shape, by fami- 
liarising public opinion with the Italian question, which 
had been so suddenly brought forward. He had 
seen, in a word, that no decisive step could be taken for 
some years to come — perhaps two, or even three ; and 
that until then the struggle must be continually re- 
newed, in otder, not only to keep possession of the 
ground already gained, but also to prepare for an onward 
march. One thing remained certain : the Paris congress 
had left the Italian question an open one ; beyond the 
Alps, Piedmont and Austria now stood opposed face to 
face. On his return to Turin, Cavour remarked : " The 
Sardinian and Austrian plenipotentiaries, after sitting 
side by side for two months, parted without personal 
animosity, but thoroughly imbued with the conviction 
that the two countries were farther than ever from 
political union, and that the principles professed by the 



IRRITATION OF AUSTRIA. 113 

two States are irreconcilable." This avowed antagonism, 
thus laid before the whole of Europe, and accepted by 
Piedmont, was felt by Austria with all the rancour of a 
Power that has been set at naught ; irritated by an 
antagonism which she rightly qualified as unequal, so 
long as only insignificant Piedmont was concerned in it, 
she increased the evil by her complaints and accusa- 
tions. A few months later the quarrel would receive the 
perilous emphasis of a diplomatic rupture. 

Even before the war in the East, in 1853, Austria 
had recalled Count Appony ; after the war, early in 
1857, she recalled Count Paar, recently sent as envoy to 
Turin. This was not yet a declaration of hostilities, but 
it was an acknowledgment of incompatibility between 
the imperial supremacy established at Milan, and the 
only free State in the Peninsula. To say the truth, this 
rupture could excite neither surprise nor emotion in 
Cavour, who had foreseen it, and was relieved by it, but 
desired to lay all the responsibility of it on Austria. He 
did not ignore " the difficulties and dangers " of ever-in- 
creasing tension in the relations between the two Powers ; 
he saw in it one of the inevitable consequences of the 
situation accepted by Piedmont, one condition of the 
new campaign he had opened by the bold initiative he 
had taken at the Paris congress. To sap the Austrian 
domination morally, without affording her the pretext 
for a rash attack — to maintain the Liberal ascendency of 
Piedmont, though at the cost of much effort — to rally 
Italian patriotic sentiment around the banner of Victor 
Emmanuel without committing himself with the different 
Governments — to obtain allies by any means, while 



114 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

leading Europe gradually to consider the liberation of 
Italy as important in the interests of conservatism — to 
prepare for war under cover of peace — and to pursue 
all these objects in the midst of conflicting parties, and 
of incidents equally new and unforeseen : such was 
Cavour's work during the two or three years following 
1856. A task so bold and intricate could only be carried 
on to the end by a man who had succeeded in obtaining 
a real preponderance, a sort of parliamentary kingship 
or dictatorship, an instrument powerful and supple to 
his hand. Few of the phenomena of contemporary 
parliamentary history are more striking and original than 
the power thus obtained by one man through parliamen- 
tary action. 

II. 

" We have a Government ; " so said the Turinese at 
this period ; "we have Chambers of representatives ; 
and we have a Constitution : the name for all that is — 
Cavour." The playful turn of the remark did not trifle 
with the truth of the matter. The fact is that at one 
time it was Cavour's fortune to eclipse, or rather to 
personify the Piedmontese constitutional regime, which 
owed him all its lustre and efficiency. Assuredly he was 
not alone in a country which numbered among its 
senators D'Azeglio, Count Sclopis, Count Gallina, 
Marquis Alfieri ; and among its deputies Balbo, Eevel, 
Menabrea, Boncampagni, Eattazzi, Lanza, Mamiani 
Farini. More rapidly than the rest he had obtained the 
exceptional position of a man reigning in and by the 
Chambers, ruling parties and leading public opinion, 
which followed humbly in his train. 



INFLUENCE OF CAVOUB. 115 

As the complication of events increased, and com- 
binations of internal policy were added to diplomatic 
action, Cavour's influence increased also to an extraor- 
dinary degree. The Chambers shrank from refusing him 
anything he asked for ; and if some eccentric members 
of the Eadical or the Absolutist party, if BrofFerio 
or Count Solaro della Margherita worried him with 
their conflicting attacks, they gave him but fresh occa- 
sion to strengthen his ascendency. Deputies who had 
come prepared to question anything and everything were 
frequently reduced to silence by a gesture or a keen glance 
from him — like the worthy tradesman of the Via di Po ? 
who, one day while exhibiting his wares to the Countess 
Stackelberg, suddenly vanished into the colonnade, but 
as quickly reappeared, saying : " Pray excuse me, but 
I caught sight of Count Cavour, and I wanted to see 
how matters are progressing. He looked cheerful and 
smiling, so things must be going on all right ; I feel 
comfortable now." It was thus in parliament ; the habit 
was contracted of judging things by the countenance 
of the President of the Council. 

Call it a dictatorship : but it was a most exceptional 
one, daily granted and hourly assented to ; continually 
exercised under the control of the Chambers. Under the 
eye of a free nation Cavour, with a confidence which he 
knew how to impart to those around him, accepted all 
the conditions of a parliamentary life which he loved, 
and the strength and dignity of which he appreciated. 
Neither the conflict nor its consequences repelled him. 
On one occasion, on its being pointed out to him that a 
measure to which he attached the highest importance 

i 2 



116 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

would already have been carried had he but been a 
minister of an absolute Government, he replied with 
great animation : " You forget that under an absolute 
Government I neither would nor could have been 
minister at all. I am what I am because I am fortunate 
enough to be a constitutional minister. A parliamentary 
government has its drawbacks like any other ; and yet, 
with all its drawbacks, it is worth more than all the 
others. I may lose patience with the opposition I 
meet with, and resist it energetically; but then, on reflec- 
tion, I am thankful for such opposition, since it compels 
me to make my views clearer, and to renew my efforts 
to convince the majority. An absolute minister com- 
mands ; a constitutional minister, in order to be obeyed, 
must persuade: and I mean to persuade the majority 
that I am in the right. Believe me, the most inferior 
chamber of representatives is preferable to the most bril- 
liant imperial anteroom." Thus he who appeared to be a 
dictator was in truth only the head parliamentary official, 
putting honestly into practice, with equal fidelity and 
liberal confidence, the regime which he appeared to 
overshadow. 

No doubt Cavour owed the authority he had thus 
obtained to his success, to his being leader in an 
onward movement, and to the pre-eminence he had 
been able to give his little country in the settling of 
European difficulties. He owed it also to his genius 
for business, to the breadth and versatility of his mind, 
to a marvellous fertility of expedients, to the ready 
influence exerted by a sympathetic nature, at once 
amiable, easy, and forceful. Be sure it was no ordinary 



HIS CAPACITY FOB BUSINESS. 117 

party-chief who could be at once Minister of Commerce, 
Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister 
of the Interior, and even at a given moment, Minister 
of War; bearing all these burdens without bending under 
them, with never-failing aptitude and unwearying 
activity. Whether in parliament or directing business, 
Cavour reaped the advantages of his early practical 
training. He combined the superiority of a politician 
pursuing the realisation of an idea, with that of a man 
who had mastered all the details of administration and 
of political economy. Completely identified with his 
country, he was as well acquainted with every province 
and town of Piedmont as with his own estate at Leri. 

Agriculture, commerce, industry, maritime interests, 
state finances, and even the finances of the communes — 
none of these came amiss to him. He often amazed and 
disconcerted his enemies, proving to them with playful 
gusto that he knew the affairs of their particular locality 
better than they did. He had the art of interpreting 
dry financial statements, so grouping facts and figures 
as to lend them a living interest. In the endless discus- 
sions upon the new taxes, he would give a graphic and 
animated description of what the people had to pay for 
these terrible taxes, and, on the other hand, how much 
they had been the gainers by the diminution of tariffs, by 
increased facilities of traffic, and by railroads ; and he 
would depict with a master-hand the increase of national 
prosperity under the happy influence of this system of 
economical Liberalism so much cried down by its oppo- 
nents. To a member who was complaining on behalf of 
his provincial district, the fertile regions of Monferrat, so 



118 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

rich in wine and cereals, Cavour replied, without hesitation : 
" The honourable member who has just spoken on behalf 
of the Monferrat agriculturists must be himself a skilful 
cultivator, and doubtless he makes thirty-one hectolitres 
of wine per hectare. The means of communication 
between Nice (in Monferrat) and Alessandria give him a 
profit of at least If. 50c. per hectolitre, which represents 
45f. per hectare. I beg him to inform us whether he 
pays 45f. per hectare in taxes." Much laughter greeted 
this home-thrust by way of demonstration. Cavour 
possessed the advantage of a thorough acquaintance, of 
the most precise and intimate kind, with all that con- 
cerned his country. This was no doubt one of the causes 
of his ascendency ; but it was far from being the only 
one, nor even the truest, or, if the word is allowable, the 
most human. 

in. 

The real cause of Cavour's superiority and authority 
in parliament, as well as at the head of affairs, was the 
quality of the nian — the attractive originality of his mar- 
vellously well-balanced nature. Cavour had nothing in 
common with the mediocre statesman, ambitious of power, 
and yet encumbered with it ; full of his own importance, 
exhausting subtleties and complications, and, with much 
labour, achieving infinitesimal results. In him there 
was no arrogance, no strain, no uncertainty. He was 
the most natural and straightforward of politicians, 
carrying out his innumerable engagements with the 
greatest ease ; doing the most engrossing work without 
effort or fatigue ; holding cheaply all etiquette and regu- 



HIS CHEERFULNESS. 119 

lations; cordial and pleasant in all his relations with 
men. He shrank instinctively from whatever savoured 
of affectation or display ; and when, after having been 
hard at work ever since daybreak in sending off des- 
patches or receiving visits, he went on his way along the 
colonnade of the Via di Po to the Office of Foreign 
Affairs, or that of Finance, he seemed only a worthy 
citizen of Turin, bowing to an acquaintance here, or 
talking to one there, affable with everyone. In the 
midst of the most important affairs he had the gift of a 
cheerful animation, the wholesome brightness of an 
elastic temperament and a well-regulated mind; a 
cheerfulness which manifested itself in a hearty laugh, or 
in a way of rubbing his hands in a certain manner which 
has become traditional. 

Thus endowed with a happy spirit, a ready intelli- 
gence, and a great enjoyment of life, he never knew 
what ennui was, any more than rancour or bitterness. 
He used to say that rancour was absurd, and that nothing 
need ever be wearisome. Thus he would pass with 
perfect equanimity from the study of some profound 
political problem to the reading of a novel or a news- 
paper article ; from conferring with an ambassador to 
conversing with some humble peasant or modest appli- 
cant for office ; from the most complicated state affairs 
to mere parish matters. This was the man who, in the 
gravest crisis in his career, between the ministry of yes- 
terday and the ministry of the morrow, could write from 
Leri to one of his friends : " Do not be vexed with me if 
I don't write to you. It is because I don't wish to en- 
tertain you with the discussions of the vestry-meetings 



120 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

of Trino, of which I am a very active member. Don't 
lose this letter ; it contains the direction of the apothe- 
cary who sells chestnut-oil to cure gout. At Leri one 
has leisure for everything, even for reading Madame 
de S.'s prosing. Here I am, shelved for an indefinite 
time. As far as I am concerned, I am quite content, for 
this life suits me perfectly. I am quite happy by 
myself, or with the worthy agriculturists amongst whom 
I live." 

He could indeed find time for everything, because he 
took an interest in everything, and he could find good in 
everything. He despised neither men nor things, and 
he used to say wittily that many card-players only lose 
because they have no regard for the small cards ; as for 
him, he knew the value of the small cards — of insignifi- 
cant people, even of counsels and remarks which he 
would call forth and listen to and make his own. But 
under this apparent facility and good humour, Cavour 
possessed the highest qualities of a statesman ; clearness 
and precision of ideas, and a strength of will which at 
times could make all give way before it. Neither peril 
nor difficulty proved an obstacle to his will. Only, this 
iron will was clad in graciousness, the sharp outline of 
his ideas was veiled in the garb of amiability ; his prac- 
tical good sense, so unerring and fully developed, was 
combined with great and broad conceptions ; and thus 
this gifted nature — hearty, liberal, impetuous, and fasci- 
nating — became irresistible : friends, adversaries, dissen- 
tients, all were attracted and carried along by it. 

The innumerable speeches by which Cavour defended 
his policy, and which subsist as a monument of the 



HIS CHARACTER AS AN ORATOR. 121 

parliamentary regime, represent faithfully his character 
and tone of mind. Cavour was not a born orator, and 
at the beginning of his career he obtained a hearing with 
some difficulty. His voice was rather harsh ; there was 
a certain sharpness in his tones, not abated by the wear 
and tear of conflict ; and he never lost a slight cough, 
which at times interfered with his well-rounded periods, 
and which, indeed, he knew how to turn to account when 
necessary. Besides this, he had to acquire the habit of 
speaking Italian, and he rather piqued himself upon his 
literary inability ; he used sometimes to pretend to con- 
sult his friends as to the correctness of some sentence ; 
but he rapidly became the first debater in the Pied- 
montese parliament, riveting attention by the reliableness 
of his views and the substantial soundness of his elucida- 
tions ; fascinating his hearers by the subtlety of his 
reasoning, and making himself formidable by the brilliant 
sarcasm of his repartees. 

Usually he would allow the discussion to develop 
itself, and speakers to follow each other in succession, 
while he betrayed emotion or impatience, or appeared to 
listen with smiling animated bonhomie ; for in him all 
was life and action. When the discussion seemed to be 
at an end, when everyone else had spoken, he would 
enter the arena with one of his telling speeches. He 
never wrote them down beforehand ; a few hours' medi- 
tation was sufficient preparation ; he relied for the rest 
on the inspiration of the moment, like a man master of 
his thoughts. Cavour had the art of grasping a question, 
at once elevating and simplifying it, answering each 
interruption without breaking the order of his ideas, 



122 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUR. 

combining the superiority and novelty of his views with 
the accuracy and abundance of his facts ; and this too in 
the most natural language, without declamation or 
literary artifice, with a logical clearness of demonstration 
which vanquished his enemies, captivated and encouraged 
his friends, and satisfied and reassured public opinion. 
Was he a witty or an eloquent man ? — He was essentially 
the richly-gifted politician, making use of wit and 
eloquence ; an orator with a practical aim ; with a com- 
prehensive grasp of every subject, quick to disengage 
whatever was practicable, and to seize the gist of the 
matter ; enlarging his own influence while enlarging his 
sphere of action. He was always on a level with the 
situations which his own inventive genius had created, 
and equal to all the difficulties which he did not shrink 
from provoking. 

For Cavour the parliamentary rSgime was by no 
means a mere medium for his eloquence or an arena of 
party stratagem ; it was a powerful lever for practical 
government, a means of awaking public opinion, and 
associating it with the progressive realisation of an ever- 
active idea. Cavour would sometimes say : "I am 
willing to lead and even to spur on the country, but the 
country - must back me up ; between it and me there 
must be no rupture. Should any such rupture arise, 
not only could I no longer indulge the hope that my 
political plans would ever prevail, but I could no longer 
be minister." To precede and direct public opinion, 
without ceasing to be in living contact with it, to know 
on occasion how to wait, this was his grand secret ; the 
secret of a great Liberal who only obtained the voluntary 



BIS' MOTTO. 123 

confidence of his country by proving himself a far-sighted 
and able promoter of a national work ; and not a mere 
partisan or faction leader. Such was his view of the 
parliamentary regime of which he made such happy use 
in order to take the first forward step. And he had 
more than ever to make use of it after the Paris congress, 
in a policy comprehending at once internal and external 
action : Piedmont, Italy, and Europe. On these three 
points he had to concentrate his efforts. 

IV. 

The position attained by the Cabinet of Turin, through 
its co-operation in the Crimean war and the general 
negotiation for peace, was certainly flattering to the 
pride of a small country. The point was to maintain, 
strengthen, and extend it for further progress. 

Cavour knew well that there could be no drawing 
back ; that after having raised Piedmont to a certain 
level, he could not allow it to decline again ; and that 
after having excited the hopes, interests, even the 
impatient expectations of his country, he could no 
longer extinguish the flame he stood in such need of. 
Immediately, therefore, upon his return to Turin, after 
the Paris congress, he busied himself with giving a fresh 
impetus, that he might enable Piedmont to keep up her 
ambitious role of a small power bent upon becoming a 
great one. "Alere flammam" was his motto. It was 
necessary to go forward, to do something ; to prove the 
omnipresence and activity of the Piedmontese leader- 
ship, which had to manifest itself in every possible way. 
In less than two years, amid a multiplication of enter- 



124 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

prises and projects, Cavour had fortified Alessandria, 
created a great marine arsenal at Spezzia, and urged on 
the boring of the Mont Cenis tunnel — all this at the risk 
of appearing to exceed the stretch and force of a small 
nation by a policy of moral action or of military 
preparation which told heavily upon its exchequer, and 
necessarily called for fresh loans. 

The fortifications of Alessandria, and especially the 
national subscription for one hundred cannon, set on 
foot by Italian patriotism, to mount on the Piedmontese 
citadel, might well, and with more reason than the 
alliance with the Eastern Powers, pass for a " pistol-shot," 
or indeed a cannon-ball, fired in the ear of Austria. 
Cavour denied nothing, asserted nothing; he did not 
deny the moral bearing of the demonstration, though 
still avoiding anything that would have seemed like a 
direct provocation. He got out of the difficulty by 
representing the fortifying of Alessandria as the carry- 
ing out of an old scheme, and brought forward, in his 
light-hearted way, his former terrible colleague of the 
War Office, La -Marmora. " When I was Minister of 
Finance," he said, " he was always tormenting me ; 
and I remember well, that on his departure for the 
Crimea, his last words to me were : ' Do not forget that 
if you fail to look to the fortifications of Alessandria, 
some fine day I shall protest formally and publicly 
against you.' ' } In like manner, on the subject of Spezzia, 
he would repeat : " When peace was made, my colleague 
La Marmora, who is at heart as tenacious as myself, 
said to me as he turned into the War Office : 'Alessandria 
and La Spezzia ; ' to which I replied, ' La Spezzia and 



MILITARY WORKS AND CIVIL ENGINEERING. 125 

Alessandria.' " The fortifying of Alessandria, by com- 
pleting the fortifications of Casale and of Valenza on the 
Po, made good the defence of Piedmont against the first 
shock of an attack ; and, in truth, it was this ensemble of 
public works suggested by far-sighted wisdom, which, 
in the decisive epoch of 1859, were destined to save 
Turin, by arresting the Austrian invasion, and leaving 
the French army time to arrive. 

The creation of a great arsenal at La Spezzia, at the 
utmost limit of the kingdom, a work whicn Cavour did 
not shrink from attempting, even after Napoleon, would 
evidently lead to vaster combinations, which compre- 
hended at least the whole of Northern and Central Italy. 
Under diverse forms, these two projects of La Spezzia 
and Alessandria, strongly opposed, and carried almost 
arbitrarily, were in truth military works, a sort of making 
ready for the conflicts of the future, perhaps of a speedy 
war. The boring of the Mont Cenis tunnel represented 
another side of this indefatigable policy : the thought of 
aggrandisement by moral action, by a fertile initiatory 
movement, by the extension and ever-increasing facility 
of intercourse between the nations. It was indeed a 
great enterprise for an insignificant country, this attack 
upon Mont Cenis ; this gigantic speculation, in which 
political and financial questions were mixed up with the 
original and purely scientific aspect — that of the possi- 
bility of its execution, and the means by which to carry 
it out. Cavour was undismayed by so venturesome an 
undertaking. His keen glance no doubt apprehended 
its practical benefits, the happy consequences which must 
ensue for the sub-Alpine population, for the national 



126 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR, 

industries, and for the part his small country would have 
to play in the world's onward progress. He reckoned 
with the precision of an economist, like a long-headed 
financier, all the material advantages of the Mont Cenis 
tunnel ; but at the same time he was, perhaps, especially 
alive to the honour Piedmont would achieve by this 
proof of indomitable resolution. He threw himself into 
the enterprise with all his accustomed ardour ; and one 
day, on the Piazza d'Armi of Turin, pointing in the 
direction of the amphitheatre of Alps which shut in the 
horizon, he observed to his friends : " If Louis XIV. said 
the Pyrenees would be no more, I hope some day to say 
with more truth that the Alps are no more. People 
speak of the great obstacles in the way, and I admit 
them ; they say also that we are still too small a State 
to attempt an enterprise of such magnitude. I reply 
that, as for the obstacles, we shall surmount them, and 
in order to become great we must do this. The Alps 
must actually come down." And, thus saying, his looks 
revealed the. ardour and power of will animating him. 

Cavour had from the first taken the greatest interest 
in this undertaking. He followed with deep attention 
all the experiments of Sommeiller, the able Savoyard 
engineer, who, after distinguishing himself in the works 
among the Apennines, in the line to Genoa, applied all 
the power of his genius to the solution of the problem of 
employing compressed air in the boring of Mont Cenis. 
Cavour not only seconded Sommeiller in his ministerial 
capacity, he also upheld him by his own faith in the 
scheme ; and just as in La Marmora he had always found 
an equally faithful and active fellow-worker, so in the 



VOTE FOR THE TUNNELLING OF MONT OENIS. 127 

matter of the Mont Cenis, his associates and supporters 
were his colleagues in public works — Paleocapa, and 
Menabrea, who laid aside his political views in order to 
aid in so great an enterprise. Cavour busied himself 
with all that could insure success, defending with equal 
energy the engineers, the means of execution, the neces- 
sary loans, or the treaties signed with the Savoy Railway 
Company ; smoothing down all difficulties, and winning 
over all hesitative opinions. " I trust," he energetically 
declared in parliament, "I trust none of you will 
belie what you have already done at the close of this 
laborious session of the Legislature ; I feel sure you will 
follow out a frank and resolute policy. If you .should 
adopt another proposition, you would inaugurate a totally 
different system ; and I should indeed deplore this, not 
only because a great work would be compromised, but 
because it would be a fatal omen for the future political 
system of parliament ; we had the choice between two 
ways, and we preferred the bolder and hardier of the 
two ; we cannot now stop half way. It is for us a con- 
dition of existence, an unavoidable alternative — On, or 
perish ! I firmly believe that you will complete your 
work by the greatest of modern enterprises — by voting 
for the tunnelling of Mont Cenis." It is thus that 
success is won, and when short-sighted opponents troubled 
Cavour, asking him to what lengths he intended to go, 
and pointing out the danger of placing the strongest 
military establishment at the extreme end of the king- 
dom, multiplying fortifications and armaments, engaging 
Piedmont in enterprises quite beyond its strength, and 
when they accused him of creating an artificial and 



128 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

hazardous situation which could not last, he did not 
always reply, although he was not one to disavow his 
thoughts. He well knew all that could be said on the 
subject. For the present he had attained the more 
obvious aim of his policy, since at the cost of efforts and 
sacrifices, the greatness of which he did not deny, and 
the justification of which he left to the future, he was 
able to present Piedmont as the active, acknowledged, 
and ever-advancing representative of the liberal and 
national idea. 



The problem for Cavour was not only at Turin : from 
henceforth it extended beyond the Alps. This problem 
consisted in penetrating Italy with the new spirit which 
animated the Piedmontese policy ; rallying, organising, 
and disciplining Italian patriotism under the tricoloured 
flag waving in the hand of a popular king. Cavour 
knew what had been the cost of dreams, chimerical ideas, 
factions, secret societies, and revolutionary movements 
to Italy. His one thought was to break with such 
disastrous associations, disengage the cause of Italy from 
all that had compromised it, set it free from revolu- 
tionary parties by maintaining its character of a just 
and honest work of restitution, and carry on the work 
he had begun at the Paris congress. 

He relied upon the propaganda of his liberal and 
national policy, not upon revolutionary dreams, the 
fatal sterility of which he knew and repudiated. He 
would say, speaking of the Mazzinians : " I admire their 
devotion to an idea ; I abhor their fanaticism." An 



REBUKES DEFENDERS OF ASSASSINATION. 129 

attempt upon the life of the king of Naples by the 
soldier Agesilas Milano excited nothing- but disgust in 
him, nor would he have dreamed of making a merit of 
his indignant repudiation of it. 

To those who reproached him with not favouring all 
attempts at insurrection in the other Italian States, or 
who in his presence applauded deeds of murder or 
incendiarism, he replied in parliament : " Our speeches 
and our policy are not intended to prompt and foster 
rash enterprises, vain and foolish attempts at revo- 
lution in Italy. It is quite otherwise that we under- 
stand the regeneration of the country. We have ever 
followed a straightforward and loyal policy, and as long as 
we shall be at peace with the other sovereigns of Italy, 
we shall never employ revolutionary means nor promote 
disturbances. As for Naples, mention has been made 
of recent and painful facts : the explosion of a powder 
magazine, and of vessels of war; a horrible outrage. 
Some have spoken in such a way as to throw the credit 
of these deeds upon the Italian party. I repudiate 
them ; I repudiate them utterly, and for Italy's own 
sake. No ; these are not deeds that can be attributed 
to the national Italian party, they are the isolated acts 
of some misguided wretch, which must be stigmatised 
by all good men, especially by those who value Italian 
honour and welfare." 

Words like these, uttered by him who had intro- 
duced Italy into the congress of European Powers, 
awakened deep and salutary sympathy beyond the 
Alps. They renovated public opinion ; they had the 
advantage of depriving the factions of their plea that 



130 LIFE OF OOUNT CAVOUR. 

they conspired for the national cause, and the other 
Powers of any pretext to charge the national cause with 
the blame of conspiracies commonly resulting from the 
violence of measures of repression. The factious spirit 
was not to be lightly overcome. Its adherents felt that 
this minister of a constitutional monarchy was their 
worst enemy; and at the very time Cavour was thus 
disowning revolutionary means, Mazzini, on the Pied- 
montese territory itself, at Genoa, was making a last 
effort to regain his influence. Mazzini's wild attempt 
at Genoa failed miserably, thanks to the good sense of 
the public, more surprised than alarmed at this outbreak. 
It was only one more proof that the power lost by the 
factious party was steadily being gained by the party of 
national Liberalism. 

In proportion as it became more marked in word 
and deed, Piedmontese policy had the happy result of 
reviving everywhere a belief that the work of liberation 
was to be brought about by open and regular means. 
And in this work Cavour quickly found allies or fellow- 
workers, who flocked to him from all parts of Italy, 
sometimes without his seeking them or knowing them. 
The national society formed at this period, organised 
by Giuseppe La Farina, a Sicilian emigrant, was one 
manifestation of this new phase in Italian affairs. 
Cavour found in this society an independent auxiliary, 
rather a dangerous one at times, perhaps ; but it had 
the advantage of bringing back into the great patriotic 
current many honest minds until then entangled in 
Mazzinian "affiliations." Cavour had especially won 
over the most generous and powerful of allies, Manin, 



MANIN. 131 

living in retirement in Paris ever since the fall of 
Venice. 

Although placed under such different conditions, the 
one in all the Sclat of an official post, the other an exile, 
these two men were made to understand each other ; 
they had numerous points in common : impassioned 
patriotism, clear-sightedness, and a keen and practical 
insight into events. At the time of the congress Manin 
had an interview with Cavour ; he had speedily appre- 
hended the meaning of the Piedmontese minister's 
policy, and in spite of his Venetian predilection for 
Kepublicanism, with the resolution of a man " in search 
of that which is practically possible, loving Italy more 
than the Republic," he did not hesitate to declare himself 
in favour of a policy whose success he had hailed in the 
Paris negotiations. Broken by family affliction — the 
death of a daughter, who was in his eyes the pathetic 
image of his beloved Venice — suffering already from the 
malady which carried him to the grave, he was spending 
his remaining strength in developing his ideas, his pro- 
gramme for the future. It was he who had promoted the 
subscription in Paris for the hundred cannon of Ales- 
sandria, concerning which a particular significance was 
found in^ the toleration extended to it by the French 
Government. He wrote innumerable letters and mani- 
festoes upholding the alliance with France ; warning his 
fellow-countrymen against old divisions and sterile party 
conflicts ; repudiating especially, as did Cavour, assassina- 
tion and the stiletto of the conspirator ; urging Mazzini 
to give up his plots, and to retire from an arena where 
his presence was only an obstacle. "I accept the 

k 2 



132 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

monarchy of Savoy," he said, " provided it will help 
loyally and efficiently in the making of Italy. The 
Piedmontese monarchy, in order to be faithful to its 
mission, must ever keep in view the final goal — the 
independence and unification of Italy. It must make 
use of all the means which will enable it to advance one 
step in the way leading to that goal. It must remain 
the kernel, the centre of attraction of Italian nationality." 

Manin could not know that before the close of four 
years from that date what seemed a dream would have 
become a reality — which he was not destined to see. 
His dying eyes and longing heart anticipated and em- 
braced the future in its ultimate issues. 

Cavour, for the time being, could not keep pace with 
him, or at least he could not acknowledge that he did 
so. He felt the danger of moving too fast ; he was 
accustomed to repeat in his own intimate circle : "We 
can do but one thing at a time. Let us begin by turn- 
ing the Austrians out of Italy ! " Being the minister of 
a regularly- constituted State, he believed himself bound 
to allow for certain necessities of government, to avoid 
false steps and useless or premature complications. 

When France and England, in 1856, engaged in a 
diplomatic intervention, to moderate the rigorous 
despotism of the king of Naples, Cavour kept out of it ; 
not because he was not tempted to make the best of 
such an occasion, but because he could not see how far 
the two Powers meant to go, and because he dreaded an 
inefficient demonstration, by which Piedmontese credit 
would suffer without compensation. When, in the 
summer of 1857, Pope Pius IX. went to Bologna, Cavour 



SAYING OF SALVAGNOLL 133 

did not consider himself free from the obligation required 
by custom; he sent Boncompagni, then representing 
Victor Emmanuel at Florence, to greet his Holiness. 
He considered such homage due to the head of the 
Church and the Piedmontese Catholics, whom he would 
not slight unnecessarily. Cavour was a minister who 
kept on good terms with governments and tradition, but 
that did not hinder him from following his own path. 

His words as well as his deeds continually strength- 
ened the ascendency of his policy on the other side of 
the Alps, and from this tendency of Cavour, from the 
impulse given by Manin, from the manifold action of the 
National Society, there sprang the new and rapidly- 
growing Italian Party, prompt to submit to the dis- 
cipline and march under the orders of him of whom the 
brilliant and accomplished Florentine, Salvagnoli, used to 
say : " After a conversation with that man I breathe more 
freely; my mind dilates." 

VI. 

For the parliamentary leader to have won over 
Piedmont and Italy by the attraction of a national 
policy was much, but more was needed. Cavour had to 
obtain allies by taking advantage of the somewhat 
critical situation in which Europe found itself imme- 
diately after the Paris congress. The peace of March 30, 
1856, had left a certain number of points unsettled — 
the limitation of the new Russian frontier in Bessarabia ; 
the possession of the Isle of Serpents at the mouth of 
the Danube ; the regulation of the navigation of that 
river ; the organisation of the principalities of Moldo- 



134 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

Wallachia — and the solution of those complementary 
questions was almost as delicate and thorny as the peace 
itself. It was rendered all the more so by the interests 
and resentments that it brought into play, and by the 
disturbing of alliances which might come of them. One 
thing was certain — there were mutual misunderstandings. 
European diplomacy was divided into two camps. In 
the one, Austria, rather suspicious in its attitude towards 
Eussia, and holding to the conditions of the peace with 
the utmost rigour, had the support of England and 
Turkey ; in the other, France showed a visible inclina- 
tion for Eussia, putting the most favourable interpreta- 
tion on the conditions, and seemingly anxious to natter 
the nation she had lately fought. Peace had hardly 
been signed a few months, and already the allies of 
Cavour seemed no longer in harmony. 

At first Cavour only interfered with much reserve in 
these private dissensions, wherein he feared to find divi- 
sion, if not hostility, between two powers, England and 
France, which he would fain have conciliated equally. 
If his intervention soon grew more active, it was because 
he was called to action by what he considered a political 
necessity, and by the confidence of the Cabinets, who 
grew more and more in the habit of referring to this 
clear and creative mind. He acted the part of a kind of 
mediator or peacemaker in the conferences held at Paris 
or at Constantinople. Thus, in the matter of boundary, 
known under the name of the "question de Bolgrad," it 
was he who suggested an arrangement desired by France, 
destined to accommodate Eussian susceptibility, and be 
definitively accepted by England. 



RUSSIA AND PIEDMONT. 135 

When the organisation of the Principalities was being 
settled, he sided with Russia and France for the union 
of Moldavia and Wallachia ; he considered this a due 
recognition paid to nationality, and he showed himself 
the more resolute when Austria proved hostile. Count 
Buol had said : "We have quite enough with one Sardinia 
at the foot of the Alps, without having another at the 
foot of the Carpathians." 

These questions were of importance in his eyes 
only in proportion as they tended to strengthen Pied- 
mont, concerned Italy, and helped the latter to attain 
the object in view; which was, to gain fresh allies 
or sympathies against the enemy he had to combat. It 
was the ruling thought in his diplomacy in the midst of 
all the European incidents which he endeavoured to turn 
to account, in order to create, as he said, an atmosphere 
favourable to Italy. 

In fact, by his readiness and wise moderation, he had 
first won over Russia, which displayed towards Pied- 
mont a marked cordiality, if only to show hatred of 
Austria. As soon as the intercourse between the two 
countries had been renewed, Prince Gortchakoff said to 
the representative of the court of Turin : " I do not wish 
to enter into recriminations. We have been ill-advised 
since 1849 in our refusal to allow you a Russian legation 
at Turin, and in refusing to grant you a legation at 
St. Petersburg. We have been too much influenced by 
Austria ; I never approved of it. Now the path is open 
before us ; we may, if we choose, be friends. Let me 
say that Russia and Piedmont are natural allies. We 
are very well pleased with your attitude towards us." 



136 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

The Emperor Alexander II., during the festivities of 
his coronation at Moscow, had spoken in most nattering 
terms to General Broglia, ambassador of Victor Em- 
manuel, purposely raising his voice in order to be over- 
heard by the Austrian ambassador. Shortly afterwards, 
the Czarina, mother of Alexander, had gone to spend the 
winter of 1857 at Nice, where she had been treated with 
marked consideration and deference. The Grand Duchess 
Helena paid a visit to Piedmont. The Grand Dukes 
Constantine and Michael, who were going on a visit to 
their mother, had been to Turin, where princely honours 
were shown them. They had gone with Victor Em- 
manuel to a State representation at the theatre, and 
these demonstrations were all the more significant in 
that they coincided with the diplomatic rupture which 
had just taken place between Austria and Piedmont. 

Meanwhile, the Russian diplomatists repeated to the 
Sardinian representatives : " Piedmont must have a 
more extended territory, even in the interest of Russia. 
But this must be brought about independently of revo- 
lution ; the initiative must come from above. Pending 
this, let the Sardinian Government continue to prove to 
Europe that it is capable of maintaining order ; let it 
abstain from disturbing the other Italian States. If 
Piedmont can calmly await the great day, that day will 
come, and Russia will assist her in driving Austria out 
of Italy." These promises and demonstrations might 
indeed be rather flattering than efficacious. In any 
case, they marked the culminating point of the relations 
between Russia and Piedmont about the year 1857, and 
were of sufficient importance to encourage Cavour, at the 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND. 137 

risk of offending Lord Palmerston, to yield to the Czar 
a permanent right of anchorage in the Mediterranean, 
in the harbour of Villafranca, and Russia's hatred of 
Austria was at least the earnest of a sympathetic 
neutrality when a conflict should take place. 



VII. 

There remained now only England and France, the 
two great allies whom Cavour kept continually in view, 
from whom he expected more direct and active support, 
without knowing to what extent it would go. Evidently 
his ideal would have been to maintain the alliance 
between these Powers in all its integrity, while he 
cherished the hope of one day making use of it for the 
cause of Italy. It was a dream, as he had lately been 
made aware in the negotiations set on foot after the 
Paris congress. As soon as difficulties arose, England 
had turned towards Austria, and England had assuredly 
not allied herself with Austria in affairs of the East in 
order to abandon her in the affairs of Italy. 

The policy of England, that of Liberals and Con- 
servatives alike, could be lavish in encouragement, and 
in proofs of the warmest sympathy towards the constitu- 
tional government flourishing at Turin ; it was willing to 
call for internal reforms in the other Italian States, to 
lecture the Pope and even the king of Naples ; nay, if 
need were, it would not refuse its help to Piedmont if 
it were attacked : but it would go no farther. The 
words of Lord Clarendon, which had for a time misled 
Cavour, did not go beyond this limit. 



138 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

England, bound traditionally to the treaties of 1857, 
desired neither war nor a readjustment of territory for 
Italy. She took especial umbrage at any complication 
offering France occasion to interfere beyond the Alps. 
Accordingly Cavour met with demonstrations of friend- 
ship and of much consideration at England's hands, but 
scarcely of encouragement, rather mistrustful and irritat- 
ing advice. In spite of all his efforts he gained no 
ground; he had perhaps excited suspicion by yielding 
to Kussia the right of anchorage in the Mediterranean 
harbour of Villafranca. Lord Palmerston had said 
sarcastically : " Eeally, I did not expect Count Cavour 
to become Kussian." To which Count Cavour, when 
told of it, replied : " Tell Lord Palmerston that I am 
Liberal enough not to be Kussian, and too much so 
to be Austrian." 

When the diplomatic rupture between Austria and 
Piedmont was at its height, at the beginning of 1857, 
the Sardinian ambassador to London, the Marquis 
Emmanuel d'Azeglio, had a decisive explanation with 
Lord Palmerstdh : "Your error," said Lord Palmerston, 
" lies in believing that in order to promote the good of 
Italy the best way is to be on bad terms with Austria. 
With the means of action Austria has at command, she 
will turn the other Italian States against you, and will 
be an irreconcilable enemy to all your plans of reform. 
Would it not be better to disarm her opposition by 
taking from her every plausible pretext of combating 
Piedmontese policy ? " " But, my lord," replied the 
Marquis d'Azeglio, "we shall never see Austria con- 
curring with us to ameliorate the situation of Italy. 



LORD PALMERSTON AND D'AZEGLIO. 139 

She lias all the Governments on her side — we have the 
people. She says to the former : ■■ Will you have my 
protection ? I grant it you. Do not forget that I repre- 
sent absolutism, the reign of the sword, and Catholic 
intolerance.' But as for us, we say to the people : 
' Follow us ; we have Italian blood in our veins ; we 
uphold the flag of independence, religious toleration, free 
institutions, and moral and material progress.' It re- 
mains to be proved which of these two policies England 
will be inclined to support.". . . . Lord Palmerston 
did not answer, or at least he only answered by evading 
the question, leaving to Piedmont the responsibility of 
its own policy and of " the consequences, good and bad," 
that might result therefrom. In default of England, 
Cavour might hope for more success with France. He 
daily felt more and more that the great and decisive 
succour for Italy must come from that quarter. It was 
no new thought for Napoleon III. The independence 
of Italy had been one of the cherished day-dreams of 
the young insurgent of the Eomagna in 1831 — of that 
man whom Pius IX. used to speak of long afterwards, 
when he was at the summit of his greatness, as '''the 
conspirator of Forli." The Paris congress had but laid 
bare the intentions or desires of which Cavour hastened 
to take advantage, and which he attempted to make 
permanent in spite of the difficulty of the task. It is 
quite evident that at one time there was between Cavour 
and Napoleon III. a sort of mysterious intelligence, un- 
acknowledged, and only revealing itself by degrees. As 
is now well known, it was at the instigation of the 
French sovereign, in consequence of a private conversa- 



140 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

tion between the Emperor and Count Villamarina at 
Compiegne, that the Cabinet of Italy took the initiative 
in the combination which settled the last conditions of 
the peace in a manner that proved favourable to Eussia 
and acceptable to England. 

The Emperor had made use of Cavour in order to 
save, as he said, the Anglo-French alliance without 
alienating Eussia ; and what had been done by Piedmont 
Napoleon III. considered a personal service. A few days 
later Count Walewski observed to Villamarina : " The 
Emperor has ordered me to testify his gratitude and 
satisfaction to Count Cavour as well as to yourself, 
and to tell you from him — pray take note of his words 
— that all this will not be in vain ; that he will never 
forget it." 

The representative of Victor Emmanuel in Paris 
was desired to make the most of these friendly 
dispositions, and about this time he wrote to Turin : 
" Napoleon wants time to insure the success of 
his favourable intentions towards Italy. Allow me, 
therefore, to express my earnest hope that the Italians 
will not by any ill-timed movement compromise the 
future which Sardinia has prepared for them by her 
sacrifices on the battle-field, and by her success at the 
Paris congress. For the present we must have patience, 
and await the course of events. We must show great 
faith in the Emperor's personal policy, and not put any 
hindrance in his way. Napoleon and the times are in 
favour of our cause and Italy's ; I maintain this asser- 
tion, even at the cost of being considered a mere enthu- 
siast." These Italians were clear-sighted people. 



SENTIMENTS OF FRANCE TOWARDS ITALY. 141 

But what increased the difficulties of the situation 
was that the France of 1857, whose alliance and co- 
operation Cavour sought and hoped to obtain, was for 
the time being singularly involved and embarrassed. 
France presented the phenomenon of a sovereign favour- 
able to Italy, with a personal policy which was shrouded 
in mystery ; and of ministers who seemed to follow 
another policy, unheeded by the sovereign. And then, 
outside the official regions, in Parisian society, in 
the old parliamentary world, there reigned a tone of 
opinion somewhat affected by the manifestations of the 
congress on the Eoman question, hostile to the empire and 
rather adverse to the cause of Italy. Cavour knew all 
this. If, justly enough, his first care was the manage- 
ment of the taciturn sovereign on whom everything 
depended, he had also each day to encounter the dis- 
cordant elements, the conflicting influences, and the 
private difficulties which characterised the internal 
regime of France, and might at any given moment turn 
aside or thwart the designs of the Emperor. Moreover, 
he was not ignorant of the fact that this imperial alliance, 
if it acquired weight, might endanger or threaten the 
constitutional liberties of Turin. 



VIII. 

Cavour's situation had now become a very extraordi- 
nary one, both as minister and man. If he turned to 
England, he found there a government, statesmen, Con- 
servatives and Liberals alike, openly declaring themselves 
in favour of all liberal progress in Italy, but utterly dis- 



142 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUR. 

countenancing any policy of national liberation. If lie 
turned to France, lie found an all-powerful sovereign, 
enigmatical, secretly disposed to favour the triumph of 
Italian independence, but suspected of wishing to give 
his help in this national w T ork at the cost of sacrifices of 
internal liberty, which Italy neither could nor would 
make. 

In the midst of these difficulties and apparently 
insurmountable obstacles, Cavour neither allowed himself 
to be troubled nor checked. He pursued his course, 
preparing the Napoleonic alliance, with the fixed resolve 
to surrender no vital liberty : possessing himself more 
and more of the confidence of the Emperor, with whom 
he had already private communications, besides the 
usual diplomatic means ; transacting business with the 
imperial ministers, who sometimes were not made fully 
aware of what was taking place, and endeavouring to 
conciliate or reassure the French Liberals. He had full 
need of all his dexterity, in a work often interrupted or 
resumed. On this complex matter he brought to bear 
such sagacity, such well-directed firmness, such fertility 
of expedients, such an art in handling affairs and men as 
made old Prince Metternich, then still living, remark : 
" Diplomacy is dying out ; there is only one diplomatist 
left in Europe, and unfortunately he is against us ; I 
mean Count Cavour." 

Skilful diplomatist Cavour certainly was ; suffi- 
ciently so to rank among the first of all diplomatists ; 
and yet when everything was said and done, beyond that 
mere confidential part in which discretion is one more 
means of insuring success, the strong point of his 



CHARACTER OF ELS DIPLOMACY. 143 

diplomacy was frankness and open dealing. He spoke 
out his opinions and aim with an openness which 
awakened surprise, and was sometimes mistaken for 
cunning ; and when once the Prussian envoy at Turin, 
Count Brassier de St. Simon, astonished at Cavour's 
freedom of speech, was searching for some hidden mean- 
ing in his words, Cavour replied quickly : " Do not 
deceive yourself. I say only what I think. As for the 
habit attributed to diplomatists of disguising their 
thoughts, it is one of which I never avail myself." 
He used often to say laughingly to his friends : "Now I 
have found out the art of deceiving diplomatists ; I speak 
the truth, and I am certain they will not believe me." 

Thus, besides his diplomacy as courtier and chancellor, 
he had another at command, a diplomacy without re- 
ticence or arriere-pensee, which after all was but the 
commentary and complement of the negotiations he 
pursued in secret. More than one of his notes was 
written less for the Cabinets than for the public of 
Europe — for general opinion ; for if he studied to con- 
vince or to manage the divers governments, he wished 
also, as he said, to prepare matters in such a manner 
that Piedmont, the day she entered the lists, should find 
European public opinion favouring her. 

The danger of this policy, doubtless straight- 
forward alike in its principle and its aim, but to all 
appearance intricate, consisted in its being liable to 
misconception, and dependent upon a multitude of 
circumstances. It was only a great promise before 
it became a reality, and meanwhile it began to 
weigh heavily upon the small State of Piedmont, 



144 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

which had so great a stake in what might after all prove 
to be but an adventure. The results might yet be far 
distant, and were quite indefinite ; the sacrifices required 
were positive, immediate ; and the extreme parties, 
equally hostile to the new policy prevailing at Turin, 
were necessarily always ready to make the worst of 
mishaps, incidents, or any more or less specious causes 
of complaint. Irreconcilable revolutionists, like Mazzini, 
never ceased to agitate, trying to rally all the demagogic 
passions at once excited and suppressed by Cavour's 
national Liberalism. The reactionary parties in their 
turn made the most of the threats of revolution, the 
taxes, the loans, the rash enterprises, the suffering of the 
populace — which they attributed to a permanent system 
of high pressure. At the least sign of vacillation in 
those in authority, the public mind was in danger of 
being unsettled. 

This was precisely what appeared to take place 
towards the end of 1857, after Mazzini's wild outbreak 
at Genoa ; the election of a new parliament seemed to 
indicate that a reaction had set in. The Liberal majority 
was still numerically of good proportions, but morally 
it had suffered loss in the contest. The Minister of 
the Interior, Eattazzi, and Lanza, Minister of Public In- 
struction, were only elected by a second ballot. One of 
the chiefs of the extreme Eight, Count Solaro della 
Margherita, had votes enough to elect him four times 
over. A certain number of canons, men notorious for 
their reactionary opinions, now entered parliament. 
Savoy had made herself conspicuous by returning 
deputies who almost all of them belonged to the Clerical 



TEE ELECTIONS OF 1857. 145 

party. What was the signification of this result of the 
elections ? — It was no doubt due to very special circum- 
stances. Aristocratic and religious influences had been 
at work for the first time, even over-acting their part, 
in the elections. The Liberals had become divided, rely- 
ing rather too much on their ascendency. The Minister 
of the Interior had been at any rate unfortunate, if not 
imprudent, in the affair of the sedition at Genoa, as also 
in directing the operations of the elections. The expla- 
nation given softened without cancelling a result that at 
first gave Cavour deep pain. " We have got into a bad 
way," he said that evening to a friend. " The policy of 
an eight years' reign is in danger of being forsaken, and 
then what will become of our poor Italy ? What can 
the king do, who is pledged to the triumph of this 
policy ? He will abdicate, and then what will follow ? — 
Coups d'etat f I shall never advise coups d'etat even in 
the interest of the Liberal policy. Dissolve the Chamber. 
That might be done ; that is constitutional. And then, 
if the same Chamber should be returned, or a worse one ? 
This eight years' policy, it goes to my heart to think 
we need ever forsake it ; but no, no, it cannot be. 
Good sense always helps Gianduja (the Piedmontese 
John Bull) at critical junctures. No, no, we will 
not forsake this policy; we will have recourse to no 
extraordinary means to preserve it ; we shall gain the 
day by constitutional and legal means, wherein our 
strength lies. Do not doubt it ; remember the red 
crisis of 1849 : it was alarming and very serious, but we 
surmounted it. Well, we shall also surmount the black 
crisis of 1857." It was in any case a warning which 

L 



146 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

Cavour would certainly not disregard, especially at a 
time when he needed more than ever the reconstruction 
of a majority that would remain faithful to him. The 
first emotion over, he looked things in the face; he 
quickly realised that this apparent hesitation in public 
opinion was not the disavowal of " an eight years' reign ;" 
that his personal influence was untouched ; and that 
faults really had been committed ; and, in order to save 
his policy, he allowed the fall of Rattazzi, who, though 
somewhat bruised, was not yet transformed into an 
enemy by it. Cavour himself took the Ministry of the 
Interior, as he had already taken in succession the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
"This change," he wrote to Paris, "has been forced 
upon me by the necessity of raising the morale of the 
administrative body, which has been depressed by a 
series of vexatious circumstances. We thought it would 
not be expedient to introduce into the Cabinet a new 
element that would have led to the belief that 'the 
minister inclined to the Right or to the Left, whereas 
he perseveres in the line of conduct he has pursued until 
now without the least deviation." 

Very soon matters returned to their former condition ; 
Cavour found his authority ever on the increase, rising 
more and more above the level of parties, drawing to 
his assistance the " moderate men " of all shades of 
opinion, Right as well as Left. He was now more than 
ever master of the field ; "and against the Clerical 
absolutists, who persisted in their opposition to him, he 
called to his assistance the most unlooked-for accomplice, 
Joseph de Maistre himself, whose diplomatic letters, 



EXTRACTS FROM BE MAISTRE. 147 

abounding with such sentences as the following, he 
caused to be republished : " The diameter of Piedmont 
is out of proportion with the grandeur and nobility of 
the House of Savoy. As long as I breathe I shall repeat 
that Austria is the natural and eternal enemy of His 
Majesty. If Austria rules from Venice to Pavia, there 
will be an end to the House of Savoy : Vixit ! Mark 
well the Italian spirit ; it was born of the revolution, 
and will soon play a tragic part. Our system, timid, 
neutral, hesitating, groping, is fatal in the present state 
of things. Let the king put himself at the head of the 
Italians, and let him employ revolutionists, indiscrimin- 
ately, in all civil and military posts. This is essential, 
vital, paramount. This is my ultimate view of the 
matter; if we remain or become an obstacle, requiem 
<Bterncmi" &c. 

What more was the Piedmontese premier saying and 
doing in 1857, half a century after Joseph de Maistre 
had uttered these words, which now came back sounding 
like an importunate tocsin in the ears of the reactionary 
members of the Right ? 

IX. 

Doubtless Cavour was not mistaken ; this " eight 
years' policy," guided with such consummate skill through 
so many complications, was not in danger of foundering 
because of an electoral mischance. It emerged from the 
crisis as it did from many others ; and by one of those 
happy strokes of fortune which befall none but able men, 
that which seemed likely to destroy it, much more than 
the passing disturbance of the election, on the contrary, 

l 2 



148 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

tended to hasten its success, by making good fortune issue 
from the most sinister of events. Something very similar 
to what took place at the beginning of 1852, the day 
after the 2nd of December, but far more serious and 
threatening now, gave Cavour the opportunity of dis- 
playing the same dexterity, attended by the same good 
fortune, and enabled him to steal a march triumphantly 
on the enemy. 

This alarming and unforeseen event was the attempt 
made at Paris on the evening of January 14, 1858, to 
assassinate the Emperor and Empress as they entered 
the Opera House. At the first intelligence of it trans- 
mitted to him by telegraph, Cavour exclaimed: "Provided 
only the assassins be not Italians ! " Unfortunately they 
were Italians. The rash originator of this criminal 
attempt, Felice Orsini, was an emigrant of the Eoman 
revolution, known to have made a romantic escape from 
his Austrian prison, affiliated with the secret societies, 
and a man from whom the Piedmontese premier remem- 
bered to have lately received a letter to which he had 
returned no answer. What was now to happen ? 

All might undergo a change ; the fanaticism of a 
handful of conspirators might defer for a long time the 
fulfilment of Italian hopes. A reaction probably, nay, 
almost inevitably, would destroy all that had been done. 
Cavour was soon aware that influences, all of them 
hostile to Italy, surrounded Napoleon III. The Papal 
nuncio had not hesitated to tell the Emperor that " these 
were the fruits of the revolutionary passions fostered by 
Count Cavour." The ambassador of the Emperor Francis 
Joseph had immediately asked whether the time had not 



REVOLUTIONISTS AND REACTIONISTS. 149 

yet come in which to " establish between France and 
Austria a mutual understanding, in order to constrain 
Piedmont to leave off protecting the machinations of the 
refugees and the licence of the press." On the other hand, 
the President of the Council received from London and 
Geneva, as well as from Paris, the assurance that the 
revolutionists had not lost hope ; that they were pre- 
paring new plots against the Emperor, and even against 
Victor Emmanuel. Cavour, without letting himself be 
intimidated, was quite aware that a storm was raging. 
"The present time," he wrote, "is full of perils and 
difficulties, daily on the increase. The fury of factions 
is unbridled ; their perverseness adds to the forces of the 
reactionists, who become daily more formidable. If the 
Liberals get divided among themselves they will be lost, 
and the cause of Italian freedom and independence will 
fall with them. We will resolutely stand in the breach, 
but we shall assuredly fall unless our friends rally round 
us to help us against the attacks besetting us on all 
sides." 

The situation was indeed a perilous one, and fore- 
most among the causes of alarm was the panic which 
appeared to prevail at Paris. The French Government 
needed no fresh stimulus. In the face of a murderous 
plot carried out by Italian hands, prepared in England, 
pointed out as the premeditated deed of revolutionary 
cosmopolitanism, pledged to conspiracies and assassina- 
tions, it was for the time convulsed, as it were, with the 
spirit of reaction. "While a general was being appointed 
Minister of the Interior, Count Walewski, the head of 
French diplomacy, was writing in all directions : to 



150 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

London, to Brussels, to Kome, to Turin, calling for 
acts of repression, guarantees, assurances against the 
right of refuge, against emigration, and against the 
freedom of the press. The French Government so far 
forgot itself as to even insert in the Moniteur certain 
military orations, animated by a spirit of bravado, alike 
useless and offensive to England. 

In London, the French demonstrations resulted only 
in awakening English susceptibility and hastening the 
downfall of Lord Palmerston's cabinet, which was 
replaced by a Tory administration. In Turin the French 
minister, Prince de Latour d'Auvergne, was commis- 
sioned by Count Walewski to demand from the Pied- 
montese Government a number of measures due to the 
occasion : the suppression of Mazzini's organ, the Italia 
del Popolo ; the banishment of dangerous refugees ; a 
new law to regulate the press ; the prohibition of 
refugees to write articles in the newspapers, &c. To say 
the truth, though disguised under the appearance of 
courtesy and friendliness, this amounted to a command. 
Cavour, who was prepared for every emergency, was 
willing to satisfy the French Government as much as lay 
in his power by an increased surveillance and a moderate 
reform in the laws regulating the press, but he unhesi- 
tatingly refused to lend himself to any arbitrary pro- 
ceedings, such as the suppression of newspapers, which 
would amount to coups d'etat. Especially did he resist 
any measure which bore too visibly the stamp of an 
attempt at foreign interference. To avoid making 
matters worse, he prudently abstained from all diplo- 
matic controversy ; he contented himself with giving 



DEMANDS MADE BY NAPOLEON III. 151 

verbal answers, offering promises and protestations, with 
which Walewski refused to be satisfied, and which only 
provoked more urgent representations. 

The Emperor himself, soon after Orsini's attempt, 
had a singular and significant conversation with General 
della Kocca, whom Victor Emmanuel sent to congratulate 
him on the failure of the outrage, and also, perhaps, to 
appease him. " Do not believe," said Napoleon III. to 
the General, and to Count Villamarina, " do not believe 
that I wish to put any pressure upon your Government. 
In the many vicissitudes of my life, I have had occasion 
to learn to esteem highly the dignified attitudes preserved 
by small States with regard to the demands of their 
more powerful neighbours. But these things that I ask 
are easily carried out, and might be acceded to by any 
allied government, even by one which cared but to see 
justice done. Let us suppose that England refused to 
grant my legitimate demands, the intercourse between 
the Cabinets of Paris and London would soon cease, and 
the next step would be a declaration of hostilities. If 
that should ensue, let us consider honestly what would 
be the condition of Sardinia. There are two alterna- 
tives : she would be for or against me, but you 
must not deceive yourselves. The realisation of your 
hopes and your future are in the French alliance, which 
alone can support you efficiently. "Well, in order to be 
with me in that day, it is indispensable that you should 
accede to my present demands. If you refuse, you set 
yourself against me, you will be with England, and 
what advantage can you derive from that ? What good 
will you get from a few English war ships at La Spezzia 



152 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

or at Genoa, if England cares to keep the treaties of 1815 
in all their integrity ? In that case, much against my 
will, I should be constrained to lean upon Austria, and 
once embarked in that policy, I should be forced to give 
up my most cherished day-dream, my dearest wish — I 
mean the Independence of Italy." These words, equally 
persuasive and menacing, left Piedmont in a cruel 
dilemma. 

x. 

In short, during several days a crisis reigned of the 
most gloomy, violent, feverish description, between 
Turin and Paris. More than once the official attitude of 
the French Ministry made Cavour think all was lost, and 
the king conceived that he must again have recourse to 
a great stroke. 

Of his own accord, as from sovereign to sovereign, 
Victor Emmanuel wrote a confidential letter to Napo- 
leon III., in which he expressed himself openly, protest- 
ing his attachment and his desire to please the Emperor, 
but at the same time declaring, with dignified emotion, 
that there were concessions he could not make ; that if 
he were driven to it, he, like his ancestors of Savoy, would 
go and fight on the Alps to defend his crown. In com- 
menting upon these words, the President of the Council 
likewise wrote to his representative at Paris : " Stand 
firm, and hold your ground with dignity and moderation ; 
do not draw back a single step. His Majesty has written 
to the Emperor in terms of the most cordial friendship, 
but as a king who will stand upon his rights. In order 
to save the independence and honour of the country he 



THE FRENCH MINISTRY AND THE EMPEROR. 153 

will shrink from nothing, and we are ready to follow 
him. The Emperor has evidently been persuaded that we 
have become more friendly with England since Orsini's 
attempt. Nothing can be farther from the truth. I have 
written nothing about our difficulties with France to our 
envoy in London, and I have not even whispered a word 
about them to Sir James Hudson." This was when the 
crisis was at its height. 

Soon, however, the pressure began sensibly to 
diminish. The mere confidential diplomacy was telling 
upon the official diplomacy, and was effectually averting 
all danger of a possible rupture. The Emperor's anger 
was also gradually dying out ; even he admitted that if 
there were any conspirators it was not Piedmont, but the 
hazardous situation of Italy that was to blame. At the 
Tuileries it had come to be repeated that : "So long as 
there should be Austrians in Italy there would be at- 
tempts at assassination in Paris ; that Count Cavour was 
in the right, and ought to be seconded." Napoleon III. 
had finally written to Yictor Emmanuel that it was 
only between great friends that it was possible to speak 
out ; he bade him do what he could, and not trouble 
himself further. And now comes the most singular part 
of this crisis in the relations between Paris and Turin. 
While the Emperor was growing more and more calm, 
and was ceasing to interfere at all in a matter which he 
had learnt to see in a new light, the French ministry 
persevered increasingly in the demands with which it 
stormed the Turin Cabinet ; it doubled the number of 
its almost threatening communications, until at length 
matters reached the climax. Prince de Latour d'Auvergne 



154 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJR. 

had been requested to read a fresh and still more 
peremptory despatch to Count Cavour. The latter lis- 
tened calmly and patiently, until, the reading over, he 
replied with the utmost tranquillity and a tone of friendly 
sarcasm : " But the affair is over ; the King received 
yesterday a letter from the Emperor which terminated 
all," It was literally true ; and Prince de Latour 
d'Auvergne, a benevolent and enlightened man, who 
faithfully carried out his instructions, but was growing 
sceptical on many points, had only to fold up his de- 
spatch and return home, pondering on the difficulty of 
serving princes who have two kinds of diplomacy. 

Cavour's invariable policy was to preserve the alliance 
with France without sacrificing the honour and freedom 
of his country. Let the inviolability of the " statuto " 
and the national liberty be secured, and he never hesi- 
tated to seek any means of giving the Emperor satisfaction 
or guarantee.* It was in his interest to do so, were it 
only by way of open protest against sinister plots. 

He found his justification in the sufficiently scandalous 
acquittal of a Turin newspaper, which at that very time 
indulged in a justification of the outrage of January 14. 
The President of the Council hoped to have found the 
means of keeping Piedmont within the bounds of 
rightful authority, by proposing a law which increased 
the penalties to be inflicted on persons conspiring 
against the life of foreign monarchs, or defending political 
assassination, and choosing a new jury for cases of trans- 
gression of the law on the part of the press. This new 
law was not in any way exceptional ; it interfered neither 
with the " statuto " nor with the essential conditions of 



OPPOSITION TO HIS MEASURES. 155 

the freedom of the press, nor yet with the principle of 
trial by jury : its value lay in its moral influence ; it 
protected the responsibilities of Piedmont. 

It was difficult, notwithstanding, to obtain so simple 
a measure from a parliament which was not and could 
not be made aware of all the circumstances of the case. 
Cavour lost ho time, and while he pursued his diplomatic 
work he brought all his activity and authority to 
bear upon the task of reconciling his opponents, and 
awakening all to a sense of the gravity of the situation. 
He gave numerous audiences, in which he displayed an 
inexhaustible vein of good sense and patriotism. As a 
matter of course, he met with strong opposition, which 
he was quite accustomed to overcome. The one accused 
him of carrying out his bold and dangerous policy at 
the cost of the humiliation of Piedmont by foreign 
Powers ; others brought forward against him the old and 
hackneyed accusation of not seeking his support in the 
people and in the revolution, instead of buying over the 
dangerous co-operation of despotic Governments. 

Virtually, however, an immense majority in the 
Chambers was predisposed to side with him, feeling 
more than ever how indispensable and secure was his 
guidance. The one question with Cavour was, how to 
give this majority an occasion of declaring itself. He 
hoped to do this in the public discussion shortly to be 
opened, and which insured his victory. Once more, in 
a few master-strokes, he set before them that " eight 
years' policy," which had begun so humbly, but had 
spread and increased and culminated in that " system of 
alliances," which the new law was intended to strengthen. 



156 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

Cavour did not attempt to conceal the truth, that 
this law, proposed and defended by him, had two 
essential objects. The first was to achieve the definitive 
conquest of the French alliance ; not by any act of 
subordination or abdication of dignity, but by a reliable 
and spontaneous proof of good- will : and to those persons 
who despised all alliances, or proposed to wait until a 
change of government should have taken place in France, 
he responded by an explanation equally luminous and 
astute ; a very model of rational policy and profound 
diplomacy. 

The second object was to set Italy free from all 
dangerous secret societies ; and to those who persisted 
in confounding the cause of Italian emancipation with 
insurrectionary movements, in short, with universal 
revolution, he replied with emotion: " How senseless ! to 
believe that the revolution which would again imperil 
the great principles of social order could be favourable 
to the cause of liberty. How senseless ! not to perceive 
that the effect would be the destruction of every vestige 
of liberty on me Continent. How senseless ! those who 
betray that their aspirations are revolutionary rather 
than patriotic ; that they love the revolution better than 
they do Italy." And, going on directly to the situation 
of the moment, he pointed out the harm which factions 
had ever done to Italy ; the harm they had again done 
her by carrying out their principle of assassination. " It 
is a mournful and deplorable fact," he exclaimed, " de- 
plorable beyond all expression, that an Italian faction 
should be known to profess and practise such horrible 
maxims. In the face of such facts we have felt that it 



FELICE OESINI. 157 

was absolutely necessary for the good of Italy that in 
the one Italian State which has a Liberal Government a 
voice should be lifted up, not only by the Government, 
but by the nation represented by its Chambers, in 
solemn and indignant protest against these criminal 
doctrines of political assassination." 

XI. 

While Cavour spoke thus, carrying his parliament 
with him by the sheer force of reason and patriotism, 
he had gained his cause already in other quarters where 
he most felt the importance of gaining it. 

The Emperor was grateful to him for what he was 
doing. The question had lost its threatening aspect ; 
but what was not yet known, nay, could scarcely be 
gathered from certain obscure indications, was that the 
crime of January 14 was about to form the strange and 
mysterious commencement of a new phase of Italian 
affairs. The question has often been asked, what part 
the attempted assassination in the Eue Le Peletier 
really had in the preliminaries of the war of 1859. 
The sudden impression of terror it awakened certainly 
did not give birth to an idea which existed already ; the 
attempt on the Emperor's life was but the pretext or 
the occasion of an incident equally strange and signi- 
ficant. While diplomatists and parliaments were still 
discussing various small amendments or unimportant 
articles of legislative measures — this was what was 
taking place. 

Felice Orsini, the man who had not shrunk from 



158 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

scattering death around him in order to take the life of 
the only sovereign likely to help his country, was 
doubtless a great criminal— a murderer from sheer 
fanaticism — but there was nothing of the mere vulgar 
assassin about him ; he stood high above his obscure 
accomplices, and by one of those strange revulsions of 
feeling which a violent crisis will sometimes bring about 
in the mind of a fanatic, the presence of death restored 
to him a stoical clearness of vision. He had written 
from prison a letter to the Emperor Napoleon which was 
produced in his defence, and even published in the 
Moniteur, in which he implored Napoleon to deliver 
Italy. " Let your Majesty call to mind," he wrote, 
" that the Italians, among whom was my father, shed 
their blood freely and joyfully for Napoleon the Great, 
that they continued faithful to him until his downfall. 
Let it not be forgotten that the peace of Europe and that 
of your Majesty will remain a mere chimsera as long as 
Italy is not free. If your Majesty will but deliver my 
country, the benedictions of twenty-five millions of men 
will resound from generation to generation." 

This was not all : at the last moment, without 
attempting to escape from the supreme expiation due .to 
so many victims, without flinching in any way in the 
very face of death, Orsini had written a second letter, a 
sort of last testament, in which he said : " In an hour or 
two I shall have ceased to be ; but before I breathe my 
last I wish to make it clear, nay, I would affirm it with 
all the frankness" and courage which until now have 
never failed me, that assassination, however it may dis- 
guise itself, is no principle of mine, although in a fatal 



ORSINI'S PAPERS. 159 

moment of mental aberration I allowed myself to be 
drawn into organising the attempt of January 14. 
Instead of having recourse to a system of assassination, 
may my fellow-countrymen reject it far from them ; 
may they learn that redemption can only be obtained by 
abnegation, and by a constant union of efforts and 
sacrifices, without which Italy can never be made free. 
As for the victims of January 14, I offer my life as an 
expiatory sacrifice, and I implore the Italians, when once 
they have become independent, to give some worthy 
compensation to those who have in any way suffered." 
These words of retraction had visibly affected the 
Emperor, who charged one of his most trustworthy 
secret agents to place Orsini's papers in the hands of 
Count Villamarina, with orders to send them to Turin. 

Why should the Emperor have been so anxious to 
send these documents to Turin ? What could his aim 
be ? Was it one of the eccentric proceedings of a com- 
plex mind, trying all paths, however devious, in order to 
reach a goal as yet but dimly perceived ? Be it as it 
may, one morning, towards the end of March, Cavour 
suddenly received this unexpected communication. In 
vain he sought for an explanation of it. He had dis- 
approved of the insertion of Orsini's first letter in the 
Moniteur, but on receipt of the packet, all hesitation on 
his part ceased. Next day the official gazette of Turin 
published all the papers, including the testament, which 
was new to the public, accompanied by a note, asserting 
the retractation and repentance of the criminal, and his 
counsels to trust in " an august Will propitious to Italy." 
This unexpected publication, which sceptics at first took 



160 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

for a mystification — it appeared on April 1 ! — produced 
everywhere a rapid and profound impression, and as 
it only preceded by a few days the discussion on the 
law of the Press, and on " conspiracies against foreign 
sovereigns," it greatly tended to insure success, the 
spirit of it animating the debate which followed. 

The President of the Council naturally abstained 
from touching upon the point, and involving himself in 
explanations which, for that matter, he could not have 
given! He knew nothing for certain ; he had only seen 
in the communication he had received a kind of in- 
distinct encouragement, or a sign of intelligence from the 
Emperor, and this was much. It was evident that from 
this time he felt greatly reassured ; he was in a state of 
suspense when, soon after, towards May, he received 
from another quarter, from a friend living in Paris and 
familiar with the Palais Royal, a fresh letter, containing 
a well-defined plan of alliance between France and Pied- 
mont, the conditions of arrangement, the reciprocal 
advantages, and even a project of marriage between 
Prince Napoleon and a daughter of Victor Emmanuel. 
The writer was a friend to Italy and the Piedmontese 
Ministers, and spoke like a far-seeing man of the possi- 
bility of a decisive negotiation. 

This looked pregnant with serious matter. The Presi- 
dent of the Council submitted everything to the King. The 
first question was how far the letter was to be depended 
on, and Cavour decided to send to Paris a young man, 
Cavaliere Constantine Nigra, for some years past his 
confidential secretary, whom he knew to be capable of 
carrying out the most delicate of missions. It was placed 



BE. CONNEAU'S JOURNEY. 161 

soon beyond a doubt, and this on the authority of a 
confidential agent of the Tuileries — the same who had 
despatched the Orsini documents — that the letter received 
at Turin, without having had any direct sanction, faith- 
fully interpreted the Imperial mind. Napoleon III. was 
quite disposed to act, but nothing could be done without 
an interview, which was to be arranged in such a manner 
as to disarm all suspicion. Dr. Conneau, on pretext of 
a pleasure trip to Italy, was about to pass through Turin, 
where he accordingly appeared in June : he had an 
interview with the King and the President of the Council, 
and a quiet excursion was planned for Count Cavour to 
Plombieres, whither the Emperor was proceeding soon 
to take the waters. 

XII. 

While this interview, the veiled preliminary step to 
such remarkable and important events, was being 
arranged, Cavour was terminating a long session which 
placed no more hindrances in his way, but left him 
wearied with the hard winter's work of 1858. He had 
passed through trials of all kinds, diplomatic struggles, 
parliamentary conflicts, and with his accustomed energy 
and flexibility had remained master of the situation. 
Perhaps he was getting a glimpse of the end of what 
would restore to him his lost vigour, and reward him for 
all his labours ; but not a word of it escaped his lips, he 
spoke only of his weariness and want of rest ; he hoped 
to be able to forget all for a few days, as might well be 
believed, and it was on July 7, the eve of his journey 
to Plombieres, that he wrote to his friend, Madame de 



162 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

Circourt, in the pleasing, careless tone of a wearied poli- 
tician, or a diplomatist out for a holiday : 

"Were I free to turn whither my sentiments and 
desires would lead me, I should certainly take advantage 
of my vacation to come and crave your hospitality at 
Bougival ; but, chained as I am to my political chariot, 
I may not turn aside from certain paths. If I were to 
go to France at this moment, where diplomatists are 
vainly trying to solve a problem that they themselves 
have rendered insoluble, my journey thither would give 
rise to all sorts of comments. When once the session is 
over I shall go and inhale the fresh mountain air of 
Switzerland ; far from men whose minds are crammed 
with petitions. I intend staying a few days at Pressinge ; 
I shall not be suspected of conspiring with my good 
friends the De la Eives, against the peace of society. 
We shall often speak of you ; we shall travel in spirit to 
the charming hermitage you have turned into an earthly 
paradise for your friends' enjoyment." 

The fact was that matters had been kept quite 
private ; no one knew anything either at Paris or Turin, 
while Cavour, who was " going to inhale mountain air in 
Switzerland," and who really had passed through Pres- 
singe, was quietly making his way to Plombieres, where 
he arrived on July 20. As he had no passport, prime 
minister though he was, he might have been arrested on 
landing by an officious gendarme, had not an imperial 
agent happily been present to extricate him from his 
difficulty. 

Immediately upon his arrival, after breakfast, the 
Emperor, on pretext of showing him some works in pro- 



THE INTERVIEW AT PLOMBIERES. 163 

gress, took him out into the country in a small chaise, 
driven by himself, and it was during this tSte-cl-tete oi 
three or four hours' duration, that the general conditions 
of an alliance were agreed upon ; it only needed a few con- 
versations to define them more precisely. Events, while 
somewhat modifying, afterwards revealed what these 
conditions were. At that time they were as follows : A 
war with Austria ; the formation of an Italian kingdom 
of eleven millions of souls, or thereabouts ; the cession of 
Savoy and Nice to France. The marriage of Prince 
Napoleon with Princess Clotilde was foreseen and wished 
for at Paris, and agreed on at Turin, but it was to remain 
an incident, not a condition. Cavour did not stay longer 
than twenty-four hours at Plombieres. The Emperor 
treated him in so cordial a manner as to surprise his 
courtiers ; he " laid himself out to please," it was said. 
He felt more than regard for the Piedmontese minister ; 
he had as much confidence in him as he was capable of 
placing in anyone. During Cavour's stay at Plombieres 
Napoleon III., who had just received a despatch, turned 
to his guest, and said with a smile : " Here is Walewski 
announcing your arrival to me " — thus in one word illus- 
trating the situation. 

The presence of Cavour at Plombieres could not fail 
soon to transpire ; and in order to lessen the effect it 
might produce he hastened to leave, as though he were 
continuing his travels. He went as far as Baden, where 
he .encountered the Prince Eegent of Prussia, the future 
Emperor William, who, after having seen him, declared : 
" But he really is not such a revolutionist as people 
make him out to be." Thence, returning through 

m 2 



164 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

Switzerland, he halted at a wayside inn, where he wrote 
out at length the memoranda of his conversations at 
Plombieres, and of the arrangements decided upon 
there. 

In the midst of all this, meanwhile, would the reader 
learn how Cavour employed his leisure moments ? On 
his passage, at Pressinge, he had taken up a thick book, 
Buckle's " History of Civilisation," and he read it, take 
my word for it, thoroughly. Six weeks later he apolo- 
gised for not having returned it. "I wished," he said, 
" to read it from end to end, no easy matter when one 
has two ministerial portfolios on one's hands. In spite 
of its deficiency of method, its lengthiness, and its want 
of clearness, this book deserves to be read ; for, to my 
thinking, it denotes an evolution in the English mind 
that will necessarily entail remarkable consequences. If 
I were not a minister I should try to write an article on 
the book." This man was one certainly who found time 
for everything. 

Cavour, being a minister, might well dispense with 
writing an article on Buckle's book. For the time 
being he had other matters on hand ; he was en- 
grossed by the combinations he had assisted in forming, 
and the hopes he had a right to entertain. He had 
returned from Plombieres, having laid aside all his weari- 
ness, silent about matters needing to be kept secret ; but 
full of vitality, and inspiring life and confidence in all 
around him. He employed the autumn of 1858 in com- 
pleting his work ; he sent to Paris the memorandum he 
had prepared, containing a resume of the ideas exchanged 
at Plombieres with the Emperor, who found only a 



THE SECRET TREATY. 165 

few insignificant details to modify in his manuscript. 
Throughout these months, Cavaliere Nigra, Cavour's 
young messenger, travelled backwards and forwards 
between Turin and Paris, like an incarnation of diplo- 
macy, transmitting the words of each to each with 
equal fidelity and intelligence. The result was a secret 
treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between 
France and Piedmont; until then there had been 
merely verbal conventions. 

Cavour and the Emperor were in perfect accord 
together, as was shown by an incident which now 
appears somewhat strange. The Prince Regent of 
Prussia had lately placed Prince Hohenzollern at the 
head of affairs at Berlin. Cavour conceived the idea, on 
an understanding with Napoleon III., of sending the 
Marquis Pepoli to Germany ; the marquis being a con- 
nection not only of the new Prussian premier,, but also 
of the Napoleons. 

Pepoli, who took his instructions from Paris as well 
as from Turin, was ordered to flatter Prussia, awaken 
her ambition, detach her from Austria, and draw her into 
the new-made alliance. Prince Hohenzollern declined 
these overtures, giving in return vague expressions of 
sympathy, accompanied by protestations of respect for 
the treaties. A common enterprise of this sort was 
surely a strong proof of the growing intelligence between 
the allies of Plombieres. 

One point remained undecided in these arrangements, 
otherwise so nearly completed. The Emperor, who 
wished or believed himself to be master of the situation, 
had reserved to himself the right of choosing the time 



166 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

and the manner of starting the question, and Cavour at 
times was anxious and troubled by a state of uncertainty 
which after all might end in an adjournment sine die; 
it is evident, however, that when such warlike combina- 
tions are made, they tend fatally towards their object. 
Secret alliances get noised abroad, men's minds are dis- 
turbed, relations are embittered, and this came to pass 
towards the end of 1858. 

Italy, thus skilfully worked upon, was thrilled with 
excitement, and earnestly desired the conflict. France, 
somewhat astonished and ill-informed, was reduced to 
consulting the oracles of the imperial policy. " Europe 
felt an uneasiness, the cause of which was not as yet 
perceived by her, when suddenly the nature of the 
situation was made known by two events happening 
almost simultaneously; or, if you will so call them, 
speeches. 

On January 1, 1859, Napoleon III., giving audience 
to the Diplomatic Corps, testified in a brusque manner 
to the Austrian ambassador his regret at the hostile 
spirit prevailing between Paris and Vienna. A few days 
later, at the opening of the Chambers, Victor Emmanuel 
remarked : " Our horizon is not at all clear. Our country, 
small indeed territorially, has yet become influential in 
Europe, through the greatness of the ideas it represents 
and the sympathies it inspires. This situation is by 
no means without its dangers ; for while we would respect 
treaties, we cannot remain insensible to the cry of 
anguish which reaches us from so many parts of Italy." 
Victor Emmanuel could not, it was understood, speak 
thus without an understanding with his French ally. 



THE KING'S SPEECH. 167 

On the evening of the day on which this speech, so 
full of warmth and colour, was uttered, the Eussian 
minister, Count Stackelberg, while complimenting the 
President of the Council, observed : " It was like a 
crimson aurora." Count Cavour replied that the colour 
was not the artist's work. "It is the landscape," he 
said, " which glows with sparks and flames ; " on 
which Sir James Hudson remarked : " It is a flash of 
lightning striking the treaties of 1815." It might indeed 
be all these ; but above all it was the first result of the 
secret understanding and treaty at Plombieres, or rather 
the fruit- of a policy which, before reaching its goal, had 
still many a trial to undergo and many a battle to 
fight. 



CHAPTER IV. 

The War of 1859 — Cavour and the Peace of Villafranca — Prologue of the 
War of Italian Independence — The Situation at the Beginning of 1859 — 
Napoleon III. and Cavour — Marriage of Princess Clotilde and Prince 
Napoleon — The Pamphlet "Napoleon III. and Italy" — Position of Affairs 
— Diplomatic Phase — English Negotiations — Diplomacy of the Emperor — 
Proposed Congress — Cavour during the Winter of 1859 — Italy in a Ferment 
— The Volunteers at Turin — Preparations moral and military — Cavour and 
Diplomacy — Trip to Paris — Two French Politicians — Napoleon III. and 
Count Walewski — Mot of Cavour to M. de Rothschild — The knotty Point 
— Crisis in April — Dramatic Situation, Coup de ThSdtre — The Austrian 
Ultimatum at Turin — War is declared — French Troops at Turin — Military 
Operations — Napoleon III. and his Proclamations — March of the Franco- 
Piedmontese Army — Movements at Modena, Parma, Florence, and Bologna 
— Cavour during the War — Solferino and the Preliminaries of Villafranca 
— Cavour in the Camp — Scene at Desenzano — Victor Emmanuel — Despair 
and Eetirement of Cavour — Departure for Switzerland — Uncertainty after 
Villafranca — Mental Condition of Cavour — Departure of the Emperor for 
France. 

i. 

Now that the national drama of Italy hastens to its 
crisis, let us recall two dates to the mind's eye, and 
compare them. On March 23, 1849, Piedmont fell van- 
quished on the battle-field, with nothing left in her 
grasp save a broken sword and a torn flag. She had no 
allies and but few friends remaining ; friends, too, more 
disposed to blame her rashness or compassionate her 
want of military success than to assist her. Austria 
triumphed by her armies ; the reactionary party 



THE TEN YEARS' POLICY. 169 

triumphed through the invariable logical result of dis- 
orderly revolutions. For a long time all seemed lost on 
the other side of the Alps. In the first days of 1859 all 
was won back again. All had changed. The cause of 
Italy had regained the attention of Europe ; it engrossed 
Governments and public opinion alike. 

Such was the work of the policy started at Turin 
and stoutly pursued during ten years : the policy which 
guided Piedmont from Novara to the Crimean war; 
from the Paris congress to the negotiations of Plombieres. 
This ten years' policy succeeded in isolating Austria 
within her contested dominions; it rallied all Italian 
feeling around a national monarchy ; it separated the 
question of independence from that of revolution, and it 
awakened the Foreign Ministers. Its success was due 
to an amazing combination of circumstances, cleverly 
prepared or still more cleverly laid hold of; and at the 
given hour, it found supporters in two men who, different 
as they were in position, character, and mind, were yet 
able, by supplementing each the other, to render the most 
difficult of enterprises a thing of possible achievement. 
Napoleon and Cavour meet and come upon the scene ! 

There was assuredly but little resemblance between 
these two men ; they stand before us rather in vivid 
and mysterious contrast with each other. They came 
into collision more than once, but nevertheless they 
mutually attracted each other, each feeling that the 
other was necessary to him. 

For Cavour, Napoleon III. was the powerful, perhaps 
dangerous, but indisputable ally, the head of one of the 
foremost of Continental nations and of an army still 



170 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

reputed irresistible. For Napoleon III. Cavour was the 
Foreign Minister and instrument of his enigmatical views 
with regard to Italy, the man best calculated to sweep 
him on, to oppose him if necessary, and ease him of the 
burden of his irresoluteness by putting pressure upon 
him, in offering him in a variety of ways the occasion of 
deciding and acting upon his decision. 

It was said that during the interview at Plombieres, 
the Emperor, then credulous of his own omnipotence, 
observed to Cavour : " Do you know that there are but 
three men in Europe, we two and a third whom I will 
not name ? " Who was this third person ? No one 
knows. Out of this meeting of the other two " men," in 
the little town of the Vosges, originated, in the beginning 
of 1859, the coincidence of the scene of January 1 at the 
Tuileries and the thrilling speech of Victor Emmanuel 
in the Turin parliament on January 10. 

Cavour, without any previous warning, had neces- 
sarily at once divined the meaning of the words care- 
lessly spoken by Napoleon III. to M. de Hubner, and 
on hearing them he remarked with a smile : " The 
Emperor means to go ahead, it appears." As for 
Victor Emmanuel's speech a week later, the Emperor 
had known and approved of it beforehand. It was a 
part of his tactics that his ally should say what he would 
not or could not as yet say himself. 

Some few days subsequently another incident 
startled the world as with a fresh revelation. It became 
known almost simultaneously that Prince Napoleon, 
accompanied by General Niel, had left Paris for Turin, 
and that the marriage of a Bonaparte with Princess 



THE IMPERIAL PAMPHLET. 171 

Clotilde of Savoy was accomplished. All was settled 
before January 30, at Turin, where an excited public 
regarded this union of the dynasties as the promise of 
events at hand. From this period, dating January 18, 
the previously personal and implied understanding 
between the Emperor and the King took a more dis- 
tinct diplomatic form, and grew into a regular alliance, 
founded on the apprehension of an attack on the part 
of Austria. 

For a final coup de theatre : on the morrow of the 
marriage of Prince Napoleon and the Princess Clotilde, 
there appeared suddenly in Paris a startling pamphlet, 
" Napoleon III. and Italy," known to be inspired by 
the Emperor, and in which was traced a whole pro- 
gramme of Italian reorganisation by national federation, 
independent of the foreigner. 

Thus within a narrow period consecutive events 
were crowded. The words spoken by Napoleon III. to 
Baron Hubner found their supplement, a sort of swelling 
echo, in the speech of Victor Emmanuel, and these two 
public acts were crowned by the family alliance, and by 
the imperial manifesto, which raised the problem of the 
destinies of Italy before Europe, as though the treaties of 
1815 were not in existence. A few weeks, it might be 
said a few days, sufficed to bring the crisis to a head. 
Meanwhile nothing was decided, and the question still 
was whether the knot would have to be finally cut by 
the sword, or whether, by a last effort, the Governments 
would succeed in conjuring the storm which, gathering 
its ominous black masses to all appearance over Austria 
alone, threatened the whole Continent. During this 



172 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJR. 

winter of 1859 the struggle continued between the war- 
like and the pacific currents ; a confused and agitated 
prologue to the great drama. 



II. 

It was indeed a most strange situation, where every- 
thing seemed to lead fatally to a conflict, and the definite 
point of the discussion remained obscure ; where diplo- 
macy knew not how to touch this Italian problem, which 
had undoubtedly its origin with bad government in 
the Legations and in the Duchies, but was also above all 
attributable to the domination of the foreigner ; that is to 
say, to a condition of things presenting difficulties only to 
be settled by an appeal to force. We see, for an example 
of this curious phase in modern history, Cavour himself, 
the only one of all the actors who was in the secret of 
what he wished, passing nearly four months between a 
national movement, alternately stimulated or bridled by 
him, and the perplexities assailing him from Europe, 
projects of negotiations on all sides rising to bar the road 
to him. 

Had Austria possessed more initiative and more 
pliability, she might easily have simplified the question, 
greatly to the confusion of her enemies. She seemed 
once to be awake to the idea, and the episode glances 
with a covert melancholy before plunging into the torrent 
of events. 

Some short time previously, in the year 1858, the 
Cabinet at Vienna had despatched the Archduke Maxi- 
milian as Viceroy to Lombardy, on a mission of peace 



TEE ARCEDUKE MAXIMILIAN. 173 

and conciliation. The ill-fated prince, doomed to the 
Mexican tragedy, arrived at Venice and Milan full of liberal 
designs. He had youth in his favour, a very cordial and 
gentlemanly manner, Austria to back him, the good 
counsel of the prudent Leopold of Belgium — whose 
daughter he had just married — and through King 
Leopold the best wishes of England in his favour. 
Maximilian had taken up his task in earnest. In the 
course of an excursion on the Lago Maggiore, and in a 
conversation with the Prussian minister at Turin, Count 
Brassier de Saint-Simon, he spoke of Cavour in the 
warmest terms. " I greatly admire Count Cavour," he 
said ; " but as the business in contemplation is a policy 
of progress, I shall not let him outstrip me." Cavour, 
who gave ear to everything, disdaining nothing, was not 
insensible to this attempt, which might have disconcerted 
all his plans ; and subsequently he confessed that the 
mission of the Archduke Maximilian had caused him the 
liveliest anxiety. 

Suppose for a moment that Austria, strong in her 
incontestable territorial rights, and a military power per- 
mitting her to make concessions that could not be deemed 
dishonourable, had persisted in this Liberal idea, diverting 
and weaning the national Italian sentiment, softening her 
rule, and taking Europe to witness to her generosity : do 
but imagine this drama turned to a reality under the 
quieting administration of an Archduke ; how different 
might events have been from the war of 1859 to the 
war of 1866, and all that since ensued — not forgetting 
Mexico. 

Though she should not have succeeded in it, the 



174 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

policy was at least worth making a trial of ; but owing 
to one of those fits or false calculations, of which she has 
given more than one example, and which have always 
cost her heavy, at the first signs of a public crisis, 
Austria fell back affrighted on her traditions of immo- 
bility and repression. She did not confine herself to 
cancelling the mission of the Archduke Maximilian, but 
exaggerated her military rule in all her Italian posses- 
sions. She . had already commenced her preparations 
for war before January 1, 1859 ; she hurried them 
forward feverishly on the morrow of this date, despatch- 
ing army corps upon army corps into Italy, organising 
her forces as on the eve of a campaign, and going so far 
as to take a position on the Ticino, in face of Piedmont. 
Some of her officers, carried away by their bellicose fury, 
were guilty of acts of grave imprudence. At theii\ 
banquet-tables in Milan, they talked of nothing less than 
a speedy departure for Turin, which was to be the first 
stage of a march on Paris. 

Austria did not see that by her precipitancy and her 
excitement she compromised everything, disarmed in 
advance those who were striving for peace, and placed 
herself in a position that from one day to another exposed 
her to a fit of rashness, by the excess of her military 
display and of her expenditure. She was unable to 
perceive that she played the game of her enemies, and 
might possibly be tumbling into a pitfall ; and in any 
case she began by offering Piedmont a pretext that, 
finding herself supported, the country did not fail to 
profit by. Piedmont replied to armaments, by arma- 
ments, to demonstration by demonstration, putting the 



DIVIDED WISHES OF ENGLAND. 175 

fortresses of Alessandria and Casale in a state of defence, 
and getting together her regiments scattered on both sides 
of the Alps. The parliament voted a loan of two millions 
sterling, ostensibly necessitated by the "provocation of 
Austria," so that the two Powers were already all but 
front to front ; or at least the question of peace or war 
became terribly vexed and envenomed when diplomacy 
went to its task of holding back issues on the verge of 
explosion. 

in. 

What was it that diplomacy sought to do, or rather, 
what could it do in the state to which affairs had come ? 
All these incidents whirling about had not failed to 
produce an impression revealing a positive danger of 
war. The wish was for peace, and diplomacy strove to 
preserve it. 

England, represented by the Tory ministry of Lord 
Derby and Lord Malmesbury, held to peace more than 
the other Powers. Unhappily, Europe was deeply 
divided, and England herself, upon whom the initiative 
of discussion and negotiations devolved, was full of per- 
plexity. She felt herself divided between her traditional 
Continental policy, which held her to the treaties of 
1815 and Austria, her sympathy with the cause of 
freedom, which made her lean to Piedmont and Italy, 
her interests as a commercial Power, and her anxiety 
regarding the designs of France, whose growing intimacy 
with Turin filled her with misgivings. She would have 
conciliated everything — peace and that which menaced 
peace — Austria, France, and Piedmont ; and she could 



176 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

not discern that her urgent applications to one and the 
other imperilled her chances of success with them all. 

When England appealed to Vienna, Count Buol 
Schauenstein, minister of the Emperor Francis Joseph, 
replied impatiently : " You are mistaken, it is not here 
that you should come with your entreaties and your 
counsels ; go to Paris and Turin, and speak your mind 
out plainly there. Let the Emperor Napoleon learn 
that, if his army crosses the Alps, England will not look 
on quietly; let the King of Piedmont know that 
England sanctions no plundering of the Austrian posses- 
sions in Italy. If the Queen's ministers hold a resolute 
language we shall have no war. Italy is not in want of 
reconstruction ; let them cease to stir her up, and we 
shall hear no more of it." 

Turning to Turin, the English Cabinet was told that, 
if it desired peace, it had better apply to Vienna ; that 
the source of the evil lay in the foreign lordship in 
Italy, which was a dangerous friend to bad govern- 
ments, a menace to Piedmontese constitutional liberty, 
and the perpetual fosterer of revolutionary passions ; it 
was explained that, taking Austria to be on the legal 
ground of 1815 in Milan, she was not so in her occupa- 
tion of Bologna and Ancona for a period of ten years, 
binding the Central Duchies to terms amounting to 
vassalage, and turning Piacenza into an imperial fortress 
on the frontier of Piedmont. 

When England put her questions to France, the 
Emperor gave her every encouragement in her peaceful 
mission, disavowing the barest idea of aggressiveness, 
and assuming the air of a prudent friend by whom 



RUSSIA'S VIEW OF AUSTRIA. 177 

Piedmont was kept back, while in the main letting 
certain ideas be seen, with regard to Italian affairs, that 
had small chance of being accepted by Austria. 

England might have found a lever in the neutral 
Powers ; but the assistance with which Prussia favoured 
her was sufficiently platonic ; and as to Russia, Prince 
Gortchakoff, from the very commencement, held these 
words to Sir James Crampton, the English minister at 
St. Petersburg : " Decidedly Russia wishes for peace, she 
has need of it ; but allow me to tell you with my habitual 
frankness that we are unable to look with the same eye 
upon France and Austria. We are upon terms of close 
cordiality with the former ; as to the latter, it is the 
contrary. The Court of Vienna has behaved disgrace- 
fully in return for our services to her. In other times 
Russia offered her counsels to her allies, she refrains now 
from counselling whomsoever it may be. If we are asked 
for an opinion, our reply is favourable to peace : so far 
we go and no farther. Be good enough to understand 
that, if the peace of Europe is disturbed, I do not tell 
you on which side you will find the Russian arms. Upon 
this head we have determined to remain quit of any 
engagement." 

Beset by such contradiction and confusion, England 
had reason to be embarrassed, but she did not lose 
heart. She had commenced by trying since the month 
of January to bring Napoleon III. to specify his views. 
She soon took another step : before the end of February, 
the Queen's ambassador at Paris, Lord Cowley, was 
despatched to Vienna with a sketch of negotiations, 
and instructions to do his utmost to bring Austria to 



178 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

agree to them. In this first programme it was a ques- 
tion of the abandonment of the military occupation of 
Bologna and Kome, the abrogation of the Austrian 
treaties with the Duchies, the establishment of a system 
of liberal reform in the Italian States, and, above all, 
the putting of the relations between Austria and Sardinia 
on a proper footing. 

Lord Cowley's mission was not much of a success ; 
nor, in fact, had it altogether failed — or at least the 
English Cabinet fancied it had not, and possibly flattered 
itself already that it would be able to command events 
by means of mediation, when suddenly, on or about 
March 20, Europe was startled by the proposition 
of a congress, coming from St. Petersburg, in reality 
responding to the secret wishes of the Tuileries. It was 
the first apparition of that idea, or it might be said 
chimsera, of a congress, so frequently and so vainly 
pursued since by Napoleon III. 

A congress to consider the Italian problem ! Under 
what conditions and where should it sit % Of whom 
should it consist ? Was it to treat of Italian affairs 
without the Italians ? Was the congress to open to 
the sound of armaments that were still being pushed on 
hard and fast on the Ticino ? Plainly the question, far 
from being simplified, became more complicated by the 
bringing of these European inconsistencies into broad 
daylight, and entering on a path devoid of outlet. An 
acute diplomatist remarked : Behold a congress that 
will never sit ! 



D'AZEGLIO TO CAVOUR. 179 

IV. 

It was in the midst of difficulties like these that Cavour 
was plunged between January 1 and April, 1859. For 
him the main trial of his dexterity was not simply 
to lead to war out of such a state of confusion ; it was 
to gain his end without too much separating himself 
from Europe ; above all, without for a moment losing 
his junction with France, whose vanguard he was across 
the Alps. The prime task for Cavour was to reconcile 
the interior movement upon which he leaned — of which, 
more than ever, he was now the prudent and impassioned 
guide — with the exterior difficulties that could not be 
avoided. In this double labour he spent four months of 
an inexhaustible and lively activity, always with an eye 
on the Ticino and on Austria; passing from a diplomatic 
conference to an inspection of the fortresses of Casale 
and Alessandria, watchful over every service, and re- 
ceiving all the world, inspiring everyone about him with 
his own spirit and fire. 

The first incidents of the new year, the moment 
when, to use the expression of the period, "the bomb 
had burst," had shaken Piedmont and the whole of 
Italy with deep commotion. It was understood that 
the hour had come, and there was from that time but 
one thought for all. DAzeglio, the knightly man, 
ever prompt to generous resolves, had hastened to write 
to Cavour : "It is no longer the hour for the discussion 
of politics, there is nothing to be done but to succeed ; 
make what use you will of me." 

The words of D'Azeglio expressed the universal sen- 
timent. From all parts a stream of frank confidingness, 

N 2 



180 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

so to speak, flowed towards Cavour. Those whose 
thoughts were set above all upon independence turned 
their faces to Turin ; and from Lombardy as from 
Tuscany, from the Komagna and from Modena, shoaled 
hosts of young men eager to be enrolled under the 
banner of Victor Emmanuel. There was nothing of the 
turbulence of 1848 in these manifestations ; on the 
contrary, they were signalised by a formal and serious 
spirit, even in the excitement of the national emotion. 
It was like a conspiracy of a novel order, whose word of 
command was to shun the errors of the past, and to 
rally without bargaining round him who had carried 
Italy so far on the road. 

Cavour took joy in a movement that was a work of 
his own creation ; it responded to his heartiest wishes, 
and he designed to make the best use of it by organising 
it. If, on the one hand, the supple and forethoughtful 
patriot had done his utmost to procure a powerful ally, 
he was not, on the other, ready to consent that every- 
thing should be owing to this ally. He wrote to La 
Marmora : %' In order that the war may come to a 
fortunate issue, we must prepare for greater efforts. 
Woe to us if we triumph solely by the aid of the 
French ! " For the sake of national dignity, as well 
as for the independence of his policy, he stood for not 
receiving freedom as a gift. To this end he was diligent 
in the moral and material preparation of his country, 
and strove to the utmost to associate Italy with Pied- 
mont. At the risk of embroiling himself with diplo- 
macy, he busied himself in creating, under the title of 
" Chasseurs of the Alps," the battalions destined to form 



GARIBALDI. 181 

cadres for the Lombard and Tuscan youth pouring into 
Turin, to place them beside the Piedmontese army ; and, 
intrepid as he was, he did not shrink from the idea of 
entrusting these battalions to Garibaldi. 

One morning in the winter of 1858-59, before break 
of day, an unknown visitor had presented himself at 
the house of the President of the Council, who had 
been immediately informed of the visit by his valet 
somewhat in alarm. "Who is the man?" said Cavour. 
" He has a broad hat, a big stick in his hand, and he 
will not deliver his name ; he says that your excellency 
expects him." It was Garibaldi, who had come to 
arrange with Cavour for putting himself under the 
orders of Victor Emmanuel. But as his name was still 
sufficient to scare many, Garibaldi quitted Turin for 
Caprera, leaving behind him Colonel Medici to organise 
the Chasseurs of the Alps ; and in Medici Cavour 
soon found a zealous and devoted auxiliar. No doubt 
it was a risk to run, and it was not impossible that such 
a coadjutor might prove an embarrassment in the future. 
Cavour alone could manage these elements and throw 
the die ; he saw herein the means of reuniting all the 
forces of the country, to annul or rally the Eepub- 
licans, leaving aside only the inveterate disciples of 
Mazzini ; and as to these, he did not hesitate to declare 
that, if they stirred a step, he would shatter them with 
grape as pitilessly as he would the Austrians. 

v. 

The gravest difficulty for Cavour lay outside the 
kingdom, with England, and even to a certain degree 



182 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

with France. England, finding hini always in the way 
of her negotiations for peace, treated him roughly. Lord 
Derby and Lord Malmesbury did not cease to worry him 
with their recriminations and admonitions, which his 
friend, the brilliant Sir James Hudson, delivered with 
more fidelity than of personal share in them. 

The English Cabinet beheld in him, and not without 
some truth, the great agitator and constant provoker of 
Austria, the most dangerous adversary of all endeavours 
after peace. Cavour, for his part, listened patiently, 
sometimes anxiously, decided both to resist the wishes 
of England and not to wound her. Upon occasion, if he 
was pushed too far, he burst out, replying boldly to an 
English diplomatist, who told him that public opinion in 
London accused him of imperilling the peace of Europe 
by his Italian policy : "Admirable ! and I, on the con- 
trary, think that the most serious responsibility for the 
troubled position of Italy rests with England, her parlia- 
mentary orators, her diplomatists, and her writers, who 
have been labouring for years to excite political passions 
in our peninsula. Is it not England that has encouraged 
Sardinia in her propaganda of moral influences opposed 
to the lawless preponderance of Austria in Italy ? " 

Susceptible as he was to the rebukes of the English 
Cabinet, Cavour still exerted his utmost wariness in 
dealing with England, trying all he could to win her by 
allusions to her previous good favour, her liberal 
traditions, and her sympathies for Piedmontese Consti- 
tutional Government. He seized opportunities for 
addressing his speeches in parliament to the English 



RECEPTION OF ENGLISHMEN. 183 

people; lie reminded them that every just cause — emanci- 
pation in Ireland, and negro emancipation — had finished 
by triumphing ; and he exclaimed : " Can it be that the 
cause of Italy is less holy than that of the Irish, or that 
of the blacks ? And she also, Italy, will vindicate her- 
self before English public opinion. I can never believe 
that a man so distinguished as Lord Derby, presiding 
over the counsels of England, will, after having affixed to 
the great act of negro emancipation the name transmitted 
to him by history, conclude his noble career by com- 
plicity with those that would condemn the Italians to 
eternal servitude." 

The astute minister was at that time graciously giving 
receptions at Turin to many eminent Englishmen, among 
others, a member of the Whig party, General Fox, and 
Mr. Gladstone ; the latter had recently left the Ionian 
islands, where he had completed an official mission, and 
returned through Venetia and Lombardy, which he found 
in full military occupation. Cavour neglected nothing 
in indicating to his guests that England was mistaken 
when she identified peace with Austrian domination. 
"You have been privileged to see," he said to Mr. Glad- 
stone, " that Austria threatens us ; here we are tranquil, 
our country is calm, we shall do our duty." 

He knew what he was about ; if he could not have 
England for friend he would not have her for an enemy, 
and he sent her as ambassador-extraordinary the man 
best calculated to reawaken her sympathies and liberal 
instincts, Massimo d'Azeglio, saying of him hopefully : 
" There is the father of the Italian question ; he is a 



184 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR, 

Moderate ; they will not be suspicious of him. His 
presence in London should be of first-rate service among 
all who are not of pure Austrian blood." 

And D'Azeglio departed for London, fresh from his 
journey to Borne, whither he had been despatched to 
decorate the Prince of Wales with the collar of the Order 
of the Annunciation on his visit to the eternal city. 

The relations of Cavour with France were of a different 
character, without being less complicated and laborious. 
The dauntless Piedmontese had found, it is true, a friend 
of the Italian cause in Napoleon III., an ally more than 
half pledged to him, and after the month of January the 
marriage of Prince Napoleon with the Princess Clotilde 
gave him a firm auxiliar in one who had become a 
member of the royal family. His relations with the 
Tuileries continued close and secret through the Count of 
Villamarina, above all through the Cavaliere Nigra, his 
young and trusty lieutenant, whose private mission 
circumstances were rendering important. 

The influence of Turin on Paris was as real and as 
active as that of Paris on Turin. The alliance, contracted 
and close-linked six months ago, was untroubled ; but 
Cavour was not unaware of the uncertain and shifty 
character of Napoleon III., nor of what difficulties beset 
the master of France. In fact, the policy indicated 
from the date of January 1 had raised a storm of oppo- 
sition in a portion of French society — in the religious world, 
among the veterans of the parliamentary world, and 
even in a certain set of the friends of the Empire. 

Some of the more thoughtful minds apprehended, in 
this war which was approaching, a destruction of equili- 



CONFLICT IN COUNCILS OF THE EMPEROR.. 185 

brium that could not but be harmful to the traditional 
interests of the country. Others foresaw danger for the 
temporal power of the Pope in an Italian war. Worldly 
Paris, the ardent and hot-brained city, little heeded by 
the Empire, though it exercised its influence on opinion, 
was for peace. Cavour knew it well, and did what he could 
to win the support of liberal minds; but the views of a good 
part of Parisian society were notorious, and he knew also 
that in the Imperial councils the Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, Count "VValewski, shared those views so little favour- 
able to the striking of a blow for Italy. Napoleon III. 
was manifestly attached to the cause for which he had 
made the alliance of Plombieres and Turin, while Count 
Walewski talked and behaved like a minister pursuing a 
directly opposite line of policy — the policy of objection to 
war with Austria, severity towards Piedmont and Italy, 
suspicion approaching almost to personal hostility to 
Cavour : and the singular thing was, that in a despotic 
government there was a sort of conflict going on, under 
shelter of which the Emperor, acting either from indolence 
or calculation, allowed his minister's pacific efforts and 
declarations to proceed publicly, without interposing the 
decisive word. 

Napoleon III. likewise was anxious to calm the mind 
of England. He wished to appear forced into war, 
taking up arms only in the interests of peace, conserva- 
tive principles, and the European equilibrium, trans- 
parently compromised or threatened by Austria in Italy. 
He suffered Count Walewski to perform with perfect 
sincerity on the thema he had selected, insomuch that 
Cavour, already embarrassed by England, found himself 



186 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

in addition face to face with this crack-skull of a double- 
headed French policy. The Emperor who sustained him 
was not given to speak every day, and, on the other hand, 
he had to deal with the salons, the financial powers, 
religious influences, and official diplomacy, which, in the 
prolonged intervals of the imperial silence, made them- 
selves heard. 



VI. 



Often during these laborious and agitated weeks of 
the beginning of 1859, obliged as he was to show front 
to all difficulties and perils, Cavour underwent woful 
anxieties, owing to the ceaseless contradictions torment- 
ing him. He did not let them thwart him. He pursued 
his course through all these entanglements, multiplying 
as they continued. 

The situo/tion began to be really critical towards 
March 20, when the proposition of a congress startled 
the world. There was a sharp scene in Paris between 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Sardinian 
envoy, ' Count Villamarina. Count Walewski, in a fit 
of ill-temper, possibly designed to intimidate the Cabinet 
of Turin, allowed himself to be carried away so far as to 
say that : " The Emperor would not make war to favour 
the ambition of Sardinia ; and that all would be settled 
pacifically at a congress, in which Piedmont would have 
no right whatsoever to participate." At the same time 
Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, under the directions of 
Count Walewski, held disquieting language though it 
was without acerbity. Cavour stood ready to face the 



CAVOUR AT PARIS. 187 

storm. He wrote to Prince Napoleon, and transmitted a 
letter from the King, that Cavalier e Nigra was deputed 
to hand to the Emperor ; and he added his instructions 
to Nigra to speak " energetically to his Majesty ; telling 
him that Count Walewski writes to the minister of 
France at this Court in a manner to dispirit us 
and push us to acts of despair." The Emperor replied : 
" Let Count Cavour come hither to Paris, without 
further delay." The summons brought Cavour to Paris 
on March 25. 

No sooner had he arrived than he saw himself in 
the presence of machinery labouring not only for the 
maintenance of peace, though it should be at the sacrifice 
of Piedmont, but to have him thrust aside, as the chief 
obstacle in the way of peace. More than ever he was 
the great suspected ! 

Count "Walewski's reception of him was courteous and 
cold. Lord Cowley also was sufficiently serious. At 
the Tuileries his welcome was cheerful and trusting, as 
it had been at Plombieres. He enjoyed repeated inter- 
views with the Emperor, and the few days he spent in 
Paris were not lost time for him ; he employed them in 
reconnoitring the situation, and studying the game of 
Parisian politics, never losing his independence of mind 
and natural airiness. " I should certainly come to see 
you," he wrote to Madame de Circourt, " but I dread find- 
ing in your salon the frantic partisans of peace, who 
would be mortally shocked by my presence. In spite 
then of my warlike disposition, as I do not wish to make 
war on your friends, I shall not present myself to you 
save on your promising to receive me privately, or in the 



188 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

presence of those who will not tear out my eyes for the 
love of peace." 

One morning of this end of March, a. financial 
sovereign, Baron James de Eothschild, called on Cavour, 
whom he had known for some period, and a curious 
dialogue ensued between them. The all-powerful banker, 
strongly opposed to war, and desirous to know how far 
things had gone, became pressing. " Well," replied 
Cavour, " there are many chances in favour of peace, and 
there are many in favour of war." " Always joking, 
M. la Comte ! " "Look here, Baron, I will make you a 
proposal ; let us buy together in the funds ; we'll buy 
for a rise ; I'll resign my post and there'll be a rise of 
three francs." " You are too modest, M. la Comte, you 
are worth fully six francs ! " 

The fact is that at the moment when Baron Roths- 
child received this waggish confidence, there was really 
in Europe a man disposing of peace or war, and this was 
the prime minister of Piedmont ; and the truth further 
is that when he spoke thus, Cavour was not much wiser 
in the matter than his interlocutor. He carried back a 
lively sense of the gravity of the situation to Turin, 
where he had returned on April 1. He saw the busi- 
ness badly begun. Without suspecting the Emperor, 
he apprehended difficulties and. delays, which might 
indeed be sharply abridged by Austria, if only Austria 
would do him the good service to commit herself to some 
rash step. 

The matter could not long remain undecided. From 
the first days of April it narrowed more and more, and 
concentrated definitely in two points, which were but 



PROPOSAL OF GENERAL DISARMAMENT. 189 

one — the congress and the preliminary disarmament. 
It was there that the understanding was next to im- 
possible. Austria on her part would not have Sardinia 
admitted to the congress, and besides, she demanded 
irritably and haughtily the disarmament of Piedmont in 
advance of any European deliberation. Cavour, on his 
side, looked with an evil eye on this sudden apparition 
of a congress, and in any case he could not consent that 
Piedmont, after for three years joining in all the deli- 
berations of Europe, should be left at the door of later 
conferences on Italian affairs. 

He had declared from the first moment that " the 
congress must have a disastrous effect on Italy if Sardinia 
were excluded," and that he should be drawn or forced 
to send in his resignation. As to disarmament, he would 
not hear of it ; he wrote resolutely to Prince Napoleon : 
" We will not disarm. Better fall vanquished, sword in 
hand, than perish miserably in a state of anarchy, or see 
ourselves degraded to maintain public tranquillity with 
violence, like the king of Naples. To-day we have a 
moral force worth an army ; if we abandon it, nothing 
will give it us back." 

How was conciliation practicable between such 
opposing pretensions ? Diplomacy was bewildered; for 
if Piedmont was refused a seat at the congress, it was 
difficult to insist on her disarming ; and if she was asked 
to disarm, it appeared simply justice to invite her to the 
congress. Out of this came a combination put forward 
by England, modified and shaped by France ; it was to 
be a general disarmament, in which Piedmont was to 
participate on her admission to the congress with the 



190 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

other Italian States. The Cabinets made the last throw 
for peace in this scheme. It was not at all to the taste 
of Cavour, who watched the latest labours of diplomatic 
expedients most anxiously. So long as he had to do 
only with England on the question of disarmament, he 
could shuffle from the pressure of English diplomacy, 
and dexterously elude replying. When the official 
proposition to disarm came to him from France, he was 
seized by a strong emotion, as in the very crisis of his 
life. 

VII. 

On the evening of April 18, towards midnight, 
a secretary of the French Legation had brought him a 
brief and peremptory telegram, in which the French 
Cabinet demanded his immediate adhesion, and on 
reading it he exclaimed in a paroxysm, "that there 
was nothing more for him to do ,but to blow out his 
brains." He fancied all was lost ; that the Emperor 
had forsaken him in the heat of the crisis ; and he felt his 
soul overwhelmed with patriotic anguish at the idea of 
this work, at which he had laboured for six years, and 
which had seemed so near succeeding, being jeopardised. 
But the first dolorous instant passed, his natural elas- 
ticity, that never gave him time to blow out his brains on 
any of the occasions when the thought of it came to him, 
revived, and he began to reflect. 

Every possible scheme and resolution worked in his 
brain. "It is true," he said animatedly to his friends, 
" true that we are unhurt on the score of our personal 
pride. England first stipulated for a preliminary dis- 



SUBMISSION TO THE WILL OF EUROPE. 191. 

armament, and we replied in the negative ; she then 
asked us to subscribe to the principle of disarmament, 
and this likewise we declined. To-day, if we adhere to 
a proposition to disarm on the condition of being ad- 
mitted to the congress, we submit to a demand addressed 
to us by Europe. ! Our honour is safe. We resisted as 
long as we could. Nevertheless our situation is grave : 
not desperate, but grave." 

Cavour had more than one good reason for calming 
himself and believing that things were not desperate. 
Despatches and telegrams received by him on the 
morrow from London, above all from Paris, helped to 
reassure him. There was also another point of which he 
had not at first seized the importance : the adhesion 
demanded of him, which he had sadly transmitted by 
the telegraphic wire — what value was there in it if not 
completed by the adhesion of Vienna ? He had most 
prudently made his sacrifice to be in accord with 
Europe, not to separate himself from France. Would 
Austria likewise submit ? Far from being decided, 
the question became more than ever doubtful. During 
the first days nothing was known, and Cavour himself 
began to say: " Austria does not speak; if she should 
refuse, Napoleon must have divined her ! In truth the 
Cabinet of Vienna did not speak, and it remained mute 
because it had already come to its resolve. 

Was it that Austria yielded to a movement of 
wounded and angry pride ? Did she see in the propo- 
sition made to her a merely captious expedient, invented 
to gain time ? Did she suppose herself ready to be 
ahead of her adversaries in the battle-field, and undo 



192 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

their plots by the .swiftness and vigour of her blows ? 
However it may be, during these latest negotiations, 
when diplomacy imagined that a solution had been 
found, Austria prepared to force events. She likewise 
had made a last effort at Berlin to endeavour to interest 
Russia and Germany in her cause, by widening the war, 
and proposing to open the conflict on the Ehine as 
well as on the Po. Though unsuccessful, she let herself 
be carried away by a warlike mood. She wished to 
have done with it; and without waiting further she 
determined to address an ultimatum direct to Turin, 
summoning Piedmont to disarm, and allowing her a 
delay of three days to reflect on it. Cavour could have 
wished for nothing better in his dilemma, and his sole 
fear was to see Austria stop short. 

He still knew nothing certain on the 19th April. 
He could not know that the ultimatum that very day 
was ready to be launched at him from Vienna. On the 
20th he began to gather the first signs of the coming 
coup de theatre. He was in the Chamber of Deputies 
at the Carignano palace on the 23rd, when a word 
written in haste by one of his intimates informed him 
of the arrival of Baron Kellersperg, bearer of a commu- 
nication from Count Buol ; and shortly afterwards at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at half-past five of that 
afternoon, he received from the hands of the Austrian 
envoy this communication, which was nothing other 
than the command to disarm. Three days later, at the 
same hour — being the term of the delay granted — he 
delivered the reply of the Piedmontese Government to 
Baron Kellersperg, whose hand he courteously pressed in 



DEFIANCE TO WAR ACCEPTED. 193 

assuring him of the happiness he would have to see him 
again "under more favourable auspices." Immediately 
he gave his final orders to Colonel Govone, deputed to 
accompany the Austrian officer to the frontier; then, 
turning to some of his friends who were waiting for the 
end of the scene, he cried with friendly familiarity, the 
natural key that never forsook him : " It's done ; Alea 
jacta est ! we have made some history, and now to 
dinner ! " 

Austria might justly declare that she had been 
pushed to extremity. She had some reason to say and 
believe that she was only defending herself in appealing 
to arms to decide a question threatening and harrying 
her on all sides. Still it was in a measure her fault that 
it so befell that the provocation coming from her should 
alienate Europe, chill England, and disengage Piedmont 
in assuring the latter, as the word flew instantly from 
Paris, "the fullest aid from France." Of this long 
and laborious diplomatic imbroglio of three months, 
there remained nothing but a defiance to war, flung 
down hastily, caught up with feverish zeal, and opening 
the road of events to Italy and the brave statesman, 
who had worked for it ten years, and had gone to the 
Crimea and to Plombieres to prepare this crucial hour. 

VIII. 

When, dating from the morning of April 30, 
the first French columns descended from the Alps, 
and debouched in the Piazza Castello of Turin, in the 
midst of an excited population, Cavour stood on the 



194 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

balcony of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with other 
persons of distinction, French and Italian, and Sir 
James Hudson as well. He had verily good reason 
to see the march of his own policy in this thrilling 
spectacle. A few days later Napoleon III. disembarked 
at Genoa, and did but express a manifest truth in 
saying to him : " You ought to be satisfied, your aims 
are being realised." 

Under this aspect, war was doubtless a blessing, 
for it delivered him from uncertainties, by making his 
long ten years' dream a living and striking reality. 
War wa,s not, as may be imagined, a time of repose 
for him, more especially in the earlier period, when 
Turin expected at any day to sight the enemy, and 
the Austrians might, with a little dash, have undone 
the combinations of their adversaries, before the junction 
of the armies of Piedmont and France. 

Much was at one moment to be feared, in fact, if 
the Austrians, having crossed the frontier, had known 
how to profit by their weightier numbers in resolutely 
marching on Turin : if, after committing an error of 
diplomatic precipitancy, they had not been guilty of 
another and stranger, by faltering in their military 
steps. What prevented the war from leading off with a 
disaster for the Allies ? It may be entirely the fortunate 
inspiration of Marshal Canrobert, wdio, on his arrival 
on April 29, took upon himself to throw out his 
first French lines to Casale, in a manner to deceive and 
intimidate the Austrians. Cavour stood ready for the 
worst, shrinking neither from the determination to 
defend Turin to extremity, nor, in case of need, from 



HIS LABOURS IN WAR-TIME. 195 

the cruel alternative of inundating the Lomellina to 
arrest the foe. There was enough all about him to 
kindle and occupy his wakefulness in this war he had 
challenged, and whose risks and troubles he encountered 
with an intrepid heart. 

Remaining alone at Turin, while the King and 
General La Marmora went to the camp, he was Pre- 
sident of the Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Minister of the Interior, Minister of War, Minister of 
Marine — everything, and equal to all his duties. He 
lived in the centre of the fire of these devouring labours. 
His bureaux were his field of battle, which he worked 
in night and day, and, after his fashion, may be said to 
have fought in ; having at once to arrange for military 
transports and provisioning, to reply to petitions for 
instructions pouring in on him from all sides, to 
maintain his diplomatic correspondence, and look to his 
relations with the French army. 

Nothing dashed him, nothing perplexed. "Witness 
that day of the month of May when, within four-and- 
twenty hours, he found means to solve the problem of 
feeding the French army, reduced to extremities. 
According to special arrangements, the Piedmontese 
Government had undertaken to provide for the wants 
of the French troops up to a certain date. The day had 
come, and the French military administration found 
itself painfully embarrassed in considering of the 
morrow. The Emperor, in camp at Alessandria, sur- 
prised by such annoying intelligence, could think of 
nothing better than to despatch Cavaliere Nigra, whom 
he kept near his person, to Turin. Cavour, after some 

o 2 



19G LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUE. 

show of vexation at the bad management, did not the 
less hasten his measures to amend it. He at once put 
in motion the whole body of mayors of the communes 
within reach of the lines of rail ; he gave them 
orders to requisition all the meal they could lay hands 
on, heat the bakeries, and make as much bread on the 
spot as they could ; then, without loss of a minute, to 
the nearest stations — and behold, next morning there 
was provision beyond what was needed at Alessandria ! 
This is but one of many instances of his indefatigable 
promptitude in regard to administrative and military 
business. 

IX. 

The gravest point ahead was in the political bearings 
of this war, which opened with numerous victories, and 
from Montebello, Palestro, Magenta, Melegnano, carried 
the allies to the Mincio. 

There can be no doubt that the agreements between 
Cavour and Napoleon III. remained at first intact 
with the original programme of the war. The Emperor, 
before leaving Paris, had himself declared in a procla- 
mation : " Austria has brought things to such a pass 
that she must lord it up to the Alps, or else Italy must 
be free up to the Adriatic : for in that country every 
nook of earth holding independence is a danger to 

the power of Austria The aim of this war 

is to restore Italy to herself, not that she should change 
masters, and we shall have on our frontiers a friendly 
people, owing their liberty to us." The Emperor added 
also, it is true : " We do not enter Italy to foment 



NAPOLEON III. TO TEE ITALIANS. 197 

disorder, nor to shatter the authority of the Holy 
Father, whom we. have replaced on his throne, but to 
relieve it of a foreign burden weighing upon the whole 
peninsula." 

Shortly afterwards, at Milan, following the victory 
of Magenta, which gave Lombardy to the allies, Napo- 
leon III. addressed far more serious words to the 
Italians, telling them : "Providence sometimes favours 
a people by giving them the opportunity to spring- 
to life at a blow, but it is on the condition that they 
shall know how to profit by it. Profit, then, by the 
good fortune offered to you ! Unite in a common aim 
— the deliverance of your country. Give yourselves 
military organisation. Fly to the banner of Victor 
Emmanuel, who has so nobly shown you the path of 
honour; . . . . . and animated by the sacred fire of 
patriotism, be but soldiers to-day : to-morrow you will 
be citizens of a great country." 

So sj)oke the Emperor, and naturally what was to be 
anticipated ensued. Already in the last days of April, 
at the opening of the war, Florence had made her 
revolution, letting her Grand Duke depart in peace 
and find an asylum in,the camp of the Austrians. The 
Governments of Modena and Parma had melted away. 
Towards the middle, of June, the Austrians, anxious 
to have all their forces on the Adige, hastened to quit 
the Papal territory, Ancona and Bologna, which they 
had occupied for ten years, and immediately, with a 
spontaneous outburst, the T^magna joined the move- 
ment. 

All these things were accomplished without a 



198 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

struggle, insomuch that in the track of the armies 
there was a half-emancipated Italy turning to Pied- 
mont. Here was the most delicate part of the pro- 
gramme of the war, and Cavour watched it keenly. 
Day by day he marked the successive steps of this 
work of liberation ; it had all his sympathies, and he 
strove to keep it in good order, for it was one of the 
sources of his strength. He had sent Count Pallieri 
to Parma, the ardent and devoted Farini to Modena, 
and to Florence the sagacious Boncompagni. He 
reserved for Bologna, a difficult position, the person 
the best fitted to exact obedience by the authority of 
his name, his noted loyalty, and his lofty mind — 
Massimo d'Azeglio. 

What was to be done with these provinces, for the 
moment delivered up to themselves, was the business 
of the war. The men he forwarded represented among 
them the lordship they had besought of Victor Em- 
manuel. He gave similar instructions to each of them : 
"Kepression in the cause of order, activity on behalf 
of the war * what remains leave to the future." His 
principal care was to allow no opening for agitation and 
declamation, and it was with this mind that he wrote to 
Signor Vigliani, a Piedmontese magistrate, of a liberal 
and conciliatory disposition, whom he had made governor 
of Milan : "We are not in 1848 ; we permit of no dis- 
cussion. Take no notice of the excitement of those who 
surround you. The smallest act of weakness wrecks the 
Government." 

His lieutenants were everywhere, even in the camp 
of Garibaldi, whither he had sent a young Lombard, 



BEFORE SOLFEBINO. 199 

Emilio Visconti-Venosta — who has since been Minister 
of Foreign Affairs — who there served as Eoyal Com- 
missioner with the Chasseurs of the Alps, with whom he 
made the campaign. In a word, the armies marched, 
Italy was in movement, and Cavour inspired and directed 
all, while holding himself as much as possible within 
the bounds of the imperial programme. The culminating 
point was about to be touched — Solferino ! 

x. 

But already, before this more bloody than decisive 
battle of June 24, there had been some clouds in the 
camp of the allies. 

With the progress of events the situation grew more 
complicated. In approaching the Mincio and the Adige, 
the armies of France and Piedmont had heavy operations 
in view instead of battles ; they had to conduct sieges 
and carry formidable positions : they were soon to be in 
the presence of the Quadrilateral. European diplomacy, 
at the same time, after leaving the war to its first shots, 
appeared disposed to resume work ; Prussia, without 
showing any hostility, seemed inclined to play a more 
active part. On the other hand, the successive move- 
ments in Italy, troubling the provinces of the Pope, 
awakened suspicions and animosities against what was 
called " Piedmontese ambition ;" and all these circum- 
stances tended to feed certain busy efforts, having their 
centre in Paris, which were soon to reach the head- 
quarters of Napoleon III. in the heart of Lombardy. 
The policy that had been unable to prevent the war, 



I 



200 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJR. 

now attempted to limit and stoj3 it as speedily as might 
be, by exciting the doubts and fears of the Emperor ; 
and assuredly such a policy found efficacious backers in 
the overwhelming heat of a torrid season, and the 
fatigues of a sovereign who, at an age past fifty, 
fancied himself capable of conducting great military 
undertakings. 

In truth, the glorious and bloody battle of Solferino 
was but the final coup cle soleil, which, so to say, ripened 
the situation. Immediately after it the Emperor received 
news from Paris leading him to dread the appearance of 
Germany on the scene. He had, moreover, been pro- 
foundly shaken by the frightful carnage he had Avit- 
nessed. "I have lost 10,000 men," he said to someone, 
with the accent of a man absorbed by the thought 
of it. 

His mind was variously swayed. He saw the diffi- 
culties and dangers lying in a continuation of the war, 
and the possible though restricted advantages of an 
arrangement proposed in the hour of- victory ; and 
under this impression he despatched General Fleury, on 
the evening of July 7, to be the bearer of a proposition 
of an armistice, that in his idea might lead to peace, 
to the Austrian camp at Verona. Three days sub- 
sequently, after an interview between Napoleon III. 
and the Emperor Francis Joseph, at Villafranca, on the 
road to Verona, the preliminaries were signed which 
put an end to the war. The main headings of the 
treaty of peace were sketched : Cession of Lombardy to 
the king of Sardinia ; creation of an Italian confedera- 
tion under the " honorary " presidency of the Pope ; the 



VTLLAFRANCA. 201 

ultimate return of the Grand Duke of Tuscany aud the 
Duke of Modena to their principalities ; Venetia to 
remain " under the crown of the Emperor of Austria." 
These preliminaries were the basis of the definitive 
treaty signed by the plenipotentiaries in the neutral 
city of Zurich. 

Thus, then, the French vanguard reached Turin on 
April 30 ; on May 20 the first battle was fought, that 
of Montebello ; and the Italian war terminated on 
July 11 at Villafranca. To conclude it Napoleon III. 
had been compelled, as he stated, to " cut off from his 
programme the territory stretching between the Mincio 
and the Adige. In stopping midway in the execution 
of plans that had been the object of the alliance of 
Plombieres, he had likewise to renounce — temporarily, 
we will say — the benefits to be obtained by France on 
her side of the Alps ; nor did he hesitate — he asked for 
nothing. Plainly he believed himself to have performed 
a great act in the face of Europe in signing peace. But 
it was a perplexed and precarious peace, leaving many 
problems unsolved, and open to the capital charge, that 
it left the permanent interests of France unconsidered 
and disappointed the hopes of Italy. It spoke strongly 
of that unhappy tendency of a mind so strangely fas- 
cinated by chimseras and wanting in will. Not enough 
or else too much had been done. 

This, however, is positive : the Emperor had con- 
ceived and executed his design without consulting his 
ally. Notwithstanding the indications of a difficult 
situation naturally disquieting him at times, Cavour 
had not foreseen so proximate a coup de thedtre. 



202 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

Shortly previous he had been summoned to the Mincio 
by the King, specially to tranquillise the Emperor con- 
cerning what was passing in the Legations. He thought 
he had succeeded ; and he had quitted the army, deeply 
affected by the spectacle of the field of Solferino, but 
without suspicion. Further, on July 6 he had written 
to Marquis Sauli, Sardinian ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg, who had mentioned the possibility of a mediation : 
"A mediation at present could bring nothing but bad 
consequences. Austrian influence must entirely dis- 
appear from Italy before we can have a solid and durable 
peace." Still less did he consider the likelihood of a 
peace directly negotiated between the belligerents. He 
was unaware while writing this that the idea of a direct 
negotiation had already been accepted by the Emperor. 

Two days later, on July 8, he received a despatch 
at Turin from General La Marmora, with news of a 
suspension of arms ; and La Marmora confessed that 
no one knew " how or by whom, the armistice had been 
proposed." He started for the camp at once ; and 
reaching Pozzolengo, the King's head-quarters, he knew 
the truth : he found himself in the presence of a peace, 
all but established, which frustrated his hopes and con- 
founded his policy. The peace was visible ; as yet he 
was ignorant of the conditions. They were communi- 
cated to him only on July 11, in a familiar and dramatic 
scene, when the King came from the imperial camp at 
Valeggio bearing the deed, which he signed with this 
formula or singular reserve : "As far as I am concerned." 

Throwing off his uniform, with a heavy face, Victor 
Emmanuel seated himself in his habitual soldierly atti- 



HIS GRIEF AT TEE TERMS OF PEACE. 203 

tude, and commanded one of the four persons present to 
read the preliminaries aloud. Cavour at this reading 
fell into a violent passion. So intemperate was he that 
the King had some trouble in calming him, and entrusted 
him to La Marmora. But Cavour knew well that the 
King had done no more than he was obliged to do. 
Between the alternatives of singly carrying on an un- 
equal war, or subscribing to a peace that rescued 
Lombardy while leaving many questions open,- Victor 
Emmanuel had not or could not have hesitated. Indeed, 
his resolution once taken, he had shown some finesse 
even in his submission — letting his grief be seen, but 
no resentment. 

Nor would Cavour himself, in his bitterness of spirit, 
have counselled other proceedings to the King. As for 
him, he declined to accept the responsibility of the 
peace, and he washed his hands of power under the 
weight of so cruel a deception. As soon as things were 
settled, he considered it due to himself, his honour, and 
his policy, to quit the Ministry, and after handing his 
resignation to the King, he left for Turin, overcome with 
grief, revolving all kinds of projects in his head. As he 
was passing through Milan, many persons, and among 
them the Governor, Vigliani, were at the station, im- 
patient to see him. The weariness following stormy 
emotions had thrown him into a deep sleep. They did 
not awaken him. It was his first wink of sleep during 
the whole of his lamentable excursion to the camp. 



204 ." LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 



XI. 



Cavour, while on the Mincio, had not seen the 
Emperor, and the Emperor had not, for his part, been 
desirous of entering into explanations with him. The 
interview at Valeggio would have been somewhat 
different from that at Plombieres. It was only on his 
passage through Turin, returning to France, some days 
later, that Napoleon III. expressed a wish to see him, 
and the interview softened the acuter pangs of his recent 
wounds. The two at least parted like men who may 
meet again. Cavour had gone to the palace in the 
evening with a friend, who accompanied him through 
the most deserted streets of the city, and on his way 
he said : "I have been invited to a Court dinner, but I 
refused. I am not in a state of mind to accept invita- 
tions. To think that I had done so much for the 
union of the Italians, and that to-day all may be com- 
promised ! I shall be reproached for not having con- 
sented to sign the peace. I was unable absolutely, and 
I cannot sign it." 

Cavour's sole idea was to be out of the way, and 
leaving La Marmora to form a ministry with Rattazzi and 
General Dabormida, he hastened to depart for Switzer- 
land. 

The state of his mind is seen in a letter he wrote 
on July 22 to Madame de Circourt : " If," he said, 
" Bougival, instead of being at the gates of Paris, were 
in some obscure corner of France, I would eagerly 
accept the hospitality you offer me so cordially. You, 



LETTER TO MADAME DE CIRCOTJRT. 205 

dear countess, would help me, I am sure, not to despair 
of my country ; and I should leave you after some time 
in a better condition than I am in at present to renew 
the struggle for independence and liberty. But I could 
not 1)e at the gates of Paris without entering it; it would 
look as if I were sulking ; and there is nothing so ridi- 
culous in the world as the sulking of a fallen minister ; 
especially if he is so foolish as to pout with the city* of 
all others the most careless of misfortune and most 
mocking. I am bidden by my position to be as quiet as 
I can. I came trudging into Switzerland, the hospital 
of the politically wounded ; but as the announcement of 
a congress at Zurich might give my innocent journey a 
suspicious look, I shall beat a retreat to Savoy, and I 
shall take my station at the foot of Mont Blanc, there 
among the marvels of nature to forget the wretchedness 
of the works of men ; then, when the heats are over, I 
shall return to my estates." 

He added with fine irony, doubtless replying to 
rather hasty compliments on his retirement : " What 
you tell me of the new kindness of my. former friends 
entirely consoles me. I am bound to look on my fall as 
a providential event, if I may owe to it the recovery of 
the esteem of the chosen circle around you, from which 
my misconceived policy had in some sort shut me out." 

Writing and speaking in this manner, he used the 
language of a beaten man ; he thought himself van- 
quished, and he was less so than he supposed. He still 
retained a touch of the bitterness which had burst from 
him so terribly in his first anguish. He had need to 
escape from the fiery atmosphere he had lived in for 



206 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

six months, and seek the repose he was sure to find in 
Switzerland, in the society of his friends De la Rive. 
One morning at the end of July he disembarked at 
Hermance, on the Lake of Geneva. Finding no other 
means to get to Pressinge, he hired a farm-cart, and the 
owner of it offering to drive, Cavour talked with the 
honest countryman on the road of the harvests, the 
value of the land about, and the divers cultivations 
going on in those parts. At Pressinge there was no one 
to receive him, so he went afoot, his coat on his arm, 
nnder a tremendous heat, to another house of the De la 
Eives, where he was hailed as a guest as little foreseen 
as he was welcome. None would have said to see him 
that he was the man who had just stirred all Europe. 
He passed some days there, happy in the family life, 
conversing freely with his friends, fishing in the lake, 
and for a solitary incident coming across a huge Bernese 
soldier with a long moustache, who asked him if he was 
Oavour in person, and then passed on in silence, after 
squeezing his hand. 

It might *be called the convalescence of Cavour after 
the fever. A week had barely passed, and he was no 
longer the same man ; he had recovered his prodigious 
elasticity of nature which saved him from the danger of 
those first fits of passion he could not always control 
in the heat of action. 

He judged matters with perfect freedom of mind, 
without recrimination and superfluous regrets, striving 
above all to comprehend them as they had come to pass. 

" It is useless to look back," he said, " now let us 
look ahead. We have been following one trail ; it is 



VILLAFRANCA AND THE ITALIANS. 207 

cut : well then, now let us follow another. It will cost us 
twenty years to do what might have been done in so 
many months. What is there for us ? Besides, England 
has not yet done anything for Italy ; to-day it is her 
turn." And to his friend Castelli, who had remained at 
Turin, he did not delay to write : "I have not aban- 
doned politics. I should if Italy were free ; then my 
work would be finished : but so long as the Austrians 
are on our side of the Alps, it is my duty to dedicate 
what remains to me of life and energy, to realise the 
hopes I have laboured to make my countrymen conceive. 
I have resolved to waste no time in vain and sterile 
agitations, but I shall not be deaf to the call of my 
country." 

Manifestly Cavour, in yielding to a sudden fiery 
impulse, had by his protestations and his retirement 
gone rather far. All one can say is that he had been 
the first to feel what Italy felt almost instantaneously. In 
all parts of the peninsula, excepting perhaps Lombardy, 
where a deep sense of deliverance was foremost, the 
feeling was deep and poignant. The disappointment 
was measured by the hopes and the confidence in a war 
undertaken to make Italy free up to the Adriatic, 
according to the proclamation of Milan. Nothing 
was seen at first but the abandonment of Venice by a 
new Campo-Formio, and the threat of the restoration 
of their former masters to Florence and Bologna. 

The peace of Villafranca caused the Italians to forget, 
for the moment at least, what France had done for 
them; and even at Turin they were far from the 
enthusiasm which had welcomed the French soldiers on 



208 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIl. 

April 30. "If this problem had been proposed six months 
ago/' wrote the most moderate of men, Massimo 
d'Azeglio : " To enter Italy with 200,000 soldiers, spend 
half a million of money, gain four battles, restore the 
Italians one of their finest provinces, and then to return 
with their curses ; such a problem would have been 
declared insoluble. Well then, it is not ; and facts have 
proved it. In Central Italy, where all heads have been 
inflamed by the great deeds of the war, they will not 
accept the peace of Villafranca. For me, I abstain from 
judging the conduct of the Emperor. The end of it is, 
he has been under fire in our cause against the Austrians; 
and as regards the splendid soldiers of France, I 'could 
embrace their knees. Still all this does not hide the 
fact, that the situation of our poor Italy is terrible. To 

tell the truth, I lose my head " 

It was this sentiment of a terrible situation, and of an 
unforeseen and bitter deception, that Cavour expressed and 
caused to resound when he gave in his resignation, which 
made the vanquished minister the popular representative 
of a national crisis, the possible workman of new fortunes. 
He was in full accord with the public instinct ; if he had 
been guilty of hastiness he had committed this fault in 
common with the country ; for him, as for his country, it 
was a force of which he, in his temporary and voluntary 
retirement from office, was the always-ready champion. 



XII. 

Nevertheless, when the first outburst was over, people 
looked about them ; and herein Cavour soon found 



THE NATURE OF THE PEACE. 209 

himself in accord with Italy. The impression was 
immitigatedly keen, but there was a disposition to look 
close at the situation newly created for them, to read 
the meaning of events, and seek a fresh direction. 

The peace of Villafranca was not without its advan- 
tages, though it had stopped military proceedings. If 
it allowed the foreigner to keep a footing in his last 
entrenchments in Venetia, it offered the prospect of new 
combinations, and a certain liberty that might be put to 
profit. The dukes might re-enter their duchies : and in 
what manner ? " Indispensable reforms " were to be 
demanded from the Pope. Supposing the Pope to refuse 
the granting of these reforms, and the Pomagna to refuse 
to submit to the Pope ? France, after fighting for 
Italian independence against Austria, could not abjure 
the moral consequences of her intervention, and join 
Austria against Italy. Napoleon HI. was bound by his 
deeds, his connivance, and his sentiments; England, 
which, according to Cavour, had as yet done nothing, 
had just gone through a ministerial crisis that had over- 
thrown the Tories and brought the Whigs to power — 
Lord Palmerston and Lord John Pussell. England, with- 
out lending material assistance, upon which they must not 
count, might give good help with her sympathies and 
her diplomacy ; and her interests lay in doing so, if it 
were but to extend her influence beyond the Alps and 
seek her advantage in the new organisation of Italy. In 
reality, everything hung more than ever in suspense. 

What was to come of it ? The first moment had been 
one of confusion, trouble, and irritation. That which 
neither Napoleon III., in improvising a peace that he 



210 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

deemed necessary, nor the Italians, in submitting to this 
peace, which seemed a mortal wound to them, had fore- 
seen, was, that Villafranca, far from settling, was hardly 
a stage between the crisis of yesterday and that of to- 
morrow ; it was only a truce, by favour of which an 
Italian campaign of a new character was preparing, and 
Cavour could return on the scene to gather fruits of a 
kind very differently unforeseen from this peace he had 
imprecated. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE ITALIAN CRISIS AFTER VILLAFRANCA CAVOUR AND 

THE CESSION OF SAVOY. 

Speech of Napoleon III. at St. Cloud — Character and first Consequences of the 
Peace of Villafranca — France and Austria — Piedmont and the New Ministry 
— Italian Phase — The Annexation Movement in Central Italy — Farina at 
Modena and at Bologna — Ricasoli at Florence — Portrait of Ricasoli — The 
Military League of Central Italy — The Tuscan Envoys in Paris — Official 
Policy of France —Personal Policy of the Emperor — Contradictions of 
French Diplomacy — Negotiations with England — The Emperor's Tactics to 
disengage himself — New Coup de Thdatre — Change in the French Ministry 
— M. Thouvenel takes the Place of Count Walewski— The Pamphlet " The 
Pope and the Congress " — Change of Ministry at Turin — Cavour recalled to 
Office — Negotiations with Central Italy and with Paris — Preparations for 
the Ddnotiruent — The Annexations — Cession of Savoy and Nice to France — 
Opinion in Italy — Opinion in Europe — The External and Internal Situation 
— The Treaty of March 24, 1860, before Parliament — Speech of Cavour on 
Italian Policy and the French Alliance — Cavour at Pisa and at Florence — 
Results of the Annexations and the Cession of Savoy — The Policy of Action 
— Revolution in Sicily. 

I. 

On the day following the campaign of 1859, when 
Napoleon III. gave audience at St. Cloud to senators, 
deputies, and councillors of state, all as eager to belaud 
his moderation as they would have been to acclaim his 
resolution and energy if he had pursued the war, the 
Emperor seemed to think the occasion good for explaining 
and specifying the nature of his work at Villafranca. 

p 2 



212 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 

It was a singular scene. To the adulations of 
courtiers comparing him to Scipio, and raving of the 
" prodigy " of a will that could so control itself, the 
Emperor replied in the nervous tone of a man who had 
to defend himself for having in " weariness " abandoned 
" the noble cause he had wished to serve." He was 
thinking doubtless of Cavour when he confessed that it 
had cost him much to stop short in a work he had com- 
menced, and to see " brave hearts robbed of their noble 
illusions and patriotic hopes." He appealed to the 
interests of France, endangered by the probable extension 
of a struggle that might at any moment have broken out 
on the Ehine as well as on the Adige. " When the 
destinies of my country seemed in peril, I made peace," 
he said; and in explaining why he had stopped, it pleased 
him to point to the fruits of victory, once more an exhi- 
bition of the prevailing of French arms ; Piedmont 
enlarged by an opulent province ; Italian nationality, 
recognised and organised by a federation ; the Princes 
restored or supported, " understanding at last the 
imperative necessity of salutary reforms." 

This was unfortunately but a vain flourish before 
courtiers, barely disguising the truth of things. The 
peace improvised or patched together in a little village 
of the Mincio, between two emperors equally sick of the 
horrors of a battle-field, had nothing stable or settled in 
it. The war was terminated, but none of the problems 
let loose by the war were solved. France and Austria 
had joined hands, and Piedmont stood deceived and 
embarrassed; the Central Duchies were half emancipated 
and left to themselves ; the national sentiment of Italy 



THE SITUATION. 213 

was cheated and irritated ; and Europe stood astonished 
and suspicions, in contemplation of that enigmatic meeting 
of the two emperors on the Mincio. 

I wish to specify the exact situation, immediately 
after the arrested conflict. France- thought right to 
push the war no farther ; Austria thought right to 
purchase peace, at the cost of a province, that still left 
her Venetia and the hope of restoring the Princes to 
Florence and Modena. Between France and Austria 
laying down their arms, the Treaty of Zurich completed 
what had been outlined at Villafranca. The Italian 
questions proper — the questions of reorganisation, 
federation, and reform — were reserved for a European 
congress. 

Here we have everything apparently arranged or 
foreseen. It was on the contrary a new beginning of the 
unforeseen. The settlement was but on the surface ; and 
side by side with Villafranca, Zurich, the congress, and 
official diplomacy, suddenly we behold an original and 
startling phase, which I may call the phase of the Italians 
taking the conduct of their destinies into their own 
hands, upsetting all calculations, and themselves ven- 
turing to give their interpretation to a peace by which 
their hopes were fettered. Cavour had said : " The track 
is cut ; let us pursue another." Napoleon III., before 
leaving the Mincio, had let fall these strange words to 
Victor Emmanuel : " Now we shall see what the Italians 
can do unaided." It is the secret of the period com- 
mencing on July 11, 1859, that of another and a 
national diplomatic drama, which, under new conditions 
and with new characters, is about to work itself out by 



214 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB, 

unexpected ways, up to the crisis once more prepared by 
the great master of the Italian revolution. 

ii. 

The terms of the peace of Villafranca had the mis- 
fortune to be fitted to a different situation, and not to be 
suitable to circumstances ; they were but an insufficient 
and a contradictory make-shift, without vitality in 
regard to the future. 

This confederation, imagined by Napoleon III. as a 
means of preserving a portion of his programme, would 
have been a gain and a guarantee — before the war. 
Transpose the hypothesis : the confederation would still 
have been possible, even with the restored Princes, if 
the war had been pushed on to the Adriatic, up to an 
independence made complete by the total ejection of the 
foreigner from Italy ; and thus France would have had 
more right to demand the acceptation of it, the Italians 
less reason to refuse it. But with Austria encamped in 
Venice, holding formidable positions, and continuing to 
overshadow Italy with her power and her alliances, the 
confederation was rather a permanent menace than a 
promise of repose ; for the enemy, that is to say the 
foreign preponderance, was left in possession of the field. 

The peace, such as it had been concluded, destroyed 
in advance the idea of confederation, or, in other words, 
the confederation thus organised compromised the peace 
of the two emperors from the very beginning. A further 
contradiction. The preliminaries of July 1 1 said : 
" The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena 



THE NEW MINISTRY. 215 

shall return to their States." At the same time the 
Emperor Napoleon had prohibited the use of force to 
help their return ; he had stipulated that the rights and 
the will of the populations should be consulted ; so that 
the Italians discovered in this strange, incoherent piece 
of work, at once a stimulant to revolt and an easy 
means to evade the deceptive tangle wound about them. 

For a moment undoubtedly their uncertainty was 
grievous and full of anguish. Cavour had disappeared, 
and with him apparently the last chance of a national 
policy and leadership. The new Piedmontese Ministry 
of La Marmora, Kattazzi, Dabormida, formed to execute 
the terms of peace, was necessarily compelled to make 
its official proclamation. At Florence, Modena, Parma, 
and Bologna, still more than at Turin and Milan, the 
treaty of Villafranca burst like a clap of thunder, and 
seemed to offer Central Italy the option of an ener- 
vating submission, or the more perilous issue of revolu- 
tion in resisting it. A single hesitation, one false step, 
a riot, might ruin everything, and complicate events 
irremediably. 

Resolute men were needed to hold the country in 
hand ; masters of themselves, and capable of seeing, as 
by inspiration, the resources belonging to so novel a 
position. The Cabinet of Turin was obliged at first, that 
it might act in harmony with diplomacy, to disengage 
Piedmont from Central Italy, and abdicate the semblance 
of a protectorate, by the recall of its representatives — 
Farini at Modena, Boncompagni at Florence, Massimo 
d'Azeglio at Bologna ; but the link officially broken was 
renewed morally in the elections made by the people. 



216 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

Farini ceased to be the commissary of Victor Emmanuel, 
only to become the dictator of Modena and Parma. 
Baron Eicasoli was made governor of Tuscany in the 
place of Boncompagni. The head of the new government 
of Bologna was one little known till then — Colonel 
Leonetto Cipriani, prudently chosen on account of his 
close relations with the Napoleons. 

There was hardly even an apparent change, and these 
chiefs and improvised dictators lost no time in developing 
what they were meditating — to win through the peace 
possibly more than they would have gained by the war. 
Before the end of August, assemblies were sitting to 
systematise the interregnum. A military league for the 
common defence was established between these States 
abandoned to their fate. Envoys were despatched from 
Bologna, Parma, and Florence — Count Linati, Marquis 
Lajatico, Bianchi, Ubaldini Peruzzi, Matteucci — to plead 
for the national cause at Turin, Paris, and London. In 
a word, while diplomacy, deeming itself all-powerful, sat 
in the thick of its more or less specious webs, Central 
Italy was organising and marching to its fixed aim. 

This aim was indicated by circumstances and the 
very nature of a situation so unexampled. For seeing 
that Austria, shorn of a province only, remained with 
the overflowing resources of the empire on the Mincio 
and the Po, there was nothing for it but to gather 
together what Italian forces could be got, create what 
was called the " strong kingdom," and at all costs 
unite with Piedmont. 

Annexation was the predominating thought. That 
which had been done to forestall greater changes, 



INFLUENCE OF PIEDMONT. 217 

turn aside or suspend the current of fusion represented 
by the Piedmontese protectorate, was precisely what 
quickened the work of unification, and drew the small 
central states nearer to the subalpine kingdom. " Austria 
in the Quadrilateral/' writes D'Azeglio, "has Italy at 
her mercy whenever she pleases. Italy sees nothing 
else : she has but this one desire — that of constituting 
never mind how, a group of States able to offer some 
serious opposition to a Power that has lost nothing of 
her strength, and is twice as evily disposed to us as she 
was. How are we to be thinking of our historic tradi- 
tions and particular clock-tower interests ? But for this 
peace, they might not have been without their influence. 
In our actual position, we think solely of creating fresh 
forces. That has been marvellously well understood 
by the good sense of all Italy. Hence we have this 
unanimous movement towards Sardinia, hence the 
casting away of egotistical traditions, the deepest rooted 
of our instincts, the dearest to Italian municipalism." 

Two things may be cited to account for this re- 
markable change in the feelings of the Italians : pri- 
marily the national necessity, and next, the ten years' 
long influence of Piedmontese policy ; the watchword 
of courage, the conception of military honour, tried 
patriotism, constitutional government, and an orderly 
and beneficial freedom. In other words — mark well — 
even in his eclipse, it is the policy of Cavour triumphing 
and bearing fruit : when seeming beaten at Turin, it 
reappears under another aspect at Modena as at Florence, 
in the person of Farini and of Eicasoli, who in their 
turn come to the front. And if anything proves the 



218 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

ripeness of a revolution it is the fortune of Italy in 
finding at every decisive step workmen fitted for the 
work of the hour. 

in. 

One of the chiefs of Central Italy, Farini, was a 
doctor of medicine, Eomagnole by origin, Piedmontese 
by adoption, a fervent and devoted heart, of a mind 
both brilliant and lettered, who had written his recol- 
lections in a " History of the Eoman States." Mixed up 
in youth with the Liberal movement of his native pro- 
vince, but holding aloof from factions, he had been in 
turn one of the Pope's ministers with the unfortunate 
Eossi in 1848, then deputy and minister at Turin with 
Cavour, whose ideas he shared, and whose policy he 
passionately supported. The representative of Victor 
Emmanuel at Modena during the war, he signalised 
himself by not wavering an instant. At the first 
rumour of negotiations between the emperors, before he 
' knew a single word of the peace, he had telegraphed to 
Turin : " Do not leave me without instructions. Under- 
stand that if, owing to conventions of which I am 
ignorant, the Duke makes any attempt here, I shall 
treat him as an enemy of the King and of the country. 
I will not be driven from my place, though it cost me 
my life." Eecalled by the Piedmontese Government, 
he remained at Modena, the elected chief of a provi- 
sional government, and raised the courage of the 
people to the height of his own, launching from the old 
ducal palace the significant words, that Italy had not 
" countersigned the peace of Yillafranca." Before 



FAEINI. 219 

quitting Turin, Cavour had time to write to him : " The 
ministry is dead ; your friend applauds your resolve." 

In all probability things were saved by Farini's 
initiative. He checked a hasty restoration, that might 
easily have been tried by the Duke with his little army 
from his place of refuge in the Austrian camp, in the 
same way that a handful of troops left by D'Azeglio 
along the line of the Marches stopped the irruption 
of the Papal Swiss troops into the Komagna. The 
first danger over, Farini soon took occasion to go 
farther, extending his governorship from Modena to 
Parma, and as far as Bologna, and forming a sort of 
provisional state under the old Latin name of the 
Emilia. He had but one idea, the realisation of which 
he prosecuted feverishly — to hurry on, at all costs, the 
fusion with Piedmont. " The stroke is done," he wrote, 
on the day of his entry into Bologna; "there is now 
only one government. In the coming year, from Pia- 
cenza to the Cattolica, laws, orders, down to the very 
names of them, all shall be Piedmontese. I shall see to 
the fortifications of Bologna ; good soldiers and good 
guns against those who are for combating the annex- 
ation — there you have my policy!" It was in fact the 
sole end of his policy. Farini would possibly have had 
to succumb, even with his reunion of the Emilia, if 
there had not been in one of the States of Central Italy, 
in Tuscany, another chief at that time who stamped 
his energetic and fiery originality on the movement — 
Baron Bettino Bicasoli. 

He virtually — after Cavour, or with Cavour — was 
one of the great authors of the Italian transformation. 



220 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

Through him Tuscany became irrevocably pledged to the 
path of unification ; and the adhesion of Tuscany was 
far more decisive than those of the minor duchies. 
Baron Eicasoli had distinguished himself in the revo- 
lution of 1848 as one of the heads of the Moderate 
party. He had been of those who recalled the Grand 
Duke from his refuge at Gaeta, and experienced the 
bitterness of seeing that prince allow an Austrian escort 
to lead him back to Florence. He thereupon sent in all 
his grand-ducal decorations and retired to his beautiful 
estate of Brolio, near Sienna, where he gave himself up 
to agricultural pursuits ; blending with an independent 
existence the duties of an all but feudal patronage, the 
cultivation of the mind, and a taste for the arts ; nor 
less, though absent, the strict ally in his opinions of 
that patrician liberal class — the Capponi, the Eidolfi, 
the Corsini, the Peruzzi. He had, like many others, 
watched with increasing interest the Pieclmontese policy; 
and he had been one of the first, on the approach of the 
conflict with Austria, to give sign to Florence. Minister 
of the Interior during the war, under the Piedmontese 
protectorate of Boncompagni, President of the Council 
after the peace of Villafranca, he, like his colleague at 
Modena, had henceforth no other thought than that of 
annexation ; and no one, in truth, better than he could 
cast an air of grandeur on this abdication of Tuscan 
autonomy before the idea of the one Italian Land. 

There was nothing in him of the common politician. 
He was like a portrait of Holbein's — with his erect, stiff 
figure, severe bearing, frigid yet courteous dignity, his 
fine and lofty mien, and imperious gestures. He was a 



EICASOLI. 221 

Tuscan of the old stock, preserving in his person the tra- 
ditions of that Kicasoli of former days, a Guelphic captain 
in the wars of the Romagna, who wishing on one occasion 
to obtain a decree of the Council of the Twenty-four of 
Florence, put the councillors under lock and key, and 
starved them until the decree was voted. The baron of 
our time, without starving anyone, used the iron will of 
his ancestor in the service of a modern idea, a national 
desire, of which, when in power, he was the impassioned 
and haughty representative. It was he who said one 
night at the Palazzo Vecchio to a compatriot on the 
point of starting for France : " Go, tell those gentlemen 
that I claim an existence of twelve centuries' duration, 
that I am the last of my race, and that I would give my 
last drop of blood to maintain my political programme 
in its integrity." And what he said he did in his 
own particular manner : not with the large and pliable 
genius of a Cavour, but with the firmness of a man 
whose energy was dreaded, whose disinterestedness and 
patriotism were respected, and who would be obeyed. 
Beholding this grave and imperturbable minister, who, 
instead of drawing emoluments from the Treasury, gave 
on the contrary from his private fortune to assist it, and 
worked steadily from six in the morning till midnight, 
the people did not seek to reward him with vain 
acclamations, which he would have disdained : they felt 
they were safe under such a leader, and held him in the 
esteem ranked by Koyer-Collard above all popularity. 

The work Eicasoli was engaged in had no revolu- 
tionary taint in it. It was a work of national necessity, 
and he made it his business to cany it through without 



222 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

suffering it to deviate and be compromised by intrigues 
on the one hand or agitations on the other. The 
Florentine dictator knew well that he was encircled by 
every kind of danger. Above all, he knew that the first 
condition of well-being for the country lay in the preser- 
vation of order ; he felt that an appearance of disorder, 
whatever tended to complicate the imminent question by 
revolutionary irruption from without, would weaken the 
national cause, and serve for a pretext to the abettors of 
restorations or for foreign interventions, and he would 
not suffer them to have a pretext. Therefore, he was 
inflexible in repressing any show of agitation or division. 
Mazzini had flattered himself that Tuscany might be 
made a centre of operations, of which he was to be ever 
the shrouded chief. Ricasoli, not without some haughty 
irony, gave him to understand that, if he caught him, he 
would hinder him from doing harm by locking him up 
in his castle of Brolio, till such time as the definitive 
constitution of Italy was proclaimed. Eepublicans were 
straightway conducted to the frontier. Guerrazzi him- 
self, the president of the democratic ministry of 1848, 
found a difficulty in entering Tuscany. The brilliant 
Montanelli, with his dreams of the kingdom of Etruria 
for Prince Napoleon, was only licensed to stay because 
there was very little fear of him. Garibaldi, whose 
services had been accepted, and to whom the Tuscan 
contingent of the military league for the common defence 
had been entrusted, Garibaldi himself came under the 
scourge of the terrible baron. Once with his Tuscans 
and Eomagnole volunteers, he was on the point of 
invading the Marches and Umbria ; if he had done it, the 



RICASOLI' 8 FIRMNESS. 223 

immediate intervention of France would have been the 
result— this was known at Florence as well as at Turin. 
Ricasoli did not delay an instant to check Garibaldi's 
warlike propensities and cut short the earliest manifesta- 
tions of a turn for military dictatorship ; and Garibaldi 
had to submit ; he fell back growling, but without 
attempting anything, to Caprera. The stubbornness of 
Ricasoli, seconded by advices from Turin, warded off a 
possibly mortal danger. 

In a word, the redoubtable Florentine meant to be 
master of his domain on the Arno ; he would not yield 
it up to soldierly dictation, nor let it be swamped by 
demagogues ; nor would he allow it even to be joined in 
a fusion proposed to him with Modena, Parma, and the 
Legations. Vain efforts were at one time exerted to 
draw him into a sort of political league that should com- 
plete the existing military league ; in vain Farini and 
Marquis Pepoli did their utmost to show him the advan- 
tages of a partial and temporary fusion, a prelude to the 
absolute junction with Piedmont, that they might 
appear before Europe with the authority of an undivided 
government, speaking in the name of the whole of 
Central Italy. Ricasoli positively refused, and he refused 
for a characteristic reason. He declared that it would be 
offering Europe the " elements ready made for a separate 
kingdom," and nothing would induce him to hear of a 
separate kingdom of Central Italy, though with the 
addition of the Legations to it, as little under a Napoleon 
or any other new prince as under a Lorraine duke. 

The annexation to Piedmont was his fixed point, 
because annexation signified the strong kingdom, as 



224 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

against Austria, and meant a constituted and armed 
Italy : before Italy only would be put off the splendid 
crown of Tuscan independence. Declining a union 
that he considered dangerous, he did not the less move 
in harmony with Farini, and thus, for a space of six 
months, by the help of some few men, Central Italy was 
enabled to present the spectacle of orderly populations, 
bound together by the same sentiment, neither carried 
away by enthusiasms nor listening to provocations. There 
was one crime, the murder of Colonel Anviti, that afflicted 
Parma, and it was followed by a universal outcry of 
condemnation. D'Azeglio writes in homely style : " If 
what is now passing had been foretold to me two months 
back, I should have laughed in the face of the prophet. 
Who would have thought it possible we should see the 
Romagnoles gentle and wise, the Tuscans energetic, and 
all the grudges ages old, crumbling to pieces with so 
entire a concordance in every Italian city ?" 

It is true that this pacific campaign of Central Italy 
could hardly have been carried through, even with the 
skilful boldness of such chiefs, and the docility of the 
populations they headed, had not the troubled mind of 
Europe on the morrow of the peace of Villafranca 
unexpectedly favoured it. The advantage of being 
animated by one firm idea was with the Italians ; they 
had a distinct policy in opposition to a diplomacy that 
knew not what it would nor what it could. Their good 
genius taught them to control themselves, and turn all 



AUSTRIA POWERLESS. 225 

things to profit, in the midst of one of the most curious 
imbroglios that have ever disturbed human affairs — a 
six months' confusion, during which Austria, France, 
England, and Piedmont played so strange a part, per- 
petually arranging matters for a congress — that was 
never to sit ! 

The object of Austria was clear enough. She had 
been compelled to relinquish one of the most brilliant 
provinces of the empire, and she designed to keep fast 
hold of the remainder of her dominions in Italy, specifi- 
cally as regarded Venice, indirectly as to the restoration 
of the Princes to their duchies, which had been promised 
to her. She lent her ear to the scheme proposed by France 
for a confederation that Venice should form part of, but 
her immediate demand was for the execution of the 
treaties ; she held tenaciously to these restorations which 
had been danced before her eyes, and took care to 
remind France, as well as Piedmont, that if the restora- 
tions were not granted, she should on her side consider 
herself disengaged from the terms of the peace, even in 
Lombardy. 

It is incontestable that she was justified by Villa- 
franca and Zurich ; but morally lessened by defeat as 
she was, more than ever doubtfully viewed by the 
Italians, all but abandoned by her European allies, and 
shaken by internal dissensions, Austria was in fact 
powerless. She could do no more than vainly fret, with 
an impatience mingled with bitterness, at these revolu- 
tions of Central Italy where she was disabled from 
interfering : she dared not cross the Po. Each fresh 
proceeding then called forth a series of protestations 

Q 



226 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

from her, which Florence could afford to deride. Europe 
made no answer to her appeals, or encouraged Italy. 
Austria had a sufficient task to defend herself in a situa- 
tion more threatened than threatening, altogether aban- 
doned to herself as she was. Eussia left her to her 
isolation. Prussia, accused of treason by the resentful 
Cabinet of Vienna, was beginning to reflect on the 
example set by the Italians, and maintained a particular 
reserve. England went much farther. After having 
been the advocate of Austria up to the eve of the war, 
and stoutly defending the treaties of 1815, England 
went straight over to the Italian camp after Villafranca, 
showering her sympathies and encouragements on her 
new allies. 

English foreign policy was no longer guided by Lord 
Derby and Lord Malmesbury, but by Lord Palmerston 
and Lord Eussell, and the England of the Whigs was 
now as fervid on behalf of Italian independence as she 
had previously been lukewarm. She was little inclined 
to a federation that offered a less safe guarantee -to her 
commercial * interests than the extension of Piedmont, 
the country of economic freedom. Naturally she had 
not a word to say to arrangements that dismembered the 
temporal power of the Pope. She was the first to 
uphold the liberty of the Central Italians, and their right 
to dispose of themselves and to cast in their lot with 
Piedmont if it pleased them. She made herself the 
guardian of the principle of non-intervention, and the 
patroness of the ambitions and broadest hopes of the 
Italian people. 

The Whigs had assuredly no intention, not a whit more 



ENGLAND FAVOURS ANNEXATION. 227 

than the Tories, to pledge England to promises of armed 
succour. They promised " all possible moral support," 
in the words of Lord Palmerston ; and Marquis Em- 
manuel d'Azeglio, Sardinian representative in London, 
could write to Turin : " The English ministers, in 
alluding to annexation, are always careful to add 
that England looks on it as the best arrangement. 
England perceives the double advantage in the annexa- 
tion, that it renders us more independent, and will be 
done in deference to the wishes of the populations." 
The Queen's ministers appeared desirous to make up for 
lost time by showing themselves more Italian in their 
feelings than the French, who had just fought for Italy, 
by flattering and goading the passion for nationality on 
the other side of the Alps. Provided that no attack 
was made on Austria in Venetia, anything might be 
done at Florence as in the Papal States. 

The design of the English ministers — and there was 
scarce any disguise about it — was to stimulate the an- 
nexation scheme as a means of counteracting French 
ascendency, in the fear of seeing France in the place 
formerly usurped by Austria in Italy, either owing to her 
direct influence, or through some half-vassal kingdom 
under a Napoleon. They were increasingly distrustful 
of the Emperor. Lord Eussell, as head of the Foreign 
Office, gave himself,, up to this propaganda with his 
habitual impetuous candour, which had more than once 
affrighted and perplexed his companions in power. He 
did not reflect that his conduct exposed him to serious 
contradictions ; for after inflaming the minds of the 
Italians, he could hardly think of turning them aside 

Q 2 



228 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

from the war for the recovery of Venice; and in favouring 
the extension of Piedmont he hurried on the eventuality 
he stood in fear of — that cession of Savoy which the 
Emperor had renounced at Villafranca, but which the 
creation of a powerful North Italian kingdom could not 
but cause to be reconsidered. The Italians were not 
deceived. If they were wary enough to make use of the 
support of England, they were not the less aware that for 
them the question lay rather in Paris than in London, 
rather with the country whose army was still encamped 
in the heart of Lombardy. 



v. 

The main point was what France wanted and meant 
to do. Lord Palmerston declared that there were two 
policies in Paris, and no great sagacity was required to 
penetrate this mystery. These two policies had existed, 
confounding and thwarting one another, all along : one 
triumphed in the war and the kindling proclamations of 
Milan ; the t>ther in the premature and imperfect deed 
executed at Villafranca ; and now the two policies were 
wrestling again over the interpretation and execution of 
the peace. Indeed, if there was a chance that the terms 
of Villafranca would be realised in their fullest integrity, 
it. lay with the continuing in office of the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Count Walewski, a gentleman of perfect loyalty, was 
not only for making good the engagements contracted 
with Austria ; his opinions, traditions, and instincts 
were opposed to the development of the Italian revolu- 



LANGUAGE HELD TO THE TUSCAN ENVOYS. 229 

tion, favourable to the ducal restorations, and disposed 
to limit Piedmontese influence. He would not have the 
annexation at any price, and he was assiduous in making 
the weight of the imperial authority and French diplo- 
macy felt at Turin, at Florence, and at Bologna. 
Agents upon agents had been despatched by him to 
propose the restoration, and Count Walewski appeared 
as astonished as indignant at the resistance his diplo- 
macy encountered. 

He chose to imagine that there was nothing serious 
in what was going on at Florence, and that it was only 
the conspiracy of a party in the pay of Piedmont ; a 
revolutionary work, managed with considerable skill and 
boldness by Baron Kicasoli. He held the very same 
language as Austria ! At Paris, in his audiences with 
the Tuscan envoys, Marquis Lajatico, Signors Ubaldino 
Peruzzi and Matteucci, he delivered himself sharply and 
very menacingly. The French Minister was not afraid 
to declare that the Tuscans must " bow the head ; - he 
expressed regret that the Italians had been permitted to 
think that there would be no armed intervention : 
humiliating discussions from which the Tuscan envoys 
withdrew without having "bowed the head." On 
another day Count Walewski summoned the Sardinian 
minister and said to him : " I do not intend to enter 
into a dispute with you ; I wish simply to make you 
acquainted with the state of things, and ask your 
aid in inducing your Government to come to an 
understanding with us upon the affairs of Central Italy. 
These populations must be taught that it is inevitable 
that the Pope should return to the Legations, the 



230 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIi. 

Lorraines to Florence, Francis V. to Modena. If Pied- 
mont helps us, compensation will be given in Parma 
and Piacenza ; if the annexations are persisted in, fresli 
evils will be raised in Europe, and Piedmont will have 
to bear the merited punishment for them." 

Such, without doubt, was the policy of Count 
Walewski ; but there was at the same time the policy 
of the Emperor. Do what he would, Napoleon III. could 
not evade the responsibility of the Italian uprising, due 
to his progress in Italy and the noise of his awakening 
proclamations. He had bidden the Italians arise and 
organise, follow the banner of Victor Emmanuel, and 
make their own destinies : the Italians had risen ; they 
were shaping their own destinies; they were acting 
"unaided" — what reply was there for him? He 
believed evidently that he had accomplished much by 
means of the peace of Villafranca ; he thought at least 
that the Italians had been assured of a degree of inde- 
pendence and advancement compatible with the circum- 
stances, and once pledged to the peace, he could not 
immediately disavow his work. He spoke the same 
language, to all appearance, as his Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. He likewise, through the medium of diplomacy, 
in his communications with Victor Emmanuel, and in 
his conversations with the Italian delegates who ap- 
proached him, began by putting the obligations incurred 
at Villafranca beyond question. He assumed a particular 
ostentation of good faith, all the more from feeling him- 
self suspected, and above all, jealously watched from all 
parts of Europe. He bore the burden of his reputation, 
according to the saying of Prince Napoleon. 

Events, however, did not fail to operate on the 



NAPOLEON III. AND THE TUSCANS. 231 

mind of the Emperor. This mind, which no one had 
ever sounded, was undergoing a singular travail ; 
and at all events the words of the Emperor, far less 
downright than those of Count Walewski, lent themselves 
to all kinds of interpretations. Attempts to fathom his 
designs by inquiries whether he was not interested in 
seeing the dispossessed princes restored, were met by the 
answer, that he had " no personal interest whatever in 
desiring the re-establishment of the Lorraine dukes:" 
and he spoke with a smile of incredulity of the candidature 
of Prince Napoleon for one of the crowns of Central Italy. 
Asked if there was not a limit to the obligations to which 
he declared himself to be bound, he replied with some 
melancholy that they had doubtless a limit : " The limit 
of the possible." When ultimately the question was put 
as to how far foreign pressure was to go in favour of 
the restoration in the Duchies, he said unhesitatingly : 
" No violence shall be done to the Italians." He did 
more ; he informed Prince Metternich at Compiegne, 
that if Austria crossed the Po, it would be instant war 
with France. 

One day, when he was subjected to a certain pro- 
bation, at the instigation of Signor Peruzzi, he replied : 
" Signor Peruzzi seems to be a man of comprehension ; he 
should know that when I am asked as to my intentions 
concerning Tuscany, I can only answer as I have done ; 
but let the populations vote, and when it shall be shown 
that the terms of Villafranca can only be executed in 
contempt of those principles of popular rights from which 
I draw my power, I may change my mind.""' 

* These negotiations of the Italians with the Tuileries are full of curious details ; 
some of them are luminous at the present day. Signor Peruzzi, in one of the 



232 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

It was sufficiently significant. By perpetually 
invoking Villafranca, the Emperor abandoned it by 
degrees ; he opened the door slowly to all possible 
combinations, even those which involved a dismember- 
ment of the States of the Church ; and what he could 
not say himself, his friends said for him. Dr. Conneau 
occasionally served for the echo of his secret thoughts 
with the Tuscans. The French ambassador in London, 
M. de Persigny, saw no harm in disavowing the language 
of Count Walewski. This devoted follower and con- 
fidant of the Emperor, ambassador to one of the first 
Powers of Europe, went about repeating everywhere 
that the Emperor perceived that he had been mistaken 
in Italian affairs ; that he insisted no farther, and that 
an evasion of the obligations of Villafranca depended on 
the firmness and wisdom of the Italians. Before he had 
been very long Sardinian minister at London, Marquis 
Emmanuel d'x4.zeglio was able to write to Turin : " I 
have read the autograph letter of Napoleon, thanking 
the English Government for their protest against foreign 

very interesting reports of his mission, relates a conversation that he had with 
Prince Napoleon. The Tuscan envoy did not forbear to say that, if they were 
abandoned, the Italians might be reduced to throw for all or nothing, dragging 
Piedmont with them, and that the Emperor would then be obliged to uphold 
them. Prince Napoleon replied : " You will he in a pretty pass, when you have 
caused the ruin of the Emperor and the arrival of the Prussians in Paris." He 
was answered that the Emperor exposed himself to ruin more certainly by 
abandoning Italy, and that Prance, in the presence of the Prussians, would 
repeat the prodigies of 1792. " The Prince," says Signor Peruzzi, "then remarked, 
that before the war his hopes were in war, because he believed that the Emperor 
would prove himself to be a general, and would be at the head of capable 
generals ; but that now his illusions had been dispersed ; for the army knew 
well both that the Emperor was no general, and that he had no capable generals 
under him." These words were spoken in October, 1859. I confine myself to 
stating that then as ever, courageous and capable generals would have been 
found, if there had been an able chief who could plan and command. 



TEE IMPERIAL POLICY. 233 

intervention It is thought here that the official 

language, so different from what is said in the letter, has 
no other object than to keep Austria quiet. The Emperor 
adds, that it will not grieve him to see events making 
his first provisions impracticable. All the statesmen 
here, including the French ambassador himself, are of 
opinion that we must proceed resolutely and rapidly, 
though with prudence, taking for rule that in reality at 
Paris they only want to have their hands forced." 

In the depths of his mysterious policy, Napoleon III. 
had a double thought. He asked for nothing better than 
to have his hand forced, as was said, that he might extri- 
cate himself as soon as he could, and cover with the name 
of England, in his relations with Austria, the non-perform- 
ance of the engagements undertaken at Villafranca and 
Zurich. Was it England or the Emperor that first had 
this idea ? It matters little : Lord Cowley had been 
the useful intermediary in a negotiation by which the 
Queen's ministers assisted the unravelment, still obscure 
and slow, of the French potentate. Napoleon III. had 
another thought, that he did not confide to the English 
Cabinet. In preparing to tolerate the tacit abrogation of 
the treaties binding him to Austria, he was careful not 
to unmask, and to hold himself in reserve. With the 
freedom of action granted them, he wished to burden the 
Italians with the responsibility of their deeds — this 
creation of a great kingdom, not openly encouraged by 
him, but for which he had resolved to demand the price. 

He, too, like Lord Kussell and Lord Palmerston, 
deceived himself strangely. If, as it appeared, the 
English ministers did not perceive that, in pushing 



234 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

forward the scheme of annexation in Central Italy, 
they offered the Emperor an apology for renewing his 
pretensions to Savoy, the Emperor, for his part, did not 
see whither he might be led by this temptation to claim 
Savoy — in which, for that matter, there was nothing so 
very extraordinary. One and the other seemed to be at 
a game of weaving and unweaving the w T eb, until the 
coming of the firm hand to cut it. 



VI. 

But Piedmont, surrounded by conflicting policies, in 
the thick of divers influences, attracted or held back 
by Italy and by Europe, was the most embarrassed. It 
was no mystery that Piedmont was in connivance with 
Italy. Piedmont encouraged her efforts, often covered 
her with her diplomacy, lent her officers — was for Italy, 
in a word, the rallying-point and the centre of action. 
An official distinction between them, however, was 
matter of necessity. Dangerous enemies were on the 
frontiers : a Erench army was in Lombardy, the treaty- 
makers were at Zurich, difficulties everywhere. The 
King was obliged to hold incessant communications with 
the Emperor, to whom he sent, now General Dabormida, 
now Count Arese, a trustworthy Milanese gentleman, 
always welcome at the Tuileries. And Victor Emmanuel, 
in giving audience to deputations that brought him 
offers of the crown of Italy, certainly promised to defend 
their rights as well as respect their wishes, but without 
daring or being able yet to take the title of their sove- 
reign. Piedmont was thus reduced to shrink from the 



FIRMNESS OF THE CENTRAL ITALIANS. 235 

object of her desires, and appear to repulse those who 
besought her to do as she wished. 

The Central Italians well understood that in main- 
taining order, accomplishing a national revolution in the 
least possible revolutionary manner, they would have 
right on their side, and that the main point for them 
was to hold firm and proceed. They replied to Villa- 
franca by decreeing in their Assemblies the deposition 
of the princes, and a proclamation of the principle of 
annexation. They replied to the Treaty of Zurich by 
voting the regency of the Prince of Carignano ; a step 
that diplomacy smoothed over, but it was not the less 
one distinctly in advance. Hostility and provocation 
were met by the daily exhibition of a settled calmness, 
an obstinate adherence to their scheme. Such was the 
marvel of the policy of the Eicasolis and the Farinis. A 
settlement became necessary at last for all concerned. 
The provinces of Central Italy had stood fast for six 
months without belying themselves for a single day ; 
they were sick of so perilous a provisional state of 
things. Piedmont could go no farther, with a despotic 
ministry falling into unpopularity from its weakness and 
inability to cope with the embarrassments of the time. 
And Europe was approaching a congress that she 
dreaded while seeming to invoke it. 

Circumstances were pressing all round, when the 
world was astonished by a double coup cle tkedtre, that 
speedily changed the aspect of affairs. The Emperor 
Napoleon emerged from the cloud of his negotiations 
with England to have an end to them after his own 
manner. In a letter of December 31. 1859, he proposed 



236 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

to the Pope to place the Legations under the viceregency 
of Victor Emmanuel : a plan that had small chance of 
obtaining the sanction of the Head of the Church. By 
the publication of a pamphlet, " The Pope and the 
Congress," as famous as that one of the winter of 1859, 
he contrived to render the congress impossible. In 
dismissing Count Walewski from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, he signed the burial deed of Villafranca and the 
policy inimical to Italy ; and it was M. Thouvenel, a 
man still young, and able as he was resolute, who came 
from his embassy at Constantinople to take in hand the 
new policy of France. 

Cavour, too, was called back to the government in 
Turin, and he reappeared on the scene as the only man 
who could meet the crisis, and lead Piedmont and Italy 
on the road together. The Emperors change of policy, 
and the return of Cavour to Turin, were facts indicating 
perhaps the beginning of the end ; at any rate, the 
period of action had set in. M. Guizot, a sagacious 
judge of passing events, could then pronounce that : 
" Two men divide the attention of Europe at the pre- 
sent moment — the Emperor and M. de Cavour. The 
game has commenced, and I should bet on M. de 
Cavour." 

VII. 

Thus the force of circumstances brought back the 
first of Piedmontese, next to the King, to direct the 
Italian movement he had relinquished on the morrow of 
Villafranca. He had supposed it partly lost ; he found 
it amplified, strengthened, penetrated as it were with his 



HIS RETURN TO PIEDMONT. 237 

own spirit. The six months that had gone by did not, 
in truth, stand for lost time either with him or with 
Italy ; they had but ripened the situation of the country, 
and permitted him to hold his liberty of action and natural 
vigour in reserve for the opportune moment. 

If, during his excursion in Switzerland, the feeling 
of a bitter deception which had driven him from Turin 
in July survived, he came back to Piedmont rein- 
vigorated, full of fire and confidence. His position was 
not a light one in the front of a ministry scarce able to 
bear its loads, about as much embarrassed by his assist- 
ance as by his passivity ; and his wish was to avoid any 
annoyance to this ministry, sprung from an imperative 
necessity. He had written from Pressinge to his friend 
Castelli : " Greet Eattazzi from me, assure him of my 
goodwill in everything, and for all purposes. I have 
no curiosity whatever to know the secrets of his policy. 
My choice would rather be to remain an entire stranger 
to the affairs of the day. Though, should Eattazzi seek 
my counsel, I am always ready to give it candidly." 
And some days later: "I shall take my way back to 
Turin to go into a corner and there give advice if I am 
asked for it, or be silent if there is no need of me." 

He was hardly the less an embarrassing presence ; 
he felt it himself, when some weeks afterwards he wrote 
with a free and flowing pen to Madame de Circourt : 
" You will perhaps be astonished to see me in a state of 
incertitude, for commonly I do not hesitate. This 
astonishment will cease if you reflect on the position in 
which I find myself. My presence in Turin is of use to 
none, and it is a burden to many. I am well disposed 



238 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR, 

to support the ministry, composed of honourable men, 
and animated by the best intentions ; but I cannot stir 
without giving it a shock. And again, I should injure 
it if I took to hiding in my rice-fields. They would say 
I was pouting, and I should look absurd. I have the 
option of travelling, but whither ? Italy is interdicted 
by policy, and it would not be becoming to visit France 
or England. I have not the heart to encounter the 
cold and heavy atmosphere of Germany, and I am 
too much a victim of sea-sickness to attempt a trans- 
atlantic trip. So I am compelled to cast about for 
what I should do, without reading the riddle. It is pro- 
bable that as I can find nothing good to do I shall do 
nothing, and let fortune direct me." Here is a man 
considerably perplexed ; but Cavour was of those who 
have an understanding with the chances of fortune, and 
the chances had this time decided that he should stay in 
Piedmont — now at Turin, now at Leri, always ready gmd 
at the disposition of events and his country. 

Do what he would, Cavour could not cease to be the 
leader of Italy, and to interest himself in the common 
work. He was minister no longer, and his manner of 
quitting the ministry had only augmented his popularity, 
by identifying him with a national crisis. Italy con- 
sulted him on all sides. At Leri or at Turin he received 
visits from Italians and foreigners of every description : 
one day Lord Clanricarde, " who insisted on coming ; " 
another day a deputation from Parma, with Verdi in the 
list ; or else it was the Tuscan deputation, bearing the 
offer of the crown to Victor Emmanuel. What was 
passing at Florence, Bologna, and Modena had revived 



THE MURDER OF COLONEL ANVITI. 239 

his ardour and his hopes. He was the centre of the 
general activity though not in power, cordial with all 
around, counselling prudence or boldness, or suggesting 
expedients ; above all, anxious for the purely noble 
character of the revolution that was being accomplished. 
At the first bruit of the murder of Colonel Anviti at 
Parma, he hastened to write to Colonel Bardesono, whom 
Farini had made a minister : " I do not doubt that you 
will know how to fulfil your new duties as well as those 
you have fulfilled hitherto ; and if the people of Modena 
should yield to excesses similar to what has occurred at 
Parma, you will stand to the death to save the Italian 
cause from being dishonoured by acts of savage van- 
dalism Tell Farini that if he does not brinsc 

more energy to bear on these Parmesan assassins, the 

Italian cause runs the greatest risks " To the 

Tuscans he said : ' ' Quick, get together a Liberal Govern- 
ment, firm* to resist diplomatic pressure or armed assail- 
ants. Let Tuscany maintain the national spirit, and she 
may save all." 

After having cursed the peace of Villafranca, he 
spoke of it with an exaltation that might have passed 
for irony, to such a degree did the commentary belie 
the first apprehension of that piece of work, and he did 
not delay writing to Prince Napoleon : " The conse- 
quences of the peace of Villafranca have developed 
splendidly. The military and political campaign follow- 
ing that treaty has done more for Italy than the military 
campaign preceding it. It works higher claims to 
gratitude in the hearts of the Italians to the Emperor 
Napoleon than the battles of Magenta and Solferino. 



240 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

How often in the solitude of Leri have I not cried out : 
Blessed be the peace of Villafranca ! " The more these 
results, so little foreseen by the author of the treaty, 
developed, the more did Cavour strain nerve and brain 
to make the most of them. He joined with increased 
earnestness in the fray, set himself to all kinds of busi- 
ness, even official business ; and naturally there came an 
hour when occasion only was wanted to make him again 
the necessary minister of a new situation. 

Everything led him to power ; two things facilitated 
his accession. It is well known that at first the peace 
had caused delicate relations to exist between the 
Emperor and Count Cavour. Napoleon III. had not 
been unaware of the Piedmontese minister's outbursts of 
indignation ; he had striven to soften them ; at heart he 
entertained no malice towards his confidant of Plom- 
bieres ; and if the former friendship had been subjected to 
u trial, it had only been half eclipsed. Cavour was wary 
enough to avoid breaking with the Emperor, who, on 
his part, soon recovered his taste for this fresh and 
fecund genius. Napoleon III. thought so little of ex- 
cluding him from power that, when it was supposed 
the congress was about to sit, he had asked King Victor 
Emmanuel to send him as plenipotentiary. Cavour had 
accepted it, and he wrote with his usual good-humour to 
a friend : " If this winter you make a journey to Paris, 
you will find me at the Hotel Bristol. I have taken the 
apartments occupied by Count Buol in 1856, just for the 
sake of invading Austrian territory." The disappear- 
ance of Count Walewski, and the friendly disposition of 
the Emperor, lightened the difficulty for Cavour in Paris, 



THE MINISTRY OF THE PEACE. 241 

and at Turin things conspired to recall him to the 
Government. 

The Ministry of six months, which had certainly 
performed an act of devotion in accepting the mission to 
conduct Piedmontese policy through a crisis of graceless 
transition, was bending under the weight of circum- 
stances. La Marmora continued the vigilant and active 
organiser of the new army, a function he had preserved 
for the last ten years. The Cabinet was well meaning 
and honest, but mediocre. It shrank from acting 
decisively under the pressure of Central Italy ; its laws 
of assimilation for the Lombards wounded them without 
satisfying the Piedmontese. It delayed the calling 
together of parliament, retaining beyond time of war 
the full powers voted for the war, and in sheer indecision 
prolonging a despotism principally embarrassing to itself. 
Eattazzi, though eager to create a party and a policy, 
wanted the breadth of a directing minister, and his 
insufficiency, by leaving the minds of the people fluctu- 
ating, was the cause of wretched divisions. In brief, 
there was need of a vigorous hand. Admitted frequently 
to the councils of ministers, Cavour saw that an end 
must be put to this wavering state of things, and a dis- 
sension with the Ministry on the subject of the sum- 
moning of parliament gave the signal. Probably 
Cavour may be accused of a certain impetuosity that 
did not always smooth the way for the feelings of his 
former colleagues. He yielded to that " impatience to 
have power again in his grasp," of which one of the 
faithfullest and most intelligent of his followers, Signor 
Artom, speaks, a "joyful high excitedness," that gave 



242 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

him prospect of "new horizons opening before him." 
He felt that he was needed, and on all sides, in Italy 
as well as in Europe, it was felt that he was needed. 
Marquis Lajatico had written from London in October : 
" We want Cavour for minister now/' 'At the end of 
1859, Lord Eussell pointed him to the seat of power in 
expressing the wish for a conference with him ; and 
when the matter was settled in the early days of 1860, 
Massimo d'Azeglio wrote : " Now we shall go ahead : I 
have the full assurance that we shall ; a firm hand directs 
the Government/' 

VIII. 

Cavour was not of those who have the passion for 
power, to do nothing with it. What was it he purposed 
in returning thus, borne back, we may say, by the reflux 
of events ? He had, it is clear, now as ever, a distinct 
and fixed design, a policy derived from the situation and 
adapted to it. 

His first determination was to call parliament to- 
gether as early as possible. Vainly the difficulties in 
legislating with a parliament, bureaucratic formalities, and 
the complications that would come of telling the electoral 
lists in the new provinces were objected to him ; he 
placed above everything the necessity of associating the 
country with the resolutions which might have to be 
taken. He saw that the country had a right to claim it, 
and that it would be a support and a guarantee for 
himself. He was ready to undertake the responsibilities 
of the proceeding, and he was anxious in so urgent an 
hour that the national revolution should no longer b e 



RETURN TO POWER. 243 

separated from free institutions. More, and principally, 
lie wished to settle without delay the annexation of 
Central Italy. He knew that he would have to square 
accounts with Paris ; and that the Emperor, fallen back 
into one of his impenetrable moods after his recent 
coup de theatre, would be making stipulations and re- 
servations ; he knew his man ; he was able to read his 
mind, and prepared to come to an understanding with 
him. " We must," he said to a confidant, "treat France 
and England with all the consideration compatible with 
our dignity and the definitive success of our aims ; I do 
not expect the Emperor to pronounce in favour of 
annexation. I fancy he will hardly do it ; and, in truth, 
his Villafranca engagements render it impossible for 
him ; but I think it necessary to assure myself that his 
opposition will not be very positive. We have to study 
him, sound his mind, observe his bearing towards us at 
every step that we take. At all events, I mean to admit 
the deputies of Central Italy to our parliament." Cavour 
counted on the half superstitious, more or less sincere, 
respect entertained by Napoleon III. for popular rights 
and the national will. And, moreover, he had another 
card to play with the Emperor — Savoy — of which there 
had been no mention since Villafranca : and which aofain 
became a decisive element of negotiation in Italian 
interests. Cavour's merit was to perceive a necessity and 
frankly accept it ; to seize, at one glance of the eye, the 
relationship between the fortunes of Central Italy and 
the cession of Savoy. " The knot of this question," he 
wrote to Count Pepoli, " appears to me to be no longer 
in the Komagna and Tuscany, but in Savoy. Although 

e 2 



214 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

I have not received -any communication on the subject 
from Paris, I have seen that we were on the wrong road, 
and I have taken another direction." The idea of the 
sacrifice of Savoy had in reality been part of Cavour's 
programme on his resumption of power : it was soon to 
bear the title of " an incident of his policy." 

A singular question has sometimes since been raised : 
Who was it that had the chief part in this negotiation — 
Baron de Talleyrand, the successor of Prince de la Tour 
d'Auvergne, at the court of King Victor Emmanuel, or 
M. Benedetti, at that time political director of the French 
Foreign Office, and who unexpectedly departed for Turin 
as plenipotentiary ? M. Benedetti has written : "In 
1860 I suddenly received orders to proceed to Turin to 
hasten the union of Savoy and Nice with France, a 
union that met with unforeseen obstacles. Leaving 
Paris on March 20, I signed the Treaty of Cession on 
the 24th." I do not desire to lessen the value of our 
diplomatists. The fact is, that this time they had 
nothing to win, for the simple reason that the whole 
thing had been settled beforehand, and Cavour had in 
no way been taken unawares, when, even before the 
arrival of M. Benedetti, Baron de Talleyrand was com- 
missioned to speak officially of Savoy. It was at Milan t 
during the winter fetes of 1860, in the honeymoon of 
the new independence. A despatch reached Baron de 
Talleyrand from Paris, charging him to announce to 
Cavour at once the wishes of the Imperial Government 
in the matter of Savoy, and the recall of the French 
army from Lombardy. This double communication 
implied something as much as follows : " You are about 



SAVOY AND NICE. 245 

to annex Tuscany, you will run the risks, you will 
assume the responsibility of it ; ours we disengage by 
calling our army out of Lombardy. We do not counsel 
this annexation; but, as after all we look on it as accom- 
plished, we ask you for the price that is due to us." 
Cavour was not deceived in his anticipation, he was 
astonished only at the hasty recall of the army, and he 
answered smiling : " If the English had occupied Genoa 
under the same conditions as your occupation of Milan, 
do you think they would have been in such a hurry as 
you are to abandon Italy ? However, all is for the best. 
We shall accept the Emperor's decision with greater 
satisfaction than we do the second half of your despatch. 
The Emperor seems to hold extremely to Savoy and this 
unhappy city of Nice ! " 

Oh ! without doubt the prime minister of King Victor 
Emmanuel would have been glad to avoid the cession of 
Savoy, still more " the unhappy city of Nice ; " and 
naturally he did not think himself obliged to anticipate 
the sacrifice, and opposed some of those little resistances 
even in the minor points of a negotiation, which are for 
the honour of diplomatic arms. If he could have kept 
everything and given nothing, he would have done it. 
Having escaped the dilemma a first time, on the morrow 
of Villafranca, be sure that he would not have failed to 
elude it still, had he been able. He had not made up his 
mind to it without chagrin, lie took it as the king did, say- 
ing, with a secret pang, " that after giving the daughter, 
they might give the cradle." Signor Artom, a frequent 
assistant at these private deliberations, relates that " this 
act Avas the sole one of his political life to which he did 



246 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

not bring the kind of heroic serenity he displayed in the 
gravest situations." Although during a space of ten 
years he had often found Savoy hostile to his policy, he 
loved this land, which was like a native country to him ; 
for it had given its old name to the dynasty whose 
ensign it was. He was very much at the mercy of these 
old recollections, even while at work upon his firm 
resolve to proceed, and he thought what D'Azeglio ex- 
pressed, when writing to a French friend : "You know 
that it would be unbefitting us to show ourselves 
indifferent to a separation that bids us say adieu to 
brothers-in-arms of eight centuries. My personal senti- 
ment — shared, I believe, by everyone — is to regret 
sincerely the severance from a population full of rare 
and eminent qualities, counterbalanced by some few in- 
significant defects, who have always faithfully followed us 
in our Italian struggles, have filled our armies, councils, 
and diplomacy with devoted, gifted, energetic men. 
Once let the Savoyards have said : ' We will be annexed 
to France ;' we shall be like a father who lets his daughter 
marry according to her desire, embraces her with a 
painful heart, wishes her full happiness, and says adieu 
to her." 

In common with D'Azeglio, Cavour said adieu to 
Savoy painfully ; but it was not a matter of sentiment 
for him. He had come to his determination as a duty 
in policy, weighing what he did, resolutely cutting "the 
knot of the question," as he called it ; and, be it said, 
seeing more clearly and farther than those who asked 
him to relinquish what liberated his hands. If the 
French plenipotentiaries had been tempted to rate their 



THE SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY. 247 

victory liigii, they might have been undeceived in the 
hour when the act was made irrevocable. Cavour walked 
up and down his cabinet thoughtfully and gravely, not 
on this occasion rubbing his hands, as he listened to the 
reading out of the treaty. His signature was affixed to 
the deed in silence ; recovering his habitual sprightliness 
the moment it was done, he went up to Baron de Talley- 
rand, and said to him, with a significant smile : " Now 
we have you for accomplices ! " 

Foreseeing all the issues of the act he had pre- 
meditated, Cavour knew well that the question of Savoy 
would raise a storm, and create every kind of difficulty 
for him at home and abroad. He stood resigned to 

o 

meet it — even the prospect of the discontent of England, 
which was not long in showing itself. Eeassured for 
a term after the peace by the declarations of Count 
Walewski, England's distrust revived at the rumours of 
a fresh transaction, and she at once began to worry 
Cavour. Interrogations, complaints, and remarks poured 
in on him. Lord Russell took up his sharpest pen to 
write to Sir James Hudson : "In speaking to Count 
Cavour of the rumours relating to the cession of Savoy, 
you will not disguise from him that it will be a blot on 
the escutcheon of Savoy to cede to France the cradle of 
the illustrious house reigning in Sardinia." Cavour, at 
home as he was with his friend Sir James Hudson, was 
put to it a little at times ; and I know not indeed if he 
did not make shift to slip out of the net like that Pied- 
montese minister of the eighteenth century, the Marquis 
D'Ormea, who, in a similar position, being pressed to 
state whether Sardinia had joined in a treaty with 



248 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

France and Spain, required that the question should be 
submitted to him in writing. " Is it true that the King 
of Sardinia has contracted an alliance with France and 
Spain ?" The Marquis D'Ormea wrote spiritedly under- 
neath : "This alliance does not exist." There was, in 
fact, a treaty with France only ! 

Cavour behaved in some such manner. To all the 
interrogations besetting him, he replied that the Sar- 
dinian Government had not the slightest intention to 
cede, exchange, or sell Savoy. He added, it is true, 
that "if the people of that country had any proposition 
to make for the bettering of their condition, the pro- 
position would be examined in the usual parliamentary 
manner, and justice would be done to it as parliament 
might decide." Sir James Hudson understood perfectly 
what was meant by that. 

The best means of shaking off England was to refer 
her to France, and here England found the efforts she 
was continuing more vigorously than ever on behalf of 
the annexation of Central Italy turned against her. She 
was caught ki her own meshes. Lord Cowley said to 
M. Thouvenel that, " in the opinion of the English 
Government, the annexation of Savoy to France was a 
European question ; " and M. Thouvenel replied : " Yes> 
if England will accept the proposition that the annex- 
ation of Tuscany to Sardinia shall not be accomplished 
without the co-operation and assent of the Great Powers, 
we will accept the same conditions for Savoy." In 
vain the English Government carried its protests to all 
quarters. Addressing itself to Vienna, Austria replied 
ironically, that there was nothing more extraordinary 



GARIBALDI AND NICK 249 

in the annexation of Savoy than in that of Tuscany. 
When it turned to St. Petersburg, Eussia replied, that 
the cession of Savoy appeared to her to be a transaction 
in due form. And the Emperor Napoleon seized the 
occasion to soothe the vexed temper — rather noisy 
than efficacious — of England with the rich indemnifica- 
tion of the commercial treaty of January 23, 1860. 
This simplified remarkably the diplomatic position of 
the Piedmontese Government in relation to England, as 
well as in relation to Switzerland, which was left alone 
to cry for a portion of Savoy neutralised by the treaties 
of 1815. 

The inevitable internal difficulties to be encountered 
had been clearly foreseen by Cavour. He was well 
assured that the renunciation of two ancient provinces 
might stir some emotion in Piedmont proper, and even 
in other regions of Italy. In any case he knew that 
it would be a pretext for hostile parties — Mazzinian 
agitators, and every form of opposition inclined to make 
use of a weapon when they found one. Had it been 
Savoy only, passions perhaps would not have been so 
angrily roused ; but the ultra-Italians laid particular 
stress on Nice, and, as it happened, Nice was the birth- 
j)lace of the popular chief, Garibaldi, in whom the aban- 
donment of his natal city provoked a deep and bitter 
resentment against the man who, in his own words, 
" made him a stranger in his country." The Italians 
held that Cavour had yielded a fragment of their 
national territory ; the Piedmontese of the old school 
accused him of sacrificing the stoutest and solidest 
portion of the state ; all declared that he had paid a 



250 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

reckless price, in an almost humiliating concession, for 
an equivocal alliance. 

Cavour was aware of the risks he ran, but neither 
internal nor diplomatic complexities arrested him. He 
was ready to bring before parliament the responsibility 
of an act in which he saw a pledge of national policy, 
and, to begin, the union of the Central provinces of 
Italy with Piedmont. 

IX. 

It was on January 20, 1860, that Cavour took 
up the reins of power ; and from that date he was at 
his work, hurrvina; forward the annexation of Central 
Italy, carrying on negotiations with London and Paris, 
making use of England in spite of her moodiness, 
appeasing France by the cession of Savoy, and triumph- 
ing over the last hesitations of Napoleon III. by means 
of a plebiscitum in Tuscany and the Emilia. Matters 
proceeded briskly. On March 11, the voting in the 
central provinces took place ; on the 1 8th a decree 
established the result by pronouncing the annexation 
to be confirmed. On the 24th the treaty of the cession 
of Savoy was signed and sealed ; on the 25th the 
election lists were opened for the Chambers in all the 
provinces of the new kingdom, so that it was no 
longer before the Piedmontese parliament, but before 
the first national Italian parliament that the question 
was to be laid which embodied for the moment the 
policy of Cavour. The head of the Cabinet hardly 
knew how near the s truth he was when in April, 1859, 
after a parliamentary sitting that had voted full powers 



GTFERRAZZL 251 

on the eve of the war, he exclaimed : " I have left the 
last Piedmontese Chamber, the next will be that of 
the kingdom of Italy ! " This forecast was a reality 
one year later ; nor could Count Cavour have much 
fear of being unsupported by an assembly owing its 
life to him, and of which he became more than ever the 
experienced and trusted guide. 

The new assembly, composed of the elite of Italy, 
represented marvellously in its spirit the national 
Liberalism which for ten years had decided the success 
of Piedmontese policy ; and this made it of priceless 
assistance, a strong governing force under a skilful 
hand. The prime minister of Kiog Victor Emmanuel 
had first to demand an act of patriotism and good 
sense of it — the sanction of the treaty ceding Savoy 
and Nice, and the discussion following thereon pre- 
sented curious features. As a matter of course, an 
unrestricted liberty reigned throughout this discussion. 
Every form of opposition was exhibited, even the most 
eccentric, and Guerrazzi, the former Tuscan chief, pro- 
digal in sarcasms, threatened Cavour with the fate 
of Clarendon, condemned to exile for having ceded 
Dunkirk to France ; but the opposition containing the 
greatest elements of danger centred in a man in whom 
Cavour found an adversary both impassioned and self- 
contained, all but an enemy — Eattazzi. 

Here was a sort of dramatic counterstroke of the 
differences and dusky conflicts which had brought 
about the last ministerial crisis leading to the eleva- 
tion of Cavour and the fall of Eattazzi. The latter 
had evidently been profoundly mortified, and it was 



252 



LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 



said that between these two men, in spite of all 
parliamentary and ministerial alliances, notwithstanding 
an intimacy of long date, all personal intercourse had 
ceased. Under an appearance of moderation, with 
calculated art and polished shrewdness in his blows, 
Eattazzi delivered a speech of the nature of an impeach- 
ment, full of bitter shafts against the treaty ceding 
Savoy, and principally the cession of Nice. Every- 
thing had been unfortunate in this miserable business, 
the principle, the proceedings, the ^ negotiations. It 
would have been possible to unite the Italian provinces, 
without prostration to a powerful ally, without thus 
abjectly courting the Emperor, who would undoubtedly 
in the end have resigned himself to consent to the 
annexations. With Savoy, a conservative and dynastic 
force, precious in a crisis of transformation, was lost. 
With Nice an Italian city was lost, the Italian pro- 
gramme was cast aside, and a policy of territorial 
barter supported the policy of nationality ! The price 
of the annexation was paid without even a guarantee 
in exchange. Like an able tactician, Eattazzi did not 
indeed, like Gruerrazzi, speak of Clarendon, " severe to 
the king, scornful of parliament, and believing in 
his pride that there would be no check to his authority ;" 
he did not adopt such angry taunts, though he alluded 
maliciously to Cavour's retirement in July, "an excel- 
lent method of escape from a dilemma, no doubt, 
but of small use in solving the difficulties." In one 
way and another he said sufficient to betray an im- 
placable animosity, and compel the President of the 
Council to take up all those gauntlets of the Opposition, 



THE COMPARISON WITH CLARENDON. 253 

and justify his honour and the character of his policy 
before the Italian parliament, now for the first time 
assembled at Turin. 

The struggle, we may remark, was unequal, for facts 
told weightily for Cavour, and his was a genius as 
prompt to seize an advantage as it was formidable 
to his adversaries. Clarendon was alluded to : " Signor 
Guerrazzi will permit me to observe to him," he said 
loftily, " that if Lord Clarendou, to defend his conduct 
from violent accusations, could have pointed to several 
millions of Englishmen delivered by him from a foreign 
yoke, several counties added to the dominions of his 
master, it may be that the parliament would not have 
been so pitiless, and perhaps Charles II. would not have 
been so ungrateful towards the faithfullest of his servants. 
Since the honourable deputy Guerrazzi has thought 
proper to give me an historical lesson, he should have 
given it complete. After telling us Avhat Lord Clarendon 
did, he should have told us who were his enemies, what 
sort of men his accusers, who shared the spoil they had 
torn from him. He should have told us that these 
enemies formed the famous coterie of men possessed of 
no antecedents in common, no community of principles, 
no ideas, and who were actuated by nothing but the most 
impudent egotism ; men fallen away from every party, 
professing all opinions — Puritans, Presbyterians, Anglican 
Churchmen, and Papists, each in turn ; to-day Republicans, 
Royalists to-morrow ; demagogues in the street, courtiers 
in the palace ; Radicals in parliament, reactionists in the 
councils of the king; men, in short, whose coming- 
together produced the ministry stigmatised in history as 



254 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOJJE. 

that of the Cabal. So much being said/' he added, " I 
leave it to the Chamber and to the country to consider 
what may be thought of the present case." Not one 
stroke of this magnificent fulmination escaped the 
electrified assembly acclaiming to the end. 



x. 

No, of a surety, Cavour had sold no cities, as the 
sarcastic Guerrazzi charged him with doing, nor had he 
turned aside from the national programme, as Rattazzi 
hinted ; he had simply performed an act that he deemed 
necessary, an act forced upon him by everything in the 
state of Italy and of Europe. The real cause of the 
cession of Savoy he confessed before the assembly, 
without circumlocution, with a mind above petty con- 
siderations : " The true ground for it is that the treaty 
is an integral part of our policy, the logical and inevit- 
able consequences of a past policy, and an absolute 
necessity for the carrying on of this policy in the 
future." 

A consequence of the past, a condition of the future ; 
in this the whole case was stated. Nothing was easier 
than bandying words, disputing over little points. The 
truth was, a choice had to be made between a system 
of barren isolation that was barely practicable, involving 
perilous revolutionary measures, and the policy of the 
alliances that in the space of ten years had led from 
Novara to the Crimean war, from the Congress of Paris 
to the war in Italy and the new kingdom, whereof the 
parliament was the living image. The choice could not 



SPEECH ON THE CESSION OF SAVOY. 255 

"be doubtful. In the path followed up to that time, and 
which had led to success, the thing to do was to advance 
without deviating, or even stopping ; and admitting 
alliances to be part of the policy, where was the useful 
and helpful ally to be found if not in France ? Cavour 
was perfectly clear-sighted. He knew the posture of 
French affairs, and with unfailing penetration he traced 
out the game of parties, the troubles, doubts, and 
antagonisms of opinions in France regarding Italy ; he 
felt, moreover, that sympathetic though the Emperor 
was, omnipotent though he appeared to be, he had also 
difficulties at home to manage. The object of Cavour, 
an interested one, as we need not say, and cleverly 
conducted, was to hold the Emperor engaged up to a 
certain point, without alienating the general opinion of 
the country, but to keep the bond of sympathy fast 
between the French and the Italian nations. His most 
devoted friends in Paris wrote to him : " For the love of 
Heaven, for the love of Italy, sign, sign ! if you wish to 
have the French alliance ; for if you hesitate your country 
will lose all sympathy in France." Hence the treaty, 
the moral nature of which raised it above the acrimo- 
nious and ribald commentaries runnino- alon^ with it. 

o © 

Such was the feeling with which he signed it, and he 
now did his utmost to impart it to the Italian parliament 
with an increasing vehemence of argument and emotion : 
" I tell you, under a profound conviction of the truth, 
that the cession of Savoy and Nice was indispensable to 
keep the French people friendly towards Italy. Eight or 
wrong, I will not debate on it. They believe that these 
provinces belong naturally to France. It may be an 



256 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUE. 

error, but whoever is acquainted with France must 
acknowledge frankly that it is a fixed idea. Now, this 
cession being once demanded of us, if we had replied 
with a refusal, the minds of Frenchmen would not have 
taken into consideration the difficulties that a matter of 
the kind would encounter in Italy. We should have 
been charged with ingratitude and injustice ; we should 
have been told that we declined to apply on one side of 
the Alps principles which we invoked on the other, and 
for which France spent her blood and treasure. In 
presence of these facts, was not the ministry bound to 
accede to the Emperor's demand ? a demand made — yes, 
I can say it — not solely in the name of French interests, 
but in the name of the alliance of France with Italy. 
For my part, I hold it a great honour to have yielded to 
it, for it behoved us to consolidate the French alliance 
necessary to us. The true, the only advantage for us, 
is the consolidation of the alliance, not so much of two 
Governments as of two peoples. You then, who are the 
Italian people, forbear to put yourselves in opposition to 
French interests. If there must be chafings and dis- 
putes, let them all be borne by the Government. If 
there is something odious in it, I counsel that it should 
fall upon us. We are as fond of popularity as others 
are, and often have my colleagues and I drunk of 
that intoxicating cup ; but we know how to waive it 
away at the bidding of duty. When signing, we were 
aware what unpopularity awaited us ; but we knew like- 
wise that we laboured for Italy, for that Italy which is 
not the sound body a certain member has spoken of; 
Italy still has big wounds in her body. Look towards 



MARQUIS COSTA BE BEAUREGARD. 257 

the Mincio, look on the other side of Tuscany, and say 
whether Italy is out of danger." And speaking thus he 
carried the assembly with him ; he obtained the abandon- 
ment of an order of the day that a distinguished deputy 
from Vintimiglia, since President of the Chamber, 
Signor Biancheri, had proposed on a question of frontiers, 
and which, at the request of the President of the Council, 
he withdrew. Cavour gained the vote for the treaty by 
a majority of 229, while 33 protested against it, and 
23 members obeyed the signal to abstain from voting 
given by Eattazzi. 

XI. 

One year previously the Marquis Costa de Beauregard, 
foreseeing the separation that already seemed inevitable, 
had exclaimed in the Piedmontese parliament : " So long 
as we are united, you will see Savoy in the front rank 
fighting the enemies of Piedmont. If one day our soldiers 
are in line with the powerful armies of France, like us 
they will be too proud to express a regret." Shortly 
after the annexation Victor Emmanuel reviewed with 
emotion the old brigade of Savoy departing for France. 
The work whereby the chief of the Piedmontese Cabinet 
proposed to give scope to his policy was accomplished. 

Preoccupied as he was, before the meeting of par- 
liament, and in the interval of these exciting discussions, 
Cavour had found time to visit some of the provinces 
recently united. He had accompanied the king to 
Milan during the winter fetes, in the midst of ova- 
tions of all kinds. He had seen the venerable Manzoni, 
who reminded him of the conversation that had taken 



258 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

place one day in 1850 in the house of Eosmini at 
Bolongaro. He had desired to see some of the cities 
of Lombardy — Cremona, Brescia, Bergamo, and every- 
where on his road he had received a welcome that bore 
witness to his popularity. Shortly after the annexation, 
still accompanying the king, he had also gone to 
Tuscany and the Bomagna, and strange to say he beheld 
those provinces for the first time ; he knew neither 
Florence nor any of those delightful Tuscan country- 
sides. 

One morning at Pisa, wakening at break of day, in 
the silence of the still sleeping city, he had with Signor 
Artom betaken himself to the Campo Santo. He 
remained speechless a moment, then the words escaped 
him : " How pleasant it would be to repose here ! " 
Signor Artom observed laughingly that he would find 
himself on holy ground, for that this earth they trod 
upon had been brought from Palestine in the period of the 
Crusades, and he answered gaily : " Are you sure they 
will not one day canonise me ? " He had marvelled 
greatly at all that he had seen at Pisa and Florence — the 
profusion of the works of human genius there ; and he 
declared on his return that he had discovered in himself 
a sense he had not imagined he possessed, that of art. 
This expedition was like a happy interlude for him, 
which he appeared to enjoy. 

Already, however, even before the annexation of 
Savoy, strange rumours began to rise in Italy, " on the 
other side of Tuscany," according to the expression of 
the Piedmontese minister. Scarcely had they come upon 
a term of tranquillity when a new campaign was pre- 



NATURE OF A GUARANTEE. 259 

paring across the Mediterranean ; and with a man every 
one of whose words had a bearing, notice might have 
been taken of a phrase and a declaration that Cavour 
had let fall lightly : " And now we have you for our 
accomplices," he had said to the French plenipotentiaries 
when signing the Treaty of Savoy. On the other hand, 
on being asked whether he had at least obtained a 
guarantee from France for the annexation of Central 
Italy, he had replied : " Not only the union of the 
Emilia and Tuscany to the ancient provinces of the 
kingdom has not been guaranteed by France in return 
for Savoy and Nice, but I will affirm that if this 
guarantee had been offered us, we should have declined 
it ; a guarantee would have implied a control." With 
this in his mind, Cavour was capable of leading those 
who thought they held him ; and of this complicity 
without control, as it pleased him to put it, he was one 
to win prodigious fruits, still richer than those he had 
been gathering. Already his eyes were on Sicilian and 
Neapolitan waters. 



s -2 



CHAPTER VI. 



CAV0UE AND THE UNITY OF ITALY — ROME AND NAPLES. 



The Idea of Unity in the Mind of Cavour — Insurrection of Sicily and the Expe- 
dition of Garibaldi — Attitude of Cavour at Turin — Eelations with Naples 
and with Eome — Negotiations with Europe — Cavour and the Dictatorship 
of Garibaldi in Sicily — Matters touching his Policy — Advance of the 
Insurrection in the South — The Eevolution in Naples — Projects of 
Garibaldi — Threats of an Attempt on Eome and on Venice — Private Dis- 
sensions between Cavour and Garibaldi — Necessity for a Eesolution — The 
Chambery Mission — Words of Napoleon III. — Invasion of Umbria and the 
Marches — The Piedmontese Army in the Kingdom of Naples — Assembly of 
the Chambers in Turin — The Policy of Cavour before Parliament — Triumph 
of that Policy — Annexation of Sicily and Naples — Programme of Cavour 
as to Venice and Eome — Letters and Speeches — Eome the Capital — The 
Free Church in the Free State — Views of Cavour concerning the Papacy. 



A question" naturally arises from this labour of a 
daring head beset by a developing national revolution. 
Count Cavour, the scion of an old Piedmontese house, 
prime minister of the King of Sardinia, standard-bearer 
of the House of Savoy, had he originally the idea of the 
unity of Italy ? If he had stood predetermined a 
fanatic for unity, and had based his proceedings on that 
idea, there would have been only one Mazzinian the 
more across the Alps, and Italy would probably still be 
seeking her way. The secret of his strength and his 
success lay, on the contrary, precisely in his having a 



SECRET OF HIS STRENGTH. 261 

mind exempt from prejudice and extravagance, in his 
reckoning always with the reality of things, mixing his 
policy, according to the saying of Napoleon, with " the 
calculation of combination and chances." He held but 
to one fixed point, the restoration of Italy to her national 
independence and powers through the absolute departure 
of the foreigner, that is to say, the Austrian lordship or 
ascendency ; he left the rest to circumstances, fortune, 
the changes of the times, never refusing an advantage, 
however small and partial it might be, when it was 
offered; as also he never shrank from broader visions 
when the horizon opened out before him. 

In the "fair days "of Plonibieres, his calculations 
did not extend beyond the kingdom of Upper Italy, and 
he did not reject the idea of a confederation in which he 
would naturally have maintained the headship of " eleven 
millions of Italians," gathered together under the flag of 
Savoy. For lack of better, the morning after Villafranca, 
he would have been satisfied with the semi-independence 
of Tuscany, provided that there were to be no more 
Lorraine princes in Florence. Even after the annexa- 
tions, he would have agreed to go no farther for the 
moment, that he might devote himself to organise and 
consolidate the kingdom just issuing from six months of 
laborious negotiations. 

The question of unity burst forth imperiously in 
reality only on that day of May 5, 1860, when, while the 
parliament in Turin was discussing the cession of Savoy 
and Nice, Garibaldi, followed by his companions-in-arms, 
the "Thousand," quitted the villa Quarto, near Genoa, 
to cross the Mediterranean, with the intention of raising 



262 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

Sicily, Naples, and still more perhaps, to the echoing 
cry of " Italy and Victor Emmanuel ! " It was, if you 
like, another result of Villafranca, a fatality of the situa- 
tion, a fresh extension of the national movement which 
had already absorbed Florence and Bologna ; but it was 
at the same time most certainly a strange complication, 
a crisis graver than all those that had been passed. 

Up to that period, in fact, things had come about 
without a conflict, by a sort of pacific victory, in 
harmony with national rights. Tuscany had not been 
conquered, she had given herself freely. Even France 
regarded the Romagna as virtually detached from the 
Holy See, These provinces belonged to the territorial 
system of Upper Italy, and the annexation up to the 
Cattolica had nothing in it that was not in the nature of 
things. But beyond it, in the South, the unknown 
reigned full of doubts and perils. The work of unifica- 
tion could only be carried out by revolution or by war ; 
it assailed the independence of a kingdom having friends 
in Europe, it touched another portion of the States of the 
Church — that"Eoman question which agitated the Eoman 
Catholic world — and the inviolability of Austria, which 
could not but feel herself defied and menaced by such a 
concentration of Italian power. 

All these problems burst forth at once in the risky 
enterprise Cavour was suddenly called to face, by the 
terrible logic that swept Garibaldi over Sicilian waters. 
Danger was everywhere, in every form; and here, in 
this supreme and decisive conflict, the fertility of genius 
and supple vigour of the man waxed in the fire of action ; 
quick in expedients, knowing how to remain a Liberal 



GARIBALDI'S EXPEDITION TO SICILY. 263 

and a Conservative still in a revolutionary chaos, 
determined above all not to be subordinate to events, 
even when they seemed pressing to force his hand. 



ii. 

" The unexpected leads us and leads all Europe," it 
was said, in this spring of 1860. It is the key-note of 
the fresh crisis, that begins with a heroic adventure ; un- 
folding, for a term of five months in the thick of our 
European commonplace, as a very drama of revolution, 
diplomacy, and war, to conclude with the fiery junction 
of the South and the North of Italy, the consummation 
of the unity. 

It is like a fabulous history, this of Garibaldi : speed- 
ing secretly on a night of May from the gulf of Genoa, 
sweeping in his pair of vessels, the Piemonte and the 
Lombardo, through the Neapolitan cruisers, landing at 
Marsala, and conquering kingdoms at a gallop — it reads 
like a legend. Cavour at Turin was the spirit of policy 
working his combinations amidst every form of change. 
Without the first, the drama would not have opened ; 
without the second, the end would have been lost in dis- 
orderly tumults : and for a further singularity between 
these two men, bound at one and the same time to the 
same campaign, holding the future of Italy in their 
hands, there was neither an understanding nor a pre- 
arranged plot. Garibaldi had gone with an angry heart, 
easily won over to the Sicilian insurrection by resentment 
at the cession of Nice ; and on starting he had let fly a 
barbed arrow at Cavour in a letter, in which he said to 



264 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJR. 

the king : "I know that I embark on a perilous enter- 
prise. If we fail, I trust that Italy and Liberal Europe 
'will not forget that it was undertaken from motives pure 
of all egotism and entirely patriotic. If we achieve it, 
I shall be proud to add to your Majesty's crown a new 
and perhaps more brilliant jewel, always on the condition 
that your Majesty luill stand opposed to councillors who 
would cede this province to the foreigner, as has been 
done with the city of my birth." Cavour, for his part, 
had not encouraged the ep edit ion. Without doubting 
the sincerity of Garibaldi, he dreaded his rashness, and 
he mistrusted in a higher degree those who surrounded 
and bore him on, hoping to turn his popularity to their 
own account. But when once the enterprise was on foot, 
he had only one idea — to hold himself ready for the up- 
shot, and play as he best could the terrible game, in 
which the business he had led up to Bologna might be 
completed at one blow beyond expectation — or else might 
founder suddenly. 

It would be childish simplicity at the present time 
to ask whether Cavour was a minister of irreproachable 
orthodoxy, and did or did not violate public law. He 
played his game like a man who did not mean to lose 
if he could help it. He had in truth done nothing to 
hasten the explosion of this question of Southern Italy ; 
he had not even desired it. He would have wished 
rather to connect the "two great kingdoms of the 
peninsula," as he called them, in an alliance, to bind the 
federative bundle of Italian forces of North and South in 
common interests for a national future. A year pre- 
viously, on the death of King Ferdinand and the acces- 



FRANCIS II. 265 

sion of the young Francis II., son of a princess of Savoy, 
Cavour had seized the occasion to send Count Salmour 
on a mission of peace to Naples. It was an offer of 
amity and support to a reign in its infancy. Early in 
1860 the Cabinet of Turin had renewed the attempt by 
sending Count Villamarina, formerly ambassador at Paris, 
to Naples, charged to bring about an understanding if 
possible. Both with Rome and Naples Cavour would 
gladly have had dealings and arrangements. Unhappily 
those governments of the South were purblind in their 
prejudices and passions. 

At Naples, the unfortunate Francis II., deaf to the 
appeals of " revolutionary Piedmont," as well as to the 
counsels of France and England, in a mesh of court 
intrigues and Austrian and absolutist influences, bent 
under the weight of a crown already within a few 
months jeopardised by a reactionary policy, puerile as it 
was violent. At Rome all the vapouring fire-eaters were 
for reconquering the Romagna. An army was to be 
formed to take the place of the French garrison, whose 
departure seemed close at hand, though it was inde- 
finitely adjourned by events. Nothing was talked of 
but the recruiting of soldiers, Zouaves of the Roman 
Catholic and French legitimists' aristocracy, Belgians, 
disguised Austrians, turbulent Irish ; and a thankless fate 
destined the command of the army of the. Holy Keys for 
one of the most brilliant of French captains, condemned 
by the coup d'etat of December 2 to a premature retire- 
ment, and impatiently thirsting for action, a man of 
perfect sincerity and not less imprudence — General 
Lamoriciere. The impetuous Lamoriciere had signalised 



266 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOTTE. 

his entry into office as " gonfalonier " of the banner of 
the Church by an order of the day resembling a 
challenge, in which the Italian revolution was likened to 
" Islamism," and the cause of the Pope was identified 
with that of Europe and civilisation. In a word, Eome 
and Naples were nests of hostility, and had become 
centres of a coalition, of which Austria was the soul, 
and whose dream it was to head Europe in a crusade 
for the restoration of order. These unfortunate Southern 
Courts imagined that they had to defend themselves — and 
be it so. But in their perplexity they did not see that, 
instead of warding off, they attracted the danger, and 
after their own way of doing it, made ready the unity 
they shrank from : by their persistence in clinging to an 
illusion they turned all liberal instincts and the passion 
for nationality into auxiliaries of Piedmont, and accom- 
plices of the first indications of a movement. The 
Sicilian insurrection was a symptom and a prelude. 

Cavour knew there was a plan that might result at 
any given moment in placing Northern Italy between 
the Austrians encamped on the Mincio, commanding the 
Po, and Lamoriciere leading an army from the south. 
He had seen his offers of conciliation declined; he heard 
of the march of a Neapolitan corps in the Abruzzi, and 
that is how it came that, without having advised it, and 
in no degree misapprehending the peril it involved, 
Cavour allowed Garibaldi to go forth and bear the spark 
to the fiery elements of the South. Not only did Cavour 
abstain from preventing the expedition of Garibaldi, 
it is notorious that he covered it with a protection that 
expanded and grew in the ratio with its success. The 



PERSANO. 267 

President of the Council, who had been careful at the 
same time to make himself Minister of Marine, was 
served in the Mediterranean by him whom we now know 
as the luckless Persano ; and Persano knew how to play 
his part, by aiding in the furnishing of supplies, and 
covering the passage of new convoys of volunteers under 
Medici and Cozenz. Cavour did what he could to keep 
on terms with the popular chief, beloved of Italy, and 
ardently watched by all eyes; on the other hand, he 
would not surrender everything to an adventurer, nor 
compromise his position before Europe by too open a 
support. Hence came a policy mixed up of audacity 
and stratagem, perfectly unfathomable, the natural issue 
of a complicated and desperate situation. The difficulties 
were enormous ; and all the more critical that, imme- 
diately surrounding him, Cavour had to deal both with 
those who accused him of not doing enough, and with 
those who were alarmed at his rashness, even when, like 
D'Azeglio, they said of him that "he only could save 
the ship." 

in. 

No sooner was the landing of Garibaldi at Marsala 
noised abroad, than a tempest of protestation broke 
loose on Turin. Austria did not fail to seize the occa- 
sion to renew her pleadings against Sardinia in Paris 
and London, representing Sardinia as more than ever 
the disturber of Europe, and asking nothing better than 
the privilege of bringing her to her senses. A step 
farther was taken at Berlin, where nothing less was 
talked of than the revival of the alliance of the Northern 



268 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

Courts, to protect public rights and laws against " Pied- 
montese ambition." At St. Petersburg, Prince Gort- 
chakoff delivered himself sharply to the Sardinian envoy 
to the effect that, " if the Cabinet of Turin was so far 
carried away by the revolutionary spirit as to be unable 
to pay due respect to international duties, the European 
Governments would be bound to take such a state of 
things into consideration, and regulate accordingly their 
relations with Piedmont. If the geographical position 
of Eussia permitted it, the Emperor assuredly would 
intervene with arms to defend the Neapolitan Bourbons, 
without allowing the proclamation of non-intervention 
of the Western Powers to stop him." Prance had a 
word to say ; and even England was anxious — less, it is 
true, concerning the deeds of Garibaldi, than as to what 
might be the consequence of them. As to the Govern- 
ments of Naples and Pome, they filled the Courts of 
Europe with their outcries and recriminations. Cavour 
preserved his usual serenity in the thick of the storm. 

His first act was to reject every interpellation in 
parliament upon the affairs of the South. Diplomacy, 
of course, demanded speech, and with diplomacy he had 
recourse to subterfuges, gaining time by disavowals that 
disavowed nothing. He replied to those who accused 
him of abetting revolutionists, in the words he addressed 
to his friend Sir James Hudson : " On what ground is 
Sardinia charged with the crime of not having hindered 
the landing of this hardy adventurer in Sicily, when the 
whole Neapolitan fleet was incapable of doing it ? The 
Austrians and Irish embark at their ease to go to the 
assistance of the Pope ; how then can the Sardinian 



DIPLOMACY AND ACTION. 269 

Government, supposing it cognizant of the expedition, 
stay the Sicilian exiles from running to succour their 
brethren in a struggle with their tyrants ? The flower of 
the youth of all Italy flies to the banner of Garibaldi. 
Were the Sardinian Government to attempt to check 
this national movement, the monarchy of Savoy would 
destroy its own prestige, and therewith its own future, 
and we should soon have anarchy in the peninsula and 
new troubles in Europe. To stem the tide of revolu- 
tionary ideas, the Italian constitutional monarchy must 
preserve the moral power it has won by its resolution to 
make the country independent. This is a beneficent 
treasure which would be lost if the Government of the 
King stood against the enterprise by Garibaldi. The 
Government of the King deplores the enterprise, but 
cannot stop it ; does not aid, but is unable to use force 
to put it down." 

Meanwhile he, whom they called a " flibustier," 
pursued his prodigious- undertaking, becoming in a few 
days master of Sicily, and causing the Neapolitan 
Government to fall upon a course of Liberal concessions 
which might, six months previously, have been of some 
effect, but were now useless, and significant simply of a 
cause more than half lost. 

The art of Cavour was shown in the skill with which 
he turned Garibaldi's successes to use before Europe, and 
kept the Courts of the North from passing to more deci- 
sive acts than protestations. The fact is that Eussia and 
Prussia soon ceased to speak of interfering in Italian 
affairs ; they showered their offerings of sympathy on 
the King of Naples, but confined themselves to promises 



270 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

of "moral support." Cavour hung mainly upon what 
would be done or would be permitted in London and in 
Paris. English ministers might entertain good wishes 
for the independence of Naples, but nothing would be 
done by them to ensure or defend it. England was 
pledged up to a certain point by what she had done in 
promoting the annexation of Tuscany and the Eomagna. 
On the very day of Garibaldi's departure from Genoa, 
May 5, Lord Eussell charged Lord Loftus at Vienna 
to communicate particular views and ideas that in- 
dicated the course likely to be taken by England : 
" If tyranny and injustice are the characteristic features 
of the government of Southern Italy, liberty and justice 
are the features of the government of Northern Italy. 
This being so, sooner or later the people of South Italy 
will come to a political union with their northern 
brethren, and will insist on being governed by the same 
sovereign." Cavour could not have said more. 

The anxiety of England, in reality, was lest Piedmont 
should be led to "acts of aggression" against Austria, 
and she feared still more that Cavour, beset by so many 
perplexities, should be tempted to purchase the aid of 
France by new cessions of territory, the sacrifice of the 
island of Sardinia or even Genoa. When a note of six 
lines was presented to him, demanding his guarantees 
upon these two points, Cavour naturally hastened to 
reassure Lord Russell. He signed an engagement readily 
not to attack Austria, and " not to cede to France any 
portion of territory beyond and in addition to that 
which had been ceded by the treaty of Turin of March 24." 
Seeing acutely what it was that Lord Eussell had most 



EXPECTATIONS FROM FRANCE. 271 

at heart, the dexterous Piedmontese had been careful to 
put in the first line the article of cession, which had been 
made secondary in the English note. Satisfied on this 
head, England felt herself at liberty to encourage all 
proceedings or hinder none. 

What in her turn was to be expected of France? 
Cavour was not ignorant that there was the grave and 
delicate question for him : more depended on France than 
on England in this new phase. He counted on the 
" complicity/' of which he had spoken the day when he 
signed the cession of Savoy and Nice, which had only 
become an accomplished fact at the moment when 
Garibaldi was already at Palermo. He counted also on 
the force of circumstances, the secret leanings and the 
interests of the Emperor, the thousand ties by whicl\ 
Napoleon III. and the destinies of the Empire were 
linked with the success or failure of the Italian cause. 
With profound sagacity he discerned, in short, that the 
Napoleonic policy could not push very far the protection 
of decaying legitimacy. Nor was he much in error in 
his calculations. 

France, it was true, had been one of the first of the 
Powers to protest against the expedition of Garibaldi, 
and against the enrolment of volunteers day by day 
being shipped for Sicily. Evidently Napoleon III. did 
not look with a favourable eye on this revolutionary 
enterprise ; he had no wish to see the Southern Kingdom 
disappear, or the annexation pushed to the uttermost. 
What he thought of it was, however, sufficiently 
placable or sufficiently obscure. To those who spoke to 
him of Southern Italy, the Emperor replied sadly : 



272 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

" What is to be clone with a Government like that of 
Naples, which refuses to listen to advice of any kind ? " 
Napoleon III. chose to go into retirement for a time. 
"The Emperor is absent," wrote Marquis Antonini, 
" and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Thouvenel) is not 
of the best mind towards us. He has told me that 
nothing can be done here for the King's Government. 
It would appear that this government believes a revo- 
lution inevitable, even in Naples." The Tuileries declined 
all responsibility, could not, whatever happened, do any- 
thing without acting in accord with its allies ! 

When at last the King of Naples, reduced in his 
extremity to submit to the infliction of a Liberal Ministry, 
a constitution and alliance with Piedmont, solicited the 
mediation of France, Napoleon III. said to the Neapolitan 
envoys : " It is too late ; a month back, all might have 
been arranged ; to-day it is too late. The position of 
France is very difficult ; a revolution is not to be stopped 
by words. The Italians know what they are about ; 
they understand perfectly that after having given the 
blood of my soldiers for the independence of their 
country, I shall never let a shot be fired against that 
independence. This conviction has led them to annex 
Tuscany contrary to my interests, and now it pushes 
them on Naples. I am not strong enough to save the 
king. I must have the aid of my allies." " What ! " 
said the Neapolitan envoys, " can France consent to the 
success of an enterprise so opposed to her interests, so 
advantageous to England, so radically revolutionary ? " 
" All that may be true," said the Emperor, " but we have 
to do with facts ; the force of opinion is irresistible ; in 



HIS MANAGEMENT OF THE POWERS. 273 

one way or another the national idea in Italy* must 
triumph." And the last piece of counsel was : " Go 
to work quickly, furnish the means of backing you 
up ; Turin is the place for you. It is not to me, it is 
to King Victor Emmanuel that you should appeal. 
Sardinia alone can stop the course of the revolution ; I 
will support you at Turin." 

At Turin Cavour was too adroit not to offer the 
Emperor and Europe the semblance of a negotiation 
with Naples. He felt himself under the necessity of 
managing the Powers, who, without being of one mind, 
were yet assailing him with remonstrances and recom- 
mendations. One day, indeed, to quiet them and shake 
himself loose, he allowed the king to try personally what 
could be done with Garibaldi — to check the " hero " in 
mid career if he could, or at least turn him from carry- 
ing the war over to the mainland. 

In reality, Cavour used extreme dexterity in opening 
the doors which he appeared to be wishing to close. He- 
practised evasions, and manoeuvred with the Neapolitan 
messengers who were sent to him ; appeared to lean 
on England as regarded France, and on France and 
England when it concerned Eussia and Prussia. Pressed 
a little too urgently to do something for the King of 
Naples, he replied promptly: "The Neapolitan Govern- 
ment is in a singular j)osition. After several times 
refusing our alliance, after letting slip the favourable 
moment for seating its authority on a broad basis of 
national policy, now surrounded by dangers of its own 
making, it suddenly shifts its tactics and claims our 
friendship. Under what circumstances is this claim 



274 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

made ? Francis II. has lost the half of his kingdom ; in 
the other half, the people, rendered suspicious by the 
former proceedings of the Government, have no longer 
even a belief in Liberal ministers, and dread that they 
may hear the cannon of the reaction in the streets at 
any moment. In order to destroy that incurable feeling 
of suspicion, and to fill up the abyss which exists 
between the king and the people, Victor Emmanuel is 
asked to become surety for the Neapolitan Government ! 
to invite Francis II. to share with him the halo of popu- 
larity which a sound and liberal policy, and blood spilt 
on the battle-field, have obtained for the house of Savoy ! 

The true enemy of the Neapolitan Government 

is the discredit into which it has fallen ! . . . ." Cavour 
might be unable always to convince, but he knew how 
to interest some while he encouraged others, leaving 
with all a deep impression of his ascendency ; and by 
dint of suppleness he contrived to steer clear of Europe 
while still keeping her in suspense, and preparing fresh 
facts for her to swallow. 



IV. 

It was not only with European Governments, whose 
divisions and indecisions might serve him, that Cavour 
had to do. He had at the same time to measure his 
policy hour by hour with what was taking place in 
Sicily, with the progress of the revolution, which he 
screened in every possible way without recognising it, 
and fully intended to make the most of. He had to 
deal with Garibaldi, and this was anything but diplo- 



HIS BEADING OF GARIBALDI. 275 

inatic work : it was a strange, complex, and feverish 
interchange between Turin and Palermo — between poli- 
tical genius and ungoverned instinct in the form of a 
revolutionary chief in South Italy. Garibaldi was quite 
sincere in selecting for his pass-word, " Italy and Victor 
Emmanuel !" He was not one of those whom D'Azeglio 
anxiously accused of the cry Viva Vittorio ! to which 
they added in a whisper : Re provisorio, while promising 
themselves to raise the republic out of a convulsion. He 
sincerely liked the king, but he liked him in his own 
way, just as he had his own way of working for 
Italian unity, dashingly and defiantly; and he carried 
into this new enterprise his passions, his intemperate- 
ness, his indefinite aspirations, his tenderness towards 
the revolutionists, his misgivings, and his personal 
animosities. It will perhaps be said that but for all 
these he would not have been Garibaldi ; and had he 
not been Garibaldi, he would not have landed at Mar- 
sala, nor been to Calatafimi, Palermo, Milazzo, Messina, 
and ultimately Naples ; and so it may be. Cavour was 
under no illusion about the "hero ;" he understood him 
thoroughly, knew his weakness as well as his strength ; 
and his ability consisted in manipulating the powerful 
nature of the popular chief by leaving him the utmost 
liberty of action, saving the liberty to ruin or com- 
promise the common cause. 

The watchful and daring Piedmontese marked with 
unwavering eyes the man disembarking at Marsala, and 
rapidly becoming dictator of Sicily, as a prelude to the 
mastership of the whole of the Southern Kingdom. He 
neither grudged him the help which Persano and his 

t2 



276 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

ships were ordered copiously to supply hini with, nor 
did he withhold manifestations of sympathy. He sent 
him word that "the King and his Government placed 
entire confidence in him." He congratulated him, almost 
officially, after the battle of Milazzo, in July. "I am 
happy," he wrote to Persano, " to hear of the victory at 
Milazzo, which does honour to Italian arms, and will 
prove to Europe that the Italians are henceforth deter- 
mined to sacrifice their lives to recover liberty and their 
country. I beg you to take my sincere and warmest 
congratulations to General Garibaldi. After this brilliant 
victory, I do not see how he can be hindered from pass- 
ing over to the continent The national standard 

once hoisted in Sicily, should traverse the kingdom, and 

float along the coasts of the Adriatic " 

So spake Cavour, and no doubt he believed what he 
said ; but at the same time the victor was made aware 
of a sting ; Cavour did not shrink from imperiously de- 
manding of the dictator the arrest of Mazzini, should the 
latter set foot on Sicilian soil : nor would he allow Bertani, 
well known for his republican opinions, to be left at 
Genoa as the representative of the new Sicilian Govern- 
ment. This Mazzinian intervention, the influence of the 
rasher spirits of revolution over Garibaldi, and the grow- 
ing anarchy in Sicily, were causes of deep anxiety to 
Cavour. "The King's Government has no intention 
of being trifled with," he wrote; .... "the course 
which General Garibaldi is following is fraught with 
danger. His idea of governing, and the consequences 
ensuing from it, reflect discredit upon us in the 
eyes of Europe. If the disturbances' in Sicily are 



THE GOVERNMENT AND THE HERO. 277 

repeated at Naples, the cause of Italy will run the 
risk of being misrepresented before public opinion, 
and condemned by a verdict that the greater Powers 
might hasten to put into execution." Cavour was not 
always successful in averting the evil ; he saw his con- 
fidential envoys, such as La Farina, sent back by the 
dictator, who took a pleasure in spiting the ministry at 
Turin. He, who so well knew how to evade others, felt 
Garibaldi slipping from his grasp, to be led away by 
sinister counsels. 

The relations between the head of the Government 
at Turin and the dictator of Sicily could not indeed be 
other than delicate ; they were both conspiring for the 
same object, and were allied by the force of circum- 
stances, but divided by numberless diversities of opinion, 
character, and instinct. There was, however, between 
them a difference that the roving chief did not perceive. 
The chief of the Piedmontese Cabinet had one great 
advantage over his formidable ally : he knew him and * 
could judge him ; he had a hold upon him in the pro- 
tection afforded him, and without which nothing would 
have been possible, from the landing at Marsala to the 
passage of the Straits of Messina. The minister mastered 
the dictator by the ascendency of his policy, by an in- 
exhaustible spirit of resource, and the incessant and 
occult activity which he exercised in every direction — at 
Naples as in Sicily. He did not desire a rupture ; on S 
the contrary, he did all in his power to avoid one ; but 
while willingly granting Garibaldi the popular title of 
conqueror of kingdoms, Cavour felt that sooner or later 
there must be a struggle, unless he consented to be 



278 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

carried away with the rest of Italy, by the burning zeal 
of passion or of imagination, which the bold soldier no 
longer disguised. At what moment and under what 
form this conflict, not to be anticipated without some 
degree of anxiety, would take place, he could not foresee ; 
everything depended upon the march of events, and the 
manner in which the now inevitable downfall of Neapo- 
litan monarchy was brought about. 
*/ Cavour at heart would have preferred that the revo- 
lution, already victorious in Sicily through Garibaldi, 
should take place, as it were, spontaneously at Naples, 
without Garibaldi, or at least before the dictator crossed 
over to the continent. He had prepared everything for 
that object by divers communications with the navy 
and army, extending even to the Government of King 
Francis II., not omitting members of the royal family. 
He considered it the best chance of his being able 
to govern the crisis, that he should keep the power 
to limit it, and so hold Europe to her attitude of 
observation. . " The problem we have to solve," he 
writes, " is this : to further the revolution, while we 
contrive that before Europe it should appear to be 
spontaneous. In that case we shall have France and 
England with us ; otherwise I do not know what they 
will do." In default of this more or less spontaneous 
revolution, if it should not declare itself, in the event of 
the arrival or decisive intervention of Garibaldi, and 
of the disorder and threatening agitation that might 
result from it, Cavour took the measures and precautions 
he deemed requisite. Like a general engaged in vast 
and delicate operations all pointing to the same end, his. 



DIRECTIONS TO THE ADMIRAL. 279 

eye and hand were alert and ready, issuing orders that 
were always the expression of a clear and resolute 
thought. He wrote to Persano : " The real object is to 
cause the national principle to triumph at Naples, clear 
of the Mazzinians. Italy must be saved from foreigners, 
evil principles, and madmen. ... If the revolution is not ► 
accomplished before the arrival of Garibaldi, our con- 
dition will be very serious, but that must not trouble us. 
You will, if you are able, take possession of the forts, you 
will gather together the Neapolitan and Sicilian navy, 
give every officer a commission, make them swear fealty >. 
to the king and to the "statuto" — and then we shall see ! 
The king, the country, and the ministry have full confi- 
dence in you. Follow the instructions I give you as 
closely as possible. If any unforeseen case should occur, 
do your best to further the great object we have in view, 
which is to build up Italy without letting the revolution 
overwhelm us." At the same time he despatched addi- 
tional naval forces and bersaglieri, that were only to be 
used in the last extremity. He took every measure to 
prevent being outstripped on the eventful day ; and thus, 
in protecting the most perilous of enterprises, for a 
great national cause, he resolved to keep it from deviating 
and lapsing into excesses ; while, on the other hand, he 
exercised all his diplomatic craft in masking it before 
Europe. 

v. 

In the midst of these ever-increasing complications, 
he found time to write the following to Madame de 
Circourt : " If I get out of the scrape this time, I shall 



280 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

try not to be caught again. I am like the sailor, who, 
finding himself surrounded by tempestuous waves, swears 
never more to expose himself to the perils of the 

sea " He was, for the time being, in the midst 

of tempestuous seas, and at every turn he had a false 
move to correct, a new resolution to take, or a peril to 
avoid. I do not pretend to say that violence and intrigue 
had no place in the dramatic affairs of South Italy in 
August, 1860. In reality, the struggle in which Cavour 
was engaged, and which he was determined to carry on 
to the end, far exceeded the limits of vulgar intrigue, or 
even those of personal antagonism between two men 
brought face to face with one another by the irony of 
fortune. 

In this conflict of policies, schemes, and passions, the 
fortunes of new Italy were at stake ; but even in. a 
labyrinth from which he seemed scarcely able to extri- 
cate himself, Cavour never swerved. He remained the 
representative of a ten years' policy, sanctioned by 
success ; a consummate politician, making Piedmont, as it 
were, the solid centre point of ail assimilations, and the 
monarchy an instrument of every national and liberal 
transformation, while it was the guarantee of conservative 
interests ; knowing how to press forward, as well as to 
combine prudence with boldness, diplomacy with war ; 
always taking into consideration the necessity for 
alliances, and the situation of Europe, especially that of 
France. What was the policy opposed to him ? It was 
a policy of rashness and defiance, that aimed at disturbing 
the centre of action, adjourning the union of the South 
with the North, prolonging the state of revolution while it 



GARIBALDI AND THE ENGLISH MINISTER. 281 

made use of the king's name, making Naples the first 
stage of a series of conspiracies against Koine, Austria, 
and the peace of the whole of Europe. 

So long as the revolution, triumphant in Sicily, had 
not crossed the Straits, the collision of the two policies 
was avoidable, or not of moment ; an island in the 
Mediterranean circumscribed the problem. With the 
development of events, however, on the day when 
Garibaldi touched the continent, and finding nothing 
before him but a king and an army in flight, entered 
Naples, and, in the midst of an intoxicated people, sud- 
denly became dictator of the two Sicilies and master of 
a kingdom, things underwent an extraordinary change. 
The question narrowed and showed its features ; it was 
the more serious that, with a victor's confidence in 
himself, Garibaldi appeared less than ever disposed to 
listen to advice; and indeed it seemed as though nothing 
now could stop him. 

Carried away by his own instinct, urged on by those 
about him, living in the exciting atmosphere of revolu- 
tion and war, giving little heed to the anarchy he 
allowed to spread under his name at Naples and in the 
provinces, Garibaldi resembled a lunatic ready to burst 
forth. He did not conceal either his audacious projects 
or his animosity towards Cavour; and at that very time, 
in a conversation he held with Sir Henry Elliot, the 
English minister, who had gone to moderate and influ- 
ence him, and endeavour in the name of England to 
dissuade him from pushing his enterprises farther, he 
showed his real colours. "I will," he said, "speak to 
you frankly, without hiding from you my intentions, 



282 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

which are just and clear. I purpose going as far as 

v Borne. When we have become masters of that city, I 

will offer the crown of united Italy to Victor Emmanuel. 

It will be his business to set Venice free ; and in that 

war I will be no more than his lieutenant In 

the present condition of Italy, the king cannot refuse to 
do this without losing his popularity and his high 
position. Permit me to say, I am certain that in advising 
that Venice be left to her fate, Lord Eussell does not faith- 
fully render the opinion of the English people "In 

vain Sir Henry Elliot endeavoured to dispel his illusions, 
by declaring to him that the English people, however 
much they might sympathise with Italy, would not 
forgive provocation to a European war : Garibaldi did 
not stick at such a trifle. " But," said Sir Henry Elliot, 
" have you made a fair reckoning, general, of all the 
contingencies likely to ensue from a collision between 
Italian arms and the French garrison at Eome ? If 
this takes place, it will immediately result in the inter- 
vention of France. It is the interest of your country 
to avoid that." At these words Garibaldi lost his 
equanimity, and exclaimed : " Well, then ! is not Eome 
an Italian city ? Napoleon has no sort of right to 
. interfere with our possession of it. By the cession of 
Nice and Savoy, Cavour has dragged Sardinia through 
the mire, and thrown her at the Emperor's feet. I have 
no fear of France, and I would never have consented to 
so profound a humiliation. Whatever the obstacles — 
even if I should be in danger of losing all that I have 
gained — nothing shall stop me. There is no other road 
for me than the one to Eome; nor do I believe the 



GARIBALDI TO THE KING. 283 

undertaking to be so very difficult : the unity of Italy 
must be accomplished ! " And, as it were, drunken with 
his mad project, not content with speaking abusively of 
Cavour in a conversation with Sir Henry Elliot, 
Garibaldi wrote a flaming letter to one of his friends at 
Genoa, in which he declared that he could never be 
reconciled to those who had heaped humiliation on 
national dignity and sold an Italian province. He went 
further ; he sent one of his confidential friends to Turin 
to demand of Victor Emmanuel the dismissal of the 
ministers. He wrote to the king with an easy assur- 
ance : " Sire, send away Cavour and Farini ; give me 
the command of one brigade of your troops ; send me 
Pallavicino with full powers, and I will answer for every- 
thing." Another moment, and war would be declared 
in the midst of a tremendous anarchy ; this was the 
climax of the crisis. 

The situation was fraught with every sort of danger. 
A march of the Southern volunteers upon Borne would 
lead fatally to French intervention, as Sir Henry Elliot 
had said; and the intervention of France, in existing 
conditions, would change everything, even at Naples, 
where Francis II. still had forces enough to defend him- 
self on the Volturno and at Gaeta, perhaps also in the 
recently-annexed provinces. Not only did Cavour per- 
ceive all the political consequences likely to follow upon 
so rank a piece of folly, but his very soul revolted 
against an antagonistic encounter between the Italians 
and the French; for though not disposed to "abase the 
national dignity " to France, he had a profound belief in 
an alliance in the blood of the two countries; and more 



284 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

—a strong feeling of all that Italy owed to the Emperor. 
Threats on the subject of Venice afforded too plausible a 
pretext to Austria, herself impatient to seize her oppor- 
tunity, and occupied at the time in trying to win the 
support of Kussia and Prussia. To put back the settle- 
ment of Neapolitan affairs, in order to press the claims 
of Venice- and Kome ; to adjourn the annexation of the 
Southern provinces, as Garibaldi proposed to do, was to 
throw the gates open to every passion, and superinduce 
a term of revolution and anarchy likely to threaten the 
safety of the Northern Kingdom itself. To yield to 
Garibaldi's orders, demanding the dismissal of ministers, 
or even one of them, was to degrade king, parlia- 
ment, liberal institutions, and public authority beneath a 
military dictatorship. To do nothing was no longer 
possible. 

VI. 

What was to be done ? Cavour was not beating 
about to comprehend the nature of the crisis, or to find 
a way out of it. For some days past he had written 
incessantly to his agents : " The critical moment has 
arrived ! We are nearing the end ; it must come up to 
our hopes, and answer the true interests of Italy !" Then 
it was that Cavour's hardy spirit had recourse to one of 
those resolutions by which a man who has reached the 
last extremity stakes all for all. He saw but one way of 
cutting the knot : boldly to take the initiative, and 
resume the direction of this movement about to go 
astray, by accepting the unity as far as it was realisable, 
treading down the revolution to stop it in its mur- 



HIS VERSION OF " AND RE MO AL FONDO !" 285 

derous follies, and so prevent it from compromising the 
national cause, perhaps irreparably. But to get the 
mastership in Naples, and to unite the North to the 
South, a way must be cut through Umbria and the 
Marches, and the Pontifical State enclosed; in its last 
hold, and in order to have the whip-hand of Garibaldi, 
strength of arms would not suffice — the moral strength 
of liberal institutions must be tellingly opposed to 
soldierly extravagance. Cavour determined upon two 
ways : the intervention and the convocation of parlia- 
ment. He, too, whispered to himself the famous saying, 
Andremo alfondo! but in the meantime he laid his 
plans so that the independence of a fortified Italy should 
be plucked from this new crisis, and the monarchy of 
Savoy established more firmly than ever. 

To accept the unity in full activity, as it were, in 
mid-career of conquest, and to act as though the 
revolution of Naples were a fact requiring only to be 
recorded, before Francis II. had fought his last battle ; 
and, moreover, to cross the Marches up to the Neapolitan 
frontier, for the sake of holding Garibaldi from a move 
back to the North, or a mad dash on Rome, was an 
extraordinary proceeding. Cavour knew that well 
enough ; regular methods were not to be thought of; 
and he bowed to international right, only to demand of 
it, with his peculiar air of self-possession, permission to 
outstep it. He felt absolved in doing so, only by the 
national necessity impelling him and by the trans- 
parently imminent danger. He required, besides, a 
mask for his undertakings ; and it was here that the 
danger of these unreserved manifestations of hostility, 



286 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

and the armaments which, the Roman Government had 
been preparing since the beginning of I860, burst forth. 
This fact had been lost sight of: that with the 
creation of an army comes the temptation to make use 
of it, especially with a chief burning to fight the enemy. 
It had been overlooked that the strength of the Papacy 
lay, as it has often been said, in its material weakness, 
and all that was being done was too little for serious 
military work, and too much for the part befitting the 
Holy See. Pius IX., with his profoundly religious 
instinct, felt it to be so. He had but a weak belief in 
the armaments. He sometimes looked on ironically, 
asking whether the lost provinces were to be reconquered 
by such means. Cardinal Antonelli, more affected by 
human considerations, felt it less. The warlike prelate 
and Minister of War, M. de Merode, had no such feeling. 
The compromising defenders of the temporal power had 
taken a pleasure in turning Rome into the camp of a 
militant Catholicism, and the meeting-place of that 
cosmopolitan army which roused the irritation of the 
Italians, ancl of which the leader of the Piedmontese 
Cabinet had foreseen the danger, six years previously. 
This was precisely the pretext he now availed himself of, 
by sending, as early as September 7, a summons to 
Cardinal Antonelli, bidding him "disarm those corps, 
the existence of which is a continual menace to Italian 
tranquillity." * He found another pretext in certain 

* Human events sometimes reproduce themselves, after an interval of half 
a century, with startling analogies. Cavour had no idea how greatly his sum- 
mary proceedings resembled those of Napoleon, in 1808, when he endeavoured 
to make General Miollis suddenly enter Eome. Napoleon wrote to his 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. de Champagny: "You must inform Alquier 



PIEDMONTESE INTERVENTION. 287 

deputations from Umbria and the Marches, who had 
hastened to Turin to ask the king's protection. 

Cavour had no time to lose if he wished to outstrip 
Garibaldi, who had already reached Naples. He put 
everything to account, and in enforcing his summons 
with the threat of immediate military execution, he 
promptly furnished Europe with the word for what he 
was doing. 

Piedmontese intervention thus became a guarantee 
against revolutionary excesses. The Venetian question, 
the settling of which time alone could bring about, was 
kept back, and every mark of respect bestowed on the 
Pope, who was reassured as to the integrity of the 
patrimony of St. Peter's. The organiser of the invasion 
of the Marches concluded by expressing, as he called it, 
" the conviction that the spectacle of the unanimity of the 
patriotic sentiments now bursting forth in the whole of 
Italy will remind the Sovereign Pontiff that he was, a 
few years ago, the sublime inspirer of this great national 
movement." He needed all his resources to emerge 
successfully from this new campaign. 

In spite of all his explanation and assurances, Europe 

that General Miollis, who commands my troops, and who appears to be 
directing his steps upon Naples, will stop at Rome ; that he will assume the 

title of commander of the division of observation of the Adriatic " 

Alquier, hearing of the arrival of the troops at the gates of Rome, was to hand 
to the Cardinal Secretary of State a note, ultimatum, or "summons," containing 
chiefly this order : " That the assembling together of Neapohtan sub- 
jects which had taken place at Eome, be dispersed " Napoleon went 

on to say : " As soon as this note has been delivered, Alquier will be careful to 

see that all is prepared for the reception of the army The Emperor does 

not desire an extension of territory for his Italian States ; but he insists 

that the Pope shall be in his scheme " Of course there was this differ- 
ence in the two instances : Napoleon entered Eome, to convert it Bhortly into a 
French department ; Cavour entered Umbria and the Marches, Italian territory, 
to convert them into provinces of Italy. 



288 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOTJB. 

could not but be stirred by such a coup de thedtre, and 
Austria might be tempted to find the occasion she sought. 
Cavour was prepared for it : he was prepared for every- 
thing. But before engaging himself he had taken the 
precaution of confiding his plans to France, and, at least 
apparently, consulting the Emperor. He had despatched 
Farini, the Minister of the Interior, and General Cialdini 
to meet the Emperor, who was passing by Chambery. 
Napoleon III. did not utter the words so often 
attributed to him : Fate presto ! He had listened in 
silence with a brooding look, perfectly understanding 
what was being done, recognising the sagacity of Cavour, 
but refusing to make promises or any engagement, and 
on the morrow of the interview at Chambery he said 
once more : "If Piedmont thinks this absolutely neces- 
sary to save herself and Italy from an abyss of evil, be it 
so ; but it must be at her own risk and peril ; let her 
bear in mind that should she be attacked by Austria, 

France cannot support her " He who had often 

dealt with the Emperor, and had often heard this 
language, and who was used to the reserves and inde- 
cisions of that complicated mind, found this enough. 
Cavour knew Napoleon III. well. He knew what had 
taken place at Eome on the subject of the formation 
of that very army which he was now about to disperse. 
He well knew the imprudence of all these semi-political, 
semi-religious manifestations which for some time had 
been taking place at the Vatican, whose aim was directed 
quite as much against the Empire as against Italy. -5 '" 

* This was the period when, according to official diplomatic reports,, visitors 
to the Vatican were questioned at the doors as to whether they were Bretons, 
and when it was triumphantly stated : " The Pope is receiving the homage of 



A PRETEXT FOB AUSTRIA. 289 

Finally, he knew, having read it in the pamphlet called 
"The Pope and the Congress," that Napoleon III., by 
protecting the temporal power at Kome, and in the 
" Comarca," relinquished the Marches and the Eomagna. 
From that moment he knew beforehand to what 
extent French policy would consent to move ; and with 
regard to the attack from Austria, of which the Emperor 
had spoken, he had foreseen the chance of it. He 
understood how much danger there would be in an 
Austrian attack at the time when Piedmontese divisions 
existed in the South. He was not asleep : he and 
certain Hungarians had already come to an understand- 
ing. He did his utmost to gather together the forces 
in Lombardy, and he wrote to La Marmora : "In the 
serious position of the country I am sure you will not 
think it strange in me to turn to you with the confidence 
I have always shown you since the days when we were 

colleagues and friends I flatter myself that you 

will not refuse to lend your help to save the country 
from the dangers that may be menacing her. The inva- 
sion of the Marches, rendered necessary by the entry of 
Garibaldi into Naples, gives Austria a pretext for 
attacking us. France is aware of it, but she seems 
little inclined to oppose it with arms. We must rely 
only on ourselves. I admit that an aggressive movement 
on the part of Austria is not likely, it is true, for the 
internal condition of the empire would make it perilous 

Brittany ! " A citizen of Lyons who, though a fervent Catholic, did not think fit 
to repudiate his nationality, was told : " Sir, you must be the Pope's subject 
before being the subject of your king ; if these be not the doctrines you 
profess, why are you here ? " I recall the matter in order to show that 
Cavour, thoroughly alive to all that was going on, had some reason to think 
the Emperor's tone at Konie would necessarily be somewhat cool. 

U 



290 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

for her ; nevertheless it is not impossible." He calcu- 
lated in his mincl that France would not so easily detach 
herself from solid co-operation with Italy, and that in 
any case she would still have an interest in holding back 
Austria. He had at all events done what he could, and 
while he kept a watchful eye upon the Mincio, whence 
an attack might spring, he continued to negotiate with 
the Tuileries ; and he felt sure of England, for England 
at that very time was backing the intervention of 
Piedmont at Vienna, with singular vivacity. It is' thus 
that he pressed forward. 

VII. 

" Fate presto ! " Cavour did not need such a recom- 
mendation from the Emperor, which indeed would have 
been a strange one from him who gave it and to him who 
received it. The hardy politician was the first to know 
that promptitude, dexterity, and definiteness of aim 
could alone secure success. Even before the signal was 
given he hacl everything in readiness — he had temporarily 
assumed the management of the War Department, the 
Naval and Foreign Affairs. On the one hand he was 
hurrying the march of the relatively considerable, and 
intentionally considerable, army towards the frontier, to 
open the campaign under Generals Fanti and Cialdini. 
On the other hand he wrote to Persano as follows : 
" General Cialdini will enter the Marches, and direct his 
steps rapidly upon Ancona, but he cannot hope to make 
himself master of that place unless he is energetically 
seconded by our squadron Tell me what you 



THE EXAMPLE TO PRUSSIA. 291 

think necessary for the success of this enterprise, and in 
what way you intend to carry it out " This en- 
terprise, skilfully prepared and promptly put into 
execution as early as September 11, was carried through 
in a startling manner, in a few brief days, by the joint 
efforts of the army and the fleet. 

Protests instantly burst forth on all sides from 
Russia, Prussia, and France, each in turn recalling her 
ambassador. Cavour had a perfect escort of protests : 
he listened ; he did not allow himself to be discomposed. 
He replied to Prussia's admonitions, conveyed to him 
by Count Brasier de Saint-Simon : " lam sorry that the 
Cabinet of Berlin should think fit so severely to judge 
the king's conduct and that of his Government. I am 
conscious of acting in accordance with the interests of 
my king and of my country. I could with advantage 
reply to all that M. de Schleinitz says, but, in any case, 
on this occasion I console myself with the belief that I 
am setting an example which, probably some little time 
hence, Prussia may be very happy to follow" He scarce 
made any reply to France, not being anxious at the 
desire exhibited by the Cabinet of the Tuileries to get 
away from him. He had guessed what the Court of 
Eome at this moment either did not or affected not to 
perceive, which was that France might protest by the 
recall of her minister, but would go no farther; the 
Emperor would confine himself to protecting the Pope, 
and the patrimony of St. Peter in a strictly military arc. 
He left Cardinal Antonelli and French diplomacy to 
contend at Rome as to whether or no the Emperor had 
.said that he would see himself " compelled to oppose 

u 2 



292 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

Piedmontese aggression," or whether he had said that he 
would "oppose it by force" — a grave question, which 
Cavour proposed to settle by success. 

During this time, in fact, the Piedmontese army was 
cutting the knotty point. It is true that it was for a 
moment about to encounter a handful of men, joined 
together by honourable convictions, and headed by a 
chief who deserved a better fate ; but what could 
Lamoriciere do in the false position in which he was 
placed ? He had no longer even his illusions left, for he 
had had a close view of the incurable disorders of Eoman 
administration. He knew that he had no army fit to 
be brought face to face with a positive army. If he had 
believed for a moment or so what was told him about the 
intervention of France, he had soon been undeceived. 
His honour being engaged, he could still say with his 
soldierly vivacity and dash : " If we stand alone, God 
will fight for us ; we will cry to him in the name of our 
right and our steel — to our trusty sword ! " He could 
but gild with one last ray a defence broken by the shock 
of Castelfidardo. It expired in the square of Ancona, 
harassed by the army of Cialdini and the fleet of 
Persano ; it was soon compelled by stress of arms to 
capitulate. 

This done, the question of the Marches was settled. 
The Piedmontese army, reaching the Neapolitan frontier, 
remained mistress of the situation, and, strange to say, 
the unfortunate Francis II., no longer able to help 
himself, had just done Cavour a singular service with- 
out intending it, or even without knowing it. He 
had stopped Garibaldi on the Volturno ; and it was 



DICTATORSHIPS. 293 

fortunate ; for the terrible fellow, more obstinate than 
ever, might, had he not been prevented, have pushed on 
to Rome, and reached it before the arrival of the Pied- 
montese. This was no longer possible. Cavour saw 
Fortune smiling on his audacity in every direction, by 
the rapid conquest of the Marches, and by the resistance 
offered by the Neapolitan royalists. 

The blow had been cleverly dealt, it is quite certain. 
If the military game was won, the political one was still 
more triumphantly so ; and I venture to say that if, in 
this matter of the invasion of the Marches, there is a 
character of violence and subterfuge from which bold 
men, struggling against the difficulties of a hazardous 
situation, do not always shrink, the political and parlia- 
mentary side of it showed loftiness of mind and liberal 
confidence in this powerful and subtle nature. In the 
thick of this tangle of troubles and conflicts, Cavour was 
urged on every side to assume the dictatorship, or at 
least to demand full power in parliament. He was deaf 
to all suggestions of the sort : and as one day, during 
his deepest embarrassment, Madame de Circourt com- 
municated to him the contents of a letter, from a 
personage of high position, who proposed a similar 
expedient, he replied : 

" I am greatly flattered by the opinion your illustrious 
friend entertains about me, but I cannot share it. He 
too greatly mistrusts the influence of liberty, and he 
relies far too much on the influence I possess. For my 
part I have no confidence in dictatorships, especially civil 
ones. I believe that many things can be done with a 
parliament which are impossible with an absolute powei\ 



294 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOTJE. 

Thirteen years' experience has convinced nie that an 
honest and energetic minister, who has nothing to fear 
from revelations of the tribune, and who is not in a 
humour to allow himself to be intimidated by the violence 
of extreme parties, can only gain by parliamentary 
struggles. I never felt so weak as when the Chambers 
were closed. Besides, I must be true to my nature ; I 
cannot be false to the principles I have held all my life. 
I am a son of liberty, and it is to her that I owe all that 
makes me what I am. If a veil had to be put on her 
statue, it is not I who would consent to do it. If the 
Italians could be persuaded that they need a dictator, 
they would choose Garibaldi, and not me, and they would 
be right ! The parliamentary road is the longest, but it 

is also the surest " 

The idea of Cavour, in political life, was that of a 
great liberal — of the greatest of liberals — knowing how 
to invent expedients if necessary ; but giving the chief 
place to that policy which was the secret of his strength, 
and which, with a sort of audacity, he practised to the 
end. What "he said to Madame de Circourt, in the form 
of a friendly and homely confidence, he repeated with 
greater energy and deeper intent, more keenly defining 
the situation, and giving a sharper outline to the nature 
and conditions of the Italian movement, of which he had 
to be the leader. It was to Salvagnoli, of Florence, that 

he wrote : " You remember how greatly the 

English papers blamed the Italians for suspending con- 
stitutional guarantees during the last war. To renew 
this measure now, in a moment of apparent peace, would 
have a fatal effect on public opinion in England, and on 



LETTER TO SALVAGNOLL 295 

all the liberal papers of the Continent. It would not 
bring concord to the national party in the interior. 
The best way of showing how far the country is from 
sharing Mazzini's ideas, and the animosities of certain 
others, is to leave parliament full liberty of censure and 
control. The favourable vote of the great majority of 
deputies will give the ministry far greater power and 
authority than any form of dictatorship. Your advice 
would only carry out Garibaldi's idea, which tends to 
establish a great revolutionary dictatorship, to be exer- 
cised in the name of the king, without the control of 
a free press, and without individual or parliamentary 
guarantees. On the contrary, I am convinced that it 
will not be Italy's smallest title to glory that she has 
known how to constitute herself into a nation without 
sacrificing liberty to independence, and without passing 
through the dictatorial hands of a Cromwell, keeping 
aloof from monarchical absolutism without falling into 
revolutionary despotism. Now there is no other means 
of attaining this end than by asking parliament for the 
only moral force capable of overcoming factions and pre- 
serving the sympathies of liberal Europe for us. A 
return to committees of public safety, or what comes to 
the same, to one or more revolutionary dictatorships, 
would be to smother legal liberty at her birth ; and it is 
legal liberty that we want, as being the inseparable com- 
panion of national independence." 

Thus he spoke both in public and in private, aiming, 
through liberty, and legal powers in the bosom of 
liberty, to solve the most complex as well as the 
simplest questions, and making the parliamentary regime 



296 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

the most persuasive instrument of moderation or the 
fullest means of action. It was with this view that 
from the beginning of his conflict with Garibaldi he had 
decided on the convocation of the Chambers ; and on the 
day that parliament met at Turin, early in October, 
while the crisis in the South was still proceeding, he 
used no subterfuge, nor did he consent to envenom or 
cloak the conflict. He defined the whole situation : the 
necessity of calling on the Southern provinces to declare 
their wishes as to annexation, and to close the revo- 
lutionary state of things by the definitive creation of a 
kingdom of twenty-two millions of Italians ; and he 
dwelt on the seriousness of this new fact, of the inter- 
vention of " a man justly precious to his country " exhi- 
biting a lack of confidence in the Cabinet. "A profound 
breach," he says, " exists between us and General Gari- 
baldi : we did not provoke it What could the 

ministers do ? Pass on without even knowing whether 
or no parliament shared Garibaldi's ideas on the sub- 
ject of his policy ? If we had done that, we should 
with reason "have been blamed for not taking parlia- 
ment into consultation on so critical a matter 

Eesign ? If the crown had come to changing her coun- 
cillors at the demand of a citizen, however illustrious 
and meritorious he might be, it would deal a death-blow 

to our constitutional system We could not but 

call parliament together, and we did so. .... It was 
for parliament to decide. .... If your vote is against 
ns, the ministerial crisis will take place,' but in con- 
formity with great constitutional principles. If it is in 
our favour, it will act on the generous soul of Garibaldi. 



THE NEAPOLITAN QUESTION SETTLED. 297 

We are convinced that he will have faith in the repre- 
sentatives of the nation rather than in bad citizens, 
whose miserable work it is to put division between men 
that have long and persistently struggled for the national 

cause " The discussion ended with an almost 

unanimous vote of confidence in the Government, accom- 
panied by a not less unanimous one of admiration of 
Garibaldi, which the minister was very careful not to 
oppose. 

The victory, therefore, both moral and political, was 
Cavour's, leaning on parliament ; and Garibaldi himself, 
it must be admitted, did not assume the air of a rebel. 
He no longer contested the immediate annexation sanc- 
tioned by vote ; he hastened to go to meet the king, 
who entered Naples with him. And if, in starting 
suddenly, almost covertly, to return to Caprera, he 
concealed a secret wound ; if he did not lay aside his ill- 
feeling, and mentally resolve to reappear some day, his 
momentary retirement at least testified both to his dis- 
interestedness and his simplicity of character. What 
followed — the final resistance of Francis II. at Gaeta, 
and the troubles immediately following upon a revo- 
lution — was but the epilogue of the drama. The 
Neapolitan question was settled, and Piedmontese in- 
tervention had gained its point. 

VIII. 

On the day when new parliamentary elections had 
just taken place in all the provinces, and when the new 
parliament met at Turin to inaugurate the existence of 



298 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

the kingdom of Italy, a curious scene was taking place on 
the Piazza di Castello. Old Manzoni, notwithstanding 
his advanced age and enfeebled condition, had insisted 
upon making the journey from Milan to Turin in order 
to be present at what he called the coronation of Italy. 
An excited crowd surrounded the palazzo Madama where 
the parliamentary debates were taking place, when sud- 
denly Manzoni appeared leaning on the arm of Cavour. 
Applause immediately burst from the crowd, while the 
minister turned to the poet, saying : " This is intended 
for you ! " The old poet quickly withdrew his arm in 
order to clap his hands, pointing to Cavour. The enthu- 
siastic acclamations of the crowd became greater, and 
Manzoni exclaimed with pride : " Well, Signor Conte, do 
you see now for whom this applause is intended ? " Both 
minister and poet may have at that moment called to 
mind the first meeting between them, ten years pre- 
viously, at the house of Rosmini, the villa Bolongaro, 
when Cavour said, while he rubbed his hands ; ' ' We will 
do something ! " He had assuredly turned time to 
account in those ten years, for representatives of Naples, 
Turin, Milan, Palermo, Brescia, Florence, Bologna, and 
Genoa were that day assembled in parliament. " Some- 
thing " had indeed been done, and that " something " 
exhibited itself in an outburst of popular enthusiasm for 
one man. Yet, even with the prodigious annexation 
just accomplished, much remained to do. Not only had 
Cavour laboriously to pursue the work of pacification in 
the Southern provinces, and maintain before Europe a 
position always difficult and perilous, he had also to 
shape and direct his policy under the very eyes of foreign 



VENICE AND ROME. 299 

diplomacy, and place himself, as it were, on a solid 
footing with regard to two questions constantly in agita- 
tion, and which henceforth stood out like two formidable 
problems, before united but incomplete Italy : Venice 
and Rome ! One of these questions, the Venetian 
question, was still the sorest wound, owing to the 
Austrian dominion left beyond the Mincio ; the other 
was a great moral question, and more than a territorial 
one. Both were in reality as difficult to settle as to 
evade, and Cavour only emerged from one crisis to find 
himself face to face with tasks more than ever thorny 
and delicate. With the help of a little revolution and 
a little fighting, Naples and the Marches had been 
carried ; to go to Venice and Eome with an army of 
red-shirted volunteers and noisy manifestations was 
not possible. Garibaldi alone thought it so; and the 
situation became the more serious that it was no longer 
a time to stake all for all, or risk in new adventures the 
existence of a kiDgdom of twenty-two millions of Italians, 
and Italian unity, scarcely as yet more than nominally 
acquired — still unfinished. 

Cavour, we may well believe, had the freedom of 
Venice at heart as warmly as Garibaldi ; he could not 
forget Venice, for it was in her behalf that he so violently 
burst out after Villafranca, almost causing a rupture with 
the Emperor ; nor could he lose sight of the dangers 
which an act of imprudence might at any moment pro- 
voke on the Mincio, and he was resolved not to commit 
it or allow it to be committed. To him it was hence- 
forth a matter of leadership, an opportunity in which he 
sought, as he always did, to have the mind of the country 



300 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

with him, and not to deceive it. " However strong may 
be our love for Venice — that great martyr," he said, 
" we must admit that war with Austria at this moment 
would be impossible ; impossible because Europe will not 
suffer it. I know that there are men who think little of 
the opposition of Cabinets. I do not. I would remind 
them that to run counter to the wishes of the Powers 
has ever been fatal to princes and people. Great catas- 
trophes have resulted from too great a contempt for the 
feelings of other nations." When asked how, then, he 
meant to solve the Venetian question, he would reply 
that Europe must be brought round; opposition springing 
from Governments only must be disarmed ; this last illu- 
sion of a possible reconciliation between the Venetians and 
Austria must be dispelled ; and, finally, it must be shown 
that the Italians, after constituting themselves into a 
nation, were capable of being organised and formed into 
a solid State based on the will of the people. " Then," 
he exclaimed, "the opinion of Europe will change. 
.... When the truth can no longer be seriously 
contested, the fate of Venice will awaken immense 
sympathy, not only in generous France and in just- 
minded England, but in noble Germany. I believe 
a time is not far distant when the greater part of 
Germany will no longer consent to be an accomplice in 
heaping misfortunes on Venice. When this occurs we 
shall be on the eve of deliverance. Will this deliverance 
take place through the agency of arms or negotiations ? 
Providence alone can decide upon that." 

We see that Cavour gave himself time to take 
counsel with circumstances, though he well knew that 



COMPLEXITY OF TEE ROMAN QUESTION. 301 

at any moment the Viennese Cabinet might be tempted 
to bring matters to a sudden termination, and he held 
himself in readiness for what might happen. The 
Venetian question was as yet relatively simple. The 
Eoman question was far more complex : it affected 
everything, from the very constitution of Italian unity 
by the choice of a capital, to the beliefs, interests, and 
traditions of the Catholic world through the Temporal 
Power ; and by the prolonged presence of a French gar- 
rison at Eome it affected the most intimate relations 
with France, It was at once a national and universal, 
a religious and diplomatic question : and it is here that 
Cavour displayed indeed the powers of a mind marvel- 
lously penetrating and clear, showing himself a master 
in the art of contriving and combining, absolutely free 
from vulgar prejudice, and pursuing, by the aid of 
Liberalism, the solution of an apparently insoluble 
problem. 

IX. 

This Roman question, which he had so often met 
with for the last twenty years, and could not fully face 
when he was only the representative of little Piedmont, 
he again encountered as minister of united Italy ; and 
the business he had to settle was in reality nothing less 
than a complete transformation of the political condi- 
tions of the Papacy. He had one advantage which 
belonged to his liberal and open mind, and it had often 
come to his assistance in all these delicate religious 
affairs. He had no animosity or prejudice of any sort 
as regards the Church : it is true that he looked upon 



302 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJR. 

the Temporal Power as lost ; he thought it as incom- 
patible with Italian nationality as it was little favourable 
to religion ; he spoke of it openly and temperately, like 
one with a great problem to solve, no sectarian passions 
to appease; and precisely because he looked abroad from 
the height of a lofty policy, he was able to accept what- 
ever was in harmony with his object in view, and eager 
to offer the Church the fullest compensation in liberty 
and independence for her lost Temporal Power. One 
day, about this period, he wrote to a confidential friend : 
" There are to my mind two methods ; the one above 
board, the other secret. The first would be resolutely to 
submit the matter to the public judgment : for instance, 
if I or another member of the Cabinet, or the king 
himself, were officially to declare, either in public speech 
or before parliament, the views of the Government in 
relation to religious affairs. The second would be to 
despatch a secret agent to Rome, whose presence would 
be unknown to our adversaries, and Antonelli among 
them : this agent to have the fullest confidence of the 
Government; in a manner to impress the belief that he 
is the bearer, and may be the receiver of serious pro- 
posals." Cavour made use of both these methods alter- 
nately, sometimes simultaneously, as a man who joined 
to a purely logical mind the rarest flexibility in practical 
issues. 

It should be understood that even in the sharpest of 
these struggles and crises Cavour was not long without 
having secret dealings with Rome. Early in 1860 the 
king's private chaplain, Abbate Stellardi, had been sent 
to the Pope, with the mission to propose a Vicariat 



DR. PANTALEONI. 303 

stretching to Umbria and the Marches, as well as over 
the Legations. Pins IX. listened suavely, and with some 
show of emotion ; he went so far as to discuss certain 
points, and ended by refusing his consent. When the 
Marches were being overrun, or shortly afterwards, 
Cavour, instead of envenoming the breach, did his 
utmost to moderate the wrath of Eome. He gave 
orders for the unconditional release of the prisoners, and 
wrote, towards the end of October, to Dr. Pantaleoni, 
a friend of his established in Rome : " I send a person 
to Rome deputed to yield up the captured gendarmes. 
The same person is commissioned to inquire whether the 
Holy Father begins to perceive the necessity of coming 
to an understanding with us, which the Roman Court 
will do well to do, and by which its spiritual indepen- 
dence will be far better assured than by foreign arms." 
The same idea had struck Dr. Pantaleoni, and of this 
came a secret negotiation, continuing up to the close of 
1860 and the first weeks of 1861, Father Passaglia 
speedily becoming associated with it. 

Other negotiations were concurrent ; the one con- 
ducted by Dr. Pantaleoni was the main one. Cavour 
concealed nothing from the Emperor, who had his own 
projects, but ended by joining the mysterious business in 
hand. What was the aim of it ? The Temporal Power 
was quietly to be swept away. The Pope remained sove- 
reign with all sovereign prerogatives, rights, inviolability, 
and honours ; with a large patrimony in real estate in 
the kingdom, and absolute ownership of the Vatican and 
other palaces and residences. The Church became com- 
pletely free and independent in its spiritual ministry. 



304 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

The State renounced all rights of intervention in the 
affairs of the Church. It was the notable treaty of peace 
long dreamed of by Cavour, and summed up in his famous 
phrase : " A free Church in a free State." 

How far was the Court of Eome serious in this nego- 
tiation ? At all events it seemed at one time to lend an 
ear to it. Father Passaglia was the most active inter- 
mediary between Eome and Turin ; Cardinal Santucci 
accepted the office of negotiator. One and the other 
had interviews with the Pope, who listened to them, 
insomuch that Cavour one day received the following 
despatch at Turin : " Cardinal Santucci has thought fit 
to tell the Pope everything ; he has spoken to him of 
the certain loss of the Temporal Power, and the friendly 
propositions that have been made. The Holy Father 
has shown himself resigned. Antonelli has been sum- 
moned ; he began with a lively opposition, then became 
equally resigned, and requested the Pope to absolve him 
and Santucci from the oath, that they might treat of the 
possible surrender of the Temporal possessions. They 
are to see Passaglia, and the latter asks me on their 
behalf for someone to be indicated here or sent from 
Turin to negotiate. It is desired that the person selected 
be not a lawyer." The telegraph was immediately at 
work to carry the news to the Emperor, who, to tell 
truth, while anxious for success, seemed to have little 
hope of it. Cavour, of course, could scarcely flatter 
himself that he was so near his ends ; still, he thought 
he perceived a door open ; he redoubled his efforts ; he 
designated the negotiators that had been asked of him, 
and wrote to Father Passaglia : "I entertain the belief 



IN SECRET AND BY PARLIAMENT. 305 

that before next Easter you will be able to send me the 
olive branch, symbol of peace between the Church and 

the State — between the Papacy and the Italians " 

And what occurred ? At the moment when the first step 
to a negotiation seemed to be made, the whole aspect of 
things changed. Either it was that Cardinal Antonelli 
had only appeared to yield in order the better to master 
the designs of his enemies and find the means of com- 
bating them, or else that his hope of evading the neces- 
sity had revived, and he believed he saw symptoms of 
coming events in Europe, signs of a possible intervention 
of the Catholic Powers. 

A final attempt had evidently been risked to hold 
back the Pope, half inclining to reconciliation. In any 
case, Cardinal Antonelli lost no time in cutting the 
threads of the projected arrangement ; and he went so 
far as to give orders to Dr. Pantaleoni to quit the 
Eoman States within four- and- twenty hours ! The 
intrigues of the foes of peace triumphed for the time : 
everything was in suspense. Cavour had not succeeded 
by the "secret means;" he had the "public means " to 
try — the parliament ; and he found occasion in due course 
in an interpellation addressed to him on the affairs of 
Eome, in March, 1861. This opportune interpellation 
was for him but another manner of taking up and con- 
tinuing the negotiation in the light of day, in the face 
of Italian and universal opinion, and frankly avowing to 
its full extent — I might add, in its grandeur — the policy 
whose realisation he had never ceased to prosecute. 

He had said in parliament : " The star now directing 
us is this, that the Eternal City, upon which twenty 



306 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUR. 

centuries have cast glory of all kinds, should become the 
capital of the kingdom of Italy." What he had already 
said he confirmed, with more precision and breadth, in 
the month of March, 1861. Cavour certainly was not 
one to be led astray by imagination and artistic enthu- 
siasm. He confesses, with some humorous modesty, 
that for his part he preferred the plain straight streets of 
his native town to all the monuments of Eome. He 
loved Turin ; it was not without regret that he thought 
of sacrificing it ; and he was led to exclaim : "Ah ! if 
only Italy could have two capital cities : one for 
Sundays, the other for the days of the week!" His 
resolution was taken entirely on political grounds, 
because the name and majesty of Rome alone could 
dominate the rivalries of Italian cities, and so put the 
definitive stamp on unity ; and he considered it was of 
prime necessity to let Europe know that Rome was 
looked on by the whole nation as vitally the capital of 
the country. "No city but Rome," he cried, "can be 
the capital of Italy ; but here we come upon the per- 
plexities of the problem. We must go to Rome, but on 
two conditions : that we are acting in concert with. 
France, and that the great body of Catholics in Italy 
and elsewhere do not see in the reunion of Rome with 
Italy the source of the subjection of the Church. In 
other words, we go to Rome, but not to restrict the 
independence of the Sovereign Pontiff — not to bring 
spiritual things under the yoke of civil authority " 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE POPE. 307 

x. 

Unquestionably the task was not a light one ; neither 
was it an impossible one as regarded France. He said 
plainly : "It would be madness, in the present state of 
Europe, to think of going to Eome in spite of France. 

We owe France a great debt of gratitude ; but 

there is a graver motive for being in harmony with her. 
When, in 1859, we called France to our aid, the 
Emperor did not conceal from us the engagements 
by which he was bound to the Court of Rome. We 
accepted his assistance without protesting against the 
particular obligations he had imposed on himself; and 
now that we have won so much from this alliance, we 
cannot protest against the engagements to which, up to 
a certain point, we have consented." There was but 
one way of disengaging France, and quieting with her 
the whole Catholic world ; and it was by giving the 
Church what a pretended Temporal Power — painfully 
sustained for twenty years by foreign arms, incapable 
of supporting itself or regenerating itself by reforms — 
could not give it : this was by establishing the dignhy 
with the independence of the Sovereign Pontiff and of 
the Church by the separation of the two powers, a large 
application of the principle of liberty in relation to civil 
and to religious society. " It is clear," he pursued, 
" that if this separation were distinctly and irrevocably 
accomplished, if the independence of the Church were 
thus established, the independence of the Pope would 
be much more securely based than it is to-day. His 
authority would be more efficacious, being no longer 

x 2 



308 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

bound by concordats, and all those bonds and treaties 
which have been and must remain indispensable so long 
as the Pope is a temporal sovereign. The authority of 
the Pope, far from diminishing, will be greatly extended 
in the spiritual sphere which is his own." If it was but a 
mighty hope, and if they were not to succeed at the first 
stroke, let there be no discouragement, and let it not fail 
to be reiterated : " Whether or not an understanding 
with the Pope precedes our entrance into the Eternal 
City, Italy will no sooner have declared the fall of the 
Temporal Power than she will separate Church and State, 
and establish the liberty of the Church on the broadest 
foundations." 

Cavour sincerely believed what he said, and he 
believed what he asked was in the interests of the Church 
as well as in the interests of Italy. One day, when his 
intimate friend, Signor Artom, was expressing his doubts 
and fears, he exclaimed with his kindling vivacity : 
" I have more faith than you in the effects of liberty. 
Do you not # see that the time has come to settle the 
question of the Temporal Power, which has ever been the 
stumbling-block in the way of Italian nationality, and 
that the only way of settling it is to reassure the Catholic 
world as to what Italy will do with the Papacy ? In- 
justice is done to Catholicism, when it is urged that it is 
incompatible with liberty. On the contrary, my con- 
viction is, that as soon as the Church shall have tasted 
liberty, she will feel herself renewed in youth by that 
wholesome and fortifying regimen. When Europe shall 
have been convinced that we are not striving against 
Catholicism, she will find it natural and fitting that the 



THE AIM FOB ITALY. 309 

Italian rather than any other flag should float over 
Rome. The enterprise is not easy, but it is worth being 
attempted." More than any other, Cavour was made to 
attempt it. He had not yet succeeded, it is true ; but 
after disentangling a revived Italy from her disorders 
and divisions, he had marked on the horizon a final aim, 
while shaping the road to reach it. He himself had 
touched the supreme point in human destiny, when a 
man made powerful by freedom, begirt by a solid 
popularity, though still with struggles before him, can 
only be stopped by death surprising him in harness, and 
in the hour of victory. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE FINAL VICTORY OF A POLICY — DEATH AND 
LEGACY OF CAVOUR. 



Italian Unity and Europe — Austria and the Annexations — La Marmora's- 
Mission to Berlin — Last Negotiation with Napoleon III. — Unity at Naples 
— Baron Bicasoli's Discourse and Interpellation — Cavour and Garibaldi 
before Parliament — The Sitting of April 18, 1861 — A Minister's last Victory 
— Sudden Illness of Cavour — His last Moments — His Death — Fra Giacomo 
— Legacy of Cavour — His Work and his Policy — Conclusion. 



To have shaped a reality out of a dream ; to have suc- 
ceeded in loading the revolution of a partly-enslaved 
people almost to the farthest limit, without suffering it 
to run to wreck in convulsions, by covering it before 
Europe with the mantle of a traditional monarchy — such 
was the fortune of Cavour early in 1861. 

What the bold Piedmontese had accomplished up to 
that time, he had not done unaided. Had he not met 
with many favourable circumstances on his way ; many 
propitious conditions — a European situation lending 
itself singularly to adventurous daring ; a small country 
forming a firm and vigorous instrument of action ; a 
soldierly and patriotic king ; concurrence of opinion and 



REVIEW OF THINGS ACCOMPLISHED. 311 

national sentiment ; auxiliaries of every kind seconding 
his designs, either skilfully or audaciously — had he not 
met with all this, he could not have succeeded. His 
genius was shown in his power of combining these 
many elements, and in handling them with a profound 
knowledge of the secret springs of policy ; and if he was 
successful to the end, it was because he knew how to lay 
out his work ahead. In fact, that which had lately 
occurred — this last act of the drama enacted at Ancona 
and at Naples — was after all but the crowning event, 
itself perhaps somewhat precipitate and unexpected, of 
the scheme which for twelve years had been developing 
itself in successive widening circles from Novara to the 
Crimean war ; from the congress at Paris, to the war of 
1859 ; from the peace of Villafranca, to the annexation 
and final unification. The unity of Italy, springing to 
life ultimately in a whirlwind — it might almost be said, 
a victory over revolutionary passions as well as over 
Bourbons and the Pope — had become now and hence- 
forward a living fact. It comprised Italy, from the Alps 
to the Adriatic, except Venice and Rome, the two 
immovable points before which it must halt for a time. 
Italy had her king, her army, her parliament, and her 
chancellor. The thing was done, and though, like many 
others, elated by so prodigious a transformation, Cavour 
himself could not be ignorant of the fact, that all was 
not as yet accomplished. He knew that, following the 
romance and adventure, the entire political business 
remained to be taken up and settled, and it was a thorny 
and complicated business : thus, amid the victor's cares, 
never doubting of the future, but putting away illusions, 



312 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOJJB. 

he wrote : " My task is even more laborious and painful 
than it used to be. To build up Italy, to blend the 
divers elements of which she is composed, and har- 
monise the North with the South, presents as many diffi- 
culties as does a war with Austria and the struggle with 
Rome " 

ii. 

The question was in fact exceedingly serious. 
Knowing what others did not know, and with an eye 
fixed on Europe as well as on Italy, Cavour could not be 
deceived, and he lost not a moment in fitting himself 
either to overcome or evade the difficulties of every 
kind surrounding him. 

The first of these was the probable collision with 
Austria openly defied. The situation of Italy relative 
to Austria was perilous when the annexation of Tuscany 
or Romagna was at stake ; it became very much more 
so when the whole of Italy united under the influence 
of an ardent passion of nationality, and Venice became 
the watchword. Morally speaking, war had begun 
through the violation of all treaties, and by the very 
nature of that Italian revolution of which every step 
threatened the imperial power on the Mincio and on the 
Adige. Hostilities might commence at any moment ; 
Austria might take advantage of the Southern crisis, 
and more than once in those cruel moments of suspense 
Cavour had feared that she would. Towards the end of 
1860 he wrote, not without some emotion, to Madame 
de Circourt : " We may perhaps be severely tried. It 
seems as if Austria meant to take advantage of the 



APPREHENSIONS OF AN ATTACK. 313 

absence of the king and of all our divisions to attack 
us. We are preparing to oppose her to the uttermost. 
Cialdini and Fanti are at Naples, but we have here La 
Marmora and Sonnaz, and they are not men to be in- 
timidated. We are ready to stake all for all. The 
country is as calm as though the sky were cloudless ; it 
knows the danger but does not fear it, for it also 
knows the cause to be great enough to warrant any 

sacrifice " 

Austria, it is true, had remained motionless ; she had 
been unable to obtain either from Eussia or Prussia the 
support and encouragement she had hoped to gather 
from an interview then famous — the interview of War- 
saw ; and on the other hand she was made dubious by 
the enigmatical attitude of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, 
as well as by the protection France was in any case 
bound to extend over Lombardy. She stood to her 
arms, nevertheless, ready to enter on a campaign, re- 
solved not to fail in her steps forward if the fault of an 
attack on her were committed : in reality, perhaps 
anxious for a pretext, if it were only some rashness 
on the part of the Italian volunteers, which she might 
have made good use of before Europe. Cavour warily 
avoided furnishing the pretext ; he was, on the contrary, 
especially vigilant in preventing anything that might 
have worn a semblance of an armed aggression. After 
having feared that he himself would be attacked, he 
was not long in detecting the Austrian game. " It is 
evident," he wrote in March, 1861, to Count Vimercati, 
at Paris, " that Austria seeks a provocation : we will not 
do her the particular service." 



314 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

At this critical moment Cavour was chiefly solicitous 
to keep Austria in good humour without yielding to her, 
while leaving the Venetian question in some sort open, 
without wildly and prematurely rushing to meet a 
contest that might prove mortal for Italy. In order to 
succeed, Cavour had not only to make use of the wariest 
prudence towards Austria, he had to clear away all the 
suspicions and prejudices that were roused in Europe by 
recent events : in a word, to reconcile all policies to the 
idea of Italian unity and the existence of a new Power. 
With England this was not difficult. The English 
Cabinet was the protector and backer of Italy, so long 
as Italy engaged not to attack Austria on the Mincio, 
thus giving the signal for a European war. Eussia and 
Prussia had evinced their displeasure by an open rupture, 
and by the recalling of their ministers from Turin : with 
them the task was not so easy. Notwithstanding all 
this, Cavour did not relinquish the hope of calming the 
two Northern Powers, at least Prussia, whose secret 
ambition he ^always contrived to flatter, trusting sooner 
or later to win her over to his cause. He had been wise 
enough not to attach too great an importance to the 
rupture ; he only looked for a good opportunity to 
renew an amicable understanding with Prussia ; and 
accordingly in the early part of 1861, when the Prince 
Eegent — the future Emperor William — was about to 
assume the Crown, Cavour despatched La Marmora with 
a special mission to Berlin. 

This act of royal courtesy from Victor Emmanuel 
towards the Prussian sovereign was really only a cloak for 
the renewal, after the war and annexations, of Marquis 



LA MARMORA AT BERLIN. 315 

Pepoli's mission before the war of 1859. Cavour sought 
to reassure Prussia as to his pacific intentions, persuading 
her that this Venetian question, which troubled her, had 
nothing of the importance regarding German frontier 
defences that artful Austria sought to attach to it. La 
Marmora was especially charged to reiterate, in all his 
conversations at Berlin, that the two Governments had 
common interests, that they both drew their strength 
from the national idea they had in view ; that a united 
Italy could never be other than a natural and useful ally 
to Prussia, destined to create and support the hegemony 
of Germany. 

King "William had not yet had time to become accus- 
tomed to the views that another bold hand was about to 
open to him " with fire and sword." He received La 
Marmora with courtesy, but said not a word of the 
events which had recently taken place beyond the Alps. 
Baron Von Schleinitz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
complacently pursued the conversation, in a tone half 
sympathetic and half reserved, expressive of the unde- 
cided attitude of Prussia. " No doubt/' he said, "there 
is between Piedmont and Prussia a striking analogy ; 
but we cannot approve everything that you have done. 
I admit that in the critical situation in which you were 
placed, you could scarcely do otherwise. We, for our 
part, have thwarted you as little as possible. As to 
Venice, and her unfortunate condition, rest assured that 
we have no intention of throwing oil on the fire, should 
Austria sooner or later show herself disposed to relinquish 
it ; but in that case we must come to an understanding 
how best to secure the interests of Germany on the 



316 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

Adriatic I understand your wish that Prussia 

should acknowledge the kingdom of Italy ; do not put a 
knife to our throats, and we will do all in our power to 
keep on good terms with the Government of Turin. We 
leave it to Count Cavour's keen-sighted wisdom to afford 
us the opportunity for doing more." It was all that 
Cavour wanted ; in leaving to the future what the future 
was actually to bring forth, he had for the moment 
succeeded, since he perceived at once Prussia less hostile 
and Austria more isolated. 



in. 



Another element in this still uncertain and always 
perilous situation, and another source of perplexity, was 
Eome : a question affecting everything ; affecting Italy in 
the definite construction of her unity ; France in the 
protection with which she covered the Papacy; and 
Europe and the Catholic world as to the independence 
of the Pontiff. Cavour felt the weight and measured the 
difficulties of all these things. " I do not conceal from 
you," he wrote about this time, " that even in my 
moments of busiest occupation, my thoughts are always 
centred on the Roman question " 

At the point reached by Italian affairs, Cavour could 
not put aside that problem of " Eome for the capital," 
and the Temporal Power of the Pope, imposed upon him 
by the irresistible logic of events, and which the re- 
volutionary passions, heated by Garibaldi's call, might 
turn into a formidable weapon and a plan of action. 
At the same time, he well knew that he dared not 



INTRIGUES AND DEBATES. 317 

deal witli what remained of the Temporal Power, 
with Rome and the patrimony of St. Peter as he 
had done with the Romagna, Umbria, or the Marches 
— he knew that he must not attempt or sanction any 
surprise vi et armis in the presence of Catholic Europe 
disquieted and France encamped in the Eternal City. 
Cavour had a profound consciousness of these difficulties, 
which might prove a stumbling-block to the unity he 
sought; and to make head against a situation so en- 
tangled, he became doubly energetic and wary, not 
excluding any transaction compatible with the national 
integrity. Scarcely emerged from the great Southern 
crisis, he was tentatively pushing at Rome, about the 
person of the Pope, those mysterious advances which he 
did not despair of bringing to a good issue. While 
diplomatising with the cardinals, he took advantage of 
the full light of parliamentary debates, to lay his schemes 
of liberal policy before Italian and European opinion, nor 
did he limit himself to this. He was at the same 
moment giving his whole attention to a private negotia- 
tion with France, in order to obtain from the Emperor 
the recognition of the kingdom of Italy, and, by a new 
application of the principle of non-intervention, the 
recall of the French garrison at Rome. 

It would have been a decided success for Cavour, and 
a step towards the realisation of that portion of his pro- 
gramme by which he declared that nothing should be . 
done but what was in agreement with France at Rome, 
and to this end he did not refuse the guarantees claimed 
of him. Here was one more phase in the everlasting 
diplomacy between Turin and Paris. Prince Napoleon 



318 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

was the agent in this secret negotiation. In the earlier 
days of April, 1861, he communicated to Cavour the 
Emperor's views on the subject of Koman affairs as 
follows : " The Emperor, who has occupied Eome for 
twelve years, will not consent that the withdrawal of his 
troops should be interpreted as a giving of the lie to his 
policy ; and as the beating a retreat before this unity of 
Italy, effected independently of his wishes ; but he 
desires to withdraw his soldiers from Eome to be free 
of a false position. It is of the greatest importance to 
the Italian Government that this act should take place ; 
it behoves it, therefore, to overlook all secondary and 
temporary difficulties in the matter. The policy of non- 
intervention applied to Eome and the patrimony of 
St. Peter might serve as the basis of a common accord. 
The Pope being considered as an independent sovereign, 
France could withdraw her garrison from Rome without 
affording Austria the opportunity of taking her place ; 
the Italian Government, on its part, would enter into 
an engagement with France, not only to abstain from 
hostilities with the Pontifical Government, but also to 
prevent any armed attack either from Garibaldi's volun- 
teers or other Italians Without recognising the 

Pope's right to have recourse to foreign intervention, the 
Emperor will probably require that the Italian Govern- 
ment should grant the Pontifical Government the right 
to organise a Catholic army of foreigners, on the condition 
of that army being a defensive force, and deprived of the 
power of becoming a means of offence against Italy. To 
you the immense advantage of this understanding is that 
it will give you an immediate opportunity of renewing 



REPLY TO PRINCE NAPOLEON. 319 

your diplomatic relations with France, considering that 
Austria may recommence hostilities at any instant, and 

you will see Kome liberated of a foreign garrison " 

Cavour, on his part, hastened to reply : " I confess 
that in the first instance I was alarmed at the difficulties 
and dangers presented by the execution of the plan to 
which the Emperor might consent, that we may come to 
a provisional solution of the Roman question. The 
promises we should have to make, and the probable con- 
dition of Rome after the departure of the French troops, 
place us in a most equivocal position before the country, 
parliament, the Romans, and especially before Garibaldi ; 
but when only two courses are open to us, we must 
choose the least dangerous, whatever the precipices lying 
in our way. I have not been long in convincing myself 
that we ought to accept the proposals made to us ; 
alliance with France being the basis of our policy, there 
is no sacrifice I would not be disposed to make, that the 

alliance should not be questioned " The two 

confederates of Plombieres, though they had one 
momentary rupture, more apparent than it was serious, 
always felt attracted towards one another ; they found 
themselves in harmony again as to the new condition of 
Rome, and the remains of the Temporal Papacy in the 
midst of a united Italy. This was virtually the origin, 
as it were the first sketch, of a combination that did not 
become an act of official diplomacy until three years 
later, but which was being arranged by Cavour and 
Napoleon III. in the months of excitement and alarm 
beginning 1861. 



320 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

IV. 

But this was only a part of the difficulties brought 
about by t the new situation. The more serious and 
immediate complication was in the interior — at Naples, 
in those southern provinces suddenly annexed to the 
North. I am not even alluding to the defence of 
Francis II. at Gaeta, the final resistance of a young and 
unfortunate sovereign, prolonging the struggle for nearly 
four months, as if to afford to Europe time to come for- 
ward to his assistance. The Bourbon standard, fixed on 
the rock of Gaeta until February 13, 1861, represented 
but a vanquished cause. 

There was less difficulty in this military protest, 
without response or hope as it was, than in the moral 
condition of this southern country, suddenly given up to 
a kind of stormy transition, and the disorganisation of a 
revolutionary interregnum. As long as the annexation 
extended only to such regions as Lombardy, Tuscany, 
the Eomagna, or Parma, it was easy. But represent- 
ing, as it then did, an entire kingdom, separated from 
the North by manners, customs, and traditions — the 
passionate, clever, mobile, and exuberant Neapolitans 
formed at the extremity of Italy an ungovernable mass, 
rebellious to any assimilation. Every element of 
anarchy accumulated under a demoralising system was 
bursting out. In the bosom of unbounded liberty, each 
party naturally took advantage of the fanaticism, the 
passions, and disorderly instincts of an impressionable 
population, easily set against laws, taxes, and the whole 
new order of things. A veritable system of brigandage 



FERMENT IN THE SOUTH. 321 

was organised, with a political cloak to it, by the de- 
fenders of the fallen regime. Mazziniism, on the other 
hand, took lip the name of Garibaldi ; to make the 
southern provinces the centre of its agitations. In vain 
the Cabinet of Turin tried to govern this chaos by send- 
ing a succession of lieutenants — first Farini, then the 
Prince of Carignano, with Cavaliere Nigra ; next Signor 
Ponza di San Marttino ; these excited, turbulent, and 
undisciplined rather than hostile southern provinces 
continued an anarchical riddle to the Piedmontese who 
succeeded one another at Naples. The South threatened 
to become another Ireland in a scarcely constituted 
kingdom, so that Cavour was brought face to face with 
every external and internal complication of an unfinished 
work. 

He might well say that he had not yet the right to 
rest on his oars, or be satisfied with his conquest. He 
had simultaneously to negotiate the accession of a new 
Italy with Europe, to fix his policy in Venice and Rome, 
to continue to quiet the southern provinces, assimilate 
the legislation and administration of all these different 
provinces, reorganise the army of the new kingdom, and 
unite six or seven budgets into one, which from the very 
first presented a deficit of 500 millions of francs ! 

Sometimes, notwithstanding his natural vitality and 
vigour, he fell into indescribable apprehensions, asking 
himself whether he could carry out this absorbing work 
on which he was bestowing his activity and his life ; but 
he soon took courage again. He braced himself against 
the difficulties which assailed him, and which proceeded 
from divisions, personal resentments, things, and men, in 

Y 



322 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

turn — often from men in the highest position ; and from 
those many questions of organisation which he directed 
and settled in the midst of absolute liberty, for he would 
consent neither to a dictatorship, to simplify the work of 
unification, nor a state of siege to pacify Naples. It 
was through discussion that he hoped to succeed, though 
the trials in store for him should be heavy. His strength 
was in the parliament and in the confidence of the 
country, in his immense influence on the popular mind, 
and the gatherings of the elect of the nation, the liberals 
who rallied to his views. His weakness consisted in a 
situation still unsettled and undecided, where all might 
be wrecked by some ill-regulated outburst, or the daring 
of some popular leader ; a condition of things in which 
incandescent passions, especially in the South, might 
rush headlong into some adventure in the direction of 
Rome or Venice, and ruin in a mad enterprise schemes 
of the most far-sighted policy. 

"What was wanted to revive a struggle such as that 
which Cavour had sustained with Garibaldi, in October, 
1860? Perhaps only a pretext, any unforeseen incident ; 
and neither pretexts nor incidents were wanting in the 
spring of 1861 — one of those stormy springs of that 
period which, to use Lord Palmerston's expression, " came 
in like lions." The pretext of the moment was the 
dissolution or reorganisation of the army of the South, 
that is to say of those volunteers who had gone through 
the campaigns of Sicily and Naples with Garibaldi. So 
irregular a force evidently could not be allowed to sub- 
sist, good as it was at best either for an adventure like 
the Sicilian expedition, or any such time of high national 



THE GAEIBALDIAN VOLUNTEERS. 323 

-enthusiasm. General Fanti, the Minister of War, would 
not have it, in the interests of the army ; and in the 
interests of diplomacy, Cavour could not consent to retain 
it. Great consideration was shown. Generals, who proved 
worthy of their rank, were made of officers like Nino 
Bixio, Cozenz, and Medici. Many of the officers were 
offered rank in the national army ; in short, the principle 
of volunteer service was maintained. Nevertheless, the 
southern army, such as it had existed, existed no longer ; 
and perhaps the Minister of War may have been guilty 
of some slight want of judgment in the execution of 
these delicate matters. 

No more was needed to awaken the wrath of Garibaldi, 
and this was precisely the kind of conflict Cavour was 
far from seeking ; he was troubled by it, but he accepted 
it with as little animosity as weakness. It was felt that 
the quarrel of the previous October was but inefficiently 
settled, and that it might at any moment kindle again 
with all its fury, with all its dangers likewise. 



v. 

It was Garibaldi's misfortune not to content himself 
with being a man of mark ; he mistook his warlike or 
revolutionary fancies for a policy, and flattered himself 
with the belief that nothing would be denied to him. 

Stopped in his plans with regard to Rome and 
Venice, after the annexation of Naples, Garibaldi had 
carried with him to his island of Caprera a soured and 
irritated mind, full of an undying resentment against 
Cavour. He had retired, leaving to his companions an 



324 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

order of the day, in which he appointed to meet them 
the following spring. In the meantime, from the depth 
of his retreat, which he had not even left to go to the 
meeting of parliament at Turin, he was spreading fire 
and flame. He gave utterance to declamations which 
were a signal for disturbance. Had he rested content to 
be the defender of the southern army and of the volun- 
teers, or had he even agitated for a general arming of 
the people, he would have been keeping to his part ; and 
his impetuous patriotism, although it might have been 
thought imprudent, would only have met with sym- 
pathy ; but he would not rest content with that. With 
the intemperateness of the soldier and popular idol he 
attacked everything, abusing the Government and all 
who upheld it. He pointed to the Moderates and 
Liberals, to those parliamentary members who recog- 
nised in Cavour their first representative and their 
guide, as being all but conspirators in treason. To a 
deputation of Milanese workmen, who presented an 
address to him at Caprera, he said, among other things : 
"For the holy redemption of this land, I rely on the 
rough hands of men of my stamp, rather than on the 
lying promises of false 'politicians. Notwithstanding 
the sad effects of a vassal policy unworthy of the 
country, and notwithstanding all that the crowd of 
lackeys upholding this monstrous and anti-national 

policy may say, Italy must stand : she must live " 

Shortly afterwards, in accepting the presidency of the 
Association of Italian Unity, he used the same violent 
expressions, arousing the same excitement. He recom- 
mended to his fellow-countrymen to fortify themselves 



WRATHFUL DECLAMATIONS. 325 

against " that cowardly fear which those seek to inspire 
who have dragged Italian honour in the dust." 

It was with such declamations as these that the 
Cincinnatus of Caprera called for a general arming ! 
He strangely outstepped the limits of his popularity, 
and of his prestige as conqueror of the Two Sicilies. 
He did not see that he was subjecting Italian unity, 
only just created, to a still greater risk than any that it 
had yet known ; that with one blow he struck king, 
army, and the parliament of which he was himself a 
member ; and that if a man, whoever he might be, could 
speak thus, nothing was left but the dictatorship of an 
ungoverned will and an implacable resentment. Gari- 
baldi certainly had not calculated the effect of these 
intemperate and dangerous words, which, no doubt, 
stirred up the passions of the country, and might find 
an echo in the South, but reverberated in a very dii- 
ferent manner at Turin and in the Chambers, where 
they excited the liveliest susceptibilities. Not only was 
the Government offended, but the deputies expressed a 
firm resolution not to allow such an outrage to pass 
unnoticed ; and thus this singular conflict began to 
assume serious proportions. It was loudly said that it 
was time to have done with it ; and that even for the 
honour of liberal institutions j>arliament was bound to 
set a watch over its dignity, though it should strike the 
popular hero, and show him that he could not have 
impunity in abuse. 

But who was to take the initiative ? If the Govern- 
ment, it would seem too official ; besides, the President 
of the Council would not appear to accept offensive 



326 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 

words which were, more than at any other, aimed at 
him; if a deputy, notorious for particular views, or 
obscure, the parliamentary demonstration might be led 
astray or fail of its object. There happened to be a man 
in parliament exactly fitted for the part, Baron Bettino 
Ricasoli. By his energetic and decisive activity in the 
events which had brought about the unity, by his rela- 
tions with Garibaldi during the interregnum in Central 
Italy, and by his independence both of station and 
character, he fulfilled all the required conditions, and 
he was fashioned to measure himself with any one. 

The former dictator of Florence had just arrived at 
Turin ; and on his first appearance in the Chamber, his 
proud and grave aspect, the natural dignity and severity 
of his manner and person, made a strong impression. 
His presence inspired a mixture of curiosity and respect. 
Like many others, the Florentine baron had been 
wounded by Garibaldi's violent language. He spon- 
taneously undertook to meet the defiant attack, and 
protest on behalf of institutions ; and in Eicasoli a par- 
liamentary manifestation necessarily assumed the most 
serious character. He proposed to ask the Government 
for explanations on the measures it had taken, or was 
about to take, with regard to the southern army, and 
the development of the military forces of the nation. 
But, previous to this, he had another account to settle : 
he wished to put an end to the anxieties for some days 
past troubling every mind; and it was on April 10, in 
the midst of an excited assembly, that he rose to his 
feet, all being hushed about him instantly. 

He was known as the dictator at Florence ; it was 



SPEECH OF BIGASOLL 327 

not yet known what sort of a speaker he might be, nor 
what he was going to say, when with a clear vibrating 
voice, and an imperious tone, which gathered fire as it 
went, he uttered the following overwhelming words : 
" A calumny has been circulated abroad concerning one 
of the members of the Assembly. Expressions hostile 
to the majority in parliament have been attributed to 
General Garibaldi. They cannot have been uttered by 
him. I know him, and I shook his hand when he was 
about to take command of the central army : we were 
then animated by the same sentiments — we were both 
equally devoted to the king. We both swore that we 
would do our duty ; I have done mine ! . . . . Who is 
it, then, that could proudly claim for himself the exclusive 
privilege of devotion and patriotism, and exalt himself 
above his fellows ? One head only has the right to be 
higher than any other among us — that of the king. Before 
him we must all bend, and any other attitude would be 
that of a rebel ! . . . . Victor Emmanuel has made our 

nation Italy's liberator being the king, and all 

Italians having marched to liberty under the command 
of a chief so magnanimous, one citizen is not above 
another. He who has had the good fortune to do his 
duty more generously, in a wider sphere of action, or in 
a manner more profitable to his country, and who has 
perfectly fulfilled it, a greater duty still lies before him, 
and it is to thank God for allowing him the inestimable 
privilege, which is granted to so few, of being able to 
say : ' I have served my country well, I have absolutely 
done my duty !' " 

These words, emphasised by his bearing and a 



328 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

vibrating delivery, as it were with the inflexible judg- 
ment of conscience and patriotism, shot a thrill through 
the whole of the Assembly, which burst forth in 
acclamations. Cavour had never heard his austere 
Florentine ally and rival speak, and had not always 
found it easy to deal with him in the affairs of Central 
Italy, and he had listened rather curiously at first ; but 
he soon began to share the universal excitement, and 
in leaving the House, he said to a friend : " To-day I 
have understood and felt the nature of true eloquence." 
Others have declared that he said : " Were I to die 
to-morrow my successor is found ! " In any case, 
royalty, parliament, institutions, and the dignity of an 
entire policy, had just received satisfaction by this 
harangue, replete with a noble severity, which singularly 
changed the parts, and transformed Garibaldi into one 
accused, and put him at the bar before his judges. 

Garibaldi, under pain of being considered a rebel — 
and notwithstanding the violence of his language he 
was not one — evidently could not decline the challenge. 
On first arriving at Turin, and as though he had felt the 
importance of Baron Bicasoli's words, he hastened to 
publish a letter, wherein he disavowed — and not without 
some spirit of dignity — all intention of censure either 
towards the king or the national representatives; this, 
however, was but a beginning. 



VI. 

Shortly after came the decisive collision in parlia- 
ment, now unavoidable, for which rendezvous had been 



GARIBALDI AND CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. 329 

given, and the presence of Garibaldi made it dramatic. 
For the last week Turin had rilled with volunteers, 
hurrying thither to escort and support their leader. The 
sturdy Piedmontese city, faithful to its king, looked 
upon this uproar with no favourable eye ; it had little 
enthusiasm for the conqueror of Naples ; it saw with no 
little impatience and apprehension a conflict in which its 
firmness would have to be the mainstay of the Govern- 
ment. 

On the day fixed — the 18th of April — the sitting 
was opened with a particular solemnity. The diplomatic 
corps had wished to be present at it; the tribunes bent 
under the weight of an excited crowd. A few moments 
elapsed, and then Garibaldi appeared in his singular cos- 
tume — the legendary red shirt and South American 
poncho. As he entered, the galleries burst forth in 
shouts of welcome, but the Chamber remained immov- 
able and cold. When the first moment was over, Baron 
Eicasoli, taking up the thread of his former subject, 
questioned the Government as to the southern army and 
the military reorganisation of the nation. 

The Minister of War, General Fanti, replied in his 
turn in a detailed statement of the measures he had 
adopted, and had found necessary. Without either 
weakness or diplomacy, he did his best to prove 
that he had done all he could do for the volunteers 
and the Garibaldian officers — for an institution born 
of the circumstances of the time — without running the 
risk of introducing into the regular army a disastrous 
spirit of rivalry, or wounding military feelings and 
interests. It was the speech of a minister defending his 



330 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 

acts on good grounds. G-aribaldi then rose, and the 
scene became animated. 

At first Garibaldi felt a little strange on this new 
stage ; he entangled himself in laborious phrases em- 
barrassing to his friends ; but speedily setting circum- 
locution aside, he went straight to the point in question, 
and to the antagonism of which he had been accused by 
Baron Eicasoli — to the personal question in short — he 
replied : "I have not given any occasion for dualism. 
It is true that plans of reconciliation have been proposed 
to me ; but these have only been in words. Italy knows 
me to be a man of deeds, and deeds have always been 

in opposition to words Whenever dualism could 

have damaged the cause of my country I have bowed, 
and shall always bow. .... But I leave it to the 
conscience of the Italian representatives here present to 
state whether I can give my hand to one who has made 
me a stranger in Italy ! " 

The agitation was beginning to manifest itself in 
loud interruptions, when Garibaldi, returning to the 
subject of . the southern army, which he stated was 
" the principal object of his presence in the Chamber," 
added, with growing excitement : " Having to speak of 
this army, I should above all relate its glorious deeds. 
The wonders it achieved have been darkened only when 
the cold and inimical hand of the Ministry has made its 
evil influence felt. When, through love of peace and 
horror of a fratricidal war, provoked by that same 

Ministry " Kt these words, before the sentence 

was complete, the tempest burst out, and protestations 
were shouted on every side ; the real struggle had come 



UPROAR IN PARLIAMENT. • 331 

at last ! Cavour, full of indignation, scarcely able to keep 
seated among the ministers, called upon the President of 
the Chamber, saying : " Such insults as these are not 
permitted ; we cannot suffer them ; see that proper 
respect is paid to the Government and representatives of 
the nation. We demand a call to order!" Eattazzi, 
the President, sadly perplexed, and almost extinguished 
in this storm, could think of no better way than to 
request Garibaldi to clothe his opinions in a less gene- 
rally offensive form. Cavour exclaimed : " He has said 
that we provoked a fratricidal war ; this is far more than 
an expression of an opinion." "Yes, a fratricidal war!" 
replied Garibaldi with vehemence. An extraordinary 
agitation convulsed the assembly. Loud shouts on the 
part of the deputies for a call to order, mixed with 
frantic applause from the galleries crowded with Gari- 
baldians ; abusive challenges, and violent invectives 
crossed each other in rapid succession, causing an inde- 
scribable confusion. The President was reduced to break 
up the sitting. 

This scene in reality, by awakening the irritation of 
the majority in the Chamber, had confounded the most 
sincere among Garibaldi's friends, and when, after some 
minutes the debate was resumed, one among them, Nino 
Bixio — himself one of the band of heroes of Sicily and 
the Yolturno — made himself the spokesman of the 
general sentiment of affliction. Bixio endeavoured to 
palliate the violent language of his ancient chief by 
invoking a patriotic return to reconciliation. " Count 
Cavour," he hastened to say, " has undoubtedly a 
generous heart. The earlier part of this day's session 



332 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

should be forgotten. It is a misfortune that it has 
happened : let us banish it from our minds " 

In spite of the wound he had received, and the 
emotion he had been unable to repress, Cavour controlled 
himself sufficiently to reply to Bixio's request that the 
insult should be overlooked, and to enter into an ex- 
planation. " It is not," he replied immediately, "that I 
natter myself with the hope of seeing the friendly 
feeling spring up again, which the honourable member 
Bixio has just entreated us to entertain. I know there 
is one deed which has put a gulf between General 
Garibaldi and me. I thought to accomplish a painful 
duty — the most painful I have ever known — in urging 
upon the king and parliament the approval of the 
cession of Nice and Savoy to France. Through the 
pain it caused me, I can realise that which General 
Garibaldi must now feel on the subject, and if he is 
unable to forgive me for that deed, I cannot hold it to be 
a reproach to him " 

Garibaldi in his turn became more calm, expressing 
a desire that, according to him, would tend to moderate 
their dissensions ; he said : " Although my sentiments 
towards Count Cavour are those of an adversary, I have 
never doubted that he also is the friend of Italy. My 
wish would be that the honourable Count should make 
use of his powerful influence to cause the law which I 
propose for the national armament to be adopted ; 
namely, to despatch the forces remaining of the southern 
army to a point wherein they might serve Italy, by 
combating a reaction daily growing more threatening : 
this is my desire ! " It was always this question of the 



THE DEBATE ON THE VOLUNTEERS. 333 

volunteers and the southern army, which reappeared in 
the shape of a desire, after showing itself under the form 
of an injunction. 

Cavour was ready to do all he could to relax a 
situation of extreme tension, promote reconciliation, and 
strive to bring Garibaldi to reason. Quick to recover 
his coolness, after the first moment of just indignation, 
he was not long in reflecting that all these rashly 
kindled conflicts descending from parliament to the 
country, might become civil war, to the destruction of 
the dawning unity ; therefore no effort was too strong for 
him, no sacrifice too great — neither the forgetting of 
personal injuries, nor concessions in particulars. There 
was but one thing — the essential one, it is true — that he 
positively refused, because in it he saw another danger, 
the external danger. He would at no price, in appearing 
to submit to Garibaldi's desire, accept a sort of active 
organisation of volunteers, which would have the appear- 
ance of preparation for an offensive war, and might ruin 
all his labour of diplomacy, of which he alone had the 
secret. " We will not," he said resolutely, " have an 
active volunteer corps, in the positive acceptation of the 
word. We decline to do what would be a real pro- 
vocation, because we do not think ourselves bound to 
follow a provocative policy." 

This was the question at issue, and for the space of 
three days he fought with consummate skill, not exactly 
in order to win over a Chamber already convinced and 
devoted to his schemes, but to prevent an equivocal state 
of things from sliding, under pretext of conciliation, 
into a not carefully weighed vote. He wished, since they 



334 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

were in for the struggle, that the result of it should be 
clear and decisive. 

"You know the policy of the Ministry," he said, 
rising high above the sense of a personal conflict. " We 
have proclaimed it before the country, as well as to 

the whole of Europe More than once we have 

repeated, in various ways, that, in our opinion, the Italian 
question will remain unsettled as long as the independ- 
ence of the peninsula is not thoroughly established ; as 
long as the important questions of Eome and Venice 
have not been satisfactorily arranged ; but at the same 
time we have declared that the Eoman question should 
be settled peaceably, without hostility or discord with 
France. We do not look upon the French troops at 
Eome as enemies. In the same way with regard to 
Venice, we have stated moderately and firmly that the 
present state of Venetia is incompatible with a durable 
peace ; we have also avowed that, in the present state of 
Europe, we should not have the right to kindle a general 
war. In other terms, we have declared that, with regard 
to Eome, cmr policy relies entirely on an alliance with 
France ; and that, in the case of Venice, we must take 
European interests into consideration, and the counsels of 
friendly Governments and Powers which at critical times 
have lent us willing and efficient help. Such is our 
policy. No doubt there is another. Declaration may 
be made that Italy is in a state of war, tempered by a 
kind of tacit truce, a truce at Eome and a truce at 
Venice; and that, as a natural result of this condition of 
things, it is not only desirable, but also indispensable, that 
we should take measures necessary for an immediate 



INTERVIEW OF GARIBALDI AND OAVOTJR. 335 

war. These are the two alternatives in juxtaposition. 
We frankly tell you that the first policy is the only one 

suited to the nation The other is practicable 

too ; it is a very dangerous one, fraught with difficulties, 
obstacles, and snares, but it may be adopted. That 
which, however, would be fatal, and which would lead to 
inevitable ruin, would be to adopt one policy one day 
and another the next, and neglecting to follow before 
the eyes of the country, and still more before those of 
^Europe, a definite, frank, and honest line. England 
would more easily overlook a piece of folly than she 
would forgive us for misleading her." It was under the 
influence of these words that the vote for an order of 
the day, proposed by Baron Eicasoli, and accepted by 
the Government, put an end to the conflict. 

That which had begun in a wild tumult and uproar, 
and might have turned to a dangerous crisis, finished 
quietly enough ; the drama had an epilogue, due to the 
diplomacy of the king, who used all his influence to 
bring about, if not a personal reconciliation — a task of 
some difficulty — at least a meeting between the President 
of the Council and Garibaldi in one of the private 
apartments of the Palace. A few days later, on 
April 27, Cavour wrote as follows to Count Vimercati 
at Paris : " My interview with Garibaldi was courteous 
though not warm ; we both kept within the limits of 
reserve. I acquainted him, however, with the line of 
conduct which the Government intends to follow, as 
regards Austria as well as France, assuring him that, on 
those points, no compromise is possible. He declared his 
readiness to accept the programme and to be willing to 



336 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOJIB. 

engage himself not to act contrary to the views of Govern- 
ment. He only asked me to do something for the army of 
the South. I gave him no promise ; but I told him I would 
seek a means to provide, as well as might be done, for 
the future of his officers. We parted, if not good 
friends, at least without any irritation." 

Once more Garibaldi disappeared to return to his 
Mediterranean island, and out of an ordeal that for a 
moment seemed to be so full of danger Cavour's policy 
emerged more than ever whole and free, sanctioned by 
the vote of parliament, and by the defeat and eclipse of 
Jiis terrible adversary. 

VII. 

At the time when Cavour was winning his last and 
decisive victory of reason and foresight over the dis- 
orderly instincts of an empty-headed popular hero, he 
was still in full vigour. He had even appeared with a 
sort of new brilliancy, as though in the fulness of a 
generous maturity. 

The greater and more complicated the work, the more 
inexhaustible seemed to be his resources of vigour and 
activity. He needed his robust constitution and strength 
of mind to suffice to all this. At one and the same 
moment he was eDgaged in establishing the relations of 
Italy with Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal ; he was in 
the heat of negotiations with the Emperor of the French 
on the subject of Eome ; he was minutely observing the 
troubled affairs of Naples ; he was regulating the finances, 
and attending to the navy of the new kingdom ; and 
every day he was in parliament, taking his part in 



SUDDEN ILLNESS OF CAVOUR. 837 

every discussion. No doubt he was not called upon to 
struggle for a majority — that was not wanting to him ; but 
he had to direct it, to guard its inexperience from 
surprises and imprudent measures which he alone could 
counteract. 

In reality it was a trying life, enough to break the 
strongest constitution. The contest with Garibaldi 
especially had given Cavour a heavy blow. The effort 
he had made to master himself in the thick of the storm, 
and the constraint he had put on himself, told seriously 
upon him. Excess of work of every kind could hardly 
be other than murderous to his health. On May 29 
he was still in parliament animatedly discussing a 
project that was to be turned into a sort of manifestation 
in favour of the republicans fighting at Rome in 1849, 
and on that day, still more than on preceding ones, he 
exhibited a certain over-excitement and an impatience 
under contradiction causing some surprise. That evening, 
on returning home, he seemed weary and gloomy : " I 
am exhausted," said he, " but I must go on working, for 
the country needs me ; perhaps this summer I may be 

able to take some rest in Switzerland " That 

same night he was seized with violent indisposition ; the 
athlete was already beaten ! 

His illness indeed began to show grave symptoms. 
For a moment it seemed to be conquered by early care 
and bleeding — the habitual remedy at Turin — and even 
Cavour thought himself all right. On May 31 he was 
again able to assemble about him his colleagues of the 
Ministry. He worked with Nigra and Artom ; but this 
was only the illusion of a man fretting himself with the 



338 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

idea that lie had not time to be ill. From June 1 the 
remedies ceased to take effect, and all hope was vanish- 
ing hourly. Cavour fell into the last struggle between 
life and death for some days, passing from fits of deli- 
rium to lucid moments, during which all that had been 
occupying him came to his mind. With his niece, the 
Marchioness Alfieri, always attentive at his pillow, and 
with his friends Farini and Castelli, he spoke of all he 
had yet to do : of the loan of 500 millions which was 
impending, of the recognition of the kingdom of Italy 
by France, a letter expected from Count Vimercati in 
Paris, and of the navy it was necessary to create. He 
was anxious about Naples, and spoke of it urgently. 

"Northern Italy is established," he said. "There 
are no longer Lombards nor Piedmontese, Tuscans nor 
Romans. We are all Italians ; but there are still 
Neapolitans. Oh ! there is much corruption in their 
country. Poor people ! it is not their fault, they have 
been so ill-governed ! . . . . We must impress the country 
morally, but it is not by abusing the Neapolitans that 

they will be* brought to reason Above all, there 

must be no state of siege, none of the measures of abso- 
lutist Governments. Anyone can govern with a state of 
siege. I will govern them with liberty, and I will show 
what ten years of liberty can do for these fine countries. 
Twenty years hence they will be the richest provinces in 
Italy. No, have no state of siege ; that is my advice 

to you " Victor Emmanuel wished to visit 

his illustrious minister, and Cavour, recognising the 
king, exclaimed : " Oh ! your majesty, I have many 
things to communicate to you, many papers to lay 



FRA GIACOMO SUMMONED. 339 

before yon ; but I am too ill, it will be impossible for 
me to come and see you, but I will send you Farini 
to-morrow, lie will give you all particulars. Has your 
majesty received no letter from Paris ? The Emperor is 
friendly to us now " Sometimes Cavour com- 
plained of confusion in his brain, imagining that his 
illness lay there : he felt that the power of thinking was 
fast leaving him. 

To the end, however, he remained what he had been 
■ — what he wished to be. He requested that the priest 
of the Madonna dei Angeli, the Fra Giacomo, with 
whom he had seven years previously made every 
arrangement, should be in readiness to come to him ; 
and accordingly, at the summons of the Marchioness 
Alfieri, Fra Giacomo hastened to the deathbed of the 
great man. Cavour spent half an hour alone with the 
priest ; and when the latter left him, he called for 
Farini and said to him : " My niece has summoned Fra 
Giacomo ; I must prepare for the great passage into 
eternity ; I have confessed and been absolved. I desire 
that it be known — that the good people of Turin should 
know — that I died the death of a good Christian. I am 
without anxiety; I know that I have injured no man." 
That same day, the "good people of Turin," who 
were anxiously watching the course of the illness, tear- 
fully followed the priest carrying the Viaticum to the 
most illustrious citizen of the Piedmontese capital. The 
worthy priest himself, it is said, comforted a relative of 
the Count by reminding her that "no man in this world 
had known better how to succour and pardon than that 
one." Among the last words uttered by Cavour to Fra 

z 2 



340 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

Giacomo, who was reciting at his bedside the prayer for 
the dying, were these : " Frate, frate" he said, in press- 
ing the priest's hand, "libera chiesa in libero stato!" 
It was almost in pronouncing these words that, at a 
quarter before seven o'clock on the morning of June 6, 
1861, Count .Camillo Cavour rendered to his God one of 
the noblest souls that ever animated a mortal being. 

He seemed to have been struck down in the heat of 
action, as on a field of battle, on the morning after a 
victory that he owed to the moderation as well as the 
greatness of his intelligence. Massari states that : " He 
who did not see Turin that day, knows not what is 
meant by the grief of a people." The town was filled 
with mourning. The tribunes of the Chambers and the 
standard on the • palace were veiled with crape. The 
whole of Italy responded to the feeling in Turin. The 
startling rapidity of the catastrophe, as well as the 
immense void left by the sudden disappearance of one 
particular man, spread consternation everywhere, and the 
news of this death resounded over Europe as well as in 
Italy. 

Friends and enemies alike felt that the world had to 
sustain the loss of one of its forces and one of its great 
lights. In the English House of Commons, Palmerston, 
following Brougham in the Lords, and Milnes, said : 
" The name of Count Cavour will live for ever, 
embalmed as it were with gratitude and admiration in 
the memory of the human race. And when I speak of 
Count Cavour I do not mean simply to praise him for 
those administrative acts which have most astonished 
the world, that is to say, for the unity of his country. 



PALMERSTON ON CAVOUR. 341 

He has clone many other things that make him no less 
great. The foundation of the constitutional Government 
in which Italy now rejoices was laid by him ; it is he 
who managed all the affairs of the peninsula, and secured 
inestimable benefits to those who are living, and to all 
who will live after us. Of Count Cavour it may truly 
be said that he taught a moral, and ornamented a 
history. The moral is this : that a man of eminent 
genius and indomitable energy, as well as of inex- 
tinguishable patriotism, thanks to the impulse he knew 
how to give to his fellow-citizens, may by devoting 
himself to a just cause, seizing favourable opportunities, 
overcoming difficulties which seemed insurmountable — 
I say that such a man may endow his country with in- 
estimable advantages. The history he ornaments is an 
amazing one ; the most romantic in the annals of the 
world. Under his influence and his directing authority 
we have seen a people awakened from a sleep of cen- 
turies These are events which history will 

record, and he whose name will pass on with them 
to posterity, however premature his end, will not have 

died too soon for his glory and his renown " 

Thus they spoke of Cavour in London. France, for 
her part, felt an emotion deep as it was sincere, and 
Cavour's sudden end had, as a first result, the hastening, 
in one degree at least, of the negotiations which had 
secretly been carried on for two months past by the 
great minister with Paris ; it caused an immediate 
recognition of the new kingdom of Italy by. the French 
Government, and thus, even in death, Cavour triumphed 
in doing one more service to his country. 



342 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

Many a time, especially at first, and even since 
June 5, 1861, when the creator of a new Italy sud- 
denly disappeared, a singular question has been raised : 
it has been suggested that perhaps Fortune favoured 
Cavour to the end in causing him to die before ex- 
periencing possible deceptions. Up to that time he had 
been successful ; everything, it is urged, had turned out 
well with him ; he might have failed in the work he 
had in hand, and which he had not as yet completed; 
and D'Azeglio himself, who confessed to having been 
" stunned by the death of poor Cavour," whom " he 
mourned for as a brother," even D'Azeglio said, three 
days after : " For him it may be well ; to disappear 
without having fallen is not given to everyone. For us 
it is a terrible trial ; but if it be the will of God to save 
Italy, will he be at a loss to do so without Cavour ? " 
This, of course, was only a touching sentiment, or else 
the wild impression of a shaken imagination. If Cavour 
did not die too soon for his glory, according to Lord 
Palmerston, a prolonged career would not have exposed 
him to a " fall," as D'Azeglio seemed to fear ; he was not 
of those who have to rely on the mysterious poetry of 
a premature and opportune end, in order to leave a 
famous reputation behind. 

No, he who for the space of twelve years had passed 
through every difficulty and every snare, displaying new 
resources at every step, and acquiring greatness in the 
fire of strife ; bringing his country from the depth of 
defeat to the summit of fortune even beyond the limit 
of hope ; such an one had no cause to dread to live on 
or to shrink from a few more trials before reaching the 



HIS LEGACY TO ITALY. 343 

point distinguishable to him. Had he been capable of 
foiling he would not have been himself. He would 
have finished what he had begun, and he was in full 
working order. He would have continued his negotia- 
tions and his combinations, more and more uniting 
Italy, who had confidence in his directing power, and 
daily winning for her the interest of Europe, already 
accustomed to his clear and inventive diplomacy. If 
more struggles had been in store for him he would have 
sustained them with a growing authority. Never had 
he shown more activity or more security than when 
disease came and crushed him in the midst of his un- 
finished task ; and I do not know on what was founded 
the statement so often repeated after D'Azeglio, that 
Cavour had disappeared "just in time for his glory." 

There is no doubt that his death was a dangerous 
crisis, a " terrible trial " for Italy ; but that which in the 
first moment of excitement was hardly discernible, and 
which has given a fresh testimony to Cavour's greatness, 
is, that although he was prematurely snatched away, he 
had done enough for his work to survive him. Had he 
lived, he would have continued to be the most powerful 
athlete of the new kingdom he had founded ; and dying, 
he left it, as an inheritance — together with the unity 
almost complete — his idea, his traditions, his whole 
policy, one which had been the instrument of his 
schemes, the secret of his success, and which, after him, 
remained the guarantee and strength of new Italy — the 
inspiration of the liberal elite who continued his work. 

Let there be no misunderstanding about it. It 
is with this idea, and these traditions, it is by 



344 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

following Cavour's directions, often by adopting his 
plans and realising his schemes, that Italy has managed 
to exist and to consolidate and complete herself during 
the past fifteen years ; and so true is this that a strange 
phenomenon of a significant eloquence may be observed : 
whenever difficulties have presented themselves, or 
questions arisen which Cavour had not in some degree 
at least prepared the answer for, or enlightened with 
the luminous rays of his reason, perplexity has been 
the consequence ; and this the honest minds which, 
for fifteen years, have had to conduct the affairs of the 
peninsula at the most critical times, do not conceal ; 
they never felt more reliance in themselves than when 
able still to follow out the designs of that guide in great 
struggles. Each time that a deviation from the path 
he had traced has been made, doubt, disquietude, and 
threatened crises have resulted. A living testimony to 
the influence of a great brain. 

VIII. 

Italy a nation is the legacy of Cavour. The fruit of 
a policy starting from an idea of independence and 
patriotism, and embracing internal order, economical 
interests, religious affairs, and diplomacy, developing 
and enlarging itself daily, by the help of the most 
astonishing mixture of dexterity and daring, justice 
and high-mindedness, practical good sense and unbafned 
energy in contrivance. 

Others in good numbers, no doubt, before him and 
about him, have been devoted to the cause of national 
liberation. Cavour outstepped them from the moment 



HIS UNDERSTANDING OF IIBEBTY. 345 

that he was able to make use of that idea seriously ; he 
knew how to bring it into the sphere of possibilities, that 
might be realised ; he made it pure of any factious 
spirit, led it away from barren Utopias, kept it clear of 
reckless conspiracies, steered straight between revolution 
and reaction, and gave it an organised force, a flag, a 
government, and foreign allies. This difficult task, 
laborious as we have seen, he pursued by a process as 
simple as it was grand ; for it was in the large under- 
standing of liberty practised in all its forms. He had 
the passion and the science of liberty, for which he felt 
himself shaped ; and none more than he has repudiated 
anarchical agitations and dark plottings on the one hand, 
and dictatorships, arbitrary combinations, and the con- 
venient measures of a state of siege, on the other. As 
parliamentary leader of a small country, devoted, tem- 
perate, and firm, he knew how to make this Piedmontese 
land a centre of attraction for Italy ; as minister to the 
King of Sardinia, he worked for the moral ascendency of 
the House of Savoy, before he put his hand to its 
material aggrandisement. 

He was at heart a Liberal Conservative, a Con- 
stitutional Monarchist, in the broadest interpretation of 
the word. He often repeated that : " No republic is able 
to grant so true and fruitful an amount of liberty as that 
which a constitutional monarchy affords, provided it be 
on a solid basis. The form of republic best adapted to 
the customs and needs of modern Europe has still to be 
discovered. It presupposes, in any case, the accomplish- 
ment already of that great task of popular education 
which will be the work of our century." Cavour was in 



346 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 

favour of constitutional monarchy, as being the necessary 
regulator of consecutive and effectual action, in the whirl- 
wind of parties ; but he held the interests of royalty to 
be inseparable from those of the nation ; he believed that 
" far from languidly following the thoughts and neces- 
sities of the people, it should, on the contrary, take 
the initiative with regard to generous and practicable 
measures, that it might be able to make head with a 
capable authority against popular passions, when dan- 
gerous impulses misled the mob." 

His ideal, which a patriotic dynasty helped him to 
realise, was that the Government should be a guide and 
an ever active adviser ; and it was thus that he worked 
out his problem. He used liberty as a means of extension 
and conquest, on behalf of monarchy, at the same time 
that he converted monarchy into the regulating force of 
a victorious revolution, and made it the guarantee of 
unity. He so fully identified the two causes that, on 
the day when the House of Savoy became, almost with- 
out an effort, the Italian House, the Eepublicans, altering 
a famous saying, have been able to say, subsequently : 
" It is Royalty that causes the least division among us." 
There is the originality, the novelty of the policy of 
Cavour : he has bequeathed a monarchy to Italy, which 
cannot be touched without endangering national exist- 
ence itself. 

One of the most characteristic manifestations of the 
Liberalism of Cavour was undoubtedly that part of his 
policy touching religious matters, which never ceased to 
develop itself through every event, until it was summarised 
in the prophetic words he uttered with his last breath : 



HIS POLICY IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS. 347 

" Libera chiesa in libero stato." He had encountered 
these formidable and delicate questions at the outset of 
his career, even before he became minister, in the narrow 
circle of Piedmontese affairs ; he had seen them grow and 
become more complicated in proportion as the Italian 
movement broadened, to the extent of questioning, at 
Rome, the Temporal Power of the Pope ; these were a 
part of the elements of the national problem. He could 
not avoid them. Nothing, however, less resembles 
despotic or revolutionary traditions, than the bold and 
independent mind with which he broached these 
religious difficulties. "Without doubt he had a grand 
aim in view, and he never lost sight of it — it was the 
complete emancipation of national and civil society ; he 
consented neither to inflict persecutions nor to impose 
shackles, nor indeed to run counter to opinion or national 
habits and customs. He was especially careful to avoid 
rough dealings, and angry provocations, and intemperate 
language in discussions, and in deeds from which he did 
not shrink. 

To his essentially politic nature, the passionate con- 
tests were repugnant in which religious excitement might 
tend to weaken the national cause. His faith as a 
reformer made him indifferent to what he considered 
useless precautions with regard to the Church regula- 
tions and the interference of the State in sacerdotal 
matters ; he did not even claim the right to a very 
close supervision of ecclesiastical teaching. He did not 
behave as an enemy to the Church. He intended to 
make the abolition of the Temporal Power a means of 
freedom for the spiritual power of the Pope. In exchange 



348 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 

for the complete liberty he claimed for the State, he was 
ready to grant every liberty ; and if it was observed to 
him that perhaps it could not be done without risk, and 
that in certain provinces it was necessary that civil 
authority should hold a firm hand over a fanatical, hostile, 
or rebellious clergy, he did not allow himself to be 
deterred by such reasons as these ; he never doubted the 
beneficent effects of a liberal system. 

He wished to ennoble the revival of Italy by some 
memorable act, and to Signor Artom, who expressed his 
doubts to him, he replied, with a certain enthusiasm : 
" To us belongs the privilege of putting an end to the 
great combat now going on between the Church and 

civilisation Whatever you may say, I have a 

good hope of gradually bringing the more enlightened of 
the clergy, the good Catholics, to accept this view. May 
be I shall be able to sign, from the top of the Capitol, 
another religious peace, a treaty which will have con- 
sequences much more important to the future of human 
societies than the peace of Westphalia ! " 

In this . confident and generous intrepidity lay the 
strength of Cavour. Two things were in his favour : 
there was this liberal conception, which has clung to the 
Italian revival ; and until the realisation of this fair dream 
— if it was ever to be other than a dream — there was at 
least the option of living on quietly, preparing the means 
for the end. Cavour's practical mind neglected nothing ; 
even up to the moment of his death he had made every 
combination, leaving the solution ready for his successors. 
The settlement he was negotiating at Paris, which was 
awaiting the signature delayed only by his death, became 



HIS IDEA IN DIPLOMACY. 349 

the convention of September 15, 1864! The object of 
the secret negotiation with the Pope and Cardinal 
Antonelli, early in 1861, shaped itself later into the law 
of guarantees ! All was linked together in that policy, 
to which perhaps Italy owed the fortune of entering 
Eome without breaking up the religious world ; and 
assuredly she will not find her advantage in straying 
from it, 

IX. 

What finally I wish to point out is the idea of 
Cavour in that labour of diplomacy which, from the first 
day of his entrance into the Ministry, was one of the 
most essential features of his policy. The force of the 
national sentiment, that liberal propaganda of Piedmont 
and of the constitutional government, created Italy. Be 
it so : but in reality it became possible only through the 
most far-sighted and watchful diplomacy, pursuing its 
task now with commercial treaties, now with a military 
alliance and co-operation in the Crimean war, now with 
the interview at Plombieres, and the many combinations 
preceding or following the arrival of French troops at 
the decisive moment. If in his impetuosity and the 
nature of some of his acts Cavour sometimes resembled 
a revolutionist, every art of a negotiator was known 
to him. He had not the futile infatuation to believe 
that Europe was made for Italy ; on the contrary, 
he held that Italy should adapt herself to Europe ; 
he knew how to estimate European interests, and 
measure circumstances ; and with his indefatigable 
activity in acquiring alliances, retaining them, or 



350 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJR. 

adding to their number, his whole ability consisted in 
constantly indicating that the liberation of a people, 
for which he was indefatigably working, was the best 
guarantee of peace. The revolutionist became a Con- 
servative in order to reassure or win over Cabinets, 
while proving to them, if necessary, that in the most 
audacious of his resolves, and in the accomplishment of 
Italian unity, he was still the defender of order. In 
playing this part he had the immense advantage of 
leaning on one of the oldest monarchies of Europe, long 
since admitted into the circle of recognised Powers. He 
had his place in the Courts of Europe, his credit among 
Governments, and the new force he represented to 
prompt his dealings with the various policies. 

Fronting Europe, whose friendliness he had to win, 
or to disarm her suspicions, Cavour was perfectly free 
from any prepossessions of mind ; and as events deve- 
loped he left no stone unturned to extend his diplomacy. 
He had especially, at an early date, turned his attention 
to Germany and Prussia. He was anxious to reassure 
Germany.and Prussia, and take away from them every 
pretext for joining arms with Austria on the Adige. It 
was to his mind a necessity of the hour as well as of the 
future : he was unremittingly busied with it. 

" Prussia," he said, " is one of the Powers having a 
direct and immediate interest in changing the actual 
state of Europe. Prussia cannot have forgotten Olmutz; 
she cannot look malevolently on the efforts we are making 
to bring down her fortunate rival. We do not ask her to 
draw the sword for our good pleasure, but I think when 
Austria is weakened Prussia will find the benefit. She 



HIS FEELING TOWARDS FRANCE. 351 

would therefore be committing a grave error should she 
espouse the cause of Austria against us. We do not 
ask the Cabinet of Berlin to help us in the struggle, we 
only claim to be let alone." On another occasion, after a 
fresh attempt to get hold of Prussia, he said : " What 
cannot be done now, shall be done later on. Prussia 
must inevitably be carried away with the current of a 
national idea. The alliance of Prussia with an enlarged 
Piedmont is written in the book of the history of the 
future." Cavour was clear-sighted, and in this respect, 
as in many others, he opened a way for those who came 
after him ; but at bottom, great as was the importance 
he attached to bringing about future relations with Ger- 
many and Prussia, his intelligence and instinct were 
all with the two great Western Powers — France and 
England. 

It was through them that he had been able to take 
part in the affairs of the world in the glorious days of 
the Crimean war. The aid of French arms had enabled 
him to engage in the struggle against Austria. His 
dream was ever the intimate relations of Italy with the 
two Powers in his eyes representing the greatest forces 
of civilisation. 

Gratitude towards France was no burden to him ; he 
was glad to express it, as a man who stood naturally 
above the perfidies and puerilities of party spirit, who 
knew how to remain an ally ; independent, doubtless, 
but an ally. 

If sometimes he was not insensible to the animosities 
levelled against him in a certain Parisian circle, his more 
sober judgment, and I venture to say his sentiments, 



352 



LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 



were not affected by them. He took his revenge without 
bitterness. " I have no desire to speak ill of French 
society; I am too greatly indebted to it. I resign 
myself to the fact of the regeneration of Italy, in spite of 
the salons of Paris." Cavour loved our nation, which he- 
only reproached on the score of so little knowing how to 
use or to retain liberty. He made the French alliance 
an important basis of his policy, a permanent condition 
for both countries ; and what may most assuredly be said 
is, that if he had lived he would, by his counsels perhaps, 
and a daily increasing influence, have succeeded in 
giving a different direction to events that have resulted 
in a disaster for France. 

In this passage of an age in which so many things 
vanish, and so many others are doubtful, the last Empire, 
it has been said, has produced two great novelties and 
two great ministers : unity in Italy and unity in Germany; 
Count Cavour and Prince Bismarck. I will attempt no 
comparison where there would be more contrasts than 
analogies. Prince Bismarck is still living, and the future 
belongs to us all. It is now fifteen years since Cavour 
disappeared from the scene, and for his part he has had 
the good fortune to realise the freedom of his country 
through liberty ; he did not make his great work a 
menace to Europe. And in this reconstruction of a people, 
which is now the triumph of his policy, and the legacy 
of a cordial and powerful genius, he did not deem it- 
necessary to mutilate another nation. 




S DICKENS AND EVANS, CEYSTAL PALACE PRESS. 



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